Russian Casualties And Tank Warfare In Ukraine

Russian Casualties

We are three weeks short of a year after Russian's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. 

The number of Russian troops killed and wounded in Ukraine is approaching 200,000, a stark symbol of just how badly President Vladimir V. Putin’s invasion has gone, according to American and other Western officials.

From the New York Times.

Maybe a quarter to a third (i.e. 50,000-65,000) of the Russian casualties are troops killed in action.

The Ukraine War is already one of the ten most deadly wars in all of world history since 1812, according to a comprehensive database of historical military data.

The entire active duty Russian military prior to the Ukraine war was about 900,000, some of which is in the navy and air force which have had minimal casualties, some of which are deployed in places like Syria and Moldova, and some of which have to be stationed near other parts of Russia's sprawling international borders and to reinforce its major cities and military bases. 

Russia is trying to fill the gap by activating reserve forces and conscripting new troops, but these forces will not be as well trained as its regular soldiers which bodes poorly for Russia's military given the poor performance of its ill-trained soldiers in a bottom heavy force so far, and it still takes months to activate these new ill-trained troops. 

Seasoned and well-trained veteran enlisted soldiers and military officers killed in the Ukraine war will take years for Russia to replace.

Tank Warfare In Ukraine

Most of the tanks of both Russia and Ukraine have been taken out of action in the last year of fighting. But tanks have played a decidedly minor part in advancing either party's military objectives and are not being used heavily by either side. Only a small percentage of the tanks that have been destroyed, moreover, have been destroyed by other tanks. Artillery has played a much larger role in the Ukraine war than tanks.

Key observations about tank warfare in Ukraine:

*  Russians are using mostly high explosive (HE) tank shells as anti-personnel weapons, against unarmored vehicles, and against structures. Using a 125mm tank shell for this purpose is overkill that can also be accomplished as well or better with 25-40mm cannons and smaller and lighter recoilless rifles (i.e. bazookas) like the U.S. 84mm M3A1 MAAWS. 

* "Ukrainian troops have seen few or no Russian tanks in the last few months."

* A "125mm HE shell fired at a maximum range [which is about 5000 meters] will land up to sixty meters from where it was aimed." So, if a Russian tank aims its shell at a target on the fifty yard line of an American football field from 5 km away, the shell will end up somewhere on the field or the end zones on each side of the field. 

* Wear and tear on the tank's main gun barrel from regularly using large numbers of HE shells, even before it needs to be replaced, causes the accuracy of a Russian tank's main gun to grow even worse. The bottom line is that like howitzers, Russian tanks are very inaccurate at long ranges (from which, and beyond which, anti-tank weapons and artillery can still be fired at the tanks).

* Unlike most Western tanks, newer Russian tanks (such as its T-80s) can also fire an anti-tank missile through its main gun, but this capability doesn't appear to have been used widely in Ukraine.

* Russians have lost about 1,600 out of 2,600 tanks that they started with in engagements with Ukraine, and have replaced about 1,000 tanks from their stockpiles (mostly out of date models). In theory, this means Russia should have about 2,000 operational tanks in Ukraine, albeit, many of which are outdated. 

* But, wear and tear on hard to replace tank main gun barrels and sporadic shortages of other replacements parts mean that not all of those 2,000 tanks, especially among the more modern 1,000 tanks that Russia was using at the start of its invasion. A Russian tank can fire about 1,000 shells before its main gun barrel needs to be refurbished - which requires moving the tank from the theater of battle to a distant factory in a lengthy process, effectively reducing the number of tanks at its disposal. A tank without its main gun isn't very useful. There have also been shortages of replacement parts for Russian tanks that make more of them that are not destroyed in battle temporarily inoperative.

* So, even with 1,000 replacement tanks from storage, Russia probably has fewer than half of the tanks it started with that are actually operational, many of which are nearing the end of their useful lives before they have to be refurbished, most of which are outdated, and most of which have ill-trained tank crews.

* Russia's supply of tank shells is also not unlimited. It has used about 100,000 tanks shells so far and the production line of new HE tank shells that its tanks are mostly using was shut down many years ago.

* In fairness, Ukraine has also had many hundreds of its tanks destroyed, rendered inoperable, abandoned, or captured in this war (473 of them according to Oryx, which is an undercount since it includes only photographically confirmed losses, out of about 900 tanks, mostly older T-64 models, that it had a year ago), and also has difficulty finding the parts it news to keep its remaining tanks working.

* The Russian military seems to be aware at some level of the shortcomings of Russia's armored forces and as a result hasn't been using its tanks very much in recent months.

Russia reported that they had 2,600 tanks available at the time of February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. There was visible evidence that nearly 1,600 were lost during the first few months of the invasion. While 924 were destroyed, another 664 were damaged and abandoned. Most of these tanks were undamaged and captured intact after their crews abandoned them. These were repainted to identify them as Ukrainian and used against the Russians. Many of these tanks eventually became unusable because Ukraine did not have replacement parts for them. Ukraine used similar tanks but not all of the replacement parts for Ukrainian tanks were suitable for the captured Russian ones.

Russia had a similar problem with the thousand tanks that survived the invasion and over a thousand more that were brought in as replacements. The replacement parts problem was even more acute for the Russians because they changed their tank tactics in the face of the numerous Western top-attack ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles) that quickly destroy Russian tanks because of the way these tanks use their autoloaders, which puts many exposed shells and their propellant charges in the turret. If the turret is hit by a top attack ATGM, all those propellant charges explode, killing the three-man crew and often blowing the turret off the tank.

Russia responded to this by using their remaining tanks only for direct-fire artillery support for Russian troops. This meant using HE (high-explosive) shells that explode when they hit something, usually the ground, and create many high-speed metal fragments that will wound or kill troops and damage structures and unarmored vehicles. These shells are effective if they hit something but they are not accurate and often just hit the ground, where most of the fragments go into the ground or fly harmlessly into the air. In Ukraine Russian tanks have used more HE shells than ever before. 

Russia used them occasionally in Afghanistan, and during the Chechen wars of the 1990s. In both these wars Russia had air superiority and could use helicopters and ground attack aircraft as well as conventional artillery. 

In Ukraine Russia has lost the tank war as well as the artillery war. Using 125mm HE shells fired by tanks seemed to be a practical solution. It was, but there were unwanted side-effects.

Firing HE is less accurate the farther away the target is. That means a 125mm HE shell fired at a maximum range will land up to sixty meters from where it was aimed. The 125mm accuracy problem was confirmed in 2018. That was when the Russian army conducted tests to measure the effectiveness of HE shells fired from the smooth bore 125mm guns tanks are equipped with. The test results recommend against tanks using HE shells. The ones on hand were not discarded but no new ones were manufactured.

Russian tanks in Ukraine appear to have used about 100,000 of these shells and in doing so discovered another problem. These shells caused barrel wear on the 125mm tank gun liners. These liners are common in tank guns and tube artillery. It’s cheaper to replace a worn-out liner than to replace the entire barrel and attached loading mechanism. Tube artillery barrel liners are good for 5,000 to 6,000 shells fired. On Russian tanks the liner wears out after about a thousand shells are fired. Most of the Russian tanks in Ukraine used for firing HE shells found that their barrels already had a lot of wear on them and heavy use of HE increased liner wear to the point where all shells (anti-tank or HE) were much less accurate.

Russian tanks can have their liners replaced but it happens so infrequently that the process is not simple. It involves removing the turret from the tank to replace the liner. This can only be done in one special facility and that means putting the entire tank on a train flat car and shipping it to the facility and then shipping it back. This meant that most of the Russian tanks with worn barrel liners were useless except as machine gun-armed vehicles. That’s hardly worth the fuel and other spare parts (like the tracks) required. This is apparently why Ukrainian troops have seen few or no Russian tanks in the last few months. This means less shell fire at Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian artillery can concentrate on other targets, like Russian infantry and supply stockpiles.

The Ukrainians want Western tanks, particularly American M1s and German Leopard 2’s because they are both considered the best designed and effective tanks available. The M1 has extensive combat experience against Russian tanks and has never, so to speak, been defeated by Russian T-90, T-72 or T-55 tanks. Like the Leopard, the M1 has multiple layers of armor protections including an APS (Active Protection System) and safer storage of tank shells and propellant inside the turret. An effective fire extinguishing system can quickly deal with any type of fire. The fire control system is one of the best available, allowing the M1 to accurately fire on the move and hit an enemy tank several thousand meters distant. The United States and Germany can supply all the spare parts needed to Ukrainian users. Worn barrels on the Western tanks are easier to replace.

From Strategy Page.

[World War II] German generals noted that “…the Russian armored force was not as good as the Russian artillery,” citing a lack of flexibility and inability of commanders to exploit success. They also observed that “The training of the individual tank driver was inadequate…” and that “The Russian avoided driving his tank through hollows and along reverse slopes, preferring to choose a route along crests which would give fewer driving difficulties.” These observations seem consistent with Russian armor operations in Ukraine. Many armor troops in the initial Russian invasion force were conscripts with minimal training. Despite the flat terrain and frozen ground, most Russian armor appeared to be road-bound as commanders sought to avoid maneuver in open areas.

To date, Russian commanders have been unable to create any major breakthroughs as the initial failed assaults demonstrate. Most Russian tank advances were made only after massive artillery barrages rather than large, armored sweeps across open terrain. The Russian armor’s main contribution is its sheer mass and numbers, just as it was in WWII. However Russian armor forces remain largely road-bound and an easy target for Ukrainian drones, artillery and anti-tank weapons.

From a February 2, 2023 report assessing the performance of Russian forces so far in the Ukraine War.