Retiring The A-10 And The Marine Corps Force Redesign

The case for a next generation A-10.

One recent article tries to justify the retirement of the A-10 Warthog attack aircraft. Retiring the fifty year old aircraft is understandable. But the Air Force has for decades scandalously ignored its obligation to support ground troops and continues to do so. Some of the recent article's reasons are more sound than others:

The F-35 Can Do Its Job

One of the reasons for decommissioning the Warthog is redundancy. While the A-10 is great at its job, which consists of ground strike and close air support, these missions can be carried out by the F-35. Since the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy all fly F-35s, each service can call in Lightning IIs for danger-close missions. The F-35 does not have the Warthog’s GAU-8/A Avenger 30-mm rotary cannon, but it can drop numerous munitions when it is equipped in beast mode. F-35s can launch the StormBreaker smart weapon and the Paveway laser-guided bomb. The F-35 can also share targeting data in real time with other airplanes.

The argument that the F-35 is a suitable A-10 replacement doesn't hold water. The A-10 is more robust, is better suited to the slow and low flights needed for close air support, and has better protection for pilots against small arms fire than the F-35, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, or the AC-130 adapted C-130 transport plane which only flies missions at night because of its vulnerability. The A-10 (when new) needs less maintenance per flight hour as well. The A-10 is better for most close air support missions than the AH-64 Apache, the AH-1Z Viper of the Marine Corps, the MV-22, or the AC-130, and rivals drones in situations where there aren't sophisticated anti-air defenses but there are anti-drone defenses like electronic jamming or directed energy weapons.

The A-10 Would Not Survive In Modern War

Another reason to retire the Warthog is its low survivability. Air defenses are constantly improving, with better radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Russian S-400 and S-500 that are layered in depth.

The A-10 would have little protection from being detected, tracked, and destroyed by newer SAMs. The A-10 is not known for speed and maneuverability, although its performance in air shows has left me impressed. A-10s are also not stealthy like the F-35, and they are much slower and less maneuverable.

The basic problem with this point is that it is all or nothing thinking. Against an opponent with strong, modern air defenses, the A-10 (and close air support in general) doesn't make sense. But, in many conflicts, such as President Trump's contemplated involvement in wars with the armed militias of Latin American drug cartels, or in the global war on terrorism, or against pirates, the adversaries don't have modern air defenses and close air support is desirable. As a country with the largest air force in the world, not every fighter aircraft needs to be a generalist suited for every conflict.

Even in the same conflict, there may be an initial stage, when the goal is to destroy enemy air defenses when air superiority has not been secured, when an expensive stealth fighter may be the right tool, and a later stage of the same conflict, when enemy air defenses have been secured and air superiority is substantially achieved, when an attack aircraft may make more sense. 

A manned close air support aircraft may be desirable when the opponent has advanced anti-drone or electronic warfare resources (that can also thwart guided missiles and smart bombs) but not sophisticated air defense resources that are still functioning. And, a modern version of the A-10 would have more active air defenses.

The A-10 Is Costly to Keep in the Air

Further, the A-10 is an older airframe. It was introduced in the 1970s and requires significant maintenance. The airplane’s need for spare parts and tender loving care makes it expensive to keep in the air.

The money saved by no longer maintaining Warthogs can be spent on other airplanes, such as the new F-15EX, as well as the F-35. The cost per flight hour of the Warthog ranges between $19,000 and $22,000. This adds up quickly, and in a future war, the costs would multiply. The Air Force has requested $57 million to retire all A-10s.

This is a legitimate concern. Airplanes are machines that don't last forever and even training missions put a lot of wear and tear on them. But, it is a straw man argument. 

The real debate is not over keeping the original airframes from the 1970s, but over whether the niche of a simple, robust, fixed wing close air support aircraft should continue to exist. The Army designed helicopter gunships and an armed version of the MV-22 Osprey because it didn't trust the Air Force to be committed to providing closely coordinated close air support for it, and the Army wasn't wrong. But a helicopter gunship or MV-22 Osprey is slower and more fragile than an A-10. The real question is whether a successor to the A-10 that is designed in a similar way with a similar mission should be built. If it was, its hourly maintenance costs (and per unit production costs) would be much lower than a supersonic stealth aircraft, or an aircraft like the F-15EX optimized for air to air combat.

Supersonic speeds, advanced air to air combat capabilities, and stealth make an aircraft much more expensive.

Also, an A-10 successor would be better suited to intercepting drones than a more expensive, supersonic, high altitude F-35 or F-15EX. The A-10 or a successor in the same niche, would be better suited to engaging adversaries in the typical drone airspace.

Would It Even Have Any Tanks to Destroy?

Finally, warfare is changing. Combat in Ukraine has focused on first-person view drones that loiter and drop down to eliminate tanks and people. The A-10 is not the best tool to take out small drones.

Plus, the tank, which has historically been the main target of A-10s, is becoming an obsolete platform. The A-10 could still offer close air support for soldiers and Marines in tight spots on the ground, but there may not be as many tanks and armored personnel carriers on the battlefield compared to the days when the United States first fought in Iraq.

Tanks probably will play a smaller role in future conflicts. But, the same folks who are pressing for the retirement of the A-10 also think we still need tracked manned tanks with a 105mm to 125mm main gun whose primary purpose is to destroy other tanks. But even without tanks, close air support is needed, and there are artillery batteries, trenches, fortified positions, and other armored vehicles to strike. Drones can take over many of these roles. But, a manned A-10 isn't vulnerable to electronic jammers, doesn't require fiber optic control wires, can evaluate the situation with richer visual and electronic input than a small laptop computer screen displaying digital camera images can (which is critical when friendly and hostile forces are close to each other), is much faster than any ground vehicle (and especially faster than a tracked vehicle), and can ignore obstacles on the ground like rivers, trees, mountains, and barricades.

In general, fixed wing aircraft are faster, have longer range, can carry heavier payloads, are more fuel efficient, are more survivable when hit with enemy fire, and are easier to maintain from austere forward operating bases. And, unlike transport aircraft, their ability to land and takeoff vertically (as opposed to from short field airstrips) isn't as important (unless they are non-aircraft carrier ship based).

Not Needed for Combat Search and Rescue

The A-10 had a secondary use for combat search and rescue, but the F-35 can carry out this mission as well. Special operations forces have personnel called “combat controllers” who act as air traffic controllers on the ground. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data collected by the F-35 can be shared with the combat controller, who then relays the findings to other special operators and helicopters that can rescue downed pilots or stranded personnel.

A critical mission like combat search and rescue isn't necessary a task for a single aircraft. It is generally a team effort.

Neither an A-10 nor an F-35 is suit for a "rescue" mission. These are single plane fighters that can't pick someone up and evacuate them. They can play a role in a "search" mission, and a supersonic F-35 at 30,000 feet simply isn't as suited for this role as an A-10 at lower altitude with a much lower stall speed that can operate from more primitive air strips. 

Drones do provide an alternative, but a manned aircraft close to the ground provides richer visuals than a digital camera and is vulnerable to being jammed. The attack aircraft could control other drones with line of sight, hard to jam lasers or microwave beams, rather than general radio signals that are used by a more conventional drone.

Also, while a fighter aircraft may not be actually "rescuing" someone, it could be dropping supplies for the troops in need of rescue or could be serving as an armed escort for a helicopter or tilt-rotor aircraft that is actually doing the retrieval. Both rolls may be better suited to a low and slow aircraft.

The case for the Marine Corps force redesign.

Another article complains about the Marine Corps divesting itself of main battle tanks and much of its heavy artillery. The Marine Corps was right and the skeptics are wrong.

I've written repeatedly and at length about why main battle tanks are obsolete. They are highly vulnerable. They are very difficult and slow to deploy. They are very slow moving. They have long and highly vulnerable logistics trails. Their main guns are ill-suited for destroying tanks. 

I have also written somewhat less voluminously about the problems with traditional howitzers, which are vastly less accurate than missiles and drones (which both means multiple shells per target destroyed and undesirable collateral damage, which also undermines their cost advantage particularly with cheap drones that are often comparable to or lower in cost than a cheap suicide drone), often have more limited range, and are much heavier than missiles or drones per target hit.

As a rapid reaction, expeditionary force, these heavy, slow to deploy systems with long logistics trails are ill suited to the Marine Corps.