10 November 2026
Saving Democracy: What's Worked, What Hasn't
04 November 2026
Wow!
24 October 2026
Random Bits
In race after race, Democrats have managed to recruit and advance candidates who are well positioned to capitalize on changing political circumstances. Even if he were not facing off against Ken Paxton, an experienced but still strikingly weak candidate, James Talarico would still be an impressive recruit. He is a natural communicator — whose seminarian background and personal faith have been a great asset in winning over Texas voters — and he has proved to be both nimble and aggressive, able to hold Paxton’s feet to the fire despite facing an onslaught of cash from outside groups and actors, like Elon Musk.You could say similar things of Adam Hamilton in Kansas, perhaps the surprise candidate of this cycle, who is running a competitive race against the Republican incumbent, Roger Marshall. Hamilton is a religious leader — the founder and senior pastor of the Church of the Resurrection, the largest United Methodist congregation in the United States — with broad appeal in a state that is, like Texas, known for its deep religious feeling. With his moderate politics, Hamilton has successfully presented himself as a bipartisan figure, with support from prominent Republicans in Kansas. It also helps that Marshall, a doctor, has struggled in the face of revelations that he took harsh and punitive action against his patients, dragging them to court for trivial amounts of money.Other Democratic candidates, such as Josh Turek in Iowa, Sherrod Brown in Ohio and Troy Jackson in Maine, have also successfully capitalized on the Republican Party’s worsening electoral position. And even those Democrats who might be a little more progressive than their electorates — Peggy Flanagan in Minnesota and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan — show a great deal of political talent and are well-positioned to win.As for the Republicans, the opposite appears to be true. There are a few candidates in the field who may well outperform the fundamentals, like the Iowa Senate nominee Ashley Hinson. Michele Tafoya in Minnesota also seems to be keeping up with her opponent. But beyond them, Republicans are working with candidates who are just not up to snuff. In Georgia, Mike Collins has been marred by his associations with white nationalists and other extremists, and is headed for a crushing defeat in his race against the incumbent, Senator Jon Ossoff. Darline Graham in South Carolina is barely ahead of her Democratic opponent, and again, this is South Carolina. The aforementioned Ken Paxton is such a lackluster candidate that he may well deliver the Texas Republican Party its first statewide defeat for federal office since 1988.Perhaps the most striking example of a candidate ill-equipped for a competitive race is Vivek Ramaswamy, the Republican nominee for governor of Ohio. Ramaswamy ran unsuccessfully for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, then returned home to Ohio to try to lead the party there. Perhaps the fact that Republicans were not anticipating a competitive year is how Ramaswamy managed to win the nomination. Either way, he is currently poised to lose to the Democratic nominee, Amy Acton.In apparent desperation, the Ramaswamy campaign commissioned an advertisement featuring Amy Acton’s mother. The two have not seen or spoken to each other since 1978. As a child, Acton testified against her stepfather, who was charged with sexually abusing her. Acton’s mother took her husband’s side, and the two fled the state. In the advertisement, Acton’s mother calls her daughter a liar, someone who “lies about her past.” The evidence says otherwise. To give one example, documents released by Mahoning County officials in Ohio corroborate Acton’s claim that she lived in a tent as a child.The Ramaswamy camp, which includes fellow Ohioan JD Vance, thinks the ad is effective. But it’s been condemned by people on both sides, including the state’s Republican governor, as crude, craven and cruel. There is a chance, as well, that it blows back on Ramaswamy, undermining his campaign in the critical final stretch of the election. It is the kind of move that a more seasoned and competent candidate might have avoided. As it is, Ramaswamy’s gambit may well drag down the entire statewide ticket.
23 October 2026
The 5th Circuit En Banc Decision On Pre-Hearing Immigration Detention
One of the key issues in immigration law is whether someone detained for being an undocumented immigrant pending a removal hearing in which that person has statutory grounds upon which they could not be deported, who is detained in the interior of the U.S. rather than at the border, and has long standing ties to the U.S. as a resident of the U.S. is entitled to a bond hearing that evaluates their dangerousness and flight risk.
The second Trump administration has taken the position that an undocumented immigrant who awaits a removal hearing may be detained indefinitely, no matter how long the hearing is delayed, no matter where they were detained or how long they have been in the U.S. or what grounds they have to not be deported, and that these individuals have no right to a bond hearing to give those individuals an opportunity to be released before their removal hearing. (The Trump Administration has also explicitly told private contractors operating immigration detention centers that the conditions of confinement should be cruel, but that is a story for another day.)
Thirty years of prior practice of the Executive Branch, prior to Trump 2.0, under the immigration statute adopted in 1996 and since amended in ways largely immaterial to this question, have held that there is a right to a bond hearing to assess whether someone awaiting a removal hearing is dangerous or a flight risk, while that removal hearing is pending (and at a time when the government has not established before an immigration judge that they are entitled to deport someone). This was also the prevailing practice pre-1996, including in the pre-1907 period which the majority mischaracterizes, as a dissenting opinion notes. As explained at page 136 of the Slip Opinion in a dissenting opinion:
The Government and the majority repeatedly cite the Supreme Court’s footnote in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), that “prior to 1907 there was no provision permitting bail for any aliens during the pendency of their deportation proceedings.” Id. at 523 n.7. That sounds significant, but, prior to 1907 this country simply did not detain persons potentially unlawfully present in the interior except in extraordinary circumstances and under narrowly drafted laws; and, when it did so, the general rule was that bail would be available. See Nash, supra, at 1540–41, 1564–76.4 In other words, the practice of seeking out people unlawfully present in this country in the interior en masse is an invention of modern immigration law. The practice (challenged here) of seeking out persons unlawfully present in this country in the interior and subjecting them to detention without meaningful process or the possibility of bail—that is, to what was long understood to be the statute applicable at ports of entry, § 1225(b)(2)(A), rather than the interior detention statute, § 1226(c)—is a recent invention of the Department of Homeland Security in the last year or so contradicting its almost three decades old practice.
Nine of the eleven numbered geographic circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeal (ignoring the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which doesn't have jurisdiction over these cases) have held that there is a right to a bond hearing under the applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedents (admittedly, most of which were decided before the current ultra-conservative majority arose in the U.S. Supreme Court, and the current U.S. Supreme Court often shows little regard for its prior precedents or a lower court near consensus). There does not appear to be a case on point out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
So did a 2-1 decision of a three judge panel of the 5th Circuit, and three U.S. District Courts who ruled in favor of the people seeking bond hearings that the government appealed to the 5th Circuit. So did 7 of the 17 judges of the 5th Circuit in a sua sponte review en banc in an 159 page set of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions announced today of that 2-1 decision in the case of Rodriguez v. Vergara (and two other cases consolidated with it).
Just counting noses in the 5th Circuit who have considered this case (including the trial court judges in these cases), 10 judges ruled that there is a right to a bond hearing and 10 judges ruled that that there was not. It also bears noting that even the current extremely conservative U.S. Supreme Court reverses decisions of the 5th Circuit more than any other U.S. Circuit, generally, in a less conservative direction than its decisions.
The 5th Circuit en banc majority relies heavily on a U.S. Supreme Court case involved sex offender registration for a general principle (a circumstance where dangerousness is a presumptively present in almost every case), which is Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), rather than prior U.S. Supreme Court immigration cases on point, in a very strained analogy.
The only other U.S. Court of Appeals denying bond hearings is that 8th Circuit (which is also very conservative, although so is the 11th Circuit that went the other way), and the 8th Circuit which also followed a related 5th Circuit precedent, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), cert. sought and neither granted nor denied at this point, in which the 5th Circuit make a minority interpretation of the relevant immigration statute. See Slip Op. at pg. 100 (in a dissenting opinion). See also Slip. Op. at pg. 141 (in a dissenting opinion) ("On appeal, only this court in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi (and the Eighth Circuit, following us) has accepted the Executive Branch’s statutory arguments for its recent about-face. See 166 F.4th 494, 502–05 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1132–36 (8th Cir. 2026).").
The majority’s holding places our court in a minority position among the circuits. See Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 188 F.4th 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2026); Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 96 (2d Cir. 2026), cert. granted sub nom. Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26104, 2026 WL 2942994 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2026); Buele Morocho v. Warden Phila. FDC, No. 261150, 2026 WL 2546223, at *10 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026); Lopez Garcia v. Guadian, No. 257044, 2026 WL 2661092, at *21 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 735 (6th Cir. 2026); Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, 183 F.4th 909, 931 (7th Cir. 2026); Padilla v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 24-2801, 2026 WL 2822044, at *19 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2026); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1251 (10th Cir. 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Mia., 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th Cir. 2026).
Without today's en banc ruling, the 8th Circuit's ruling in Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding that a lawful resident alien could be detained pending removal for over a year as long as “deportation remain[ed] a possibility”) would have been a solitary outlier.
The circuit by circuit analysis is a little complicated, because all immigrations cases funnel up to the national Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which like the courts it reviews is an Article II court of the executive branch that is not judicially independent, and then from there to the U.S. Court of Appeals Circuit in which the case arose at the immigration trial court level. As explained at page 154 of the Slip Opinion:
Article II IJs generally are not bound by Article III district court precedent, just that of courts of appeal. The BIA has stated that it, “as well as Immigration Judges, [is] bound to follow [BIA] precedent, the Attorney General, and the circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over the geographic region where a case occurs.” Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. 693, 695 (B.I.A. 2023); see Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) (noting that the BIA has permitted intercircuit nonacquiescence, but “has not followed a practice of nonacquiescence in decisions of a circuit court in cases arising within the jurisdiction of that circuit”).
But, habeas corpus review starts in a U.S. District Court (an Article III independent trial court) in a collateral attack on immigration court decisions and proceeds in the usual way to the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals Circuit.
Today's 5th Circuit en banc decision is in my view, clearly wrong under existing precedents, and affects many hundreds of thousands of people in a highly material way. There is little doubt that the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually chime in, and it is not at all clear how it will resolve the issue, since it involves a signature position of the Trump administration which the current U.S. Supreme Court has upheld in all but the most extreme instances of overreach.
31 August 2026
Standing Law Still Broken
The U.S. law of standing basically states that even if the government or a government official is blatantly violating a law that benefits everyone, that unless someone can show how the violation of the law affects them in a way distinct from the way if affects taxpayers or voters or citizens, in general, that no one can enforce the law.
Most mainstream jurists manage to find a way to find standing in cases of clear violations of the law, but the ultraconservatives in the U.S. Supreme Court have used this doctrine to allow Trump to keep building the White House Ballroom in gross violation of the relevant law. The Chief Justice and the three liberal justices voted to prevent him from his clearly illegal actions, but were outvoted 5-4 on a standing argument.
No other sensible system of public law takes this approach. Standing was a rule invented for litigation between private parties that has never worked well in the public law setting.
28 August 2026
The Executive-Judiciary Interface In Undermining The Rule Of Law
One of the most distinctive features of Trump 2.0 has been the breakdown of the rule of law. The administration has routinely ignored the law and settled interpretation of existing law in a wide variety of domains.
It has enacted illegal tariffs, it has denied due process to immigrants, it has deported immigrants to countries to which they have no connection, it has illegally impounded Congressionally appropriated funds, it has conducted the Iran war without complying with the war powers act, it has illegally and in violation of international law bombed suspected drug boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific and killed survivors of its attacks, it has unlawfully meddled in state election processes, it has fired government officials whom Congressionally enacted statutes don't allow it to fire, it has pardoned January 6 insurrectionists, it has corruptly allowed officials to benefit personally in monetary terms from their offices, it has openly admitted to denying FEMA disaster relief based upon how states have voted in recent elections, it has brought sham criminal prosecutions of political opponents, and so on.
Trump 1.0 was odious, incompetent, dishonest, and violated some political norms and legal rules, but shows much less disregard for the rule of law and for well-established political and legal norms.
What changed? How will that affect future administrations?
A lot of the change can be fairly attributed to the courts, especially lower court judges appointed by Trump and the U.S. Supreme Court, which attained a conservative majority and an ultra-conservative plurality under Trump 1.0, consistently letting Trump circumvent rulings against him personally, and against his administration, made by lower courts and non-Trump appointed judges (including many judges appointed by Republican Presidents in prior administrations).
The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions to grant Trump expansively Presidential immunity from criminal liability for his official or arguably official acts (even if they are clearly ultra vires), and to interpret the insurrection clause out of the 14th Amendment, were some of the earliest and most damaging of its steps down this path.
Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't given Trump a complete blank check in Trump 2.0 to be a dictator, largely because the non-ultra conservative justices and the liberal justices on the Court has sometimes formed coalitions to block the ultra-conservative agenda. But this hasn't been consistent enough to discourage mischief in the executive branch.
Of course, the Republican controlled Congress also hasn't pro-actively intervened, but as some justices on the Supreme Court such as Gorsuch are starting to acknowledge, while Congress has significant power to deny funds to the President, Congress has very little capacity to pro-actively contradict or restrain a President inclined to ignore it.
The relative irrelevance of Congress has also been illustrated by Trump 2.0's heavy reliance on executive orders to act, rather than Congressional legislation, despite the fact that Republicans hold majorities in both the House and the Senate, and despite the fact that past precedents have pretty well established that the filibuster in the Senate is a voluntary restraint that the Republican Senate majority has afforded to the minority, and not a legally binding barrier to action, and despite the tight hold that Trump has acquired over the Republican party, effectively turning it into a MAGA party.
So, the existence of a GOP trifecta has, in practice, been less important to the disappearance of the rule of law than judicial and especially U.S. Supreme Court, connivance in facilitating unilateral illegal actions by President Trump (in a highly partisan fashion that it did not afford to President Biden).
Indeed, if anything, the Republican majorities in Congress have been more even handed in protecting the limited rights of the minority Democrats in Congress on a non-partisan basis, than SCOTUS has been in its rulings, many of which simply can't be explained by anything but partisan bias.
14 May 2026
Colorado's State Bivens Law
The bill's full and final text is below:
Senate Bill 26-05:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1. Legislative declaration.
(1) The general assembly finds and declares that:
(a) Since the earliest days of the nation, the United States supreme court has held, in cases such as Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), that federal officials may be liable in damages for violations of federal laws;
(b) In later 19th century cases as well, the United States supreme court held that federal officials could be liable for damages even for reasons relating to but beyond the lawful scope of federal duties, Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1851), and in particular that state courts possessed jurisdiction to consider such damages claims, Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. 284 (1852);
(c) The United States supreme court has long held that federal employees are not inherently beyond the reach of state laws simply because they are federal employees. For example, in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment", and in Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932), the court stated, "Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such, granted immunity from prosecution in state courts for crimes against state law".
(d) Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to recognize the role of state law in holding federal officials accountable for legal violations, noting in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), "[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal officials are usually governed by local law";
(e) When the United States supreme court recognized a federal law cause of action for violation of certain constitutional rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that cause of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law remedies. Even one of the dissenting justices in Bivens noted the ongoing role of state courts, writing, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States".
(f) More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the exclusive remedy for certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity specifically "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government [. . .] which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States", 28 U.S.C. sec. 2679. The prime sponsor of legislation amending the federal "Tort Claims Act" to provide for limited exclusivity took pains to clarify, "We make special provisions here to make clear that the more controversial issue of constitutional torts is not covered by this bill. If you are accused of having violated someone's constitutional rights, this bill does not affect it", 134 Cong. Rec. 15963 (1988).
(g) In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the Bivens action in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the United States supreme court observed that legislatures, not courts, are the better branches of government to fashion damages remedies;
(h) In its most recently completed term, the United States supreme court declined, in Martin v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1689 (2025), to extend the doctrine of supremacy clause immunity beyond its traditional criminal law context;
(i) Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the United States has never been and can never be "necessary and proper" to the execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the meaning of article I, section 8, clause 18 of the United States constitution; and
(j) In enacting this act, the Colorado general assembly affirms its longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing forum in its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.
SECTION 2. In Colorado Revised Statutes add 13-20-1302 as follows:
13-20-1302. Civil action for violation of constitutional rights during immigration enforcement - relief - attorney fees - time limit to commence action - definition.
(1) A PERSON WHO HAS THEIR RIGHTS THAT ARE GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY ANOTHER PERSON WHO, ACTING UNDER COLOR OF ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LAW, IS PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON WHOSE CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VIOLATION. A PERSON FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHILE PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IS LIABLE TO THE PERSON WHOSE RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF.
(2) (a) IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION, A COURT SHALL AWARD REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO A PREVAILING PLAINTIFF. IN ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, A COURT SHALL DEEM A PLAINTIFF TO HAVE PREVAILED IF THE PLAINTIFF'S SUIT WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR OR SIGNIFICANT CATALYST IN OBTAINING THE RESULTS SOUGHT BY THE LITIGATION.
(b) WHEN A JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT, THE COURT MAY AWARD REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES TO THE DEFENDANT FOR DEFENDING ANY CLAIMS THE COURT FINDS FRIVOLOUS.
(3) TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. SEC. 1983, A GRANT OF IMMUNITY TO A DEFENDANT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY; OFFICIAL IMMUNITY; INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; QUALIFIED IMMUNITY; SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY; STATUTORY IMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", ARTICLE 10 OF TITLE 24; OR COMMON LAW IMMUNITY, DOES NOT APPLY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.
(4) AS USED IN THIS SECTION, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES, "CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT" MEANS AN ACTION TO INVESTIGATE, QUESTION, DETAIN, TRANSFER, OR ARREST A PERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING FEDERAL CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW. "CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT" DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ACTION COMMITTED BY A PEACE OFFICER WHO IS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PEACE OFFICER'S DUTIES CONSISTENT WITH STATE LAW.
(5) PURSUANT TO SECTION 13-80-102, A CIVIL ACTION DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES.
SECTION 3. In Colorado Revised Statutes, 13-80-102, amend (1)(k); and add (1)(l) as follows: 13-80-102. General limitation of actions - two years. The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(k) All actions brought under AND PURSUANT TO section 13-21-109(2) [ed. the bad check statute];
(l) AN ACTION ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BROUGHT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13-20-1302.
SECTION 4. Severability. If any provision of this act or the application of this act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
SECTION 5. Appropriation. (1) For the 2026-27 state fiscal year, $125,604 is appropriated to the department of law. This appropriation is from the legal services cash fund created in section 24-31-108 (4), C.R.S., from revenue received from the department of personnel that is continuously appropriated to the department of personnel from the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1)(a), C.R.S. The appropriation to the department of law is based on an assumption that the department of law will require an additional 0.5 FTE. To implement this act, the department of law may use this appropriation to provide legal services for the department of personnel.
SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety or for appropriations for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions.
29 January 2026
Brainstorming Possible Public Law Reforms
17 November 2025
Structural Problems With The Living Constitution
As interpreted the U.S. Constitution has various problems:
* The insurrection clause was gutted by making it not self-executing.
* Presidential immunity from crimes was a horrible mistake.
* No one has standing to pursue too many violations of the law, such as the emoluments clause, the bar on increasing Congressional compensation, some kinds of religious establishment (e.g. not enforcement the ban on political action by religious groups).
* The pardon power is too easily abused.
* Limiting campaign finance by corporations in a partisan neutral way is prohibited (although Citizens United is less of a problem than it is given credit for being IMHO).
* Term limits for Congress would be good.
* The filibusters has done more harm than good.
* Gerrymandering is an intractable problem and the first past the post system also leads to spoiler effects and a two party system instead of a multiparty system.
* Grounds for impeachment are too feeble and impeachment is too hard to accomplish for genuine crimes.
* The veto power is too strong, undermining Congress.
* The electoral college has proven to be a bad idea.
* The Senate is too distorting.
* The Second Amendment is a bad idea.
* Treaties are too often found to be not self-executing.
* Treaties are not subordinate to domestic laws.
* Given Congress control over election disputes in their own houses was a bad idea. Their roster should be out of their control.
* The unitary executive theory is incredibly harmful and should be actively overruled. The ban on legislative vetos is less of a big deal but also deeply problematic.
* The 25th Amendment on Presidential disability was a good idea, but was executed poorly.
* It should not be possible to be President as your first political position. Prior statewide office, a cabinet post, a top generalship, or service in Congress should be required first.
* The franchise should be affirmatively defined.


