The Ukraine War Considered After Nine Weeks

Tomorrow it will be nine weeks after the commencement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

Where are we now?

Ukraine, remarkably, remains in control of much of its airspace. Its smaller Air Force was better trained than the Russian Air Force and has performed remarkably. The widespread availability of MANPADS (infantry carried anti-aircraft missiles) and some larger anti-aircraft missiles has helped.

Russian forces have retreated from Kyiv and much of northern Ukraine. Apart from possibly providing air bases for Russian aircraft and missile launchers, Belorussia is no longer being used as a staging area for Russian forces. This is, in part, due to Belorussian rail sabotage

The Russian military has experienced not insignificant losses in the form of military personnel casualties, armored vehicles and weapons systems, one major naval ship, and a modest number of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. It has largely exhausted its supply of guided missiles. 

Ukrainian forces have made a small number of high impact strikes into Russian territory near the Ukrainian border to hit industrial and military facilities that support the Russian invaders.

Russia has committed well documented war crimes, indiscriminately targeting civilians with unguided artillery and rockets and with tank rounds, and engaging in mass rapes and executions. The civilian toll has been mostly in areas that are disproportionately ethnic and linguistically Russian. In the areas Russia has targeted in this post-2014 offensive, the local populations appear to be mostly pro-Ukrainian. Russia continues to aim strikes deeper into Ukraine, but seemingly randomly, like missiles that hit a residential area in Odessa and killed six civilians. 

This conflict has demonstrated the important priority of quickly locating and destroying enemy artillery which has been the characteristic means by which Russian forces have harmed Ukrainians.

Mud was Ukraine's friend, keeping Russian forces in conveys on roads. Light Ukrainian forces fired advanced anti-tank missiles at tanks and other heavy military vehicles in the convoys; while Russians failed to have the disciplined infantry support for their armor necessary to counter these attacks. Ukrainian forces particularly emphasized armor at the front of the line (to block vehicles behind it when immobilized), striking the small number of armored vehicle recovery vehicles (basically tow trucks for tanks) to prevent barriers from being cleared, and lightly protected logistics vehicles supplying food and fuel to Russian troops.

Most of the world has rallied around Ukraine, providing it an abundance of advanced weapons and parts and ammunition and supplies, but not troops. Russia's threats to use nuclear weapons after tolerating this proxy war structure, appears to have ebbed.

Russia has cut off natural gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, something that those countries lacked the political will to do themselves. This deprives Russia of its main leverage going forward agains Poland and Bulgaria since it has already "pulled the trigger" and significantly cuts its access to foreign currency for exports. It comes close to an act of war against Poland and Bulgaria pushing them further to the Ukrainian side. It provides Germany and other Western European nations with a sneak preview of how to respond to losing natural gas supplies.

The global economic boycott, partially due to formal governmental sanctions and partially due to private companies withdrawing from operations in Russia, has a continuing and mounting negative effect on the Russian economy. And, even countries like India and China that are formally non-aligned or have been mild Russian supporters, are not sticking their necks out to do anything meaningful to support Russia or continue vigorous trade with it. Russia doesn't have an ability to import new advanced military supplies and its defense industrial capacity is only mediocre. Russia's best and brightest are emigrating, possibly for good. This will continue to extract a toll on Russia's economy month by month, which means that time is not on Russia's side in this conflict, and much of the harm done to the Russian economy will not easily be remedied when the war is over.

At least in terms of appearances, seizures of yachts, private aircraft, sports team ownerships, and financial assets of Russian oligarchs have been a win for the West, providing a propaganda example of a strike back at Russia while not provoking serious Russian countermeasures. It is a serious blow to an entire elite Russian social class that will no doubt leave even those oligarchs feeling little personal impact from the sanctions feeling less wealthy and less secure.

The conflict has undermined pro-Russian politicians and conservative activists in the U.S. (including many pro-Trump figures) and on the right in much of Europe, although not decisively enough to oust incumbent far right politicians and parties in either place.

Ordinary Russians are now mostly cut off from news and media from the outside world, and the Russian propaganda machine is working hard to pitch an absurd story of the conflict, but it can't be as absolute as it used to be. There are plenty of leaks of the Western side of the story coming through.

Satellites, civilian and military alike, along with electronic surveillance and Internet based tools and the media, have made this a war in which there are no big secrets. Western intelligence sources have been sharing their collected information with Ukraine and with the general public, no doubt selectively, but in fairly credible ways. There has always been a "fog of war", but this time it has been a thinner one.

The sneak preview that this war has provided of what military equipment and tactics work and don't work will help the rest of the world readjust their forces for the next war at minimal costs to them.

A war of attrition that is starting to develop in Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine is bad for civilians there, bad for Ukrainian military forces, and depletes Russian military resources which it has a harder time replenishing despite being a larger country. But a war of attrition benefits the rest of Europe by diminishing the capacity of the Russian military in personnel, equipment, and morale, while European forces can reposition their forces optimally and otherwise prepare for any plausible Russian attack.

But for the threat of Russian nuclear weapons, Western countries would almost surely have intervened already with their conventional military forces rather than just supplying military gear to Ukraine. They have the collective military capacity to rout Russian forces in and near Ukraine swiftly. The Russian Black Sea fleet could be obliterated in a long weekend by Western anti-ship missiles and aircraft.

Historically, the number and importance of the allies of each side is the most important factor in determining who wins wars. Ukraine clearly has the advantage here. Russia has only a handful of insignificant firm allies (like Syria and some Central Asian former Soviet Republics) and a few powerful but neutral states supporting it. Ukraine has almost all of Europe and North America, and the bulk of the rest of the world backing it and almost no countries decisively giving it the cold shoulder in a pro-Russian fashion.

A best case scenario for Russia looks like coming away with Putin and his former United Russia party still in power, control of slightly more territory in Eastern Ukraine than it secured in 2014 with slightly more legitimacy and international recognition, a greatly diminished reputation for military prowess, and an economy permanently hampered by international disinvestment and a long run European disengagement from natural gas and oil that it hastened. 

It isn't yet clear what a worst case scenario would look like. Military capability concessions, turning over war criminals for trial, removing Putin from power, and reparations would be further downsides with historical precedents.