A New York Times article entitled 21 Miles Of Obstacles highlighted the barriers that Russian forces had put in place of the Ukrainian counter-offensive on the front lines between Ukrainian forces and the Aral Sea.
There are open fields that provide little cover. Tree lines between fields that provide cover to Russian forces and conceal Russian forces from aerial observation. There are anti-tank traps, trenches, and mine fields. Beyond that is a city with tall buildings and narrow side streets that poses its own challenges.
Several basic tools for these kinds of obstacles came to mind. A core concept here is that getting just a little bit off the ground, without really relying on aircraft susceptible to anti-air systems, could overcome a lot of defenses designed to stop slow, heavy, ground treading tanks and soldiers on foot. Another is that unmanned systems are preferred for the front lines combat where some losses are inevitable.
1. Large swarms (hundreds) of small drones carrying assault rifle scale weapons, individually controlled by remote operators far from the front line, to take on Russian troops in tree lines, trenches, and urban sniper positions in tall buildings and narrow side streets. These would also locate Russian armor that has been concealed so that their tanks, etc. can be targeted with anti-tank missiles from outside the accurate range of Russian tanks and even from outside the accurate range of Russian artillery. The physical obstacles would be meaningless to them and the massive numbers of them at just a few meters of height outside cities with tall buildings would make it harder to counter them with anti-air defenses. Prototypes of such drones already exist.
2. A few fiber optic wire operated drones could clear out anti-drone electronic warfare jamming type devices first to make way for the main drone force. The concept with be similar to wire controlled TOW missiles.
3. Drone hovercraft that were smaller than a compact car outfitted with 20mm-40mm cannons and some missiles with the punch of tank shells (i.e. in the range from a TOW or Javelin missile), and forward facing armor shields. These could clear even muddy open fields quickly, would provide more challenging targets than treaded vehicles for enemy tanks, could cross mine fields and streams and rivers without much risk, and could have the capacity to make a few "hop" boosts (possibly with a rocket assist) over anti-tank traps or wide trenches or compromised bridges. As an unmanned fighting vehicle, they could be risked on the front lines to break trenches and break bunker and pill boxes. They could get close enough to deliver anti-tank missiles if longer ranged missiles weren't available. They would be small enough to go into small side streets or moderately narrowly spaced tree lines. Similar wheeled or tracked ground based armed drones are in the prototype phase.
4. Something akin to the U.S. Marine Corps Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC), with some light (but enhanced relative to the standard version) armor shielding and more active defenses (including MANPADS) to deliver light mechanized troops quickly over mine fields, mud, streams, and with a "hop" boost - trenches, after the small arms drones and the hovercraft drones clear the way of the most serious obstacles, in order to seize control of territory.
None of these would have to have a terribly long range. Something like 50-100 miles would be enough for the first and the third, 25 miles might be enough for the second (on the assumption of a one way trip), and 150-200 miles might be enough for the last one.
Two thoughts come to mind. First, everything you wrote is reasonable, feasible, and not terribly sophisticated or expensive (unlike Abrams and Leopard tanks, or the US's entire supply of HIMARs which has been exhausted and will take years to restore; that's our fault not Ukraine's, as we aren't big on manufacturing anymore).
ReplyDeleteNext, since Jan or Feb 2023, I have seen too many cell phone videos uploaded to Twitter (probably to telegram then to Twitter) from Ukrainian infantrymen on the front lines, who show their old, dilapidated or even useless rifles, and grossly inadequate, if any, supplies that soldiers in the field need.
There's something very wrong here. Has the $75 billion from the U.S. plus funds from western European countries and the UK plus humanitarian assistance gone toward field rations and other basics for Ukrainian infantry? It isn't clear from those videos, and no, they aren't Russian propaganda.
Likewise, I have no doubt that if YOU were deployed to Ukraine in a position of sufficient rank and authority, some of your numbered list of suggestions could be implemented. I'm not suggesting that you would be a U.S. military serviceman, of course. Yet there should be some Ukrainian commanding officers who could think of and put in place some or all of the measures you suggested. Or, if not Ukrainian, then members of the German or Polish armed forces who are officially acting as advisors, or actually volunteering as private citizens to help out in Ukraine.
I really don't understand. At least 100,000 or even 200,000 Ukrainian men have died in combat during the past 18 months. NATO and the United States MUST not be directly involved. Yet there seems to be a lack of leadership between Zelensky and the soldiers. Some may be Ukraine's fault but certainly not all!
P.S. I arrived here via a 2011 post on Dienekes' Anthopology blog, on which you had mad several good comments. I was raised one state to the south of Colorado and live one state to the south of Utah now, so you're a local and I thought I would stop by.
"live one state to the south of Utah now"
ReplyDeleteWhat an interesting way to describe that. Also, I still write about Anthropology mixed with physics, at Dispatches from Turtle Island, the sister blog of this one.
Simply having better rifles would help Ukraine (and better still would be sniper rifles with AI assisted aiming add-ons that allow comparative notices to rival the best snipers in the world).
I recognize that R&D takes time, and that as one is fighting day to day in a war of indeterminate length, may be a luxury that is unavailable. Ukraine has made a lot of innovations (e.g. quiet, small electric bicycles for infantry carrying anti-tank guided missiles, or fitting Western air to air and air to ground missiles to their Russian aircraft, etc.) that are smaller development leaps. I'm not so much criticizing their current efforts and thinking about ways to do better in a comparable "next war" of similar character.