As of the last financial statement, accounts payable were about $71 billion, short term debt was $163 billion, other current liabilities were about $29 billion, and long term debt was about $350 billion.
As of the filing date, the listing of the top 30 outsider creditors of the firm mentioned $138 billion of ordinary bonds (managed by two bond trustees), $17 billion of subordinated bonds (managed by one of the two ordinary bond trustees), and about 3 billion in bank loans and letters of credit ranging in size from $463 million to $10 million from 23 different institutions (a few of whom appear to be related entities of each other). This leaves about $485 million of debts owed to creditors in amounts less than $10 million and insider debtors.
This would suggest that $71 billion+ is made up of trade credit in small amounts per creditor, while $414 billion is made up of financial creditors in amounts less than $10 million and insider debt, with insider debt probably making up the bulk of the debts, as investment banks don't generally take deposits from millions of households the way that commercial banks do.
There don't appear to be any significant (i.e. more than $10 million) secured creditors or trade creditors, although this might not include financial rights of setoff.
There are more details (and explanations for why better data isn't provided) in an Affidavit of the CFO, which is honestly rather dubious and unsatisfying. I find it very hard to believe that Lehman Brothers is incapable of providing much, much more information than it has to date with only modest effort. While it might not be able to provide ever single creditor in a matter of weeks (although with the joy of computers it is hard to see why it shouldn't, it has to do so every quarter anyway), it ought to be able to publicly account for more than a third of its outstanding debt. These folks are in the financial analysis business and live and die on their own ability to be highly leveraged without becoming insolvent.
The most recent financial statement listed the aggregate value of preferred stock at $7 billion (and did not include it as a debtor in the petition).
The aggregate redemption value of the preferred stock based upon the rights of each class of preferred stock, the number of preferred shares identified in the petition (presumably the number of authorized preferred shares in each class), and assuming that preferred stock dividends aren't grossly in arrears, is about $237 billion. This is calculated as follows:
C 5 million shares, $500 each, $2.5 billion
D 4 million shares, $5000 each, $2.0 billion
F 12 million shares, $2500 each, $30 billion
G 5.2 million shares, $2500 each, $12.5 billion
J 66 million shares, $2500 each, $165 billlion
K 12 million shares, $25 each, $0.3 billion
L 12 million shares, $25 each, $0.3 billion
M 16 million shares, $25 each, $0.4 billion
N 8 million shares, $25 each, $0.2 billion
P 4 million shares, $1000 each, $4 billion
Q 2 million shares, $1000 each, $2 billion
But, this appears to grossly overstate the amount of preferred stock shares outstanding.
There are 694,401,926 common shares outstanding according to the petition.
The source balance statement listed the company's assets as $314 billion in cash, $42 billion in net receivables, $4.3 billion in fixed assets, and $279 billion in non-current assets.
Presumably, this number is lower now, due to market losses, particularly in mortgage based securities.
Some breakdown on the nature of those assets is available:
Sanford Bernstein analyst Brad Hintz estimates that 55% of Lehman's balance sheet can be quickly liquidated, particularly such assets as receivables and short-term loans known as repurchase agreements. There are about $269 billion in securities that are "another story," Hintz wrote in a report released Monday. He estimates 27% of the $269 billion is in mortgages, 17% in derivatives, and 8% in real estate.
The two primary bond trustees seem likely to be the dominant voice on behalf of creditors in this bankruptcy on the creditor's committee.
This could be a 100% payout liquidity failure bankruptcy, and failing that, could be one in which common stock shareholders, preferred stock shareholders, and perhaps subordinated debtors bear the brunt of the impact, while general creditors are held harmless or nearly so.
Indeed, if the company adopts a plan that holds harmless all preferred and general unsecured creditors, and all secured creditors, then only the holders of subordinated debt would have any right to object. Since all of the subordinated debt appears to be represented by a single bond trustee, this might mean that the plan could be confirmed in a one on one negotiation with the representative of that bank.
Equity and subordinated debt together are capable of absorbing a $43 billion loss between May 31, 2008 and the bankruptcy filing, and pre-bankruptcy loss estimates had been in the vicinity of $7 billion.
Barclays Bank is discussing buying the brokerage and investment banking operations including the headquarters out of bankruptcy for about $8 billion (presumably the usually highly profitable brick and mortar part of the operation which probably also counts for most accounts payable and accounts receivable), and assuming that this is a market value for that operation by some reasonable measure, the market losses that other creditors would have to bear would remain unchanges, but greater liquidity could speed up the payout.
As one source explains:
The bankruptcy filing covers only Lehman’s holding company. Its brokerage and money-management units are not in Chapter 11 – employees still have their jobs, customers still execute transactions on accounts, and portfolio managers still manage mutual funds.
The relative independence of these subsidiaries from the bankruptcy process is what enables Barclays, the U.K.-bank that walked away from a Lehman rescue over the weekend, to consider purchasing part of Lehman.
Another interesting possibility would be a plan that allocated good, short term assets to outsider creditors as payment in full, while allocating securities of uncertain value, like the mortgage backed securities, to the insiders. Outsiders can't object if they get quick cash in exchange of the debts owed to them, so this plan could be imposed on them, leaving insiders with any windfalls resulting from market undervaluation of Lehman Brothers' complex financial assets.
The biggest overall risk is that the derivatives market, and in particular, the credit default market, will be screwed up by the freezing of the positions of a major market player, although recent bankruptcy law reforms are designed to minimize this impact.
Bottom line: Despite the drama, the class of people really taking a hit from this bankruptcy may be quite small.