About The Crisis In the Ukraine

In 2014, Russia seized and annexed the Crimea from the Ukraine in a move that was a fait accompli before Ukraine or the West could really react, and has backed pro-Russian insurgents in Eastern Ukraine who control an area about the size of Switzerland on Ukraine's Russian border. This has not been internationally recognized by many, if any, countries, but is the de facto reality on the ground.

The areas of Ukraine under the control of Russia or pro-Russian insurgents are majority Russian linguistically, have the largest percentages that ethnically identify as Russian, and were annexed to the Ukraine only in the Soviet era, in the case of part of Crimea, only in the later half of the 20th century. Ukrainian politics follow basically a West to East cline with the West being more Western European leaning politically and in policies, economics and culture, and the East and Crimea being more Russian leaning and less open to little "l" liberal political economy reforms.

Honestly, had it been negotiated diplomatically and approved democratically, without pervasive military power overshadowing opportunities for free and fair elections, rather than secured by force, the existing de facto division of Ukraine might have been pretty sensible places to create autonomous regions within the Ukraine, to form one or two new independent countries, or to transfer territory from Russia to the Ukraine by agreement in an orderly fashion. 

All of that, however, would have been very difficult to accomplish, because the existing system of sovereign states is very resistant to redrawing boundaries.

For example, regional independence movements just as justified or more so by a doctrine of self-determination for ethnically defined "nations" have gone nowhere in Chechnya, elsewhere in the Caucasuses of the former Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (within which they were autonomous regions), in Scotland, in Catalonia within Spain, in the Basque country of Spain and France, in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq and Syria, in Northern Italy, in Quebec, in Puerto Rico, in Southeastern Mexico (e.g. Chiapas and Oaxaca), in Tibet, in other ethnically distinct regions in the interior of China, and in Northern Nigeria. Yet federalism, especially in the absence of special degrees of political autonomy, can be a poor substitute for political independence.

Still, history chose a course. Russia wasn't patient, it had the military power to take what it wanted, and it did. Russia faced only minimal international consequences and a surprisingly low cost in blood and treasure, because its action was so swift and decisive and complete.

Now, eight years later, Russia has not achieved the diplomatic goals that its actions in 2014 were designed to accomplish, and would like to turn its citizens attentions outward from its semi-democratic politics and mediocre economy (outside its significantly recovered post-Soviet military sector despite its loss of key manufacturing centers and an economy half the size of the Soviet one), and we are on the brink of war again. 

Almost every country in Europe that was previously part of the Soviet Union or its Eastern European Warsaw Pact allies except Belarus, has drifted away from Russia in the direction of Western Europe, although there has recently been some partial backsliding in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. NATO has expanded. It has managed to secure some influence in Serbia (apart from Montenegro and Kosovo), in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia, in Moldova and in the Caucasus. It remains the primary major power ally of the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.

A Russian invasion of the Ukraine could be imminent. It could literally happen today. 

Russia has built up forces to do so on its own border with the Ukraine, in parts of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea that it controls, on the Belorussian border with the Ukraine, in the Black Sea, and heading in that direction in the Mediterranean (partially with Syrian basing), and in the Atlantic involving more than 130,000 Russian soldiers and sailors.

There are also constraints that limit how far nations in "the West" will be willing to help the Ukraine repeal these forces.

Germany has an anti-war constitution put in place after World War II. 

Russia has a seat on the U.N. security council that could prevent any meaningful action against it coordinated by the U.N.

Western Europe, but Germany in particular, is dependent upon Russia for natural gas supplies, although peak demand is in the winter, so to the extent that this is a mild winter, and that spring is coming soon, the leverage it gains from this factor diminishes. Western Europe could come up with makeshift alternatives given nine months or so until next winter to deal with this problem. Russia also pays for a lot of its imports with natural gas revenues that would be gone if it cut off natural gas supplies which can't easily be sold to anyone else except domestic consumers.

A war would grossly disrupt international trade in and with Eastern Europe, but the volume of trade between Russia and the West is still not critical apart from natural gas sales.

Most importantly, of course, Russia has one of the two largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world, rivaled only by the U.S. If it feels it is being crushed too badly in a conventional war, it could play chicken and make a nuclear first strike on Western or Ukrainian targets at the risk of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). It could also make use of tactical nuclear weapons which are mostly absent from the arsenals of all other countries that would be less likely to trigger a MAD response.

Still, the U.S. and its Western allies have ample conventional military resources that could be brought to bear without being too likely to trigger a nuclear war.

The West, led by the U.S., could easily sink every Russian ship in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It could bomb into oblivion every Russian and Crimean Black Sea port. It could prevent the Russian Atlantic fleet from crossing the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. It could bomb all air fields and military installations and armored vehicles like tanks and mobile artillery systems in Crimea and Russian occupied Eastern Europe. It could destroy Russian missile batteries in Russia and Belarus within range of the Ukraine. It could bomb all airfields in Russia and Belarus that are used to support the anti-Ukraine effort.

Of course, it could also provide more supplies to the Ukraine. It could make satellite, spy plane and signals intelligence to the Ukrainian military. It could spend in specialized group troops to support Ukrainian forces. 

The West could impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. But, historically, economic and diplomatic sanctions have taken a very long time to work when they work at all (decades of sanctions directed at the apartheid regime of South Africa are a rare successful example), and sometimes end up being counterproductive or producing mixed results (e.g. trade sanctions barring military imports often lead to the development of a thriving domestic military equipment industry). It also isn't clear precisely what measures would make sense to take. 

Would a total trade embargo be imposed? Would immigration to and from Russia be halted? Would Internet connections to Russia be limited? Would Russian assets or assets of key Russian figures that are abroad be frozen or confiscated? Would contracts with Russian firms be canceled? Would Russian athletes be barred from international competitions? Would Russian flagged ships face sanctions? Would any of that matter?

None these measures individually, or even collectively, would be likely to trigger a nuclear attack launched by Putin.

A solid, limited, controlled defeat of Russian forces could leave Russia with a bad taste in its mouth for these kinds of tactics for another couple of generations. It would also prime the West for favorable arms control treaties with Russia (for both conventional and nuclear arms) and for a favorable resolution of the territorial disputes of the Ukraine with Russia.

A swift decimation of Russian naval forces in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, which is well within the scope of U.S. and allied military capabilities, might decisively end the era of military investments in naval surface combatants worldwide in all global navies, the way that World War II marked the demise of battleships, or the Hindenburg wiped out the airship industry in the 85 years that have followed.

But, I very much doubt that Biden will choose that option. I have doubts about whether Congress would support Biden, although Congress and the American people have historically been quick to rally around the flag when given strong Presidential leadership. And, I very much doubt that Western European nations will provide such a bold response without U.S. playing the leading role of the coalition involved.

Because of this, Putin is likely to call the West's bluff unless it can extract major concessions. Putin is more likely than any foreign leader in decades to call the West's bluff and use military force to achieve more territorial and political gains, and I don't think that the West (and certainly not the U.S.; the U.K. had turned out to be the Ukraine's most stalwart ally) has the political will to respond forcefully if he does. 

Also, even if he backs down for a while on this front leaving an unstable and unsatisfactory status quo achieved with Russian and Russian backed military force in place, he can just redirect his focus to elsewhere in the Balkans, to Belarus and its neighbors, to the Caucasus, to Central Asia, and so on for a while, as he tries to rebuild the Soviet Empire (which even then was called Russian, despite its multiethnic basis).

On the other hand, it is hard to know what Russia's real military and political objectives are in this crisis, because its formally announced goals don't ring true. As Colorado pollster and political pundit Floyd Ciruli explains at his blog (emphasis added):

Where Does Putin Go Next?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has a number of options to achieve his stated goals of reducing NATO’s footprint in Eastern Europe and eliminating Ukraine’s independent, pro-Western drift. Unfortunately for him, his military strategy to achieve the goals has initially produced the opposite effect. This is a “military exercise” and “I don’t want to attack Ukraine” are not credible on their face and highlight the dangerous, cynical expression of political power that threatens civilians, holds a country hostage, and disrupts the economies and peace of the democratic West.

The Putin build-up has produced:

• A renewed commitment to NATO with a step up in interest in joining, an increase in funding and transfer of equipment to frontline nations threatened by Russia.

• A shift in public opinion against Russia’s intentions and actions, including publics in the Ukraine and other frontline countries. New polling shows little support among Russians.

• American opinion now strongly dislikes Putin and identifies Russia as a threat. The military overreach has helped create a bipartisan commitment to sanctions. In addition, the administration is drawn back to the Atlantic Alliance and European affairs after a desire to focus on the Pacific China.

But, if the military show of force has not accomplished its purpose in the short run, the West should be prepared to see the long-term strategy, which will continue the effort to weaken NATO and the EU and undermine Ukraine’s economic and political institutions. An invasion was always a risky strategy, but Russia is a master of hybrid war, including cyber attacks, and Ukraine and other neighbors should be prepared.

I think that Mr. Ciruli overstates the extent to which Russia's military buildup and threatened invasion have backfired and produced a stronger Western response. 

But it is also true that Russia can't very well expect the same kind of instant military success and backing in parts of the Ukraine that do not have the Russian ethnic and linguistic majorities that it did in the parts of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea that it sill holds. 

The Ukraine may be a smaller country than Russia, but it is still a big country in both territory and population, is closer to be in the first world than the second economically in the area it still controls, is more politically united behind a pro-Western political position without its Russian controlled portions, has modern military resources rather than second hand dated equipment and training, has a few thousand Western troops backing it, and has lots of foreign military supplies and diplomatic backing. 

Russia also doesn't have the element of surprise this time around. Its previous actions have caused Western nations to take its bluster seriously this time.

Any territorial gains Russia made this time would be marginal and hard fought. It could do a lot of damage to the remaining rump Ukraine, but couldn't gain much control by doing so.

I suspect that Russia's main desired diplomatic outcome would be to gain international recognition including through a treaty with the Ukraine of what it had largely already accomplished in its 2014 military actions, without actually having to fight a significant military campaign.

If such a deal could be struck in a way that includes enough Russian concessions that it does not look like simple appeasement or a pure Russian victory that would encourage it to repeat that tactic, such as an agreement to demilitarize the Black Sea and the Ukrainian border region, it might be worth doing.

But, until there is a final diplomatic resolution, we are left globally with a volatile crisis that has the potential to lead to World War III if the main participants in the discussion (especially President Biden of the U.S., Prime Minister Boris Johnson of the U.K., Vladimir Putin whose current title is President of Russia, and President Volodymyr Zelensky of the Ukraine) make catastrophic missteps in the next few days and weeks.