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25 January 2022

Military Quick Hits

* The next major conventional war between near peers with a significant maritime component will give rise to a catastrophic defeat of surface warships to one or more of a variety of threats including missiles delivered by aircraft and drone aircraft, medium to long range hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, submarines and drone submarines, coastal missile boats, and sea mines. 

The soonest this could happen would be a catastrophic defeat of the Russian Black Sea fleet in an imminent conflict between Russian-proxy fighters and the Ukraine, although that conflict might never end up going in that direction. 


A conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the East China Sea would be the second most likely place this paradigm changing battle or series of battles could play out, where sword rattling has crescendoed in recent weeks (see also here).

For example, on Sunday (two days ago), the People’s Liberation Army Air Force flew 39 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s airspace.


* The Army's Mobile Protected Firepower program which is basically a light tank program aiming for a 25-35 ton sized tank (less than half the weight of an M1 Abrams main battle tank) will probable feature "a lightweight 120mm gun called the XM360 – built for the now-cancelled Future Combat Systems Mounted Combat System" and made possible with advanced technologies. 

As impressive a technological achievement as this may be, however, it is akin to the invention of a carbon fiber or composite longbow: it is military irrelevant. 

Why? 

Any 120mm gun will still be heavier, less accurate, and have a shorter range than highly effective anti-tank missiles that are much less expensive than a state of the art modern light tank. Admittedly, 120mm shells are less expensive per round than a guided missile that delivered a comparable punch, but in real life, few shots are fired in anger, especially in the case of highly accurate guided missiles.

These 120mm tank rounds may also be vulnerable in conflicts with near peers to active defense laser weapons the cause incoming rounds to explode prematurely, or other active defense systems such as a land based version of the U.S. Navy's "Close In Weapons System" that fire a barrage of big bullets at incoming ordinance. 

These laser weapons have been successfully tested against mortar rounds and drones, but could also be effective against artillery rounds, missiles, and tank shells. Tank shells may have some edge because they are probably faster moving than the other laser weapon targets, and aren't vulnerable to "soft" active defense that defeat guidance and communications systems in drones and missiles.

Tanks and other armored vehicles can be formidable opponents against civilians and light infantry will only small arms like assault rifles and machine guns (although many are still vulnerable to infantry approaching out of an armored vehicle's line of sight to deliver heavy ordinance at short range to "Achilles heel" points on many of these armored vehicles). But they are highly vulnerable to moderately expensive but highly effective anti-tank rockets and missiles that can be delivered by dismounted infantry, carried by light ground vehicles (manned or unmanned), or delivered by helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, or drone aircraft. They are also reasonable vulnerable to modern landmines such as Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs), despite efforts to improve the designs to address this threat. Armor is effective against bullets, shrapnel, and smaller shells, but it no match for purpose built anti-tank weapons.

4 comments:

  1. Let's hear it for the SAAB Carl Gustav M4

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  2. In other words, the latest version of the bazooka. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Gustaf_8.4cm_recoilless_rifle

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  3. Hum... this is all pretty much a cluster caused by the chaotic breakup of the USSR. Anyone who spent anytime thinking about the dividing lines should have raised the point that Russia would not give up the DonBas or the Crimea. I know in our military gaming group we pondered this as early as '95. Talking to Ukraine (PfP) should have had a prerequisite of getting RU and Ukraine to sit down and have a serious discussion about realistic borders. Sigh...

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  4. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44021/heres-what-those-bunker-defeat-rockets-the-u-s-sent-to-ukraine-are-actually-capable-of?fbclid=IwAR12HmGRdi2kdFETu6Q_xNfY02AYj6hzIz981VALh_ycIr5jxcnhr9gHUgk

    "this is all pretty much a cluster caused by the chaotic breakup of the USSR."

    The Ukraine part anyway, sure. Probably no material impact in Taiwan.

    Breaking up the USSR to the next lower level of pre-existing administrative divisions was a natural choice that minimized the risk of opening up cans of worms at the next level down. But the rigidity of national boundaries in the international diplomacy scene means that once you take the easy choice it is hard to undo it, and there will always be an imperfect match of nation to state. Still, when they were internal to the USSR boundaries, matching nation to state wasn't nearly as important as it is in international boundaries.

    Ultimately though, the onus on sitting down at the table rather than using military force once it was a done deal, as it was in a matter of months after the collapse of the USSR, was on Russia rather than on the Ukraine or other countries and Russia has been a bad actor since then.

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