More Surface Warships Still Don't Make Sense

More destroyers is not the right response to concerns about China invading Taiwan or seizing control of the Western Pacific. 

Anti-ship weapons delivered from ground based batteries, aircraft, submarines, and ad hoc (basically disposable) freighters converted into arsenal ships all make more sense as ways to address this threat.

An Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer costs approximately $2 billion to build, not including its weapons or operating costs. It could be damaged, disabled, or sunk by a range of Chinese antiship cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. Conversely, a Chinese Type 52 or Type 55 destroyer could be disabled or sunk by a U.S. Long-Range Antiship Missile (LRASM) or a Naval Strike Missile costing approximately $2 million. The math for mines and torpedoes is of the same order of magnitude. While delivering these weapons requires costly assets, surface vessels are among the most cost-ineffective options.

Air power’s primary benefit is being able to deliver large quantities of weapons over extended time periods. For example, B-1 Lancers can deliver 24 LRASMs at a time. Even assuming a low sortie rate, a single B-1 could quickly surpass a warship’s offensive firepower. The addition of other aircraft, such as other bombers, P-8 Poseidons, and tactical aircraft if in range, would allow air power to deliver punishing blows against an adversary. . . .

The United States should do everything in its power, including subsidies or other methods if politically and diplomatically acceptable, to encourage Taiwan and other allies to purchase large numbers of antiship weapons. . . .

the Navy should invest in ways to cheaply increase the missile capacity of sea-based assets. Practically, this means exploring the potential to rapidly purchase and convert merchant ships, particularly from the Maritime Security Program, into missile carriers.

From here.