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27 February 2020

The Scope Of The Franchise And Voting Habits Have Consequences

tl;dr 

The American system of representative democracy utterly ignores the needs of people who don't vote  (such as children, young people, non-citizens, institutionalized people, and people of color), not because it is a flawed implementation of a pure model of representative democracy, but because it is working as a pure representative democracy is intended to. There are, however, some reforms and policies and approaches that can mitigate the harms caused by these intrinsic flaws of representative democracies.

The Political Theory Context

Critiques Of Representative Democracy Due To Flawed Implementation

It is trendy in political discussions these days to focus on the ways in which, in U.S. politics, the desires of the people (often summed up by the preferences of the median person eligible to vote) are undermined, in the formal electoral and legislative process, undermining a pure representative democracy model.

Two of these flaws receive particular attention in discussions of our political system.

The undue influence of money in politics that undermines pure representative democracy.

Sometimes, this undermined by monied special interests, often described as "corporate" (when what is really the heart of their ire is the influence of the rich and the influence of big business on politics without regard to their actual corporate form of organization), especially through campaign contributions and political spending.

Discrepancies in electoral laws and legislative rules from pure representative democracy.

Sometimes, this is undermined by subtle flaws in the design of our the formal electoral and legislative components system like the electoral college, unequal representation of U.S. states relative to population in the U.S. Senate, the filibuster and other anti-democratic U.S. Senate rules, gerrymandering, the use of single district plurality voting with primaries instead of systems like "instant runoff voting", bad U.S. Supreme Court rulings that become entrenched, and abuses of Presidential powers like the veto power, the pardon power, and executive branch discretion to undermine the intent of Congressionally enacted legislation or resolutions.

Unfair political tactics that undermine pure representative democracy.

Sometimes, this is undermined by unfair political tactics. 

One of the most common unfair political tactics is when political candidates and people advocating for them, lie to and misleading voters, in the course of political campaigns and political discussions, in ways for which they are not held accountable, when this causes voters to vote for candidates and ballot issues that select outcomes that those voters do not actually favor.

Problematic Implications Of Representative Democracy When It Works As Intended

The focus in political discussion on problems with representative democracy that undermine pure representative democracy diverts attention from the fact that our flawed representative democracy works as intended to a much greater extent than is widely appreciated. 

Also, many people who participate in political discussions and debate have only a dim understanding that "perfect" democracy and a political economy that produces a "good society" are not naturally produced by pure representative democracy. The very ideal of pure representative democracy is itself flawed.

(Note that the concept that there is such as thing as a "good society" distinct from what democratic majorities favor is an idea that I take as an axiom for the purposes of this post as this deontological political concept is beyond the scope of this already long and theoretical post.)

As a result, people pay less attention to the problems with our system of formal representative democracy at the electoral and legislative level when it works as intended.

Core Tenants Of Pure Representative Democracy

One the theories within the realm of political theory, which is generally empirically accurate, and is at the heart of the American representative electoral and formal legislative democratic process is that the formal American political process causes the government to adopt policies that reflect the preferences and interests of the people who vote for elected officials who are the people who have an ultimate say over what policies are adopted.

At a superficial, shallow and naive level, this seems like a good thing and is what most people mean when they argue in favor of making representative democracy work as intended. But, even pure representative democracy is only a means to an end and has its own inherent flaws even when it works as intended, as discussed below

The Median Voter Theorem

The most direct description of the American political process working as intended, which also has quite a bit of empirical support, is the median voter theorem. The median voter theorem is that: "a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter."

A Pure Representative Democracy Selects For Outcomes Favored By Voters And Not Meaningfully Opposed By The Median Voter

A more subtle aspect of the political system tending to reflect the policy preferences of people who vote is that lots of policy choices that benefit one minority subgroup of voters are not strongly in conflict with the outcomes preferred by the median voter. There are lots and lots of issues and policies upon which the median voter has no clear opinion or preference.

When the preferred outcomes of non-majority groups of people who vote do not conflict meaningfully conflict with the preferred outcomes of the median voter in ways that policy makers can comprehend, these outcomes also tend to be selected. This is true even when the non-majority groups of people who vote tend to not vote for the candidates who win when voting for elected officials.

Indeed, in our slightly "flawed" actual representative democracy relative to a pure representative democracy model (in a reality that is not necessarily bad), intense outcome preferences of non-majority factions of voters often (contrary to the political theory of the Federalist Papers) often prevail in having their preferred outcomes selected over the weak outcome preferences of diffuse majorities and the median voter.

The Corollary Is The Outcomes Favored By Non-Voters Are Almost Completely Ignored

There is no representative democracy in which everyone who is subject to the governments policy choices votes. 

The Franchise Is Not Universal.

The scope of the franchise (i.e. the right to vote) has expanded dramatically since representative democracies first came into being in the early modern period in Europe, but there is no representative democracy that includes everyone, and it is necessarily true that there never will be one that does.

Children, people who are too incapacitated to vote, non-citizens, citizens who reside somewhere that doesn't have elected officials allocated to them, certain people who are incarcerated or have civil disabilities from past convictions for crimes, and entities that aren't natural persons, aren't legally entitled to vote in some elections. It will never be the case, for example, that babies get to personally cast ballots in elections because they lack the ability to do so.

Not Everyone Who Has A Right To Vote Does Vote.

There will also always be people who have the right to vote, but do not do so.

Sometimes people spoil their ballots and deny themselves meaningful vote, or fail to cast a ballot by mistake or due to inadvertence.

Sometimes people are busy and stressed and don't vote as a result, even if they would like to, because the would be voter can't allocate that time and those resources to do so when this provides no immediate benefit to the would be voter, and produces no immediate penalty to the would be voter.

Sometimes people don't vote (at all, or in a particular political race or on a particular ballot issue) because it takes time and resources (e.g. from media source access to mental space to think about something) to understand the choices on the ballot in a way that would reflect the would be voter's wishes, and the would be voters can't allocate that time and those resources for something that provides no immediate benefit to the would be voter, and produces no immediate penalty to the would be voter.

Sometimes people don't vote because the election doesn't seem salient to them, or they don't feel that their vote will make a difference. And, sometimes they are right about this conclusion when it comes to the direct election outcomes of the vote they could have cast. For example, a vote for President in a state that leans strongly in favor of one candidate or the other in today's winner take all electoral college system, won't change the outcome.

Sometimes people don't vote or spoil their ballot as an act of protest against the political system in general.

The Outcomes Favored By Non-Voters Are Almost Completely Ignored

In a pure representative democracy model, political theory concludes, in a conclusion that has empirical support, outcomes favored by non-voters are almost completely ignored, no matter how intense they may be, relative to the slightest whim of the median voter or when the median voter is indifferent, to the whim of any non-majority group of voters who has an opinion about an issue.

The fact that a representative democracy favors the preferred outcomes of non-majority groups of voters whom the median voter does not particularly oppose is most strikingly revealed when the extent to which outcomes salient to them are selected is compared to the extent to which the preferred outcomes of non-voters, no matter how intense, are selected.

Agency, Trusteeship and Indirect Impacts

This doesn't mean that anyone's interest are utterly and completely ignored in a pure representative democracy or a real one, just that they are highly marginalized.

The interests of non-voters aren't completely ignored, even though they are highly marginalized, because voters may acts as agents or trustees by preferring outcomes that benefit non-voters, either selflessly out of moral obligation, although usually much less intensely than their own personal self-interest, or because the well being of non-voters has indirect impacts on them even though the impact on a voter is much less intense.

For example, a voter might favor an outcome that is preferred by a homeless non-voter, either out of moral obligation that the voter feels towards the homeless person, or because the person's homelessness indirectly impacts them by reminding them that their city allows people to sleep on the streets which makes the voter feel guilty. But, these moral and indirect influences on the outcome preference of voters are much less intense than those of homeless people themselves, who have an extremely intense life or death interest in policies related to treatment of homeless people.

Footnote: Indirect Impact Through The Median Voter Theorem

The indifference of representative democracy to non-voters is also manifested through the median voter theorem discussed above. The preferences of non-voters doesn't enter into to the determination of who the median voter is, while the preferences of a voter, even one whose viewed differ from the median voter, shifts the determination of who the median voter is in favor of people whose preferred outcomes are more similar to theirs than they would be if that voter had not voted.

For example, suppose that the median voter is electing representatives who decide how much money to spend on public schools per student, a continuous policy variable, and voters favor a range of values spread almost continuously on a curve from $500 per student to $30,000 per student. If 20% of voters who otherwise wouldn't have voted favor spending of $30,000 per student, the funding among favored by the median voter will shift from the 50th percentile preference of the other 80% of voters to the the 62.5th percentile of the other 80% of voters. This might, for example, shift the outcome selected, to the extent that the median voter theorem holds true, from $5,000 per student to $7,500 per student. Thus, even though the 20% of voter who wouldn't otherwise have voted don't get their preferred policy outcome, the fact that they voted will increase per student spending on public schools by 50%.

The Empirical Reality Of Representative Democracy Working As Intended For Non-Voters

As I note above, in the political theory part of this post, for all of the American flaws of the American political process relative to pure representative democracy, it is usually true that the formal American political process causes the government to adopt policies that reflect the preferences and interests of the people who vote for elected officials. And, this sometimes impedes our ability to secure a "good society."

Colorado, which has a system of representative democracy that is closer to pure representative democracy than all but a handful of U.S. states, for a variety of reasons including low levels of corruption relative to most other state governments, a healthy political culture, and reforms to the formal electoral and legislative process that have not been adopted elsewhere, is a good place to illustrate this fact.

In the American political system, and in Colorado, in particular, people who don't have the right to vote get absolutely screwed in political policy making on a systemic basis over long periods of time.

These people include children (especially children without parents who vote who can be a proxy for them in the political process), non-citizens, disenfranchised people with felony records, and people who are institutionalized (such as some mentally ill or otherwise institutionalized people).

Furthermore, groups of people who have the right to vote but, on average, don't exercise it very consistently (often due to barriers in the process or society that exist to their ability to do so) like young people, the poor, the homeless, and people of color, get seriously slighted. 

But, people who vote reliably like homeowners in rural and suburban areas who regularly attend church, and senior citizens, tend to have their political preferences overrepresented.

Potential Remedies To The Intrinsic Flaws Of Pure Representative Democracy

There are various ways to reduce the intrinsic flaws of pure representative democracy. These include taking some of the following steps from this non-exclusive list:

* Expand the franchise, for example, to non-citizens who reside in a place with elected representatives, to people with criminal records, and so on.

* Reduce barriers to getting information needed to cast a meaningful vote (something that Colorado does well) and to casting ballots (something else that Colorado does well).

* Decentralize decision making so that more than more people get outcomes closer to their preferences because the median voter in their local area has preferences closer their own than the median voter in a more centralized decision making unit of government. But, federalism is an imperfect solution because some policies need to be implemented uniformly at a high level to be effective, and it harms non-majority people located in a smaller decision making unit, and it harms people who don't reside in that jurisdiction who are visiting that area.

* Enact bills of rights and protect other legal rights like private property and contract rights vis-a-vis majoritarian political decision making to preserve key deontological moral principles that the political process is intrinsically prone to ignore. Pay particular attention to protections from discriminatory policies directly particularly a non-voters.

* Remove certain kinds of policy decisions from the majoritarian political realm and instead vest them in the non-majoritarian economic realm and the non-majoritarian intrafamily and religious domains. Milton Friedman was right in his observation that allocation of power in favor of the rich and powerful relative to the poor and the weak, is usually more unequal in the political sphere than it is in the economic sphere.

* Develop a political culture in which moral empathy and concern for non-voters is high, and the indirect impacts of policies that help non-voters are better and more widely understood. 

* Give representatives of non-voters power in forums outside the political process. These include, for example, the diplomatic rights of foreign countries to act for the benefit of their expatriates, and the power of non-profits and lawyers enforcing fiduciary duties in a fiduciary capacity (perhaps in class actions or public interest litigation) to legally enforce legal rights of non-voters and to demand fairness in the treatment of non-voters.

* Give extra votes to people who are good proxies for non-voters so that the interests of non-voters can receive more weight (especially on continuous variable policy decisions like budgeting decisions). For example, parents might be able to cast votes for the minor children, guardians of adults might be able to cast voters for their adults, and sponsors of legal immigrants might be able to cast votes for the non-citizens whom they have sponsored. But, this is an imperfect solution since these proxies would never be perfectly selfless in their voting choices and will never perfectly and definitionally understand the true preferences of those for whom they are proxies.

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