Iraqi Election Results

The early returns from last weekend's provincial elections in Iraq are as follows:

BAGHDAD – 1.75% - 57 seats total (Shiite Islamist parties 43/57)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite-Islamist – 38% - 29 seats
Sadrists/Shiite-Islamist – 9% - 7 seats
Tawafiq/Sunni Islamist– 9% - 7 seats
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 8.6% - 7 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 5.4% - 4 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/ Shiite-Islamist – 4.3% - 3
Mithal al-Alusi/Sunni Moderate – 1.6%
Fadhila/Shiite-Islamist - 1.3%
Communist Party – 1.2%

ANBAR – 3.45% - 29 seats (No obvious majority)
Iraqi National Project/Salih al-Mutlaq – 17.6% - 7 seats
Awakening of Iraq and Independents/Sunni Tribal – 17.1% - 7 seats
Tawafiq/Sunni Islamist – 15.9% - 7 seats
National Movement for Reform and Development – 7.8% - 3 seats
Iraqiya/Ayad AllawiModerate– 6.6% - 3 seats
Iraqi Unity – 4.6% - 1 seat
Tribes of Iraq – 4.5% - 1 seat
The Group of Scholars and Intellectuals – 3.3%
Justice Movement – 3.2%
National Bloc – 2.3%
Constitution Party – 2%

BABIL – 3.33% - 30 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 20/30)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite-Islamist – 12.5% - 8 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 8.2% - 5 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist– 6.2% - 4 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 4.4% - 3 seats
Iraqi Commission for NGOs – 4.1% - 3 seats
Independent Justice – 3.7% - 2 seats
Independent Ansar – 3.4% - 2 seats
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 3.4% - 2 seats
National Unity– 3.3%

BASRA – 2.86 – 35 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 29/35)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist - 37% - 19 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist - 11.6% - 6 seats
Gathering of Justice and Unity – 5.5% - 3 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist - 5% - 3 seats
Tawafiq/Sunni Islamist – 3.8% - 2 seats
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist - 3.2% - 1 seat
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 3.2% - 1 seat
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 2.5%

DHI QAR – 3.23% - 31 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 31/31)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 23.1% - 12 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 14.1% - 7 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 11.1% - 6 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 7.6% - 4 seats
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist – 6.1% - 3 seats
Constitutional – 3.2%
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 2.8%

DIYALA – 3.45% - 29 seats (No obvious majority)
Tawafiq/Sunni Islamist – 21.1% - 8 seats
Kurdish Alliance – 17.2% - 6 seats
Iraqi National Project/Salih al-Mutlaq/Sunni Moderate – 15% - 6 seats
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 9.5% - 4 seats
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 6% - 2 seats
Coalition of Diyala – 5.3% - 2 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari - 4.3% - 1 seat
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist - 3.1%
National Movement – 2.6%
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist – 2.3%

KARBALA – 3.70% - 27 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 13/27)
Yousef Majid al-Habboubi/Shiite Moderate – 13.3% - 8 seats
Hope of Rafidain – 8.8% - 6 seats
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 8.5% - 5 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 6.8% - 4 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist– 6.4% - 4 seats
Justice and Reform – 3.6%
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 2.5%
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist – 2.5%

MAYSAN – 3.70% - 27 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 27/27)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist - 17.7% - 9 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 15.2% - 8 seats
ISCI//Shiite Islamist – 14.6% - 7 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 8.7% - 4 seats
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist – 3.2%

MUTHANNA – 3.85% - 26 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 17/26)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 10.9% - 5 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 9.3% - 5 seats
Jumhouriyoun – 7.1% - 3 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 6.3% - 3 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 5.1% - 2 seats
National List – 5% - 2 seats
Gathering of Muthanna – 4.9% - 2 seats
Academics – 4.4% - 2 seats
Middle Euphrates – 3.9% - 2 seats
Fadhila/Shiite Islamist – 3.7%
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate – 3.5%

NAJAF – 3.57% - 28 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 22/28)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 16.2% - 7 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 14.8% - 7 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 12.2% - 5 seats
Loyalty to Najaf – 8.3% - 4 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 7% - 3 seats
Union of Independent Najaf – 3.7% - 2 seats
Tribes and Sons of Najaf – 2.6%

NINEVEH – 2.70% - 37 seats (Sunni parties 25/37)
Hadba/Sunni nationalist – 48.4% - 22 seats
Kurdish Alliance – 25.5% - 11 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party/Sunni Islamist – 6.7% - 3 seats
Turkmen Front – 2.8% - 1 seat
National Iraqi Project/Salih Mutlaq/Sunni Moderate – 2.6%
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 1.9%

QADISIYA – 3.57% - 28 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 23/28)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 23.1% - 10 seats
ISCI//Shiite Islamist – 11.7% - 5 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 8.2% - 3 seats
Iraqiya/Ayad Allawi/Moderate - 8% - 3 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 6.7% - 3 seats
Islamic Loyalty – 4.3% - 2 seats
Fadhila//Shiite Islamist – 4.1% - 2 seats
Development of Diwaniya – 3.4%
Chalabi – 3%

SALAHUDDIN – 3.57% - 28 seats (No obvious majority)
Tawafiq/Sunni Islamist - 14.5% - 6 seats
Allawi/Moderate – 13.9% - 5 seats
Iraqi National Project/Salih al-Mutlaq/Sunni Moderate – 8.7% - 3 seats
Jumuaa – 8.5% - 3 seats
Scholars and Intellectuals – 6.6% - 3 seats
Turkmen Front – 4.8% - 2 seats
Salahaddin List – 4.6% - 2 seats
Taaqi List – 4.5% - 2 seats
Tahrir wa Binaa – 4.5% - 2 seats
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 3.5%
Constitution – 3.2%
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 2.9%

WASIT – 3.57% - 28 seats (Shiite Islamist parties 22/28)
State of Law/Nuri Kamal al-Maliki/Shiite Islamist – 15.3% - 11 seats
ISCI/Shiite Islamist – 10% - 7 seats
Sadrists/Shiite Islamist – 6% - 4 seats
Allawi/Moderate – 4.6% - 3 seats
Constitutional – 3.9% - 3 seats
National Reform Trend/Ibrahim al-Jaafari/Shiite Islamist – 3.2%
Independence – 3%

Nine provinces have clear Shiite Islamist majorities. Another has a Shiite party majority, but is one seat short of a Shiite Islamist majority (Karbala). One province has a Sunni nationalist majority (Ninevah). Three more provinces have no clear majority and significant Sunni dominated parties (Anbar, Diyala and Salahuddin). Kurdish parties are significant minorities in Ninevah and Diyala.

Kurdish controlled areas and the hotly contested Kirkut region did not hold elections.

The results closely mirror the patterns seen in the 2005 national elections in Iraq. The Southeast of Iraq from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf is a contiguous, more or less politically unified Shiite Iraqi block. The North is controlled as it has been from the beginning by the Kurds, who have prevented Kirkut from having a meaningful political voice as its disputed status is resolved. The West and the contiguous province between Baghdad and Kurdistan called Diyala, have signficiant Sunni populations and have elected mostly non-Shiite party representatives.

The results bring a large swath of Iraq firmly in the sphere of influence of Shiite Islamist Iran, although several parties compete for power within the Shiite Islamist part of the political spectrum. Sunni dominated areas are split between more religious and more secular parties, with Kurdish parties also playing a significant role in some provinces. The natural international allies for the Sunni areas are Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. There is, of course, no Kurdish controlled country outside Iraq; Iraqi Kurdistan is a focal point not just for Iraqi Kurds, but also for Turkish, Syrian and Iranian Kurds.

The results also presage Shiite Islamist dominance in the next round of national elections, a round of elections that Sunnis have little incentive to participate in vigorously because they have little hope of having a meaningful say in the national government, even if they win, by virtue of their limited electoral strength and political division.

Juan Cole has a couple of key observations: (1) Iran's influence in Iraq remains great; and (2) proponents of a strong central government appear to have gained ground relative to those favoring decentralized regional government. He also offers additional commentary on turnout and the political parties involved.