The State of Capital Punishment In Ohio

Jones was convicted of a murder committed in Ohio in 1997 for murdering a police officer trying to arrest him on outstanding felony warrants, and sentenced to death in 1998 following a sentencing hearing.

During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder. The psychologist testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment for them was to “throw them away, lock them up.” After hearing this testimony, the jury recommended the death penalty. The court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Jones to death. . . . 

In his post-conviction appeal, Jones did raise this ineffective-assistance claim and supported it with an affidavit from psychologist Hugh Turner. Dr. Turner, who had been contacted by post-conviction counsel, interviewed Jones and conducted new testing. In Dr. Turner’s view, Dr. Eisenberg’s diagnosis of APD was incorrect: Jones primarily suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder

How did Jones come to be betrayed in this fashion by his own court appointed lawyer?

Prior to the trial, held six months after he was indicted for murder, but the court wouldn't let him replace his court appointed counsel who he figured out was ultimately going to sabotage his case at the 11th hour.

the relationship between Jones and his appointed counsel deteriorated. Two hours after the jury was sworn in, attorney David Per Due filed an entry of appearance, having been retained by Jones’s family that day. The trial court held a hearing the following day to discuss the status of Jones’s representation. But after hearing from Jones and the attorneys, the court denied Jones’s motions for Per Due to substitute as counsel and for a continuance, finding that Jones’s relationship to his court-appointed counsel had not broken down beyond repair and that the request for a continuance was made in bad faith and for purposes of delay. The trial proceeded as scheduled with Doughten and Tobik representing Jones. At the close of trial, the jury found Jones guilty of aggravated murder. 

During the penalty phase, the court explained to the jury that they had four sentence options: (1) life in prison without parole eligibility for 25 years; (2) life in prison without parole eligibility for 30 years; (3) life in prison without the possibility of parole; or (4) death.

Appeals by Jones of the conviction and death sentence were rejected repeatedly by the Courts of Ohio, with the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the conviction and sentence on direct appeal in 2001, and a federal district court ultimately denying him relief in a collateral attack on the conviction and sentence.

But, after twenty-four years on death row, the U.S. Court of Appeals before the 6th Circuit vacates his death sentence, but not his conviction of the crime, for ineffective assistance of counsel.

This gross betrayal by his own lawyer and the expert witness his lawyer hired was corrected before any of the originally available sentencing options had been rendered moot after the incredibly prolonged appellate and post-trial litigation (which is typical of U.S death penalty cases). But spending twenty-four years on death row instead of in an ordinary prison sentence was an incredible psychological hardship and excessively severe punishment.

There was also a claim that his lawyers in the original murder trial failed to present evidence that another man had claimed to have murdered the police officer, but because this arguably could have been presented at that trial and was "harmless error" because courts found that the jury wouldn't have believed, this mistake by his trial lawyer went without a remedy and his conviction for murder was allowed to stand.

This is the quality of justice in Ohio's courts, which is very typical of cases in which the death penalty is imposed.

N.B. the 6th Circuit notes in a footnote that: 

During federal habeas proceedings, petitioner legally changed his name to Malik Allah-U-Akbar. For purposes of clarity and continuity, we continue to refer to petitioner by his former name.