19 July 2008
Online Fiction Marketing
Many people with websites are primarily seeking traffic. Anyone in the world with an internet connnection can visit, but will they? The Novelr blog focuses on the legitimate side of that undertaking, the quest to get traffic that wants to be at your site without using deceptive or manipulative tactics to do it, with a focus on marketing online fiction. The entries are articulate, well informed and up to date.
18 July 2008
McCain Isn't The Sharpest Guy In The Senate
Presidental candidate John McCain, by his own admission, was fifth from the bottom of his class at the Naval Academy out of 899 ("barely passing" in his words), and doesn't know how to use a computer, even simply to surf the net.
The net ignorance isn't explained by age alone either. My father and most of his contemporaries, who are similar in age in McCain, are quite facile with computers and routinely use the Internet, even those who weren't part of the computer revolution from the start, as my father was (he was buying computers for the office back in the 1970s). The parents of almost all the kids I went to college with (who are also of McCain's generation for the most part), like my parents, routinely communicated with me by e-mail back in the 1980s. I've worked for a couple of law partners (both Republicans) who were utterly computer illiterate, but both of them had their memorable moments of military service in World War II, not Vietnam where McCain's service thrust him into the fame that would put wind at his back as he ran for public office. Also, keep in mind that the only major the Naval Academy offered when McCain was there was in engineering, which is not normally a major associated with computer illiteracy.
The Republican authors of the book, "The Grand New Party" who favor repositiong the party as the nation's "working class" party were embarassed by their candidate's dimness on an interview with "Fresh Air" and noted that they here little enthusiasm for McCain in Republican circles. They aren't alone. Another conservative Republican party critic, Bruce Bartlett (author of “Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy” and “Wrong on Race: The Democratic Party’s Buried Past”), recently proclaimed that:
Bartlett then went on to debunk the practical importance of the differences between McCain and Obama on taxes and judges (without even mentioning McCain's famous recent flip flop on the judicial appointee issue from a previous more moderate stance in a private conversation with a group of Republican insiders).
The net ignorance isn't explained by age alone either. My father and most of his contemporaries, who are similar in age in McCain, are quite facile with computers and routinely use the Internet, even those who weren't part of the computer revolution from the start, as my father was (he was buying computers for the office back in the 1970s). The parents of almost all the kids I went to college with (who are also of McCain's generation for the most part), like my parents, routinely communicated with me by e-mail back in the 1980s. I've worked for a couple of law partners (both Republicans) who were utterly computer illiterate, but both of them had their memorable moments of military service in World War II, not Vietnam where McCain's service thrust him into the fame that would put wind at his back as he ran for public office. Also, keep in mind that the only major the Naval Academy offered when McCain was there was in engineering, which is not normally a major associated with computer illiteracy.
The Republican authors of the book, "The Grand New Party" who favor repositiong the party as the nation's "working class" party were embarassed by their candidate's dimness on an interview with "Fresh Air" and noted that they here little enthusiasm for McCain in Republican circles. They aren't alone. Another conservative Republican party critic, Bruce Bartlett (author of “Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy” and “Wrong on Race: The Democratic Party’s Buried Past”), recently proclaimed that:
In conversations with my conservative friends, I almost never hear any real support for John McCain. Between the utter disgust most conservatives feel these days for the party of George W. Bush and the disdain that many feel for McCain personally because of his long record of deriding conservative policies ranging from taxes to stem cells, there simply isn’t much to excite a conservative this political season.
Bartlett then went on to debunk the practical importance of the differences between McCain and Obama on taxes and judges (without even mentioning McCain's famous recent flip flop on the judicial appointee issue from a previous more moderate stance in a private conversation with a group of Republican insiders).
Not My Tribe Considers Toilets
I've noted before at this blog that I often disagree with the authors of Not My Tribe, but continuing my recent focus on toilets, I'll highlight two posts there today on that subject.
Should Yellow Mellow?
Marie Walden today, makes the case for flushing your toilet less often so as to emulate our neighbors in the Golden State.
In the comments there, I suggested that her one third of household water use for flushing statistic (from the Colorado Springs Gazette, which is not the world's best newspaper) is really closer to one eighth (based upon the East Larimer County water company's statistics).
I also tend to disagree with the no flush policy enshrined in the California motto, "if it's yellow, let it mellow, if it's brown, flush it down," although I see her point. In my view dual mode toilets (a big flush for solids and a small one for liquids), and gray water toilets (where clean water in a house is recycled for flushing for which less clean water is satisfactory) make better sense as water conservation solutions than low flow toilets (a personal pet peeve), or the waterless urinals that they have at the recreation center in Golden, Colorado closest to town hall.
Is Capitalism A Big Toilet?
Three Cheers For Socialized Sewage
Tony Logan, meanwhile, examines the crappy world toilet situation as an example of the failure of capitalism. He is, of course, absolutely correct sanitation in much of the world is dismal. I've twice in recent days discussed latrines as the best short term solution to that problem in the Third World, at least until decent municipal sanitation can be established.
He offers the sad state of world sanitation as exhibit one in a larger indictment of the failure of capitalism to solve the world's problems, and hence, the inadequacy of capitalism itself at solving problems that perhaps communism could. He looks to an allegedly capitalism driven worldwide toilet shortage as a metaphor for capitalism's role in impeding U.S. efforts to secure decent healthcare for all.
I would also freely agree that good sanitation is best handled with government as the primary actor via municipal water and sanitation systems (which might be called "socialized sewage" by histrionic Republicans), secondarily through regulation of housing development through building codes by local government, and with a decided tertiary role assigned to individual firm or household involvement in solving the problem.
Market based solutions and personal responsibility for disposal of human waste free of government involvement makes sense only in rural America and the exurbs, where septic systems are preferable for reasons of cost to establishing the infrastructure necessary to maintain municipal systems. In urban and suburban areas, sewage is what they call in economics a "natural monopoly" because the economies of scale involved in have a comprehensive sewer system overwhelm all other considerations.
But, despite being a strong proponent of socialized sewage, I also disagree with Mr. Logan. I do not think that capitalism is the root cause of the Third World's woes in the toilet arena or otherwise. The industrialized world's greatest sin is of omission, it has not done a good job of finding a way to help other countries secure public health, healthy economies and better governments.
Indeed, conceptualizing economics issues in the developed world as capitalist or communist is an important reason that the industrialized world has done a poor job of promoting development elsewhere. Inherent in the domestic political movement that distrusts excessive government activity is the fact that the U.S. and the rest of the developed world used government to solve a lot of the problems that government isn't solving abroad in the Third World long ago, so we have forgotten about these uncontroversial government institutions and roles in our public discourse. When industrialized world policy makers come to the Third World, that arrive with their attitudes framed by a political discussion irrelevant to solving the problems at hand.
When Did The United States Develop?
If we want to look for the right lessons from our political history to solve the Third World's problems, which should look not to the present but to the eras in our own history when we solved similar problems, and even then, we need to ask ourselves if those solutions make sense elsewhere.
Flush toilets came to most of urban America before the Civil War, and to most of the rural American South during Reconstruction and the decade or two that followed (a trend that real began to take hold, incidentally, while Northern carpetbaggers were in charge).
Urban America mostly had municipal electrical service already when the Great Depression hit, after which the Rural Electrification Administration was established to do the same in rural America, a task mostly completed in two or three decades (I have the statistics in a past post at this blog on the History of Energy also reproduced at dKospedia).
Municipal police forces were first established in the late 1800s, replacing the local, mostly volunteer militias that preceded them, and soon became the norm nationwide. The nation didn't need a national law enforcement agency (the FBI) until Prohibition led to massive organized crime, and state level law enforcement growth was mostly a product of the automobile, which made state highway patrols necessary. Even today in the United States, more than 90% of law enforcement officers are at the county and municipal level, with multiple state police and federal law enforcement agencies, sometimes working at cross purposes with each other, making up the balance of law enforcement officers.
Likewise, most, but not all, states use locally elected prosecutors or district attorneys, or prosecutors appointed by local government elected officials, to decide who should be prosecuted and what plea bargains should be struck. A larger share of the judicial function in criminal cases takes place at the state level, but probably a majority of criminal cases are still heard before judges who are either elected locally, or appointed by local elected officials.
In contrast, the national government has played a leading role in Britain (Scotland Yard) since the day of Queen Victoria and continues to have little local control of law enforcement (there are 42 police districts in England with appointed supervisory boards, but most law enforcement policy is set by the Home Secretary who is a member of the cabinet appointed from Parliament), and the autonomy of local government in the U.K. has been limited for most of its history. Both Italy and France likewise historically ran local government from the central government through appointed local prefects, with the establishment of strong elected local government bodies not really taking hold until the late 20th century.
I don't have good dates on the history of municipal fire protection services, but suspect that this was probably widespread in urban America even sooner (fire protection was a general civic duty of neighbors in rural America until a very late date, and volunteer fire departments remain common in small communities).
Indeed, most of the governmental functions that work seamlessly and invisibly in the United States, but are obviously and tragically absent or mishandled in most of the third world, are governmental functions which a assigned to local governments and are mostly non-partisan in the United States.
How Did The U.S. Get Strong Elected Local Governments?
The American tradition of strong elected local governments dates to the Colonial era and the Puritan's Mayflower Compact, and continues uninterrupted, helps explain why such important and basic governmental functions were assigned to them. The practical communication and transportation gaps between the European monarchies that established colonies in the New World and the subject colonies made local autonomy a necessity. Also, a large share of American local governments were established after the right of ordinary (or at least middle class and affluent) people to vote was widely established internationally, and most importantly, in Britain, while many European local governments pre-date the popular franchise (although there were democratically governed towns long before there was democratic national governments in any great number), so the establishment of elected local government required innovation in Europe. National governments run by elected officials, which were more responsive to reformers than monarchies, were established before elected local governments were established in much of Europe.
Property taxation was the primary method of American municipal finance from pre-Revolutionary War days, until after World War II, at least, and remains a dominant means of finance for many municipal governments. Where property taxation didn't do the trick, early American governments in the feudal tradition, received services in kind, on juries, in the local militia, and so forth, to finance government undertakings that government didn't. Property taxes were initially the only tax source for public school funding and remain the dominant means of providing the local component of funding for public schools. And, as property tax scholars note, in relatively egalitarian communities, where home values tend to be similar, property taxes look a lot like simple head taxes. Meanwhile, in communities with gross inequalities of wealth, property taxes are quasi-feudal, with major property owners financing such governmental services as exist, for the benefit of their "subjects."
Of course, prior to the American Revolution, property ownership was still tied to the franchise, and it remained tied to the franchise for almost century after the Revolution in much of the United States. Also, historically, and really up until the Warren court really took up the cause of nationalizing the Bill of Rights and giving those rights practical legal meaning, the legal responsibilities of a local government weren't much different from the local responsibilities of a private corporation. In any case, state statutory restrictions on local government powers prior to the widespread onset of home rule charters, left local governments with little general legislative authority. With a financing mechanism limited to homeowners based on home value, a franchise limited to property owners, few operational requirements uniquely associated with having a governmental character, and limited general legislative power, municipal governments in the days when most municipal governments around today were founded looked more like today's home owner's associations than like modern governmental entities that happen to be municipalities.
Capitalism, Communism, Islam, and the Roman Empire
There is more to the scope of government than the tired old fight between capitalists and communists. The fight between capitalist and communists only makes sense in societies that have reached the stage of economic development where it makes sense and evolved in the first place, the industrial age. Then, at that stage of the game, some societies, like the British and Americans, accomplished industrialization mostly through the private sector, while in much of the rest of the world, major industrialization efforts were largely government led. (The Japanese and Korean system of oligarchic cabals sort of splits the difference.) But, until a society has meaningful physical capital, who owns that capital is irrelevant.
The Third World is full of disorganized communities in which no one is in a position take roll up their sleeves and turn underutilized services and resources into useful collective action. Governments, religious organizations, civic organizations and businesses are all devices for organizing groups of people bringing about that kind of action.
My take on the explosive initial growth of Islam is to a great extent the ability of its leaders to organize people to take action to better their communities that Islam's unified leadership fused church and state made possible. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the pagan communities that Islam conquered, were disorganized and far less dynamic. Certainly, the Islamic empire was also extended at the tip of the swords of horse riding soldiers, but military force alone can't explain how that empire grew so fast from such a tiny baseline. Islam expanded from a tiny community of Arab believers, to an empire that stretched from Spain and Morroco to Indonesia, mostly in the first couple of generations following the death of its founding prophet. Force of arms alone, despite only minimal advances from pre-existing warcraft that arose at the time, makes a less persausive argument for this dramatic expansion than the force of ideas (in this case a more functional social organization), which could have muted organized opposition and permitted conquered territories to be easily co-opted.
Similar community catalysis can been seen in those areas, both inside and outside the United States, where Islam and Islamic institutions (or other religious organizations, such as the tremendously rapidly growing Christian churches and organizations in Africa) are growing most rapidly today. For example, the ability of the Taliban's Islamists to shake people out of three decades of anarchy into a coherent functioning society largely explains there rise to power in the stateless nation that was Afghanistan before they took control, until they were swept out of power just as they were on the verge on controlling the entire country in the post-9-11 invasion by the United States and its allies. If the Taliban hadn't organized Afghan society out of the funk it had fallen into, prior to the post-9-11 invasion, the country would have been ungovernable by anyone.
Back To Toilets
Where am I going with this and what does it have to do with Third World toilets?
Most places that have bad sanitation also have rampant unemployment. This is notable because unemployment is not primarily a shortage of jobs, but is instead a key measure of a societal failure to creativity and entrepreneurship. Behind the visible lack of physical capital is a lack of human and social capital. Unemployment happens when not enough self-starters with power can thing of anything worthwhile for less self-driven people to do. In any community with poor sanitation, there is no shortage of worthwhile work that could be done by unemployed people. Creating good sanitation systems is work that doesn't have to be done with cheap manual labor, but it is also work that certainly can be done that way.
In any community with both bad sanitation and rampant unemployment one of the big underlying problems is a lack of leadership to put two and two together to make everyone better off. It doesn't really matter if leaders style themselves as local government officials, business chiefs, clergy or non-profit organization directors. All that matters it that someone establishes some social structure to meet people's obvious needs with resources that are already available to meet those needs. It isn't that these communities don't have people that could potentially be those leaders, but those people either lack the know how, or can't manage to secure the authority they need, to make a difference.
In contrast, a well organized society, like that of the Romans, who were well known as the best plumbers of the ancient world, the Egyptians (who invented surveying out of the need to manage flood damage), the Greeks, the Incas and Mayans, the Anasazi (also known for their good water management), the Chinese Dynasties in their golden age, and the Islamic empire at its peak, can achieve high levels of civilization even without modern technology or particularly unusual natural resources.
What the Third World real needs is some way to get their societies organized to meet their basic needs using well established technologies, so that they can, having established the basic necessities for functioning, move on to making a better life for themselves from a firm foundation.
The Third World plays Plato
Plato, in his political treatise, The Republic compared various forms of government and asked which was best. Much of the Third World, is with greater and lesser degrees of conscious thought, asking the same question. What kind of society do we need to have to secure the good life?
The most of the Third World is neither capitalist nor communist. Many Third World monarchies, dictatorships and one party systems are for practical purposes feudal or neo-feudal. Other places, like Somalia, Northwestern Pakistan, and the rural portions of most Third World countries that are far from their small numbers of government officials and sprawling haphazard cities, are often pre-feudal, with fractured tribes and warlords having predominant influence locally.
It is little wonder then, that Islamists have been these places their new centers of evangelization and power bases. Reforming these kinds of communities is what brought Islam to the powerful role it has in today's world. The trouble is that while Islamist are good at bringing communities out of chaos and into order, they can impede further development in the organized urban communities that follow. Iran seems to have developed some sort of nascent democratic capitalism shepherded by Islamic theocracy, as have a couple of Islamic monarchies, but there are been more failures than successes, and even now Iran is experiencing intense international friction and chaffing against the limitations theocracy imposes upon it domestically, simmering below the official surface. Theocracy is a dead end development strategy.
Both capitalism and communism would be a boon to these countries, which have neither in any meaningful sense, if they could be pulled off. But, capitalism presumes a strong state to enforce the legal rights of the capitalist who has no army of his own. Communism presumes a society of full of people who have the inclination and ability to manage a whole society of large enterprises by committee. Most Third World countries lack either. Marx himself was very aware that neither capitalism nor communism are the default grounds states of economic organization, and are, instead successors to early modes of economic organization. Theocracy, another leading economic organization option, is effective at first in the situations the Third World faces, but is a dead end in the long run.
Democratic capitalism works pretty well in some places, and those places happen to be the wealthiest societies on the planet. But, democratic capitalism is only a means to an end, and I, at least, am not ideologically committed to it. I favor it because it often works, as a practical matter, not because it is right as a matter of some modern day natural law. Indeed, one important reason why the developed world has less than burgeoning enthusiasm for encouraging the economic development of the rest of the world has been the long list of failures that its efforts to put in place governmental and economic institutions in their own image has produced.
Democratic capitalism requires a lot of elements to work. These include elected officials who know how to give direction to civil servants in ways that produce result and have workable plans for securing the results the public is asking for, significant levels of administrative competence for a large class of civil servants, widely held commitments by community members and civil servants to non-corrupt administration, high levels of societal organization, strong coincidences between written law and actual practice in daily life, secure governmental authority, national level civic and political organization, a widespread money based post-subsistence economy, and a consensus on the core rules under which rule of law will operate. If enough of the elements needed to make democratic capitalism work are absent, it is unstable and can't produce effective civil government. In the industrial world, the necessary elements are so ubiquitous these predicates to making it work can be virtually ignored. But those elements are not present everywhere. Often in those countries, the military is the only institution organized enough to salvage the state at all (or is, at least, the most organized governmental institution in the country), so it steps in (often prematurely) when the fumbles of the civilian democratic regime grow obvious and no one manages to step up to the plate to fix them in normal civilian democratic channels.
For all its faults, colonialism was probably, on the whole, better than what it left in its wake, for the average citizens of colonial regimes. While almost all initially adopted democratic capitalist regimes upon attaining independence, you can count on your fingers the number that managed to hold onto it continuously afterward. The most notable post-Colonial regime to stay democratic, India, did so only after enduring a painful ethno-geographic schism and carefully hewing a middle line between communism and capitalism, and only after several hundred years of making a more nuanced assessment of the lessons to be learned from its colonizers, a period much longer than most of its fellow colonies of first world countries. Alas, as the small number of successful post-colonial regimes makes clear, like theocratic regimes, colonial powers also have a tendency to thwart further development. In the colonialism case, these thens to happen when colonized powers threaten to compete with the domestic industries and interests of the colonizing power.
Given the spectacular collapse of the one party rule regime that was the basis of the Soviet Union's empire, and the lack of necessary predicates to a thriving democratic capitalist government in much of the rest of the world, it is little wonder that prominent alternatives like Iran's theocratically restrained democracy, and China's more organic and undoctrinaire species of Communist government, look attractive. I'm not conviced, given the bloody and tumultuous history of Maoist communism in the world, even if much of that has faded away, that Chinese communism is much more attractive, although it has enough currency that the first democratic parliamentary regime of Nepal, upon shedding its monarchy, is one that calls itself Maoist.
I can't easily point to a way out that is better than the options discussed above. If there were a clear example, everyone would have followed it by now and there would be no Third World. But, sketching out the problems with the current approaches is a good first step to finding a better solution, even if it may have to wallow through muddy territory full of crappy alternatives on the way there.
Should Yellow Mellow?
Marie Walden today, makes the case for flushing your toilet less often so as to emulate our neighbors in the Golden State.
In the comments there, I suggested that her one third of household water use for flushing statistic (from the Colorado Springs Gazette, which is not the world's best newspaper) is really closer to one eighth (based upon the East Larimer County water company's statistics).
I also tend to disagree with the no flush policy enshrined in the California motto, "if it's yellow, let it mellow, if it's brown, flush it down," although I see her point. In my view dual mode toilets (a big flush for solids and a small one for liquids), and gray water toilets (where clean water in a house is recycled for flushing for which less clean water is satisfactory) make better sense as water conservation solutions than low flow toilets (a personal pet peeve), or the waterless urinals that they have at the recreation center in Golden, Colorado closest to town hall.
Is Capitalism A Big Toilet?
Three Cheers For Socialized Sewage
Tony Logan, meanwhile, examines the crappy world toilet situation as an example of the failure of capitalism. He is, of course, absolutely correct sanitation in much of the world is dismal. I've twice in recent days discussed latrines as the best short term solution to that problem in the Third World, at least until decent municipal sanitation can be established.
He offers the sad state of world sanitation as exhibit one in a larger indictment of the failure of capitalism to solve the world's problems, and hence, the inadequacy of capitalism itself at solving problems that perhaps communism could. He looks to an allegedly capitalism driven worldwide toilet shortage as a metaphor for capitalism's role in impeding U.S. efforts to secure decent healthcare for all.
I would also freely agree that good sanitation is best handled with government as the primary actor via municipal water and sanitation systems (which might be called "socialized sewage" by histrionic Republicans), secondarily through regulation of housing development through building codes by local government, and with a decided tertiary role assigned to individual firm or household involvement in solving the problem.
Market based solutions and personal responsibility for disposal of human waste free of government involvement makes sense only in rural America and the exurbs, where septic systems are preferable for reasons of cost to establishing the infrastructure necessary to maintain municipal systems. In urban and suburban areas, sewage is what they call in economics a "natural monopoly" because the economies of scale involved in have a comprehensive sewer system overwhelm all other considerations.
But, despite being a strong proponent of socialized sewage, I also disagree with Mr. Logan. I do not think that capitalism is the root cause of the Third World's woes in the toilet arena or otherwise. The industrialized world's greatest sin is of omission, it has not done a good job of finding a way to help other countries secure public health, healthy economies and better governments.
Indeed, conceptualizing economics issues in the developed world as capitalist or communist is an important reason that the industrialized world has done a poor job of promoting development elsewhere. Inherent in the domestic political movement that distrusts excessive government activity is the fact that the U.S. and the rest of the developed world used government to solve a lot of the problems that government isn't solving abroad in the Third World long ago, so we have forgotten about these uncontroversial government institutions and roles in our public discourse. When industrialized world policy makers come to the Third World, that arrive with their attitudes framed by a political discussion irrelevant to solving the problems at hand.
When Did The United States Develop?
If we want to look for the right lessons from our political history to solve the Third World's problems, which should look not to the present but to the eras in our own history when we solved similar problems, and even then, we need to ask ourselves if those solutions make sense elsewhere.
Flush toilets came to most of urban America before the Civil War, and to most of the rural American South during Reconstruction and the decade or two that followed (a trend that real began to take hold, incidentally, while Northern carpetbaggers were in charge).
Urban America mostly had municipal electrical service already when the Great Depression hit, after which the Rural Electrification Administration was established to do the same in rural America, a task mostly completed in two or three decades (I have the statistics in a past post at this blog on the History of Energy also reproduced at dKospedia).
Municipal police forces were first established in the late 1800s, replacing the local, mostly volunteer militias that preceded them, and soon became the norm nationwide. The nation didn't need a national law enforcement agency (the FBI) until Prohibition led to massive organized crime, and state level law enforcement growth was mostly a product of the automobile, which made state highway patrols necessary. Even today in the United States, more than 90% of law enforcement officers are at the county and municipal level, with multiple state police and federal law enforcement agencies, sometimes working at cross purposes with each other, making up the balance of law enforcement officers.
Likewise, most, but not all, states use locally elected prosecutors or district attorneys, or prosecutors appointed by local government elected officials, to decide who should be prosecuted and what plea bargains should be struck. A larger share of the judicial function in criminal cases takes place at the state level, but probably a majority of criminal cases are still heard before judges who are either elected locally, or appointed by local elected officials.
In contrast, the national government has played a leading role in Britain (Scotland Yard) since the day of Queen Victoria and continues to have little local control of law enforcement (there are 42 police districts in England with appointed supervisory boards, but most law enforcement policy is set by the Home Secretary who is a member of the cabinet appointed from Parliament), and the autonomy of local government in the U.K. has been limited for most of its history. Both Italy and France likewise historically ran local government from the central government through appointed local prefects, with the establishment of strong elected local government bodies not really taking hold until the late 20th century.
I don't have good dates on the history of municipal fire protection services, but suspect that this was probably widespread in urban America even sooner (fire protection was a general civic duty of neighbors in rural America until a very late date, and volunteer fire departments remain common in small communities).
Indeed, most of the governmental functions that work seamlessly and invisibly in the United States, but are obviously and tragically absent or mishandled in most of the third world, are governmental functions which a assigned to local governments and are mostly non-partisan in the United States.
How Did The U.S. Get Strong Elected Local Governments?
The American tradition of strong elected local governments dates to the Colonial era and the Puritan's Mayflower Compact, and continues uninterrupted, helps explain why such important and basic governmental functions were assigned to them. The practical communication and transportation gaps between the European monarchies that established colonies in the New World and the subject colonies made local autonomy a necessity. Also, a large share of American local governments were established after the right of ordinary (or at least middle class and affluent) people to vote was widely established internationally, and most importantly, in Britain, while many European local governments pre-date the popular franchise (although there were democratically governed towns long before there was democratic national governments in any great number), so the establishment of elected local government required innovation in Europe. National governments run by elected officials, which were more responsive to reformers than monarchies, were established before elected local governments were established in much of Europe.
Property taxation was the primary method of American municipal finance from pre-Revolutionary War days, until after World War II, at least, and remains a dominant means of finance for many municipal governments. Where property taxation didn't do the trick, early American governments in the feudal tradition, received services in kind, on juries, in the local militia, and so forth, to finance government undertakings that government didn't. Property taxes were initially the only tax source for public school funding and remain the dominant means of providing the local component of funding for public schools. And, as property tax scholars note, in relatively egalitarian communities, where home values tend to be similar, property taxes look a lot like simple head taxes. Meanwhile, in communities with gross inequalities of wealth, property taxes are quasi-feudal, with major property owners financing such governmental services as exist, for the benefit of their "subjects."
Of course, prior to the American Revolution, property ownership was still tied to the franchise, and it remained tied to the franchise for almost century after the Revolution in much of the United States. Also, historically, and really up until the Warren court really took up the cause of nationalizing the Bill of Rights and giving those rights practical legal meaning, the legal responsibilities of a local government weren't much different from the local responsibilities of a private corporation. In any case, state statutory restrictions on local government powers prior to the widespread onset of home rule charters, left local governments with little general legislative authority. With a financing mechanism limited to homeowners based on home value, a franchise limited to property owners, few operational requirements uniquely associated with having a governmental character, and limited general legislative power, municipal governments in the days when most municipal governments around today were founded looked more like today's home owner's associations than like modern governmental entities that happen to be municipalities.
Capitalism, Communism, Islam, and the Roman Empire
There is more to the scope of government than the tired old fight between capitalists and communists. The fight between capitalist and communists only makes sense in societies that have reached the stage of economic development where it makes sense and evolved in the first place, the industrial age. Then, at that stage of the game, some societies, like the British and Americans, accomplished industrialization mostly through the private sector, while in much of the rest of the world, major industrialization efforts were largely government led. (The Japanese and Korean system of oligarchic cabals sort of splits the difference.) But, until a society has meaningful physical capital, who owns that capital is irrelevant.
The Third World is full of disorganized communities in which no one is in a position take roll up their sleeves and turn underutilized services and resources into useful collective action. Governments, religious organizations, civic organizations and businesses are all devices for organizing groups of people bringing about that kind of action.
My take on the explosive initial growth of Islam is to a great extent the ability of its leaders to organize people to take action to better their communities that Islam's unified leadership fused church and state made possible. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the pagan communities that Islam conquered, were disorganized and far less dynamic. Certainly, the Islamic empire was also extended at the tip of the swords of horse riding soldiers, but military force alone can't explain how that empire grew so fast from such a tiny baseline. Islam expanded from a tiny community of Arab believers, to an empire that stretched from Spain and Morroco to Indonesia, mostly in the first couple of generations following the death of its founding prophet. Force of arms alone, despite only minimal advances from pre-existing warcraft that arose at the time, makes a less persausive argument for this dramatic expansion than the force of ideas (in this case a more functional social organization), which could have muted organized opposition and permitted conquered territories to be easily co-opted.
Similar community catalysis can been seen in those areas, both inside and outside the United States, where Islam and Islamic institutions (or other religious organizations, such as the tremendously rapidly growing Christian churches and organizations in Africa) are growing most rapidly today. For example, the ability of the Taliban's Islamists to shake people out of three decades of anarchy into a coherent functioning society largely explains there rise to power in the stateless nation that was Afghanistan before they took control, until they were swept out of power just as they were on the verge on controlling the entire country in the post-9-11 invasion by the United States and its allies. If the Taliban hadn't organized Afghan society out of the funk it had fallen into, prior to the post-9-11 invasion, the country would have been ungovernable by anyone.
Back To Toilets
Where am I going with this and what does it have to do with Third World toilets?
Most places that have bad sanitation also have rampant unemployment. This is notable because unemployment is not primarily a shortage of jobs, but is instead a key measure of a societal failure to creativity and entrepreneurship. Behind the visible lack of physical capital is a lack of human and social capital. Unemployment happens when not enough self-starters with power can thing of anything worthwhile for less self-driven people to do. In any community with poor sanitation, there is no shortage of worthwhile work that could be done by unemployed people. Creating good sanitation systems is work that doesn't have to be done with cheap manual labor, but it is also work that certainly can be done that way.
In any community with both bad sanitation and rampant unemployment one of the big underlying problems is a lack of leadership to put two and two together to make everyone better off. It doesn't really matter if leaders style themselves as local government officials, business chiefs, clergy or non-profit organization directors. All that matters it that someone establishes some social structure to meet people's obvious needs with resources that are already available to meet those needs. It isn't that these communities don't have people that could potentially be those leaders, but those people either lack the know how, or can't manage to secure the authority they need, to make a difference.
In contrast, a well organized society, like that of the Romans, who were well known as the best plumbers of the ancient world, the Egyptians (who invented surveying out of the need to manage flood damage), the Greeks, the Incas and Mayans, the Anasazi (also known for their good water management), the Chinese Dynasties in their golden age, and the Islamic empire at its peak, can achieve high levels of civilization even without modern technology or particularly unusual natural resources.
What the Third World real needs is some way to get their societies organized to meet their basic needs using well established technologies, so that they can, having established the basic necessities for functioning, move on to making a better life for themselves from a firm foundation.
The Third World plays Plato
Plato, in his political treatise, The Republic compared various forms of government and asked which was best. Much of the Third World, is with greater and lesser degrees of conscious thought, asking the same question. What kind of society do we need to have to secure the good life?
The most of the Third World is neither capitalist nor communist. Many Third World monarchies, dictatorships and one party systems are for practical purposes feudal or neo-feudal. Other places, like Somalia, Northwestern Pakistan, and the rural portions of most Third World countries that are far from their small numbers of government officials and sprawling haphazard cities, are often pre-feudal, with fractured tribes and warlords having predominant influence locally.
It is little wonder then, that Islamists have been these places their new centers of evangelization and power bases. Reforming these kinds of communities is what brought Islam to the powerful role it has in today's world. The trouble is that while Islamist are good at bringing communities out of chaos and into order, they can impede further development in the organized urban communities that follow. Iran seems to have developed some sort of nascent democratic capitalism shepherded by Islamic theocracy, as have a couple of Islamic monarchies, but there are been more failures than successes, and even now Iran is experiencing intense international friction and chaffing against the limitations theocracy imposes upon it domestically, simmering below the official surface. Theocracy is a dead end development strategy.
Both capitalism and communism would be a boon to these countries, which have neither in any meaningful sense, if they could be pulled off. But, capitalism presumes a strong state to enforce the legal rights of the capitalist who has no army of his own. Communism presumes a society of full of people who have the inclination and ability to manage a whole society of large enterprises by committee. Most Third World countries lack either. Marx himself was very aware that neither capitalism nor communism are the default grounds states of economic organization, and are, instead successors to early modes of economic organization. Theocracy, another leading economic organization option, is effective at first in the situations the Third World faces, but is a dead end in the long run.
Democratic capitalism works pretty well in some places, and those places happen to be the wealthiest societies on the planet. But, democratic capitalism is only a means to an end, and I, at least, am not ideologically committed to it. I favor it because it often works, as a practical matter, not because it is right as a matter of some modern day natural law. Indeed, one important reason why the developed world has less than burgeoning enthusiasm for encouraging the economic development of the rest of the world has been the long list of failures that its efforts to put in place governmental and economic institutions in their own image has produced.
Democratic capitalism requires a lot of elements to work. These include elected officials who know how to give direction to civil servants in ways that produce result and have workable plans for securing the results the public is asking for, significant levels of administrative competence for a large class of civil servants, widely held commitments by community members and civil servants to non-corrupt administration, high levels of societal organization, strong coincidences between written law and actual practice in daily life, secure governmental authority, national level civic and political organization, a widespread money based post-subsistence economy, and a consensus on the core rules under which rule of law will operate. If enough of the elements needed to make democratic capitalism work are absent, it is unstable and can't produce effective civil government. In the industrial world, the necessary elements are so ubiquitous these predicates to making it work can be virtually ignored. But those elements are not present everywhere. Often in those countries, the military is the only institution organized enough to salvage the state at all (or is, at least, the most organized governmental institution in the country), so it steps in (often prematurely) when the fumbles of the civilian democratic regime grow obvious and no one manages to step up to the plate to fix them in normal civilian democratic channels.
For all its faults, colonialism was probably, on the whole, better than what it left in its wake, for the average citizens of colonial regimes. While almost all initially adopted democratic capitalist regimes upon attaining independence, you can count on your fingers the number that managed to hold onto it continuously afterward. The most notable post-Colonial regime to stay democratic, India, did so only after enduring a painful ethno-geographic schism and carefully hewing a middle line between communism and capitalism, and only after several hundred years of making a more nuanced assessment of the lessons to be learned from its colonizers, a period much longer than most of its fellow colonies of first world countries. Alas, as the small number of successful post-colonial regimes makes clear, like theocratic regimes, colonial powers also have a tendency to thwart further development. In the colonialism case, these thens to happen when colonized powers threaten to compete with the domestic industries and interests of the colonizing power.
Given the spectacular collapse of the one party rule regime that was the basis of the Soviet Union's empire, and the lack of necessary predicates to a thriving democratic capitalist government in much of the rest of the world, it is little wonder that prominent alternatives like Iran's theocratically restrained democracy, and China's more organic and undoctrinaire species of Communist government, look attractive. I'm not conviced, given the bloody and tumultuous history of Maoist communism in the world, even if much of that has faded away, that Chinese communism is much more attractive, although it has enough currency that the first democratic parliamentary regime of Nepal, upon shedding its monarchy, is one that calls itself Maoist.
I can't easily point to a way out that is better than the options discussed above. If there were a clear example, everyone would have followed it by now and there would be no Third World. But, sketching out the problems with the current approaches is a good first step to finding a better solution, even if it may have to wallow through muddy territory full of crappy alternatives on the way there.
The Economic Impact Of Domestic Oil Production
The Wilderness Society has gathered up a number of briefing sheets at their website about the environmental impacts of oil shale development, which is a hot issue in the debates over Colorado oil and gas development in environmentally sensitive areas. Not surprisingly, gathering up oil shale resources is bad for the localized natural areas and residents, and separating oil from oil shale involves energy use that produces lots of greenhouse gases and air pollution generally.
One of the blurbs they pick out of their story, which is that "Experts generally agree that more drilling will not lower gasoline prices," is almost certainly not true.
Increased supply reduces prices, and oil drilling increases the supply of oil. (The oil and gas industry wouldn't be interested in more drilling if it didn't increase supply.) This is about as fundamental a principle as one gets in economics. Indeed, by claiming otherwise (even though it requires lengthy nuance to state a more accurate message), the Wilderness Society triggers an immediate rejections of their overall message, which is still basically on target, in the same way that they might turn off a physicist by claiming to have a perpetual motion machine. At best, to the extent this statement is true, it is deceptive. Gasoline prices may be up in absolute terms because the forces pushing up gasoline prices are greater in magnitude than the economic impact of additional drilling.
For example, the impact of opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve to drilling and ending legal prohibitions on drilling oil on the coastal shelves of the United States combined has been estimated by government economists to take years to have an impact, and at their peak might reduce prices at the pump by a few pennies a gallon, at the same time that other forces in the world market may overshadow these impacts to the point where the impact is hard to parse out of the overall price. Thus, more drilling may simply make gasoline prices lower than they otherwise would have been without more drilling, but gasoline prices will still rise due to other factors.
But, I seriously doubt that many economists are actually arguing that increasing domestic oil supplies by opening up ANWAR for drilling and allowing offshore drilling on U.S. Coasts would not have any downward impact on world oil prices at all. It may be a drop in the bucket, but it still contributes to the world supply of oil.
The magnitude of the impact more domestic oil and gas drilling in environmentally sensitive areas would have on oil prices is quite another thing. As the Wilderness Society rightly notes:
The point these statistics try to make is true, despite a few important technical niggles that I identify below about them. The U.S. has ceased to be a very important player in the world oil production market. Even substantial increases and decreases in domestic oil supplies have only a modest impact on the overall petroleum market. The magnitude of the economic impact of U.S. production on world oil prices, and hence on domestic gasoline prices, is quite modest.
For example, about 8% of U.S. vehicle fuels come from biofuels, mostly corn based ethanol (per a NPR story I heard in the past week or so), which is on an order of magnitude comparable in market price importance to or more important than any possible changes in domestic oil production. Producers are souring on the economic viability of corn based ethanol, even with substantial government subsidies, but the example of corned based ethanol shows that biofuels can have an economic impact on domestic vehicle fuel supplies comparable to or greater than major changes in domestic oil production.
Likewise, fairly modest single digit percentage reductions in consumption from fuel efficiency and conservation efforts can have impacts on oil prices comparable in magnitude to increased domestic oil and gas production in economically sensitive areas.
Of course, even the statistics on the U.S. share of world oil resources, come with caveats. First, the number are current numbers. But, countries where oil is cheaper and easier to drill, like those in the Middle East, Nigeria and Venezuela, are using up their supplies at a faster rate than the U.S. is right now.
Second, the U.S. imports natural gas mostly from geographically close and politically stable places like Mexico and Canada. And, a good share of our imported oil also comes from these geographically close, politically stable neighbors. But, since oil travels better than natural gas, oil prices are more strongly driven by the world market, rather than the local market, and oil in the world petroleum market comes mostly from places with questionable government much further from home.
Third, when one talks about world "oil resources" and "gas resources" one is using shorthand for the real number referred to, which is economically exploitable oil resources and gas resources. Many reserves that are not economically exploitable when oil prices are in the $20-$40 2008 dollars a barrel range where they have been for most of the past century, may be economically exploitable in an age of $140 a barrel or more oil.
Terms like "Peak oil" do not refer to the point at which the world runs out of oil. Indeed, it probably never will run out of oil. It refers to the point at which the amount of oil produced in a given time period (typically a year) reaches its peak. After that, annual oil production is expected to decline gradually, while demand is expects to continue to rise in the face of developing world economic growth and population growth. These twin forces are expected, more or less inevitably, to drive up oil prices to the kind of shockingly high levels we see now and to get higher and higher over time.
Eventually, of course, this will end the "oil age" of the world economy which replaced the "steam age" (a euphemism of a coal based economy) that preceded it, although what combination of natural gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables will replace petroleum is very much up a question still in the process of being resolved.
It is also worth noting that while natural gas is not running out as fast as petroleum (i.e. annual consumption is a smaller percentage of known reserves), Peak Natural Gas is expected to follow Peak Oil by a decade or two, and the natural gas market is likely to start looking more like the petroleum market over the next couple of decades, because the technology for transportation natural gas over long distances by ship, rather than via pipelines, is advancing. This will turn the natural gas market into a true world market, rather than several regional ones, and will permit natural gas to be diverted from natural gas rich locations without enough economic development to use it, to places that have exhausted or never had natural gas resources but have economies that could use more of the cleanest fossil fuel.
One of the reason that the oil industry hasn't fought terribly hard about U.S. environmental restrictions on off shore drilling along the U.S. Coasts, and drilling in environmentally sensitive places from Alaska to Colorado on federal property, is that the environmentally sensitive domestic oil supply (particularly oil shale which requires more work to extra than liquid oil reserves in which a finished product can simply be pumped out of underground pools of oil in the ground), is that environmentally sensitive domestic oil reserves are mostly expensive to exploit relative to oil reserves elsewhere in the world market.
Indeed, I wouldn't be at all surprised if, in the long run, it turned out to be cheaper to chemically convert vast American coal reserves into liquid fuels that are a close substitute for petroleum from mineral sources (and into syngas that is a close substitute for natural gas), than it is to exploit Colorado's oil shale reserves. The break points for economically viable oil share and coal to oil conversions in the last 1970s and early 1980s, before the oil shale bust wiped out Grand Junction, Western Colorado more generally, and seriously maimed the entire Colorado economy, were within a few dollars of each other, and the technology to covert coal to a liquid fuel backed most prominently by Montana's Governor seems to have advanced more rapidly than oil shale technology, whose biggest fan these days is probably Republican U.S. Senate candidate Bob Schaffer.
A more honest pitch would be to explain that the amount of oil produced in ANWAR and other environmentally sensitive places is a drop in the bucket that comes at a great price to our nation's treasures.
One of the blurbs they pick out of their story, which is that "Experts generally agree that more drilling will not lower gasoline prices," is almost certainly not true.
Increased supply reduces prices, and oil drilling increases the supply of oil. (The oil and gas industry wouldn't be interested in more drilling if it didn't increase supply.) This is about as fundamental a principle as one gets in economics. Indeed, by claiming otherwise (even though it requires lengthy nuance to state a more accurate message), the Wilderness Society triggers an immediate rejections of their overall message, which is still basically on target, in the same way that they might turn off a physicist by claiming to have a perpetual motion machine. At best, to the extent this statement is true, it is deceptive. Gasoline prices may be up in absolute terms because the forces pushing up gasoline prices are greater in magnitude than the economic impact of additional drilling.
For example, the impact of opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve to drilling and ending legal prohibitions on drilling oil on the coastal shelves of the United States combined has been estimated by government economists to take years to have an impact, and at their peak might reduce prices at the pump by a few pennies a gallon, at the same time that other forces in the world market may overshadow these impacts to the point where the impact is hard to parse out of the overall price. Thus, more drilling may simply make gasoline prices lower than they otherwise would have been without more drilling, but gasoline prices will still rise due to other factors.
But, I seriously doubt that many economists are actually arguing that increasing domestic oil supplies by opening up ANWAR for drilling and allowing offshore drilling on U.S. Coasts would not have any downward impact on world oil prices at all. It may be a drop in the bucket, but it still contributes to the world supply of oil.
The magnitude of the impact more domestic oil and gas drilling in environmentally sensitive areas would have on oil prices is quite another thing. As the Wilderness Society rightly notes:
At current consumption levels, U.S. resources are inadequate to achieve energy independence. The United States contains 2.5% of the world's oil resources and 3% of world natural gas resources. But we account for 24% of total world consumption of oil and 22% of natural gas consumption.
The point these statistics try to make is true, despite a few important technical niggles that I identify below about them. The U.S. has ceased to be a very important player in the world oil production market. Even substantial increases and decreases in domestic oil supplies have only a modest impact on the overall petroleum market. The magnitude of the economic impact of U.S. production on world oil prices, and hence on domestic gasoline prices, is quite modest.
For example, about 8% of U.S. vehicle fuels come from biofuels, mostly corn based ethanol (per a NPR story I heard in the past week or so), which is on an order of magnitude comparable in market price importance to or more important than any possible changes in domestic oil production. Producers are souring on the economic viability of corn based ethanol, even with substantial government subsidies, but the example of corned based ethanol shows that biofuels can have an economic impact on domestic vehicle fuel supplies comparable to or greater than major changes in domestic oil production.
Likewise, fairly modest single digit percentage reductions in consumption from fuel efficiency and conservation efforts can have impacts on oil prices comparable in magnitude to increased domestic oil and gas production in economically sensitive areas.
Of course, even the statistics on the U.S. share of world oil resources, come with caveats. First, the number are current numbers. But, countries where oil is cheaper and easier to drill, like those in the Middle East, Nigeria and Venezuela, are using up their supplies at a faster rate than the U.S. is right now.
Second, the U.S. imports natural gas mostly from geographically close and politically stable places like Mexico and Canada. And, a good share of our imported oil also comes from these geographically close, politically stable neighbors. But, since oil travels better than natural gas, oil prices are more strongly driven by the world market, rather than the local market, and oil in the world petroleum market comes mostly from places with questionable government much further from home.
Third, when one talks about world "oil resources" and "gas resources" one is using shorthand for the real number referred to, which is economically exploitable oil resources and gas resources. Many reserves that are not economically exploitable when oil prices are in the $20-$40 2008 dollars a barrel range where they have been for most of the past century, may be economically exploitable in an age of $140 a barrel or more oil.
Terms like "Peak oil" do not refer to the point at which the world runs out of oil. Indeed, it probably never will run out of oil. It refers to the point at which the amount of oil produced in a given time period (typically a year) reaches its peak. After that, annual oil production is expected to decline gradually, while demand is expects to continue to rise in the face of developing world economic growth and population growth. These twin forces are expected, more or less inevitably, to drive up oil prices to the kind of shockingly high levels we see now and to get higher and higher over time.
Eventually, of course, this will end the "oil age" of the world economy which replaced the "steam age" (a euphemism of a coal based economy) that preceded it, although what combination of natural gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables will replace petroleum is very much up a question still in the process of being resolved.
It is also worth noting that while natural gas is not running out as fast as petroleum (i.e. annual consumption is a smaller percentage of known reserves), Peak Natural Gas is expected to follow Peak Oil by a decade or two, and the natural gas market is likely to start looking more like the petroleum market over the next couple of decades, because the technology for transportation natural gas over long distances by ship, rather than via pipelines, is advancing. This will turn the natural gas market into a true world market, rather than several regional ones, and will permit natural gas to be diverted from natural gas rich locations without enough economic development to use it, to places that have exhausted or never had natural gas resources but have economies that could use more of the cleanest fossil fuel.
One of the reason that the oil industry hasn't fought terribly hard about U.S. environmental restrictions on off shore drilling along the U.S. Coasts, and drilling in environmentally sensitive places from Alaska to Colorado on federal property, is that the environmentally sensitive domestic oil supply (particularly oil shale which requires more work to extra than liquid oil reserves in which a finished product can simply be pumped out of underground pools of oil in the ground), is that environmentally sensitive domestic oil reserves are mostly expensive to exploit relative to oil reserves elsewhere in the world market.
Indeed, I wouldn't be at all surprised if, in the long run, it turned out to be cheaper to chemically convert vast American coal reserves into liquid fuels that are a close substitute for petroleum from mineral sources (and into syngas that is a close substitute for natural gas), than it is to exploit Colorado's oil shale reserves. The break points for economically viable oil share and coal to oil conversions in the last 1970s and early 1980s, before the oil shale bust wiped out Grand Junction, Western Colorado more generally, and seriously maimed the entire Colorado economy, were within a few dollars of each other, and the technology to covert coal to a liquid fuel backed most prominently by Montana's Governor seems to have advanced more rapidly than oil shale technology, whose biggest fan these days is probably Republican U.S. Senate candidate Bob Schaffer.
A more honest pitch would be to explain that the amount of oil produced in ANWAR and other environmentally sensitive places is a drop in the bucket that comes at a great price to our nation's treasures.
Are Elders Too Powerful In America?
This morning on NPR, they were interviewing an international architect about the CCTV Tower going up in China in a lengthy piece that was trying to get at the social context of the project. What really stuck out as noticable in the piece was the architect's comments on the age of the decision makers in different countries.
In the United States, decision makers were in the 70s. In Europe, they were in their 50s. In China, they were in their 30s. This influenced their perspective on and attitudes towards major architectual projects he said, with younger decision makers tending to be more innovative and risk taking.
If these patterns exist more widely, they indicate a sociology of business decision making by continent that has wide implications beyond major architectual projects. More notably, it raises the question of whether American governmental and business leaders have been too slow in passing the torch to the next generation and, if this is the case, why?
One plausible theory is that management of large enterprises is so autonomous from ownership, that senior managers start acting like owners and thus hold onto control long past the point where it is economically sensible to do so.
This information also seems to put the lie to the notion that other countries are more respectful of their elders than Americans. In addition to have a quite old average age and quite large number of elderly individuals by international standards, the old in the U.S. also benefit from the most vigorous part of the government's social safety net (Medicare, Medicaid elder care, Social Security without means tests, and SSI, among other programs), not to mention strong tax incentives to favor retirement savings and among the world's toughest age discrimination laws, and they are the wealthiest age demographic in the United States.
In the United States, decision makers were in the 70s. In Europe, they were in their 50s. In China, they were in their 30s. This influenced their perspective on and attitudes towards major architectual projects he said, with younger decision makers tending to be more innovative and risk taking.
If these patterns exist more widely, they indicate a sociology of business decision making by continent that has wide implications beyond major architectual projects. More notably, it raises the question of whether American governmental and business leaders have been too slow in passing the torch to the next generation and, if this is the case, why?
One plausible theory is that management of large enterprises is so autonomous from ownership, that senior managers start acting like owners and thus hold onto control long past the point where it is economically sensible to do so.
This information also seems to put the lie to the notion that other countries are more respectful of their elders than Americans. In addition to have a quite old average age and quite large number of elderly individuals by international standards, the old in the U.S. also benefit from the most vigorous part of the government's social safety net (Medicare, Medicaid elder care, Social Security without means tests, and SSI, among other programs), not to mention strong tax incentives to favor retirement savings and among the world's toughest age discrimination laws, and they are the wealthiest age demographic in the United States.
17 July 2008
VSP's 501(c)(4) Exemption Revoked
No one disputes that VSP (for Vision Service Plan), which is basically a major insurance company specializing in vision services that also provides on the order of 40,000 sets of eyeglasses on a charitable basis each year has no shareholders in the traditional corporate sense. Likewise, VSP doesn't claim that charitable income tax deduction that comes with 501(c)(3) status. It has claimed since 1960, a tax exemption under 501(c)(4), more commonly applied to civic membership organizations, originally optometrists. But, this wasn't enough for VSP to hold onto to its 501(c)(4) tax exempt status which was revoked this year. Even if a corporation is organized as a non-profit under state law, it can't receive a tax exemption without fitting into one of the numerous different categories of non-profit organizations out there.
The vast majority of its services are provided on a fee for service basis. It pays high salaries to its senior executives and big commissions to its major brokers based upon sales generated, and has for-profit like incentives for its employees to cut costs. VSP also accumulates large surpluses by charging more for its services than it costs to provide those services.
In practical effect, this ruling means that a little more than a third of VSP's accumulated earnings each year, after payment of all expenses including executive compensation, will have to be turned over to the federal government to pay federal corporate income taxes. Given the availability of a charitable deduction for for profit corporations, this means that VSP actually has a stronger tax incentive to be charitable and to control fees for its members as a for profit corporation, than it did as a non-profit corporation.
Also ironically, the current tax code contains no strong incentive "for profit" corporations that are not closely held pay dividends to shareholders, despite the paper tigers of the accumulated income tax and personal holding company tax. Special tax rates applicable to the dividends received by individual shareholders from corporations identical to the capital gains tax rates paid by those shareholders gaining from the sale of shares in corporations make the tax code largely neutral, beyond two taxes aimed at accumulated income, between dividends and capital gains.
Debt financing of for profit corporations is also favored over equity financing of for profit corporations under the current tax code in almost all economically important circumstances, and the likely repeal of favorable rates of taxation on dividends received by individuals in the next administration will favor retention of earnings over distribution of dividends in large "for profit" corporations.
In practice, the vast majority of corporations subject to corporate income taxes measured by revenues, profits or assets, for example, are publicly held corporations. The overwhelming majority closely held companies never pay corporate income taxes in the absence of a tax planning goof. Medium sized privately held companies can likewise often greatly reduce their corporate income tax burden with fairly simple tax planning.
It is time to square tax law incentives with non-tax law objectives. The taxation of publicly held corporations should be designed to favor equity financing (which makes the economy more stable) and to favor dividend distributions (which subjects publicly held corporation investment decisions to market discipline) over the accumulation of income, while discouraging high executive compensation when it doesn't produce shareholder value. The taxation of non-profits should reward non-profits that focus on the greater good or the good of their members, while creating natural incentives that discourage use of non-profit resources for narrow gain or purposeless or unnecessary accumulation of income, while similarly discouraging self-dealing fat compensation packages by senior executives.
The theoretical basis for transforming the incentives already exists. Indeed, doing so is basically a multiple choice question, there are a small finite number of big picture to go about doing it. There are technical issues that would have to be vetted carefully, because the devil is in the details in tax law, but the broad economic principals involved in crafting these kinds of reforms are well established.
The main distinction between U.S. tax law and tax law in countries with better corporate tax incentives is that U.S. tax law reform has to be sensitive to the fact that in American federalism. In the U.S. individual state tax systems are largely independent of the federal system, something that is hard to force states to due differently, because state constitutions make fiscal reforms in many states, including Colorado, difficult. For reasons that aren't obvious until you try to start drafting concrete proposals, American public finance federalism makes the "dividend withholding credit" model used in much of the world and in many academic proposals to implement some of these incentives much more awkward to implement here than it is elsewhere. In contrast, American federalism favors approaches that tinker with definitions of corporate adjusted gross income and individual adjusted gross income, which are touchstones of state income taxation in most states that have income taxes, even though this may not secure theoretical perfect parity between debt and equity, and between capital gains and dividend income.
The vast majority of its services are provided on a fee for service basis. It pays high salaries to its senior executives and big commissions to its major brokers based upon sales generated, and has for-profit like incentives for its employees to cut costs. VSP also accumulates large surpluses by charging more for its services than it costs to provide those services.
In practical effect, this ruling means that a little more than a third of VSP's accumulated earnings each year, after payment of all expenses including executive compensation, will have to be turned over to the federal government to pay federal corporate income taxes. Given the availability of a charitable deduction for for profit corporations, this means that VSP actually has a stronger tax incentive to be charitable and to control fees for its members as a for profit corporation, than it did as a non-profit corporation.
Also ironically, the current tax code contains no strong incentive "for profit" corporations that are not closely held pay dividends to shareholders, despite the paper tigers of the accumulated income tax and personal holding company tax. Special tax rates applicable to the dividends received by individual shareholders from corporations identical to the capital gains tax rates paid by those shareholders gaining from the sale of shares in corporations make the tax code largely neutral, beyond two taxes aimed at accumulated income, between dividends and capital gains.
Debt financing of for profit corporations is also favored over equity financing of for profit corporations under the current tax code in almost all economically important circumstances, and the likely repeal of favorable rates of taxation on dividends received by individuals in the next administration will favor retention of earnings over distribution of dividends in large "for profit" corporations.
In practice, the vast majority of corporations subject to corporate income taxes measured by revenues, profits or assets, for example, are publicly held corporations. The overwhelming majority closely held companies never pay corporate income taxes in the absence of a tax planning goof. Medium sized privately held companies can likewise often greatly reduce their corporate income tax burden with fairly simple tax planning.
It is time to square tax law incentives with non-tax law objectives. The taxation of publicly held corporations should be designed to favor equity financing (which makes the economy more stable) and to favor dividend distributions (which subjects publicly held corporation investment decisions to market discipline) over the accumulation of income, while discouraging high executive compensation when it doesn't produce shareholder value. The taxation of non-profits should reward non-profits that focus on the greater good or the good of their members, while creating natural incentives that discourage use of non-profit resources for narrow gain or purposeless or unnecessary accumulation of income, while similarly discouraging self-dealing fat compensation packages by senior executives.
The theoretical basis for transforming the incentives already exists. Indeed, doing so is basically a multiple choice question, there are a small finite number of big picture to go about doing it. There are technical issues that would have to be vetted carefully, because the devil is in the details in tax law, but the broad economic principals involved in crafting these kinds of reforms are well established.
The main distinction between U.S. tax law and tax law in countries with better corporate tax incentives is that U.S. tax law reform has to be sensitive to the fact that in American federalism. In the U.S. individual state tax systems are largely independent of the federal system, something that is hard to force states to due differently, because state constitutions make fiscal reforms in many states, including Colorado, difficult. For reasons that aren't obvious until you try to start drafting concrete proposals, American public finance federalism makes the "dividend withholding credit" model used in much of the world and in many academic proposals to implement some of these incentives much more awkward to implement here than it is elsewhere. In contrast, American federalism favors approaches that tinker with definitions of corporate adjusted gross income and individual adjusted gross income, which are touchstones of state income taxation in most states that have income taxes, even though this may not secure theoretical perfect parity between debt and equity, and between capital gains and dividend income.
The Right To Bear Arms and Self-Defense In Colorado
Eugene Volokh notes an interesting case on the right to self-defense under historical Colorado law:
The rule of law articulated is probably still good law in Colorado, although the precedent is probably not directly applicable any longer. The argument would now be made from current statutory language and the cases interpreting that language. Colorado codified its criminal code decades after the 1913 case, following the general outline of the Model Penal Code (which among other things, discontinued criminal penalties for adultery), there has been further tinkering with the right to self-defense in the home by the legislature since then, and there has been a massive evolution in the law regarding both domestic violence and the nature of a husband's rights concerning his wife. Spouses are no longer immune to criminal prosecution for crimes committed against each other outside some very specific situations (e.g. statutory rape in the context of a legally recognized marriage).
The 1913 ruling followed the first wave of major reforms in the legal status of married women in the late 19th century in the state, and would have been a much harder case at the time than it is under existing law. Colorado became a state at the dawn of the progressive movement, a trend that was important it making it a leader in providing women's sufferage, and was either a leader or in the middle of the pack in enacting other protections for women's rights. This case also came on the heels of the repudiation of the fugitive slave law when the Union won the Civil War.
In contrast, in the terroritorial era in Colorado, husbands and wives would have been immune from both civil and criminal prosecutions for almost all acts other than murder perpetrated against a spouse, courts generally didn't have the authority to end a marriage by divorce (a power confined to legislatures), and married women were generally considered incapable of owning property or being parties in lawsuits.
Volokh cites the case for what it illuminates about the link between the right to self-defense, which was mostly implied and arose mostly under state law (the widespread federalization of crime didn't really begin until the New Deal), and the right to bear arms under federal and state constitutions.
Colorado's state Bill of Rights (Article II of the Colorado Constitution) differs in language from the Second Amendment. It states, at Section 13 (and has without amendment since August 1, 1876) that:
A growing discussion of the Second Amendment is asking if it also creates an affirmative right to self-defense, subject to reasonable government regulation, and the case for an implied right to self-defense is stronger under the state constitution, that specifically mentions defense of "home, person and property" as one of the contexts in which the state right to bear arms applies, than it is under the federal constitution, where the language and federal scope of the Second Amendment is muddier.
The Courts in Colorado have held that the state right to bear arms is not absolute, despite less language indicating such limitations in the text of the state constitution itself than in the Second Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977), People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228 (1979), Douglass v. Kelton, 199 Colo. 446, 610 P.2d 1067 (1980), and People v. flugbeil, 834 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1992). The Colorado right has instead been held to be subject to reasonable regulation under the police power which is not subject to scrict scrutiny by the courts and is not a fundamental right. Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994).
The state right of convicted felons to bear arms is subject to reasonable legislative regulation and limitation, People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), but an assertion of a state constitutional right to bear arms may be considered in a prosecution for possession of weapons by a previous offedners if there is an evidentiary basis for doing so, People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977), although not if there is no offer of proof to show a factual basis for asserting the right, People v. Barger, 732 P.2d 1225 (Colo. App. 1986).
A City of Lakewood municipal ordinance was held constitutionally invalid in the case, Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972).
Two other cases addressing the right to bear arms in Colorado, under the state constitution, were People v. Makamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936) and People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
The Second Amendment constrains only the federal government and does not appply to laws or policies of state governments and their subordinate local governments, because the right is not "incorporated" as part of the legal impact of the 14th Amendment. This is due to current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which is a binding statement of federal constitutional law upon all lower U.S. courts (although, in practice, state supreme courts honor this principle less often than federal courts do). This is true even after Heller, which recognized that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, at least of one's home, with a handgun, subject to some level of regulation, . There is some indication that some members of the U.S. Supreme Court are interested in overruling that precedent, but lower courts are not at liberty to do so of their own accord until that day. Thus, the scope of any state constitutional right to bear arms is highly relevant at this time to the constitutional issues involved in gun control.
[A] 1913 Colorado decision relied on the constitutional status of the right to defend one’s home in rejecting a husband’s claimed right to enter another’s house to bring back his estranged wife. Bailey’s sister had fled her abusive husband and came to stay at Bailey’s house. The husband came to Bailey’s house; Bailey demanded that he not come in; the husband came in, and Bailey shot him. Bailey was convicted of murder, in a trial at which the court instructed the jury that a husband
"had a right to enter, in a lawful manner, the house ... of any person ... for the purpose of talking with and procuring his said wife to leave the said house, and had a right to use such reasonable force and persuasion as was necessary to induce her to ... come back to her home with him; and no person ... had a right to interfere with him in the exercise of such reasonable force or persuasion."
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the conviction partly because this instruction “would destroy the moral, constitutional, statutory and common law right of defense of habitation.”
The rule of law articulated is probably still good law in Colorado, although the precedent is probably not directly applicable any longer. The argument would now be made from current statutory language and the cases interpreting that language. Colorado codified its criminal code decades after the 1913 case, following the general outline of the Model Penal Code (which among other things, discontinued criminal penalties for adultery), there has been further tinkering with the right to self-defense in the home by the legislature since then, and there has been a massive evolution in the law regarding both domestic violence and the nature of a husband's rights concerning his wife. Spouses are no longer immune to criminal prosecution for crimes committed against each other outside some very specific situations (e.g. statutory rape in the context of a legally recognized marriage).
The 1913 ruling followed the first wave of major reforms in the legal status of married women in the late 19th century in the state, and would have been a much harder case at the time than it is under existing law. Colorado became a state at the dawn of the progressive movement, a trend that was important it making it a leader in providing women's sufferage, and was either a leader or in the middle of the pack in enacting other protections for women's rights. This case also came on the heels of the repudiation of the fugitive slave law when the Union won the Civil War.
In contrast, in the terroritorial era in Colorado, husbands and wives would have been immune from both civil and criminal prosecutions for almost all acts other than murder perpetrated against a spouse, courts generally didn't have the authority to end a marriage by divorce (a power confined to legislatures), and married women were generally considered incapable of owning property or being parties in lawsuits.
Volokh cites the case for what it illuminates about the link between the right to self-defense, which was mostly implied and arose mostly under state law (the widespread federalization of crime didn't really begin until the New Deal), and the right to bear arms under federal and state constitutions.
Colorado's state Bill of Rights (Article II of the Colorado Constitution) differs in language from the Second Amendment. It states, at Section 13 (and has without amendment since August 1, 1876) that:
The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil powers when thereto legally summoned, shall be called into question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.
A growing discussion of the Second Amendment is asking if it also creates an affirmative right to self-defense, subject to reasonable government regulation, and the case for an implied right to self-defense is stronger under the state constitution, that specifically mentions defense of "home, person and property" as one of the contexts in which the state right to bear arms applies, than it is under the federal constitution, where the language and federal scope of the Second Amendment is muddier.
The Courts in Colorado have held that the state right to bear arms is not absolute, despite less language indicating such limitations in the text of the state constitution itself than in the Second Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977), People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228 (1979), Douglass v. Kelton, 199 Colo. 446, 610 P.2d 1067 (1980), and People v. flugbeil, 834 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1992). The Colorado right has instead been held to be subject to reasonable regulation under the police power which is not subject to scrict scrutiny by the courts and is not a fundamental right. Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994).
The state right of convicted felons to bear arms is subject to reasonable legislative regulation and limitation, People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), but an assertion of a state constitutional right to bear arms may be considered in a prosecution for possession of weapons by a previous offedners if there is an evidentiary basis for doing so, People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977), although not if there is no offer of proof to show a factual basis for asserting the right, People v. Barger, 732 P.2d 1225 (Colo. App. 1986).
A City of Lakewood municipal ordinance was held constitutionally invalid in the case, Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972).
Two other cases addressing the right to bear arms in Colorado, under the state constitution, were People v. Makamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936) and People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
The Second Amendment constrains only the federal government and does not appply to laws or policies of state governments and their subordinate local governments, because the right is not "incorporated" as part of the legal impact of the 14th Amendment. This is due to current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which is a binding statement of federal constitutional law upon all lower U.S. courts (although, in practice, state supreme courts honor this principle less often than federal courts do). This is true even after Heller, which recognized that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, at least of one's home, with a handgun, subject to some level of regulation, . There is some indication that some members of the U.S. Supreme Court are interested in overruling that precedent, but lower courts are not at liberty to do so of their own accord until that day. Thus, the scope of any state constitutional right to bear arms is highly relevant at this time to the constitutional issues involved in gun control.
16 July 2008
Latrines Change Lives
In India, household toilets run the full gamut from Western style flush toilets (the Japanese models with features like heated seats and customer music preference analysis are still mostly absent) to chamber pots. The dirty clean up job in handled in chamber pot households in a manner quintessentially Indian. It is outsourced to "manual scavengers," "a euphemism for those who clean up the faeces from houses that lack flushing toilets," who are paid a pittance (about $1.73 a month) and social pariahs.
According to The Economist:
Most "manual scavengers" work in big cities where alternative toilets are available. The solution to this social problem, involving cheap, ecologically sound latrines that are better for public health and a retraining program, is also quinessentially Indian, in the tradition of other Indian innovations like microlending:
I've previously noted at this blog that latrines can be best from a public health perspective in the developing world, where sewage from flush toilets is often insufficiently treated before it is dumped in waterways that are used directly for drinking water and household washing.
Should Sulabh's training programs fail, India's guaranteed employment system, one of the countries core welfare programs, can provide a backstop. The system was a key Congress party coalition platform item in 2004, and this year the “National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme” (NREGS) went from being a pilot program in 330 districts to a nationwide program key to the Congress party coalition's May 2009 general election campaign. Last year the program "provided 30m families with an average of 43 days' work." The government estimates that 260 million of its citizens are below the poverty line.
Many seasonal workers use the program to survive economically between busy seasons. Competition from NREGS has also allegedly driven up local wages in other manual work sectors like farming, although this may also be attributable to worldwide increases in food prices and a booming Indian economy.
The manual work dominanted public works projects themselves don't appear to be terribly important to the economy and suffer from a lack of expert engineering supervision, and like all government programs in India, there is inevitable corruption, although it is modest by Indian standards. "According to a recent World Bank simulation, more Indian peasants would be withdrawn from poverty if the government just handed them cash—without first making them shovel dirt." But, handing out money has it own problems: "By Congress's own rule of thumb—attributed to Rajiv Gandhi, the party's murdered leader, in the 1980s and since parroted by activist and politician alike—85% of welfare spending fails to reach its intended recipients."
According to The Economist:
Manual scavenging was banned in 1993 by a law that also forbade the unplumbed toilets that necessitate it. But implementation has been slow. So several hundred thousand scavengers are still at work.
Most "manual scavengers" work in big cities where alternative toilets are available. The solution to this social problem, involving cheap, ecologically sound latrines that are better for public health and a retraining program, is also quinessentially Indian, in the tradition of other Indian innovations like microlending:
Sulabh, a charity, has developed an ingeniously simple one, costing around $100, that empties into one pit, and then, when it is full, another. It flushes with two litres of water, compared with the ten litres required by a standard cistern toilet. It takes ten people two years to fill one pit, by which time the waste in the other has turned into composted manure, clean enough for growing vegetables.
Sulabh has built 1.2m of the latrines across India and helped 60,000 scavengers find new work. “The toilet is a tool of social change,” declares Bindeshwar Pathak, a (high-caste) brahmin who started the charity in 1970 and has developed a passion for lavatorial technology.
I've previously noted at this blog that latrines can be best from a public health perspective in the developing world, where sewage from flush toilets is often insufficiently treated before it is dumped in waterways that are used directly for drinking water and household washing.
Should Sulabh's training programs fail, India's guaranteed employment system, one of the countries core welfare programs, can provide a backstop. The system was a key Congress party coalition platform item in 2004, and this year the “National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme” (NREGS) went from being a pilot program in 330 districts to a nationwide program key to the Congress party coalition's May 2009 general election campaign. Last year the program "provided 30m families with an average of 43 days' work." The government estimates that 260 million of its citizens are below the poverty line.
Wherever it applies, Indians may demand employment as their right. If it is not provided within 15 days, they are entitled to receive unemployment benefit. . . . To exorcise ghost workers, NREGS muster rolls are read aloud at work-sites each morning. Many of these lists are available online. To chase away dodgy contractors—a main beneficiary of some works projects—at least 60% of the funds devoted to NREGS must be spent on wages for manual labourers. . . . these poor folk are self-selecting: only a genuinely needy man would be likely to labour under an Indian sun for 60 rupees ($1.50) a day, the national minimum wage stipulated under NREGS. . . . In Rajasthan, at least, it is working well. With its history of public works, and with fairly well-established local governments to run the scheme, the state last year came closer to honouring its prescriptions than any other. In the fiscal year that ended this March, Rajasthan provided an average of 85 days' work to some 2m households, a threefold increase in public-works employment offered by the state . . . [and] NREGS employees came mostly from India's poorest groups: including 19% from dalit (formerly “untouchable”) castes, and 46% from tribal groups. Nearly 70% were women. Earning 73 rupees for a day's labour—the minimum wage set by the state—they did better than their sisters working in agriculture. In 2005 the average agricultural wage for women in Rajasthan was 48 rupees a day.
Many seasonal workers use the program to survive economically between busy seasons. Competition from NREGS has also allegedly driven up local wages in other manual work sectors like farming, although this may also be attributable to worldwide increases in food prices and a booming Indian economy.
The manual work dominanted public works projects themselves don't appear to be terribly important to the economy and suffer from a lack of expert engineering supervision, and like all government programs in India, there is inevitable corruption, although it is modest by Indian standards. "According to a recent World Bank simulation, more Indian peasants would be withdrawn from poverty if the government just handed them cash—without first making them shovel dirt." But, handing out money has it own problems: "By Congress's own rule of thumb—attributed to Rajiv Gandhi, the party's murdered leader, in the 1980s and since parroted by activist and politician alike—85% of welfare spending fails to reach its intended recipients."
15 July 2008
Coal Makes Kids Stupid
Coyote Gulch highlights a study documenting the harm to children's brains and development caused by coal pollution.
Banking Mayhem Limited To Shareholders
U.S. banking regulators swooped in to seize mortgage lender IndyMac Bancorp Inc (IMB.N) on Friday after withdrawals by panicked depositors led to the third-largest banking failure in U.S. history. . . . IndyMac joins top bank failures headed by the 1984 collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) insisted IndyMac's failure was the second-largest bank failure based on FDIC figures. But the FDIC said its data showed it was third behind the collapse of First RepublicBank Corp in 1988.
From here.
Thanks to the FDIC, not many people will be hurt in the third largest bank collapse in U.S. history, despite the fact that depositors withdrew more than $1.3 billion in an 11 day June/July run on the bank.
The FDIC, which will seek a buyer for IndyMac, estimated the cost of the bank's failure to its $53 billion insurance fund at between $4 billion and $8 billion.
A particularly notable fact is the two of the worst subprime offenders, IndyMac and Countrywide, had the same founders.
IndyMac was founded in 1985 by David Loeb and Angelo Mozilo, who also founded Countrywide, another big mortgage lender whose loans helped fuel the housing boom. Countrywide was taken over last week by Bank of America Corp (BAC.N).
So, who suffers:
IndyMac had said earlier in the week it was unable to raise new capital, would slash staff by 60 percent and had stopped making home loans. Its stock then tumbled, last trading at 28 cents on the New York Stock Exchange, down 95 percent in 2008.
The FDIC insures up to $100,000 per deposit and up to $250,000 per retirement account at insured banks.
At the time of closing, IndyMac had about $1 billion of potentially uninsured deposits held by about 10,000 depositors. The FDIC said it would pay those depositors an advance dividend equal to 50 percent of the uninsured amount.
Why uninsured depositors should get anything when the FDIC is taking a hit bigger than the uninsured deposits in this incident is mysterious. Both stockholders and uninsured depositors knew the risks that they were taking. The harm to the staff and to people on the verge of closing home loans is more troubling.
What Has FISA Legislation Cost Us?
The Democrats caved to the President on FISA, the law that governs foreign intelligence related wiretapping. What did we lose (substantively) in this legislative itself?
First, it gave telecom's retroactive immunity for breaking pre-amendment FISA and makes it unlikely that the government officials who broke the law will ever be held accountable. It also created a new FISA warrant loophole, called a Certification of Mass Acquisition Surveillance Program explained below:
In short, this law, for the first time, allows surveilance of electronic communications, some foreign, and statistically, some percentage domestic, without the requirement of any particularized governmental interest in the surrepticiously monitored communication
First, it gave telecom's retroactive immunity for breaking pre-amendment FISA and makes it unlikely that the government officials who broke the law will ever be held accountable. It also created a new FISA warrant loophole, called a Certification of Mass Acquisition Surveillance Program explained below:
Beyond the obvious fact that it requires only certification and loose judicial review rather than a warrant, it does so in the following way:
1. It Eliminates the requirement that there be probable cause that a foreign target is a suspect of any kind — terrorist, criminal, ore “foreign agent.” They merely need be your French grandmother, as long as they are outside the United States and not a U.S. person, and if the government says wiretapping them is for the purpose of collecting “foreign intelligence information” (e.g., her Pommes Frites recipe).
2. It requires the cooperation of telecoms in these efforts.
3. It eliminates of the need to specify a particular email address or phone number to be wiretapped.
4. 1-3 together imply that certifications of wiretapping on individuals is not the issue. The point is to use telecom cooperation to target large collections of data on communications between U.S. Persons and foreigners. This implies data mining — where, for instance, because a foreign target has communications passing through a given domestic switch, any communications (domestic or international) passing through that switch are subject to collection, analysis, and storage. There are “minimization requirements” meant to ameliorate this, but it is unclear if they really help.
5. The compromise of domestic communications in (4) is exacerbated by the fact that targets need only be “reasonably believed” to be outside the U.S.
6. It includes only minimal court oversight — who it is that is subject to warrantless wiretapping will not be know to the FISA court; the government can wiretap before it court order is sought and continue to do so even if it is denied — during a lengthy appeal process.
In short, this law, for the first time, allows surveilance of electronic communications, some foreign, and statistically, some percentage domestic, without the requirement of any particularized governmental interest in the surrepticiously monitored communication
Mixed Result For Al-Marri In En Banc Review Ruling
There have been just two people detained as enemy combatants in the United States.
One, Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was criminally prosecuted for conspiracy and his enemy combatant status was vacated before his case was fully litigated, leaving in place a bad precedent in a moot case. Padilla was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a long prison term. His case is now being appealled in the civilian courts.
The other, al-Marri, is a non-citizen legally in the country, was criminally prosecuted, after which he was removed from the criminal justice system upon being declared an enemy combatant.
The controlling 5-4 per curiam ruling in his case states:
Thus, Chief Judge Williams and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, and Duncan voted with the government on both issues, while Judges Michael, Motz, King, and Gregory voted against the government on both issues. The swing vote was Judge Traxler who upheld the government's authority to detain Al-Marri if the allegations made were true, but stated that Al-Marri was not afforded sufficient due process, so that further proceedings are required.
The highly divided en banc panel of the 4th Circuit (links are available at How Appealing) reached its decision in a 5-4 vote that spawned seven opinions.
Either parties may either further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to grant certiorari prior to the en banc decision, or may see what happens upon remand. SCOTUS blog reports that Al-Marri plans an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, while the government is willing to let the ruling stand and proceed to dealing with the case on remand.
The best indication of the rights that Al-Marri will have on remand flow from swing Judge Traxler's concurring opinion. This states:
In other words, the government will be required to present some real evidence and to justify decisions to withhold evidence on an individualized basis, but may still be permitted to withhold some evidence from Al-Marri.
This ruling, on the power of the President to treat someone outside a war zone in the continental United States as an enemy combatant is the most important of all the war on terror cases other than Padilla, because the habeas corpus rights of people within the United States have a far greater impact on the typical American or American immigrant's constitutional rights. It does not appear to overrule the troubling Padilla holding, although it does appear to narrow it.
One, Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was criminally prosecuted for conspiracy and his enemy combatant status was vacated before his case was fully litigated, leaving in place a bad precedent in a moot case. Padilla was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a long prison term. His case is now being appealled in the civilian courts.
The other, al-Marri, is a non-citizen legally in the country, was criminally prosecuted, after which he was removed from the criminal justice system upon being declared an enemy combatant.
The controlling 5-4 per curiam ruling in his case states:
PER CURIAM:
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his military detention as an enemy combatant. After the district court denied all relief, al-Marri noted this appeal. A divided panel of this court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered that al-Marri’s military detention cease. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
Subsequently, this court vacated that judgment and considered the case en banc. The parties present two principal issues for our consideration: (1) assuming the Government’s allegations about al-Marri are true, whether Congress has empowered the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant; and (2) assuming Congress has
empowered the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant provided the Government’s allegations against him are true, whether al-Marri has been afforded sufficient process to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.*
Having considered the briefs and arguments of the parties, the en banc court now holds: (1) by a 5 to 4 vote (Chief Judge Williams and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Traxler, and Duncan voting in the affirmative; Judges Michael, Motz, King, and Gregory voting in the negative), that, if the Government’s allegations about al-Marri are true, Congress has empowered the President to detain him as an enemy combatant; and (2) by a 5 to 4 vote (Judges Michael, Motz, Traxler, King, and Gregory voting in the affirmative; Chief Judge Williams and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, and Duncan voting in the negative), that, assuming Congress has empowered the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant provided the Government’s allegations against him are true, al-Marri has not been afforded sufficient process
to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions that follow.
*We deny the Government’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. The Government relied on section 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, which amended the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42. After we heard en banc argument in this case, the Supreme Court declared section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, ___, slip op. at 64 (June 12, 2008). The Government now concedes that we have jurisdiction over al-Marri’s habeas petition.
Thus, Chief Judge Williams and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, and Duncan voted with the government on both issues, while Judges Michael, Motz, King, and Gregory voted against the government on both issues. The swing vote was Judge Traxler who upheld the government's authority to detain Al-Marri if the allegations made were true, but stated that Al-Marri was not afforded sufficient due process, so that further proceedings are required.
The highly divided en banc panel of the 4th Circuit (links are available at How Appealing) reached its decision in a 5-4 vote that spawned seven opinions.
Either parties may either further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to grant certiorari prior to the en banc decision, or may see what happens upon remand. SCOTUS blog reports that Al-Marri plans an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, while the government is willing to let the ruling stand and proceed to dealing with the case on remand.
The best indication of the rights that Al-Marri will have on remand flow from swing Judge Traxler's concurring opinion. This states:
The general rule, therefore, is that al-Marri would be entitled to the normal due process protections available to all within this country, including an opportunity to confront and question witnesses against him. But, if the government can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district court that this is impractical, outweighed by national security interests, or otherwise unduly burdensome because of the nature of the capture and the potential burdens imposed on the government to produce non-hearsay evidence and accede to discovery requests, then alternatives should be considered and employed. Given the grave national security concerns in matters such as this, and that the Rapp Declaration references not only al-Marri’s activities in this country but also those he engaged in abroad prior to his entry here, the Rapp Declaration might conceivably prove to be "the most reliable available evidence" within the meaning of Hamdi, at least as to some allegations. However, I am not satisfied to let matters stand as they are when the government has not even been required to demonstrate to the district court why it cannot or should not be required to produce, even for ex parte examination, any of the supporting evidence relied upon by Rapp to justify al-Marri’s detention. Here, the government has made no showing that "[h]earsay . . . [needs] to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the [g]overnment" or that the "exigencies of the circumstances . . . demand . . . [that the] enemy combatant proceeding[ ] . . . be [otherwise] tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34; cf. Boumediene, slip op. at 64-65 ("Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the definition and reach of the law’s writs, including habeas corpus. The cases and our tradition reflect this precept.")
In other words, the government will be required to present some real evidence and to justify decisions to withhold evidence on an individualized basis, but may still be permitted to withhold some evidence from Al-Marri.
This ruling, on the power of the President to treat someone outside a war zone in the continental United States as an enemy combatant is the most important of all the war on terror cases other than Padilla, because the habeas corpus rights of people within the United States have a far greater impact on the typical American or American immigrant's constitutional rights. It does not appear to overrule the troubling Padilla holding, although it does appear to narrow it.
Evil Without God
"With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil--that takes religion."
- Steven Weisberg
"If you don't believe in God, evil is meaningless."
- Michael Heller (recent winner of the Templeton prize and a different person than the author of "The Gridlock Economy" discussed yesterday).
"That God is necessary to appreciate evil and suffering is a hubris that flies in the face of what we know of the ordinary communal life of human beings."
- Robert Justin Lipkin (at the Ratio Juris blog).
- Steven Weisberg
"If you don't believe in God, evil is meaningless."
- Michael Heller (recent winner of the Templeton prize and a different person than the author of "The Gridlock Economy" discussed yesterday).
"That God is necessary to appreciate evil and suffering is a hubris that flies in the face of what we know of the ordinary communal life of human beings."
- Robert Justin Lipkin (at the Ratio Juris blog).
Turnout and Taxes
Why are federal taxes less regressive than state taxes?
One of the better explanations for the regressivity of state taxes is as a natural political consequence of majority voting for the lawmakers who enact taxes.
Why would federal taxation be less regressive under that model? Because voter turnout is higher for federal elections (and voters are more informed about these elections) than is the case in elections involving state and local officials.
Since voter turnout and voter knowledge about elections is highest among higher income voters, voters who vote in federal but not state elections and voters who are well informed about federal but not state elections, will have lower incomes on average. It follows that federal elected officials should tend to be more concerned about the well being of low income voters than state and local officials. This concern translates into federal tax policies that are more progressive than state and local tax policies.
One of the better explanations for the regressivity of state taxes is as a natural political consequence of majority voting for the lawmakers who enact taxes.
Why would federal taxation be less regressive under that model? Because voter turnout is higher for federal elections (and voters are more informed about these elections) than is the case in elections involving state and local officials.
Since voter turnout and voter knowledge about elections is highest among higher income voters, voters who vote in federal but not state elections and voters who are well informed about federal but not state elections, will have lower incomes on average. It follows that federal elected officials should tend to be more concerned about the well being of low income voters than state and local officials. This concern translates into federal tax policies that are more progressive than state and local tax policies.
Tax Law Sinks Car Donations
Some donations are more tax driven than others. In hindsight, it is clear that one form of charity which was very tax motivated was an in-kind donation of car. They plummetted when tax rules changed in 2004. An analysis cited at the Tax Profs Blog explains:
Needless to say, optimism concerning the fair market value of used cars abounded prior to the change in the tax law, something that serves as fair warning to policy makers considering any tax code provision dependent upon individualized estimates of fair market value (grants of conservation easements are another area of charitable giving that poses similar concerns).
Before 2005, taxpayers who donated a vehicle were allowed to deduct its fair market value. Tax legislation enacted in 2004 changed the rules to generally limit vehicle donation deductions of over $500 to either the actual proceeds from a vehicle’s sale or the vehicle’s fair market value -- whichever is less. . . .
[B]etween tax year 2004 and 2005, car donations of over $500 dropped by two-thirds. Over 900,000 tax returns claimed deductions for donated automobiles in 2004. In 2005, the last year for which the IRS has detailed data, less than 300,000 tax returns included such claims.. The total amount deducted for all car donations declined from $2.4 billion in 2004 to just a half a billion dollars the following year, a decrease of over 80%.... the total number of car donations fell by 67%, and the amount of deductions claimed as a result of such donations fell by over 80%, the deduction claimed per car donated . . . declined by 41%....
The total amount of deductions claimed for charitable deductions increased from $156 billion in 2004 to $172 billion in 2005. In 2006, the number increased again to $173 billion.
Needless to say, optimism concerning the fair market value of used cars abounded prior to the change in the tax law, something that serves as fair warning to policy makers considering any tax code provision dependent upon individualized estimates of fair market value (grants of conservation easements are another area of charitable giving that poses similar concerns).
14 July 2008
Private Pension Mayhem
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation is quietly alerting the investing public that it intends to provide less protection to private individuals who are beneficiaries of private defined benefit pension plans of companies that are bankrupt or otherwise can't meet their obligations. Unfunded liabilities of at risk pension plans exceed $14 billion now, and tend to surge when companies go under.
A federal PBGC bailout at the same time as a FreddieMac and FannieMae bailout (they just received massive credit line extensions from the Federal Reserve Bank) could make the S&L bailout look like kids' stuff.
A federal PBGC bailout at the same time as a FreddieMac and FannieMae bailout (they just received massive credit line extensions from the Federal Reserve Bank) could make the S&L bailout look like kids' stuff.
AC-130 Replacement Proposed.
U.S. Special Operations forces are looking into replacing the AC-130 gunship, a military C-130 transport plane variant with a 105mm howitzer and other arms designed for air to ground close air support, with a modified C-27B, a small transport based upon but smaller than the C-130, which was recently added to U.S. service. The new plane would have special sensors, Hellfire missiles like those on attack helicopter and Predator drones (in lieu of a howitzer which has excessive recoil for the small plane and is the largest slug thrower used on any aircraft at this time) and 30 mm guns.
The existing AC-130s are aging beyond the point of no return without a costly overhaul. The average AC-130 in the existing fleet is more than 41 years old.
The existing AC-130s are aging beyond the point of no return without a costly overhaul. The average AC-130 in the existing fleet is more than 41 years old.
Beware Of Lion
Residents of rural El Paso County, Colorado near Colorado Springs have sighted what appears to be a wild African lion roaming their fields. No local African lion owners, however, seem to have any missing African lions, which are, of course, not native to Colorado. The only African lion known to teleport into non-native habitats on a regular basis, called Aslan, has not previously been sighted in Colorado Springs, despite the presence of many C.S. Lewis fans in the area. As Drudge would say, with fewer words, this is a developing story.
Enjoy Bastille Day
I can't take time today off, but did get in a moment or two to appreciate Bastille Day early at Le Central, Denver's affordable French restaurant.
My personal dinner recommendation is the mussels menu which offers two pounds of mussels with unlimited French fries prepared one of ten different ways, for under ten dollars.
My personal dinner recommendation is the mussels menu which offers two pounds of mussels with unlimited French fries prepared one of ten different ways, for under ten dollars.
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