Showing posts with label Pennsylvania. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pennsylvania. Show all posts

10 November 2023

Election Rules And Gridlock In American Politics

This post restates an answer I made at Politics.SE where I am a moderator and participant, with only one minor modification to remove a reference to another answer at the site, adding a link, adding some discussion of the situation in Alaska, making minimal formatting modifications, and quoting a comment to the answer. I quote the question I am answering piecemeal during the answer.

In the course of answering this question, I was surprised to learn just how undivided and not gridlocked the state political process in the United States has become, in stark contrast to the federal political process in the United States.

A false premise
What kind of amendment clause can encourage many parties to represent the voters in the way originally intended by the founding fathers?
The Founding Fathers intended the constitution to result in a no party system within many disorganized majority and minority factions (see, e.g. The Federalist Papers, especially Federalist No. 10 written by James Madison), not a multi-party democracy. They predicted wrong, in part, because the world known to them had very little experience with national level democracies in early 1789 when the U.S. Constitution was drafted.

In particular, they were unaware that political parties arise spontaneously, more or less automatically, whether formally recognized or not by the electoral system, in any governmental system with a group of multiple legislators, even when legislators are appointed, rather than elected. But political parties profoundly change the dynamics of the legislative and electoral process in ways that they didn't anticipate.

Also, to slightly nitpick the title question:
What kind of amendment can oblige multiple political parties, to fix the unintended two-party malfunction of the constitution?
You can't oblige people to form multiple political parties. Some electoral systems favor the creation of multiple political parties, but this only happens if someone decides that it a worthwhile thing to do and creates and runs them. Often at the outset of a new political system, the people who caused the system to come into being are so united from that struggle that multiple political parties aren't established right away.

Securing a multi-party system through electoral reforms

But securing a multi-party political system, which is the international norm for democratic countries, rather than a two party system, in the United States wouldn't be that hard to achieve in terms of the formal constitutional process to do so. It wouldn't even require a constitutional amendment. Politically, however, there would be big barriers to achieving this goal.

Duverger's Law, a law in the social sciences sense, says that first-past-the-post election systems tend to cause dual party systems (there is an exception to this law for geographically segregated political movements, such as nationalist parties for a region like the nationalist parties in Quebec and Scotland). So, all one needs to do in order to end a two party system is to change the election law system. This doesn't require a constitutional amendment.

Reforms possible with a change to federal law without a constitutional amendment

The U.S. Constitution does not direct that members of Congress be elected from single member district plurality election system. This system exists in the U.S. because it is mandated by 2 U.S. Code § 2c, which currently mandates single member districts for U.S. Congressional elections in states with more than one representative in the House.

Historically, before 2 U.S.C. § § 2c was adopted in 1967, multi-member Congressional districts were common in U.S. states, although not by a proportionate representation system. The reason for this reform in 1967 is that the majority in a multi-member district would elect all members of Congress from that multi-member district from the party with a majority in that multi-member district and this approach was used to suppress the black vote in the South, and this legislation reinforced the mandate of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 to prevent the suppression of the black vote in the South.
This statute states, in its entirety, that:
In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress).

Even with this statutory limitation, some U.S. states (e.g., Maine and Alaska) already elected members of Congress by ranked choice voting. Several other states require a majority vote to elect a member of Congress with a runoff election held if no candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round (e.g. Louisiana), which like an instant runoff voting system eliminates the spoiler effects associated with third-party candidacies.

There is no reason that you can't have proportional representation in a country with a strong Presidential government like the U.S. with its current constitution. This is what is done in almost every other country with a strong President system countries (e.g. Turkey and Russia).

A conversion to a proportionate representation method of selecting members of Congress in states with more than one member of Congress could be accomplished without a constitutional amendment simply by repealing 2 U.S.C. § 2c and replacing it would a statute that mandated either rank choice voting or majority required to win with a runoff voting in states with a single member of Congress, and mandating proportional representation with a party list system of some kind in states with more than one member of Congress. This would also, simultaneously, end the problem of gerrymandering.

A statute, needless to say, is much easier to enact than a constitutional amendment which requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress (or identical proposals from two-thirds of the U.S. state legislatures, or by constitutional conventions in two-thirds of U.S. states) to propose, and ratification by three-quarters of U.S. states to approve.

The relevant statute would require a majority of the U.S. House, a majority of the U.S. Senate (after overcoming a 60% of the U.S. Senate filibuster or using the nuclear option to abolish the filibuster in this situation with a majority of the U.S. Senate) and the signature of the President (or an override of a Presidential veto by two-thirds of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate), with no state legislative action before the law in enacted.

The main barrier to this kind of change (which would be even greater to enact a U.S. Constitutional Amendment) is that at least naively, it is not in the interest of either of the two major political parties that control all but a handful of seats in Congress to create a multi-party system that would reduce their control of the process. But reforms of the electoral process contrary to the seeming narrow interests of those currently in office aren't unprecedented, usually because the political party backing the changes sees partisan gain from doing so, even though it technically makes their current voters less powerful.

For example, if the Democrats had a thin majority in both houses of Congress and held the Presidency, and abolished the filibuster in the U.S. Senate with the nuclear option, they might decide that proportional representation was the lesser of two evils to end the disadvantages that they face due to gerrymandering at the state level, and this might cause them to enact a statutory reform like this one.

On the other hand, if Congress simply repealed 2 U.S.C. § 2c, the laboratory of democracy in the states could reopen and some U.S. states with more than one member of Congress, perhaps by citizen's initiative following the model of Maine and Alaska adopting ranked choice voting, could adopt proportional representation, and if this system was popular, other states might follow suit and this could become the national norm, or provoke a national level re-enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 2c that mandated proportional representation.

Proportional representation at a national level, rather than state by state, would require a constitutional amendment. But since the practical difference between a state by state proportional representation system and a national one would be slight (basically just a rounding error scale effect), and because this would also require amendment to the Presidential election contingent election system at the same time, it probably wouldn't be worth the additional effort to attempt to achieve one.

Furthermore, you don't want to have too many seats at state in any proportional representation system because then it becomes possible to elect fringe candidates backed by just a tiny percentage of the vote (less than 0.25% in a single national proportional representation system) which if the majority coalition is thin, gives outsized power to fringe groups. This has historically been a problem in Weimar Germany which dealt with it by adopting a 5% threshold to get any seats post-WWII, in Italy where unstable coalitions of centrists designed to keep the extreme left and the extreme right out of power led to a very fragile democracy after WWII until recently, and in Israel. In contrast, only a handful of states have enough seats to allow a party with less than 5% support in the voting public to gain a legislative seat because they have 20 or fewer members of Congress.

Reforms possible without federal statutory reform or constitutional amendments

Short of this kind of statutory amendment, it would be possible to enact more limited reforms that don't so strongly lead to a two party system without amending 2 U.S.C. § 2c, either a state by state level (possibly with reforms enacted via citizen's initiative to overcome the biases of legislators elected in a two party system in many states where this is possible), or by enacting an additional law mandating certain reforms for the conduct of U.S. House elections from single member districts in addition to 2 U.S.C. § 2c.

Any single member district system inherently distorts the results in a state with more than one member of Congress relative to proportional representation except in the most idealized distribution of voters. But one can (and a number of states, such as Colorado and Ohio have) imposed standards implemented on a non-partisan basis for how Congressional districts are drawn that reduce the impact of partisan gerrymandering relative to the worst case scenario. This doesn't weaken the two party system, however.

But if you mandate, either nationally or in a single state at a time, that states used ranked choice voting, or require the winner to have a majority of the vote to win (with runoff elections if necessary) or have a California style "jungle primary" with the top two finishers in the primary facing off in the final round vote, you can eliminate the spoiler effect of first past the post voting systems.

In a first past the post voting system, a vote for a third-party or independent candidate always helps the candidate from the political party least similar to the third-party or independent candidate that you vote for.

This inherent bias against third-party candidates in first-past-the-post voting systems prevents viable third-party candidates from emerging. But if you have a system that eliminates the spoiler effect, voters are free to support a third-party or independent candidate in a first choice or first round vote, without worrying about helping their least favorite candidate. And, free to do so, third-party candidates would receive more support and stronger candidates would be more comfortable running on third-party tickets, and gradually, a multi-party system would emerge, although probably not one with as many viable political parties as a pure proportional representation system, because any candidate elected would have to receive at least second choice support from a majority of voters in a single Congressional district. Still, it might make three or four political parties, rather than just two, viable and would allow more unaffiliated candidates to be elected.

Any of these systems (but especially "jungle primary" systems) also inherently favor more moderate candidates relative to a system in which each of two major political parties holds a primary election and those two candidates then compete in a general election (which is the status quo in most, but not all, U.S. states). Partisan primaries favor farther left of center candidates in Democratic primaries and farther right of center candidates in Republican primaries, and in the process make it harder for moderate or centerist candidates to make it to the general election.

First-past-the-post elections with closed political primaries in many states are among the multiple reasons that Congress currently has fewer moderates and a larger partisan divide between the two political parties than at any other time in U.S. history since the eve of the U.S. Civil War. This is trend that is likely to continue to become more extreme with West Virginia's U.S. Senator Manchin, the most politically moderate U.S. Senator right now, announcing that he will not seek re-election, and independent U.S. Senator Kyrsten Sinema, from Arizona, who was elected as a Democrat and left the Democratic party in December of 2022 (who is the second modest politically moderate U.S. Senator U.S. right now) is unlikely to be re-elected in 2024.

In 2024, the most moderate U.S. Senator who caucuses with the Democrats will probably be the independent U.S. Senator from Maine Angus King, and the most moderate U.S. Senator on the Republican side will probably be U.S. Senator from Maine Susan Collins, since there are no strong candidates campaigning for U.S. Senate seats in the 2024 election right now who are more politically moderate than either of Maine's Senators, and they are quite far apart. In contrast, for much of recent U.S. history, there has been some overlap in political ideology at the moderate end between the Democratic party and the Republican party in the U.S. Senate and in the U.S. House.

On the other hand, these election laws clearly aren't the only reason for the currently highly divided partisan breakdown in Congress. More states have reformed their election laws incrementally to reduce the tendency of those laws to elect less moderate candidates than had done so a couple of decades ago, but Congress has nonetheless grown more divided on partisan grounds. These institutions have only led to the current status quo with the help of additional factors not so directly related to U.S. election laws (most notably the fact that "realignment" of the two main U.S. political parties has run its course as described below).

Reducing partisan voting with legislative rule reforms

It would also be possible to reform legislative rules in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate respectively, in ways that would reduce the pressure on federal legislators to vote with their political party, weakening party discipline and the hold of the majority party on each house of Congress.

Unlike a parliamentary system, in the strong President system of the United States, you don't structurally need stable partisan majorities in either house of Congress to have a stable, functioning government. As long as there are majorities to pass the necessary appropriations bills every year to keep the government running, and to approve enough Presidential nominees to executive branch and judicial positions to keep the government running, you don't need bills that are passed to have the same partisan majority backing them for every bill.

The U.S. already has relatively weak party discipline compared to parliamentary systems, but it could be weakened further.

We know this from experience.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States political party system was in the middle of a transition of the policy positions of the two major political parties (called "party realignment"), which basically traded ideological positions on most issues in a process that began with Presidential candidate Goldwater's "Southern Strategy" for the Republican Party in the 1960s.

This produced a de facto three party system of Northern Democrats (who are similar to today's Democratic party), Republicans (who are similar to today's Republican party), and Southern Democrats, who were conservative on issues of national defense, foreign policy, and social issues, but liberal on economic issues. So, the working majority in Congress on economic issues was made up of Democrats, and the working majority in Congress on national defense, foreign policy, and social issues was made up of Southern Democrats and Republicans. But this lack of a consistent one party majority of every policy subject matter didn't seriously interfere with the operations of the government.

This de facto three party system eventually ended as the two major political parties completed their realignment into one fully liberal Democratic party and one fully conservative Republican party. But if electoral reforms produced a new groundswell of mode moderate legislators in Congress, this could resurface.

To make this work, however, partisanship in the procedural rules of each house of Congress would have to change.

In the U.S. House, the main reforms that would be necessary would be (1) to remove the control of the partisan leadership over the committee assignment system (e.g. by seating members on the committees of their choice by seniority with a proportional partisan balance in each house), and (2) to remove the authority of the House Rules committee to decide on a partisan basis what legislation is taken up on the floor once bills clear committees, for example, by granting every bill that clears a committee a right to a floor vote with significant right to make amendments, in the order adopted, without a supermajority vote to consider urgent legislation out of order. The allocation of U.S. House resources, like office space, would also have to be vested in some non-partisan decision-maker.

In the U.S. Senate, partisan control is already weaker, but rules that strongly empower the minority acting in a partisan fashion, like Senatorial holds and the filibuster would have to be repealed.

Is the system actually not working as intended?
The founding fathers did not foresee that the constitution would foster a two-party political system that is radical, inflexible and deadlocked. There is probably little political will to reform it for many reasons, at the cost of prosperity, security, efficiency and peace.

The U.S. federal government is undoubtedly very prone to deadlock. A majority of representatives in the U.S. House, a large minority of U.S. Senators, the President, or the courts applying constitutional rules that invalidate federal laws, each have de facto veto power over new legislation. And, the power of the two major political parties in the U.S. is equally balanced.

One of the other well known political science laws is that in a two party system (or generalizing it, to a two coalition of parties system), where the parties (or coalitions) are ideologically coherent are prone to continually attempt to tweak the composition of their pre-election coalitions by changing their policies or political tactics, in a way that tends to bring them close to a 50-50 balance of power in the governmental institutions that they most strongly wish to control (the federal government in the U.S. case).

The U.S. federal level political system has been quite evenly balanced between the two major political parties for most of the period since the 1980s (more than four decades) with only brief periods when a single party had "trifecta" control of both houses of Congress and the Presidency, and courts that have been disinclined to thwart their agenda.

In contrast, during the Great Depression and into World War II, the federal government was a dominant party system united under FDR's Democratic Party, and the initially combative Lochner era U.S. Supreme Court eventually backed down when faced with court packing legislation that was likely to pass.

Also, the most recent Congressional elections in 2022 produced outcomes in terms of legislative seats held in the U.S. House that quite closely tracked the overall popular vote for each political party nationwide, with factors that favored Republicans in some places balanced by factors that favored Democrats in other, ultimately balancing out for the nation as a whole. And, the increased partisanship and ideological distance between the political parties seen in Congress mirrors increased partisanship and ideological distance between the political parties in the electorate itself.

Legislation that has bipartisan support (e.g. aid to Israel in the wake of recent events there) can still get passed. But it has been the exception rather than the norm pretty much since the 1980s (before which there was a short period when the Democratic party was dominant at the federal level) that a single party without bipartisan support can pass federal legislation leading to major policy changes. These windows of opportunity have appeared now and then and been utilized by the parties having them. But these windows of opportunity have generally been short-lived and resulted in only moderate and somewhat incremental, rather than decisive and bold reforms.

Arguably, a system that produces gridlock and little federal legislative activity in time periods when the nation is deeply and fairly evenly divided on most political issues, is exactly what the Founders intended when they created a federal political system. When the nation is united, major new national political policies can be enacted, but when the nation is divided, real major policy innovations become much easier to achieve at the state and local level than they are to achieve at the federal level.

The two party system doesn't necessarily have a lot to do with that. Ultimately, exercising political power to change the status quo is about securing legislative majorities to take action, which requires majority support from legislators as measured by the standards of the political system to pass legislation.

In a two party political system, one assembles coalitions that the organizers of the respective political parties hope will be sufficient to secure the majorities necessary to pass legislation before the election into two pre-negotiated coalitions.

In a multi-party political system, coalitions that their member political parties hope will be sufficient to secure the majorities necessary to pass legislation are negotiated after the election.

Lots of countries, especially non-federal "unitary" political systems, make it easier to secure a legislative majority than the U.S. does. But, it isn't manifestly obvious that the task of organizing a multi-party coalition (probably balanced close to 50-50 anyway) with sufficient backing to pass legislation after Congressional elections are held would have an easier time passing legislation than the task of building one of the two major party coalitions before the election to achieve this goal in the status quo.

Also, countries with these unitary systems where the majority threshold needed to pass legislation is lower are often more politically homogeneous than the United States is politically. This lack of political consensus at a national level was a fact that was apparent even back in the time when the Founders set up the current U.S. Constitution, and it shaped how the U.S. Constitution was written.

Federal level political gridlock is ugly and frustrating.

But political gridlock is not the norm in most U.S. states, despite the fact that they also have two party political systems, mostly because most U.S. states aren't so evenly politically divided and secondarily because most U.S. states have fewer barriers to legislating (like the minority veto powers created by U.S. Senate rules and unequal populations for U.S. Senate electoral districts, i.e. U.S. states).

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Republicans secured a trifecta in Louisiana after the 2023 general election. Democrats gained control of both houses of the Virginia state legislature in the same election, although Virginia's Governor is still a Republican.

In the wake of the 2023 general election in the U.S., for example, there were 22 Republican trifectas (plus Nebraska where Republicans elected on a non-partisan basis to the unicameral legislature controlled it and the Governor was a Republican), 17 Democratic trifectas (plus the Democratic party controlled District of Columbia), and 10 divided governments where neither major political party had trifecta control. As a result of the 2023 elections, there are fewer divided governments across the United States than at any other point from 1992 to 2022.

In all of those ten states, except Pennsylvania and Alaska, both houses of the state legislature is controlled by the same political party. In theses eight states, one major political party controls the legislature and the other major political party holds the Governorship (with a Governor who is almost invariably a moderate within his or her own political party and who usually holds a line item veto that brings more give and take to partisan budget negotiations). 

Alaska's state legislative houses both have split party control after adopting ranked choice voting, with the state house also having a significant number of members who aren't members of the two major parties. This has produced a political culture which is "moderate and consensus based." A majority of the legislators in both houses of Alaska's state legislature are Republicans (as is Alaska's Governor), but each house has chosen instead to organize itself on a bipartisan basis.

Pennsylvania is the only U.S. state where the legislative process is even close to being as vulnerable to being gridlocked as the federal legislative process. It has a Governor who is a Democrat, Democrats control the state house by one seat out of more than two hundred, and Republicans control the state senate.

Also, legislative process gridlock on particular key issues can be overcome with citizen's initiatives in many U.S. states, an option that is not available at the federal level in the United States.

Federal government political gridlock has not been accompanied by corresponding state level political gridlock in the U.S.

Divided control and gridlock is the exception rather than the norm at the state level in the United States, and there are no states with legislatures elected from districts with unequal populations nor are there any states that give legislative minorities the privileges the receive in the U.S. Senate. So, getting clear majorities to pass legislation is easier at the state level than at the federal level in all but a modest minority of U.S. states.

Given the currently deeply divided state of political preferences in the U.S. at the national level, that has a strong regional geographic character, a system where state level policy reforms are much easier to achieve than federal level policy reforms where gridlock prevails, is arguably a feature and not a bug, of just the kind that the Founders intended.

One Comment

There were a number of comments to this answer, but one in particular deserves to be mentioned as it adds an important factual observation:
"not in the interest of either of the two major political parties" In the simplest case where no new parties get founded and actual voters' votes remain the same, PR would have denied the Republicans a majority in the House in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2012, and 2016; but there has been no case since the present system was introduced when the Dems won a majority under the present system but would have been denied it under PR. Hence, PR could be argued to be in the Dems' interest. – Daniel Hatton

01 October 2020

High Speed Rail In Texas And Southern California Gets Real

A high speed rail project in Texas from Dallas to Houston will be the second true high speed rail lines in the U.S., rather than mere "medium speed rail" barely faster than interstate highway motor vehicle traffic. The Dallas to Houston line is scheduled to be finished by 2027 and is a rare Trump Administration initiatives that a Biden-Harris administration surely wouldn't roll back. The Texas line will be much faster than the properly described "medium" speed Acela line in the Northeast (which is at least upgrading to trains that can handle somewhat higher speeds but needs expensive infrastructure improvements). 

A similar Los Angeles to Las Vegas proposal is scheduled to be completed in 2023 that will make the trip in 85 minutes making it the first truly high speed rail line in the U.S. California has other high speed rail plans in place in the early stages with construction just starting and completion in phases from 2029 to 2033 planned.

Florida has "medium speed" rail from Miami to West Palm Beach similar to Acela service in place (but suspended due to Coronavirus), with construction continuing to Orlando underway scheduled for 2022 completion, and continuation on to Tampa at some indefinite time after that time.

Texas High Speed Rail

The high-speed train that promises to transport passengers between Dallas and Houston in 90 minutes has been approved by the Federal Railroad Administration, according to Texas Central Railroad, the company in charge of the project.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administration issued the two key rulings, which provide the regulatory framework and the environmental review for the high-speed train, that Texas officials were waiting on to move forward with the project, according to the company. The announcement was first reported by the Houston Chronicle.

Texas Central expects to start construction in the first half of 2021. The federal Surface Transportation Board still must approve the project before construction can begin. . . . 
The company estimates that the construction for the project will take up to six years, with a total cost of around $20 billion. The train will use the same technology as the Shinkansen bullet trains in Japan, which can reach speeds of more than 200 mph. . . . 

The project has seen resistance from property owners in rural areas of Central Texas, where the railroad would travel through. According to Texas Central Railroad, they already have control of over 600 parcels of land — approximately 40% of the parcels they need for the project — as well as sites for stations in Dallas, Houston and the Brazos Valley.

From The Texas Tribune (September 21, 2020) (image from here).


XpressWest, a passenger rail project between Las Vegas and greater Los Angeles, a distance of about 170 miles, received the rights two weeks ago to build on the Interstate 15 median. Brightline, the Miami company that runs the project, plans to break ground later this year, with $5 billion of private funding, $4.2 billion of which will come in the form of tax-exempt bonds. Trains will reach speeds of 200 mph. It's expected to be completed in late 2023.

A Texas project that will offer 90-minute-or-less trips between Houston and Dallas received an important environmental review in May after a six-year wait. It also won a state court case this spring that gives it eminent domain rights, which will simplify the process of acquiring land between the two cities, which lie 240 miles apart. . . 
Efforts began to speed up Northeast corridor train service in the 1990s, and the Acela launched in 2000. But the service isn't considered true high-speed rail without investment in the tracks and infrastructure, and Amtrak has struggled to find funding. High-speed rail interest re-emerged in 2008 when former President Obama pledged billions.

High-speed rail advocates say that 2020 may be a turning point for US high-speed rail development, which has long lagged other developed nations. Japan began building high-speed rail in the 1960s. Europe followed in the 1980s and 1990s. Africa's first high-speed rail train came in 2018. China surpassed everyone in the last 12 years, building the world's largest high-speed rail network, stretching thousands of miles, and moving passengers at speeds of up to 217 mph.

From CNN (July 8, 2020) (image from here).

Acela In The Northeast Corridor. 

The Acela (/əˈsɛlə/ ə-SEL-ə; until September 2019 Acela Express) is Amtrak's flagship high speed service along the Northeast Corridor (NEC) in the Northeastern United States between Washington, D.C. and Boston via 16 intermediate stops, including Providence, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City. The route contains segments of high-speed rail, and Acela trains are the fastest trainsets in the Americas; they attain 150 mph (240 km/h) on 33.9 mi (54.6 km) of the route.

Acela carried more than 3.4 million passengers in fiscal year 2016; second only to the slower and less expensive Northeast Regional, which had over 8 million passengers in FY 2016. Its 2016 revenue of US $585 million was 25% of Amtrak's total.

Acela operates along routes that are used by freight and slower regional passenger traffic, and reaches the maximum allowed speed of the tracks only along some sections, with the fastest peak speed along segments between Mansfield, Massachusetts and Richmond, Rhode Island. Acela trains use active tilting technology, which helps control lateral centrifugal force, allowing the train to travel at higher speeds on the sharply curved NEC without disturbing passengers. The high-speed operation occurs mostly along the 226 mi (364 km) route from Pennsylvania Station in New York City to Union Station in Washington, D.C., with a fastest scheduled time of 2 hours and 45 minutes and an average speed of 82.2 mph (132.3 km/h), including time spent at intermediate stops. Over this route, Acela and the Northeast Regional service captured a 75% share of air/train commuters between New York and Washington in 2011, up from 37% in 2000.

The Acela's speed is limited by traffic and infrastructure on the route's northern half. On the 231 mi (372 km) section from Boston's South Station to New York's Penn Station, the fastest scheduled time is 3 hours and 30 minutes, or an average speed of 66 mph (106 km/h). Along this section, Acela has still captured a 54% share of the combined train and air market. The entire 457 mi (735 km) route from Boston to Washington takes between 6 hours, 38 minutes and 6 hours, 50 minutes, at an average of around 70.3 mph (113.1 km/h).

The present Acela Express equipment will be replaced by new Avelia Liberty trainsets, beginning in 2021. The new trains will have greater passenger capacity and an enhanced active tilt system that will allow faster speed on the many curved sections of the route. Amtrak plans to retire all current Acela trains by the end of 2022. . . .
On August 26, 2016, Vice President Joe Biden announced a $2.45 billion federal loan package to pay for new equipment for the Acela Express service, as well as upgrades to the NEC. The loans will finance 28 trainsets, named the Avelia Liberty, that will be built by Alstom in Hornell and Rochester, New York and will replace the existing fleet of twenty trainsets.

The fleet expansion will allow for hourly New York-Boston service all day and half-hourly New York-Washington service at peak hours. The new trainsets will be longer, offering 30% greater seating capacity and will feature active tilt technology that would allow service to operate at 186 miles per hour (299 km/h) if infrastructure improvements were completed to allow the higher speeds.

The new trains will be phased in between 2021 and 2022, after which the current fleet is to be retired. Amtrak will pay off the loans from increased NEC passenger revenue.

From Wikipedia (references omitted).

Infrastructure upgrades to make Acela a true high speed rail line would cost about $151 billion (as of July 2012), and with the infrastructure upgrades: "A trip from New York to Washington, D.C., would take just 94 minutes instead of three hours. Boston to D.C. would take just three hours instead of seven." 

Democratic Presidential nominee Joe Biden is a long time Amtrak user who often commutes from Wilmington, Delaware (a suburb of Philadelphia across the state line from it) to Union Station in Washington D.C. for his work in Congress (a 79 minute trip on the high speed line and up to a 106 minute trip via the ordinary Northeast Regional line) at a cost of $23-$45 and you don't have to buy your ticket far in advance. His choice of Amtrak to make the trip isn't irrational.

The trip takes about 119 minutes and is 108 miles via I-95 by car, requires you to have parking at your destination and prevents you from doing anything else en route unless you have a driver - at a realistic 50 cents a mile "all in" cost of driving a personal car (i.e. not just gasoline, but car insurance, oil changes and maintenance, and the cost of the car itself), it costs about $54 to make that trip one way by car. 

A Greyhound bus also connects the two locations, takes 145 minutes and costs $18-$26 one way, but it makes trips only about as often as the Amtrak and is less comfortable in addition to being slower.

You basically can't buy a direct commercial airline flight on that route. Once you factor in the time needed to clear security and board the plane (realistically at least 45 minutes), time spent on the plane from gate to gate (about 44 minutes), time spent walking from the gate in the airport to ground transportation (at least 10 minutes) travel from one of the area airports (one of two in metro D.C. or one in Baltimore) to the Capitol (at least 9 minutes from Reagan airport, at least 37 minutes from Dulles with more time from the gate to ground transportation since its a larger airport, and at least 41 minutes from Baltimore), it realistically, it would take at least 108 minutes from the Wilmington, Delaware airpot to Union Station, which is longer than the longest Northwest Regional trip and would cost more than the most expensive Acela ticket. The closest price comparison where there actually are direct commercial flights, would be from the Philadelphia airport to Reagan (about the same distance and flight time) which would cost at least $265 one way plus $19 for transport from the airport for a combined cost of at least $284 one way.

From Reagan Washington Airport, it takes 9 minutes and $19-$60 to go by taxi, shuttle or town car to Union Station, or 22 minutes and $6 to go by subway. From the Washington Dulles Airport it takes 37 minutes and $40-$120 to go by taxi, shuttle or town car to Union Station, and 50 minutes and $4-$18 to go by bus. From the Baltimore Airport, it takes 41 minutes and $35-$140 to go by taxi, shuttle or town car to Union Station, and it takes 65 minutes and $22-$115 to go by Amtrak.

The Amtrak stop at the end of the line, Union Station, is easy walking distance from the capitol. When I worked as an intern in Congress, I took a commuter rail line from a Virginia suburb of D.C. where I was staying with extended family to Union Station and walked to the Congressional office building where I worked. 

Florida's Medium Speed Rail Projects

The orange line in Florida, construction of which is already underway with service between Miami and West Palm Beach having already commenced in 2018 until it was halted in March 2020 due to COVID, on a stretch connecting three stations in about an hour with peak speeds of 79 miles per hour on a roughly 72 mile route.

An expansion to Orlando, a three hour, 240 mile trip from Miami with peak speeds of 125 miles per hour to the North of West Palm Beach, due to completed in 2022. This compares to highway travel times of 3 hours 30 minutes to 3 hours 45 minutes between the same destinations. 

An Orlando to Tampa expansion similar to the West Palm Beach to Orlando portion of the route is planned with no firm timeline or financing. 

Thus, the lines are comparable to the Acela system in the Northeast Corridor and not truly "high speed" rail lines. The cost is about $3.5 billion from Miami to Orlando.

California High Speed Rail

A high speed rail line connecting San Francisco and Sacramento to Los Angeles has a decent chance of being built. 

Plans are in place and there is a government agency that is operating in California to build 380 miles of high speed rail from Los Angeles to San Francisco with a trip time of two hours and 40 minutes, an estimated price as of 2018 of $63-98 billion, and completion in phases from 2029 to 2033. The cost for Bakersfield to Merced would be $12.4 billion. 

But construction on high speed rail has not yet begun outside the Central Valley and the route to Las Vegas.

General Considerations In Future Rail Development

High speed rail works best on medium length routes with high population density. (See a previous post at this blog on the subject here). 

Some of the plans are more serious than others. It is hard to mobilize resources to build major infrastructure projects like high speed rail lines in places like the red lines in Rust Belt cities of the Midwest and in the Northeast, that are stagnant or in decline, while it is easier to generate enthusiasm to invest large sums of money in places that are experiencing relative economic growth.

Applying those criteria (and other criteria too) the study linked above proposed the following routes:

In reality, the orange lines have ended up getting built or upgraded, before the higher priority red lines, in part, because the cost is more manageable than building high speed rail lines through high density urban areas ($154 billion for the red Northeast Corridor upgrades in 2012 dollars v. $20 billion current dollars for the orange Texas line and $4.2 billion current dollars for a Palmdale to Las Vegas line). 

Lines that involve only one or two states appear to be easier to coordinate than more involved multi-state lines. 

Yellow and gray priority lines on the map above are too low down the priority list to be considered. 

Proposals Stuck In The Planning Stage

A number of high and medium speed rail proposals are in the planning stage. They are imminent, but are further along that other lines that are merely a twinkle in the eye of some very long range planner, so they might happen someday.

The planned upgrade of the Acela line in the Northeast Corridor, because it is such as high priority, because there is already a foundation and ridership in place, and because this corridor is stable than declining economically, might get upgraded to true high speed rail status at some point. But, while new trains are planning, infrastructure improvements are basically just conceptual at this point.

The lines connecting Los Angeles to San Diego and Phoenix, are in the conceptual planning stages. So is the orange line in the Pacific Northwest where only studies are underway at this time. But these have some plausible chance of being built at some point. 

The red and orange priority lines in the Midwest, and the orange priority lines from New York City to Albany, New York and from Atlanta to the District of Columbia, seem much less likely to be built with no real recent progress to date, and the unambitious plans made to date mostly involving modest increases in the speed of existing Amtrak service to "medium speed" rail.

Colorado High Speed Rail Proposals

For example, while Front Range high speed rail in Colorado and New Mexico might have a manageable price of about $11 billion (in 2020 dollars) for 90 to 180 mile per hour lines from Colorado Springs to Fort Collins, the Interstate Highway system there is quite adequate and fast considering the volume of traffic in this corridor. 

This is particularly true if you are considering only half measures, like an 80 miles per hour line from Pueblo to Fort Collins along an Interstate highway where speed limits on the adjacent highways are already 75 miles per hour in many places. 

But a cost of $18 billion or so (in 2020 dollars) from a high speed rail line from DIA to Eagle, Colorado (along I-70, more or less) while it would alleviate congestion, would have only about a quarter of the estimated traffic of the proposed Colorado Springs to Fort Collins line along the I-25 corridor, despite costing much more to build and really makes sense financially only to the extent it can alleviate the need to spend as much on expanding and/or maintaining I-70 in the mountains. According to a study from 2014:

Two studies from the Colorado Department of Transportation have estimated the cost of building high speed rail in Colorado
With travel speeds of 90 to 180 mph, the system could save considerable time, said CDOT. A trip from C-470 and Interstate 70 in Golden to Breckenridge would take just more than a half hour; travel to Vail would take 50 minutes. Meanwhile, a trip from Fort Collins to DIA would take less than 40 minutes, and Colorado Springs to DIA would take less than an hour.

CDOT also forecasts such a rapid system could serve 18 million to 19 million passengers a year in 2035.

But preliminary capital costs are insurmountable, said Mark Imhoff, director of CDOT's division of transit and rail. A transit system linking DIA to Eagle would cost $16.5 billion, while Fort Collins to Pueblo comes in at $13.6 billion. A maximum of $1 billion to $3 billion could be obtained in private financing, leaving a considerable shortfall, Imhoff said.
This is consistent with a previous report from November of last year, which also noted that the Fort Collins to Colorado Springs portion would cost about $9.8 billion and carry 13 million passengers a year. Extending light rail from Colorado Springs to Pueblo would add $2.8 billion to construction costs and only modestly improve ridership.

The DIA to Eagle route would add about 4-5.5 million passengers (after considering an estimated allowance for Colorado Springs to Pueblo traffic out of the total), with an additional cost of $16.5 billion of infrastructure costs. Thus, the cost per rider in the mountains would be about four to five times as expensive per passenger as the Fort Collins to Colorado Springs route to build.

UPDATE October 6, 2020.

This plan below isn't realistically going to happen any time in the next couple of decades, but is a dream plan that might have happened in the absence of an Interstate Highway system.



 

23 November 2018

Winning in 2020

What do Democrats need to do to win in the 2020 election and beyond?

Policy

* Show off the virtues of the Democratic agenda in state houses we control, rather than insisting on trying to show that Democrats can get something done primarily in Congress, where only legislation acceptable to Donald Trump and hard line Republicans in the Senate can pass. 

* Demonstrate at the state level that Democrats can take meaningful steps to reduce teen pregnancy, enact sensible gun control legislation, broaden access to higher education, legalize marijuana, reduce unnecessary and costly excessive incarceration, fund relatively inexpensive government bureaucracies and court systems at levels necessary to meet the needs of growing businesses, roll back unnecessary occupational licensing regulation, use all available means to make health care more accessible, etc.

* In Congress, one potentially fruitful way to cross the aisle may be to try to distinguish Mormon Republicans, whose bases in states like Utah and Idaho were skeptical of Trump in the first place, to break with other Republicans on select issues targeting Trump's corruption and immorality. The Democrat's hand will be strongest on budget and appropriations issues and those issues can be leveraged for gains on other fronts. Sentencing reform and marijuana legalization may be exceptions where good legislation can be passed as Republicans have eventually come around to Democratic positions on these issues.

* In particular, hammer the administration on unpopular decisions like weak approaches towards Saudi Arabia, Russia and North Korea, inhumane treatment of immigrants, especially children and Dreamers, tax cuts restricted to big corporations and the rich that have produced large, peacetime deficits, corruption, environmental regulations such as endangered species protections and clean water, poor disaster responses, and support for white supremacists and neo-Nazis. Democrats have nothing to gain from cooperating to achieve half-measures with Trump.

* Keep fighting back and building outrage over Trump's conduct as President. This is what drove record turnout for the midterms. The 2020 election can have record turnout too, particularly given record turnout from Millennials for their age group. 

Election Law Reform

* Push election administration innovations that increased voter turnout like election day voter registration and all mail-in ballots and an end of signature matching for mail-in ballots in states that Democrats control legislatively, and in states that Democrats do not control, by initiative where possible.

* Push legislation and ballot initiatives to mandate that only candidates with majorities can win seats, requiring runoffs or rank choice voting in cases where the plurality candidate receives less than 50% of the vote, so that third-party candidates don't act as spoilers.

State By State Efforts

* Flip states that Trump won narrowly in 2016. Many states were very narrow wins for Trump in 2016: Wisconsin (0.7%), Pennsylvania (0.7%), and Michigan (0.3%) stand out, but Arizona (3.5%), North Carolina (3.6%) and Florida (1.2%) are also states that were reasonably close in 2016 and can be flipped in 2020. These are states that a Democrat in 2020 running against a campaign by Trump who has shown his true colors ought to be able to win.

* Defend states that Clinton won narrowly in 2016. Maine (which went for Clinton by 3.0 percentage points, but gave Trump one electoral vote in the 2nd Congressional District by 10 percentage points, which flipped to a Democrat in the House in 2018), New Hampshire (0.3%), Minnesota (1.5%) and Nevada (2.4%) were narrow wins for Clinton in 2016 and can't be taken for granted. Clinton won Colorado with a 4.9% margin in 2016 and the trend line in Colorado in the midterms was even more strongly towards the Democratic party, so Colorado may need less attention in 2020.

* Iowa (9.4%) and Ohio (8.1%) which voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012 are also winnable with the right candidate, even though they weren't close in 2016. A Midwestern nominee might be attractive.

* Democrats need a candidate who is strong in these swing states, not in states that are strongly GOP leaning, or in safe blue states.

* Work on long run party building in Arizona, following in the footsteps of similar successful efforts in Colorado, Nevada and Virginia. Arizona has supported moderate Northeastern style Republicans in the past. As the GOP has moved to the right, there is room for big tent Democrats to win Arizonans over. Even if Democrats don't win the Presidential election in 2020 in Arizona, this is one of the few states that has a potential to shift its long run partisan leanings in the long run, joining its neighbors California, Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado in the mountain states. Democrats aren't up against deep seated cultural commitments in Arizona in the way that they are in the South and many rural states or states with large Mormon populations.

* In Florida, devote lots of resources early to registering to vote the 1.4 million people with felony records who were newly enfranchised by the passage of issue 4, and Hurricane Maria migrants from Puerto Rico; improve election administration in large counties where Democrats control county government; and pursue litigation now to outlaw and prevent dirty trick voter suppression tactics utilized in the midterm election cycle.

* Develop a stronger economic issues agenda to address the concerns of voters in the Rust Belt (e.g. Northern Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and Southern Michigan).

* Provide solid Democratic party candidates to take on Cory Gardner in Colorado and Susan Collins in Maine.