The Marines Do It Right And Active Defenses

Technologically, we've turned a corner where active defenses are in, and armor is out.

A particularly stunning demonstration of the fact that active defenses are ready for prime time comes from Israel's defense of a massive Iranian missile and drone attack, nominally in retaliation for Israel's strike on Iran's embassy in Syria to kill an Iranian military leader there.

Iran’s attack against Israel on April 14 was historic—it marked the first time that Iran has directly struck Israeli territory from its own soil despite decades of tensions and shadow conflict. Iran utilized around 170 drones in the operation, making it one of the largest drone attacks in history—possibly the largest. As such, the attack epitomizes the increasing reliance on remote, uninhabited systems in modern warfare.

Aerial drones and other types of uninhabited vehicles are undoubtedly key to the future of conflict, but Iran’s attack demonstrates that the current generation of these systems have crucial weaknesses that limit their effectiveness on the battlefield against sophisticated adversaries. In particular, drones are highly susceptible to air defense and thus often do not reach their intended targets. However, Iran’s large-scale use of drones against Israel also illustrates how the military deficiencies of these systems can be leveraged to achieve two higher-order, strategic political goals—limiting escalation and maintaining a strong reputation for resolve.

Defense Is Stronger Than You Might Think

The only thing more striking than the large quantity of drones Iran used in its attack against Israel was the number of those drones that were shot down by Israel and other countries. According to Israeli estimates, over 99 percent of all Iranian weapons used in the attack were intercepted before reaching their targets—including all 170 drones. In part, this reflects the sophistication of Israel’s air defense capabilities and the abilities of the many other countries that helped Israel destroy these drones. But it also highlights something broader—the generally high susceptibility of drones to air defense compared to more traditional inhabited aircraft.

There are at least three reasons uninhabited aircraft are typically easier to shoot down than their inhabited counterparts. First, current-generation drones tend to fly much slower. For example, Iran’s Shahed-136 drones, which were used in the attack against Israel, can only fly a maximum speed of around 115 miles per hour. By contrast, Iran’s inventory of MiG-29 inhabited aircraft, which it acquired decades ago in the early 1990s, have maximum speeds closer to 1,500 miles per hour. The slow speed of uninhabited aircraft has helped enable Ukraine to shoot down Russian drones (many provided by Iran) with even unsophisticated air defense tools like machine guns.

Second, today’s drones tend to have only limited countermeasures they can deploy to protect themselves against air defense systems. For instance, they typically do not carry chaff or flares, which can be used to confuse air defense missiles. Compared to inhabited aircraft, military-grade drones (such as the Shahed or the Turkish-built Bayraktar TB-2 drone used by Ukraine) usually have quite limited maneuverability. This weakness, which does not apply to small quadcopters, makes it harder for drones to evade air defense missiles by executing sudden rolls and turns.

Third, the signals that enable communication between a pilot and a drone can be jammed. This is one crucial defense tool Russia and Ukraine have been using to down each other’s drones. It is also a tactic Israel deployed to disrupt the Iranian attack.

Of course, the cat-and-mouse game between drones and air defense will spur future innovations that could make uninhabited aerial vehicles less suspectable to being shot down. For example, drones can be designed to fly at faster speeds, carry more sophisticated countermeasures to air defense systems, and operate autonomously if communication links with pilots are severed. Furthermore, even existing systems do have at least one potential advantage over the defense: shooting down cheap drones that cost just tens of thousands of dollars with expensive air defense assets that can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars or more can bleed the financial resources of a country over time. Israel’s defense likely cost more than Iran’s offensive.

Nevertheless, the high vulnerability of most current-era drones to air defense can help explain why all of the Iranian drones were shot down and failed to reach their intended targets. It also explains why the attrition rates of Ukrainian and Russian drones are similarly high, with Ukraine losing as many as ten thousand drones per month. As one Ukrainian air force pilot said, relatively high-end and expensive Turkish TB-2 drones “were very useful and important in the very first days [of the war] . . . but now that [the Russians have] built up good air defenses, they’re almost useless.” 

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In any case, the most interesting aspect of the attack may be what it portends for the future of warfare. The alleged offensive advantage current-generation drones provide over the defense is overrated, but a new era where drones can operate autonomously in coordinated large-scale swarms is coming. To keep pace, defenders will need to continue to innovate cost-effective counter-drone technologies, including the possibility of using drones directly to destroy other drones. Sporadic drone-on-drone “dogfights” have already occurred in the Russia-Ukraine War and may offer a preview of the next generation of remote warfare.

Despite the military deficiencies of contemporary drones, their political utility will continue to be a defining element of modern warfare and statecraft well into the future. As Jacquelyn Schneider said, “These systems exist not because they are invincible, but instead because they decrease political risk for decision makers.” By reducing the financial and human costs of conflict, increasing public support for the use of force, and lessening the chances of escalation, drones are having a transformational effect on international politics.

Similar, but less sophisticated defenses in Ukraine have neutralized perhaps 95% of incoming large missile and suicide drone barrages from Russia.

Armor, in contrast, has been less effective. 

In the Ukraine War, single 40-100 pound anti-tank missiles and suicide drones have taken even the heaviest Russian and American made tanks, like the M1A Abrams tank, out of commission. So have barrages to cannon fire from an M2 Bradley, and single artillery shells and tank shells.

Likewise, one or two anti-ship missiles or torpedoes which are under half a ton each, are enough to remove from action warships that are many thousands of tons each, and probably even large amphibious ships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers up to a hundred thousand tons.

Armor can shield a target from small arms fire up to about a 0.50 caliber machine gun round, and heavy armor can even stop individual rocket propelled grenades and grenade sized cannon rounds that don't hit just right or with many successive hits. But they won't stop larger missiles and shells designed to be armor piercing, which are ubiquitous in near peer conventional warfare.

The response has largely been to look to active defenses. The navy, whose surface warships are so vulnerable to multiple threats, has taken this lead on this front, with systems like the Phalanx Close In Weapons System that shoots large numbers of cannon round at income missiles and shells, new laser and microwave directed energy weapons that can cause drones and missile fuel and warheads to ignite and explode, electronic warfare systems and flares designed to prevent guided weapon guidance systems from directing missiles to their targets, and small supersonic missiles designed to take down incoming aircraft, incoming anti-ship missiles, and incoming drones. These defenses were highly, but not perfectly, effective in warding off Houthi missile attacks on U.S. Navy ships and civilian merchant ships in the Red Sea.

The U.S. Marine Corp has been the U.S. military force that has best headed the lessons of recent military conflicts. It has shed tanks and howitzers from its forces entirely. And, it is more than tripling the size of its air defense forces by 2029:

The U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of a major expansion of its organic ground-based air and missile defense forces. The total number of air defense batteries within the service is set to increase by more than two-thirds by the end of the decade. Starting just next year, those units will be equipped with a mixture of new medium and short-range capabilities, including a version of Israel's Iron Dome, with a particular focus on added defenses against drones and cruise missiles.

Marine Col. Mike McCarthy, who runs the aviation enablers branch within the office of the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, provided an update on the service's air and missile defense plans earlier today at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition.

"Just give you some perspective about kind of where we're going in ground-based air defense, in 2019, when Force Design [2030] started, we had four air defense batteries the Marine Corps armed with Stinger missiles and machine guns. That was it," McCarthy said.

Force Design 2030 is the Marine Corps' current template for a complete restructuring of its forces, which is still ongoing and is centered on supporting new and evolving expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations. McCarthy was also referring here to the mix of Humvee-based Avenger air defense vehicles, armed with heat-seeking short-range Stinger surface-to-air missiles and .50 caliber M3P machine guns, as well as shoulder-fired Stingers, or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), that have formed the core of the service's air defense arsenal for decades now.

Marine Avenger short-range air defense systems. DOD

"As we approach 2029, we're going to have 15 batteries of air defense in the Marine Corps, to include the reserve component, and the weapon systems they're going to employ are night-and-day better than what we had three [to] four years ago," McCarthy continued.

Next year, we're going to field the Medium-Range Intercept Capability [MRIC]" which is "a cruise missile defense system based on the Israeli Iron Dome," the Marine Colonel added.

MRIC is by far the most substantial forthcoming addition to the Marine Corps' air defense arsenal. As McCarthy said, it is derived from the Israeli Iron Dome system and utilizes a trailer-based road-mobile launcher. It also fires the same Tamir interceptors as Iron Dome, which use active radar seekers to zero in on their targets and have a very high degree of maneuverability. The missiles also have a two-way data link and proximity-fuzed warhead to improve accuracy and the overall probability of scoring a hit. 

A Marine Corps MRIC Expeditionary Launcher. A total of 10 Tamir missile canisters are seen here loaded on the launcher, which can hold up to 20 at a time. USMC 

While the Marine Corps is acquiring MRIC with a focus on defending against incoming cruise missiles, as an Iron Dome derivative, the system inherently has the ability to engage a broader array of other incoming indirect threats. This includes artillery rockets and shells, as well as drones. Significant upgrades have been made to Iron Dome over the years to expand the breadth of targets it can be employed against, and MRIC could further evolve into an even broader medium-range air defense system.

"Next year, we'll also see the initial fielding of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System [MADIS]," Col. McCarthy also highlighted today.

A complete MADIS system in its current form consists of two 4x4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) with similar, but different air defense configurations. One vehicle has a remote weapon station armed with a 30mm automatic cannon capable of firing proximity-fuzed rounds and Stinger missiles. The second vehicle has the same type of remote weapon station, but no Stingers, and has added electronic warfare, electronic support measures, and sensor capabilities, including active electronically-scanned radar arrays (AESAs). Small form factor AESA radars are an increasingly popular component of counter-drone systems, in general. 

A complete Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) system. USMC

There is also the "Light" version of MADIS, or L-MADIS, which consists of 4x4 Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicles equipped with a mix of sensors and electronic warfare jammers. The L-MADIS vehicles can be carried inside the main cabin of an MV-22 Osprey and Col. McCarthy highlighted how this system is ideally suited for supporting smaller echelons, including forces embarked on amphibious warfare ships.

L-MADISs have already been in use for years now and there are now multiple configurations of the system. An L-MADIS buggy, lashed to the deck of the Wasp class amphibious assault ship USS Boxer, was actually used to knock down an Iranian drone that came within "threatening range" of the ship as it transited through the Strait of Hormuz in 2019.

A view of the forward end of the USS Boxer's flight deck from around the time of the knocking down of the Iranian drone in 2019, with an L-MADIS system seen highlighted inside the red circle. USN 

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MADIS and L-MADIS are both primarily geared toward the counter-drone role. MADIS, with its Stinger missiles, also has the ability to be used for more general short-range point air defense. 

The U.S. Army is also now in the process of developing a more capable replacement for the venerable Stinger that will still be able to use existing launchers, and that could be of interest to the Marines in the future. Newer versions of Stinger have already been developed that are better optimized against drones.

New radars are another important component of the Marine Corps' future air and missile defense plans, especially when it comes to MRIC. Currently, the service plans to pair MRIC with its existing AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which is a modern road-mobile multi-purpose AESA radar that can be used for air defense and more general air traffic control purposes. You can read more about G/ATOR here.

Last year, the Marine Corps also awarded a contract to Leidos for the delivery of four prototypes of a new air defense radar called the Medium Range Air Defense Radar (MRADR; pronounced 'marauder'). Leidos subsidiary Dynetics is leading the development of the MRADR. The Marines have also been exploring Humvee-based mobile radar systems.

The Marine Corps' focus on cruise missile and drone threats in its new air defense push is hardly surprising.

Near-peer competitors like China and Russia are continuing to develop and field more advanced cruise missiles, including claimed hypersonic types. More and more capable cruise missiles are also proliferating among smaller countries and even non-state actors like Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.

The threat posed by uncrewed aerial systems has also now fully exploded into the mainstream consciousness, thanks in large part to the conflict in Ukraine. However, as The War Zone has long pointed out, the drone threat, including when it comes to weaponized commercial types, is not new, and is becoming an increasing given in conflicts large and small. The Marines and the rest of the U.S. military continue to very much play catch-up when it comes to addressing this threat through the fielding of systems like MADIS and L-MADIS. . . . it is also worth pointing out that MRIC will give the Marine Corps its first medium-range air defense capability of any kind since the service retired its HAWK surface-to-air missiles in the 1990s.

The Marine Corps is also developing palletized medium range missile systems to use, for example, in conjunction with with its new Light Amphibious Warships, which would be used for island hopping missiles carrying units of about 75 Marines, rather than concentrating larger Marine units on a single amphibious ships as the current force structure does.  

The Corps has established special “littoral” units for the specific purpose of refining an ability to conduct warfare operations in coastal and island areas throughout the Pacific such as the island chains in the South China Sea. As part of this, the Corps’ Marine Corps Force Design 2030 document calls for specific “stand-in” ready forces capable to conducting offensive operations in close proximity to enemy areas within the larger perimeter reach of longer-range weapons. . . . For instance, forward operating “stand-in” forces will, according to Force Design, operate with a much greater concentration of drones, unmanned systems and manned-unmanned teaming to ensure mobile ISR and targeting and sustain connectivity with stand-off forces and other command and control nodes. Stand-In forces will also need self-protective capabilities and offensive firepower typically less available to mobile, dismounted, island-hopping units. These kinds of mission challenges, threats and operational expectations form much of the inspirational rationale for the Marine Corps emerging Light Amphibious Warship.

The Operational Concept is to enable closer-in, faster, lighter and more expeditionary amphibious operations and quickly transit weapons and Marines from island to island or along littoral coastal areas without needing to risk a larger, more vulnerable footprint. Quick landings and close-in-ship-to-shore operations will be required to a much greater extent should the Corps find itself in need of protecting or taking over island chain, littoral and coastal areas. . . . 

Raytheon has been working with the Corps on a land-fired variant of the well-established ship-fired Naval Strike Missile.

Northrop Grumman, yet another massive weapons developer and US Navy industry partner, sought to anticipate the Corps' operational need and enterprise a mobile, multi-domain missile system engineered to sling-load beneath a helicopter and fire from both warships and land-locations. Northrop Grumman’s Modular Payload System is a 26,000-pound four-pack missile system designed for forward, highly-mobile fires from warships and land-locations as needed. Built to travel beneath a US Navy UH-60 Sea Hawk or CH-53 Super Stallion, the MPS can quickly transit from am amphibious warship to an island location for quick setup and attack.

Modular Payload System -- Northrop Grumman Image

Northrop Grumman innovators, who displayed renderings of the weapon at the 2024 Surface Navy Association, explained that the weapon is engineered for maximum modularity, meaning it can set up fire control and attack wherever there is a link to targeting data. This means the MPS is built to synch with both ship-based radar and fire control as well as land-operating systems. Precise ranges or details regarding the warheads and kinds of explosives are likely not available for security reasons, yet the weapon is designed for mobile, offensive attack in support of dismounted, fast-moving Marines. . . . Missiles of this kind could potentially offer counter-drone protection, anti-aircraft fire or even missile attacks against high-value land targets with a previously non-existent level of versatility and mobility. . . .

Corps weapons developers explain the LAW is intended to fill a critical maritime warfare capability gap between large, big-deck amphibs and smaller transport craft such as Landing Craft Utility vehicles or Ship-to-Shore Connectors. With this in mind, an MPS system capable of traveling beneath a helicopter from an amphibious assault ship or LAW could introduce unprecedented mobile lethality for “stand-in” forces needing close-in attack and rapid ship-to-shore kinds of combat transitions.

A couple of reasons suggest why the Marines are making the smarter choices. First, they are a smaller organization, which makes change less burdensome. Second, they are the only U.S. military service that integrates land, sea, and air resources under a single bureaucratic tent, which encourages cooperation and smart tradeoffs that other services including only one of these, can only make with intervention at the highest joint operations levels.