The War In Ukraine After Three Weeks

The Russian invasions of Ukraine is three weeks old. Enough time has passed to make some preliminary assessments.

The Russian military is "hollow". 

Russia has far fewer guided missiles and "smart bombs" than the U.S. or other developed nations, and apparently used up much of its supply in the first day or two of this conflict.

Russia's pilots are only minimally trained, Russian forces weren't patient enough to wait until they had air superiority, and the widespread availability of MANPADS among Ukrainian forces (infantry carried anti-aircraft missiles) have all worked together prevent Russia from gaining air superiority and control in Ukraine. This deprived Russia of an edge in the conflict could have had a decisive advantage for their forces if it had been secured.

Russia's logistics planning is horrible. Its forces were literally running out of gas, running out of food, and getting lost in the first few days. Ukrainian forces have targeted the "tow trucks" used for heavy military vehicles that are disabled and fuel and supply trucks, that are more vulnerable, for strikes to prevent their advance, and have been quite effective at doing so.

Despite their treads, tanks overwhelmingly stay on main roads, leaving their column exposed to attack.

An expectedly large share of Russian tanks and artillery are very dated models.

The best available data suggests that something on the order of half of Russian tanks deployed in this mission have been destroyed, as well as many armored personnel carriers and some mobile artillery vehicles. The large number of small, anti-tank missiles available to Ukrainian forces have been an important factor on this front.

Russian forces have lost significant numbers of fixed wing warplanes and military helicopters, maybe two dozen, all told.

About one in seven Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously injured in this conflict so far. About one in twenty-five of its generals have been killed.

It does not appear that either side has been able to use their tanks to secure decisive victories.

About a quarter of Russian soldiers are minimally trained and marginally competent conscripts. They are not properly trained to defend themselves against reasonably competent attacks or otherwise.

Inaccurate and indiscriminate unguided howitzer shell attacks that hurt civilian and military targets alike instilling terror in the general population, and indiscriminate bombing by fighter aircraft with "dumb bombs" are shaping up to be some of the characteristic tactics of the Russian invasions. But this has not been cost free. It has painted Russian troops from Putin to the rank and file Russian soldiers in Ukraine as war criminals. These tactics have unified the Ukrainian people against the Russia. These tactics have helped cement global public opinion against Russia.

Russia's substantial Black Sea naval forces have done very little after the first day or two when they were part of a campaign to launch missiles all over Ukraine. They have not been used for fire support for ground troops and do not appear to have been important in making amphibious assaults. There has been essentially no naval warfare so far.

Russia already controlled Crimea and the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine, immediately prior to its invasion. As shown on the map below, Russia has crept a few miles past the Russian-Belorussian border in the north, has gained control of a narrow strip of Ukraine's Aral Sea coast,  and has gained control of some territory immediately adjacent to Crimea. But they have been stalled in the suburbs of the capital city Kyiv for three weeks. 

Overall Russia's territorial gains over the last three weeks have been very modest and have been largely confined to areas with substantial Russian minorities, despite the very heavy toll that Russian forces have suffered in both casualties to their troops and destroyed major military systems. 

Even if Russia manages to eventually take Kyiv, that would be a pyrrhic victory, as it seems highly unlikely that this would result in regime change in Ukraine or in giving Russia control over the vast majority of Russian territory. It is hard to imagine a scenario at this point in which Russia could secure regime change in Ukraine or could control anything close to the majority of the territory or population of Ukraine.

This is a map of the territory Russia controlled on March 17, 2022 (yellow dots indicate recent battles):

This is a map of territory that Russia controlled on March 7, 2022, ten days earlier, with the shaded and striped areas being territory that Russia controlled immediately prior to the invasion.

It is quite clear that Russia has gains only a little ground in the last ten days, and only a modest share of Russian territory at all since the invasion began.

The credibility of Russia's conventional military forces as a tool in diplomatic negotiations has been dramatically undermined. Unless Russia can make quick and remarkable gains relative to what it has achieved in the last three weeks, the credibility will only be diminished further as time passes.

The losses of equipment and personnel that Russia has suffered in its invasion has significantly degraded the capabilities of Russia's military as a whole, at least in the short term. The longer Russia continues to try to fight in Ukraine, the weaker it military capacity to fight other conventional wars in the near future will be.

Unprecedented international sanctions and boycotts are seriously harming Russia's economy and daily life for ordinary Russians. 

International trade in anything other the natural gas exports, air travel in and out of Russia, foreign investment, and international financial transactions have basically ground to a halt. The ruble has plunged in value. Interest rates have surged to 20%. Russian's can't trade stocks domestically and have only limited access to their bank accounts. Russia narrowly avoided a default on its sovereign debt this week. Foreign Russian assets of Russia, its political leaders, and its oligarchs have been frozen. China is preparing to cooperate with international sanctions against Russia because it needs trade with the rest of the world more than it needs Russia. Russia has been closed out of international sporting and cultural exchanges. Access to foreign media and entertainment has been shut down.

Even if sanctions and boycotts are formally lifted, the developed world and global big business has collectively concluded that the political risk associated with doing business in and with Russia is prohibitively high. As a result, it may take a decade or more for Russia to recover economically from the side effects of its invasion of Ukraine, even if the war ends swiftly, unless Russia experiences regime change.

Russia's "liberal intelligentsia" is fleeing Russia in droves, resulting in a massive brain drain from Russia. They are leaving mostly by car and train to neighboring countries,  some of which were formerly Soviet Republics, before the borders are sealed or these individuals who rarely supported the invasion in the first place and didn't think that Putin would go as far as he did, are persecuted themselves. This may help Putin continue to consolidate power as dissenters self-deport themselves, but it will do grievous harm to the Russia's medium to long term future as a country.

Europe has been given a powerful nudge to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and Russian natural gas in the long run. This will do serious long term, irreversible harm to Russia's predominantly export industry.

Europe and the rest of the world have mostly united around strong opposition to Russia's invasion.

How Russia will use its nuclear arsenal, as it has threatened to do, is the elephant in the room. This is the main reason (together with the dependency of countries like Germany and Italy on Russian natural gas) that other countries haven't directly intervened militarily.

Ukraine is more united as a single country than it ever has been in the past, and pro-Russian political forces in the country pre-invasion, have been completely undermined.

Ukraine is suffering immense property damage, significant although not nation changing loss of life, significant loss of military equipment (although foreign aid is making up for some of that), and an indefinite major refugee crisis that is sending more than 10% of the country's population fleeing abroad.

Global food prices will soar from now until a year or two after the war is over, because Ukraine is a major exporter of food that can't pay attention to farming right now.

Other countries bordering Russia are fortifying collective European defense measures and are studying the tactics hat have been effective against Russia in this war so that they can better repel those tactics in future conflicts.