Showing posts with label War On Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War On Terrorism. Show all posts

11 September 2025

Musings On September 11

 * I was supposed to be in a trial out of town today for one of my clients. She's been hospitalized since Sunday (it is not life threatening at this time, although it sucks to be in the hospital, of course). So, the trial had to be continued to a future date to be determined. As a result, I have some found time today.

* I was in court 24 years ago, on September 11, 2001, when the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon took place, and Flight 93 crashed after passengers rose up and disrupted the efforts of the men who hijacked the plane. 2,996 people were directly killed in the attacks including 19 terrorists were killed in the attacks, predominantly passengers on the four hijacked flights, people in the World Trade Center, and World Trade Center first responders. 

I still lived in the same house and was married to the same wife. Back then, I was a junior associate attorney with a two year old and an infant. Now, my children have finished college, have apartments of their own, have good jobs, and have significant others with good jobs. My daughter is engaged to be married in less than a year. I'm a few days away from starting a new job as a senior city attorney for the City and County of Denver, after almost twenty years of self-employment as an attorney in the interim.

* In the U.S., the 9-11 attacks, after briefly completely shutting down commercial air travel in the U.S., resulted in the formation of the Transportation Security Administration, the reorganization of the federal government bureaucracy to create a Department of Homeland Security, the establishment of much more strict security checks and protocols for commercial air travel, the creation of memorials and compensation schemes for the victims of the attacks (several thousand people were killed), the rebuilding of the Pentagon, and the erection of a new skyscraper where the World Trade Center once stood. Islamic terrorism in the U.S. after 9-11 proved to be extremely rare and small in scale. Some of the measures imposed in the wake of that attack, like a requirement to remove one's shoes in a security line that was triggered by a single failed shoe bombing attack on December 22, 2001, are finally being rolled back now. The 9-11 attacks also spurred the passage of the controversial PATRIOT Act which strengthened the authority of U.S. intelligence agencies, the substance of which largely remains on the books with several modifications adopted since then.

* A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, dismissing a lawsuit alleging the arbitrary detention without probable cause and mistreatment of American Muslims in the wake of the 9-11 by the federal government adopted a new standard for bringing federal lawsuits, that replaced "notice pleading" that allowed lawsuits to be brought upon information and belief to be substantiated in the discovery process with "plausibility pleading" that requires allegations of facts that were actually known to state a plausible claim for relief to bring a federal lawsuit, and many but not all U.S. states subsequently also adopted this standard. The case was dismissed because the plaintiffs didn't have actual knowledge of the insider discussions of top U.S. officials in adopting the policy. The case and a related one called Twombly, which involved an anti-trust lawsuit in which the plaintiffs did not have the "smoking gun" of actual knowledge of the deal reached by allegedly conspiring insiders who had allegedly reached an anti-competitive agreement with each other, made it much harder to bring lawsuits that involve misconduct that only actual insiders have actual knowledge of without court ordered discovery.

* The 9-11 attack was planned and orchestrated by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization operating in Afghanistan, an organization that the Taliban, which controlled almost all of Afghanistan at the time. al-Qaeda was backed financially and intellectually mostly by factions of the Saudi Arabian royal family and allied wealthy elites were were not part of the ruling faction. The terrorist was Saudi Arabian and Egyptian and Lebanese nationals.

In response to the attacks, Congress promptly and almost unanimously passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against this non-state actor. Starting on October 7, 2001, a small U.S. force using a combination of CIA operatives, U.S. Special Forces, and U.S. air power promptly crushed the Taliban (by December 7 of 2001), which had been on the verged of conquering the entire control over the opposition of a coalition of warlords, called the Northern Alliance, that was resisting them. 

A multinational coalition led by the U.S. then occupied Afghanistan in the resulting power vacuum, shepherded a constitutional assembly based upon local traditions which adopted a Western style government (but with Islamic law as the supreme law of the land) under which a democratically elected civilian government of Afghanistan was formed, with the multinational force supporting the newly formed Afghan government (whose take on Islamic law was far less extreme than that of the Taliban) in counterinsurgency actions against the Taliban. 

The Afghan government fell in 2021, just days after U.S. forces withdrew on August 30, 2021, under an executive agreement that previous U.S. President Trump had negotiated with the Taliban without Afghan government involvement. The Taliban government swiftly seized control of the entire country and has imposes a very strict Islamic law regime in the four years that have followed. 

The AUMF, however, continues to be in force to fight a larger "War on Terrorism" against Islamist terrorist groups and insurgencies related to al-Qaeda, especially the "Islamic State" group that briefly operated an ultra-extreme Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. U.S. military action under the AUMF, predominantly in the Middle East and Africa, has continued into 2025.

About 5.5 million members of the U.S. military served in the post-9-11 era and a large share of the soldiers in the Army and Marine Corps, as well as many members of the U.S. Air Force, and a modest number of U.S. Navy sailors, serve in Afghanistan and/or Iraq (where the Iraq War was conducted from March 10, 2003 to December 15, 2011 with some U.S. forces remaining on a residual basis afterwards). There was a steady, but small stream of casualties from that conflict: 2,420 U.S. soldiers were killed and 20,093 were wounded but not killed in the Afghan War over almost twenty years, usually from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes from Taliban-linked insurgents. The peak strength of the multi-national force in Afghanistan, in October of 2019, was 17,178 soldiers (about two-thirds of whom were U.S. troops, with British and Canadian troops making up a little more than half of the rest), which was about 5% of the peak number of U.S. troops deployed in Iraq. The U.S. spent $2.3 trillion on the war in Afghanistan (about 90% for the conduct of the war and 10% for related care of Afghan war veterans). At least 243,000 people died as a direct result of this war (mostly Afghani civilians, contractors, and Afghan combatants on both sides). These figures do not include deaths caused by disease, loss of access to food, water, infrastructure, and/or other indirect consequences of the war. 

* Afghanistan has been immersed in civil wars and insurgencies, with only brief interruptions, since 1979 (just six years after the 18th century monarchy that unified the country was removed in a 1973 coup, with the Western style republic's government removed in a 1978 coup). As a result, on essentially ever element of human development is it the worse in the world outside Sub-Saharan Africa, with only Yemen and the Palestinian territories within Israel (especially post-October 7, 2023 Gaza) coming anywhere close.

04 August 2025

Military Technology Musings

Nuclear Weapons

Most of the nuclear weapons in the world are H-bombs (which create a nuclear fusion explosion from heavy hydrogen) and ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that carry H-bombs) with multiple warheads that spread out over a large area, and a much greater explosive power than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombs (that created a nuclear fission explosion from uranium) that were the first and only time that nuclear weapons were used in combat in 80 years ago.

The problem with one of these typical weapons in nuclear arsenals worldwide is that blowing up everyone and everything in a major metropolitan area, irradiating that area for many years, doing significant harm to the global environmental, and risking a counterattack in kind from other nuclear powers under the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, is almost never a militarily useful thing to do. We justify them primarily under the MAD doctrine as a way to discouraging anyone from ever using nuclear weapons.

Even for extreme military missions like "bomb Mecca", or destroying the headquarters of an enemy government in a capital where its top leaders are located, or destroying a large military base isolated from civilian populations, or penetrating deep bunkers (such as a North Korean or Iranian nuclear facility or an ICBM missile base or an underground submarine base in China), a single warhead much less potent than a typical U.S. ICBM or SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile) and closer in explosive power to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombs, are more than adequate in terms of explosive power.

Really, the only mission for which such powerful weapons make any military sense is planetary defense, to break up a large incoming meteor or comet into small enough pieces to burn up in the atmosphere before doing serious damage, or to divert an incoming meteor or comet from a collision course with Earth, in the basically oxygen free environment of deep space.

Indeed, one of the main reasons that nuclear weapons haven't been used again for 80 years, despite the fact that quite a few countries now have them, is precisely because they aren't a good fit to any military objectives, and not because the countries that have them been particularly ethical.

Tactical nuclear weapons, such as the backpack sized "Davy Crocket" bomb from Cold War era, are another matter. These can be as potent as, or perhaps ten times as potent as the largest conventional missiles and bombs, but can be five hundred times less massive. This makes them the right size to bust deep bunkers, sink aircraft carriers and other large warships, or destroy a large dam, bridge, or military base, or a dictator's palace while the dictator and his top lieutenants are in residence, with a single blow. This could be delivered using a small hypersonic missile, or small fast supercavitating torpedo, or small stealthy drone, or a guided bomb delivered with a stealth warplane, or by special forces soldiers disguised in a civilian boat or car or ATV, that can more easily evade air defenses that could more easily intercept a conventional sized missile or conventional bomber aircraft. If one could make a tactical nuclear weapon with a much smaller yield than even the 10-20 kiloton Davy Crocket bomb, one would even use it to make much smaller anti-armor/anti-ship/anti-fortifications weapons - with a four to ten pound mini-missile doing the damage of the two thousand pound bombs that are the largest typically used by fighter aircraft and as conventional ship and submarine launched missiles.

But, the much smaller size of the bomb is less likely to provoke a civilization ending counterattack, and, particularly if it is an H-bomb that doesn't spread uranium or plutonium all over the place, leaves a much smaller area irradiated for a shorter time period and doesn't do nearly as much damage to the global environment.

What this means for policy is another matter. 

On one hand, it suggests that investing in large numbers of multiple kinds of large modernized nuclear missiles and bombs doesn't really make sense. Optimally, one wants no more of them than is necessary to present a credible MAD deterrent. Why, for example, should you have land based ICBMs at all, when they turn those bases into first priority targets in World War III and are easier to use missile defenses against than SLBMs and nuclear bombs delivered by stealth aircraft or shorter range hypersonic missiles launched from aircraft.

On the other hand, if you create a significant arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly if other nations and insurgent groups follow your example, it is much more likely that they will actually be used in war. And, honestly, existing conventional bombs are more than adequate to destroy or disable that most heavily armored vehicles and all but the deepest and most secure bunkers, without crossing the line of normalizing the use of nuclear weapons in war.

Nuclear Batteries

Nuclear power for military applications has only been used for military submarines and large ships like aircraft carriers and mega-cruisers, in part, because they have been hard to scale down in size, and in part, because the nuclear materials in them could be used by an enemy, if captured, to make nuclear weapons.

But nuclear batteries, using lighter radioactive isotopes than uranium and plutonium (like thorium), that are not nearly as suitable for use in nuclear weapons, share the immense energy density of existing nuclear power plants on submarines (which use only 10 kg of fuel for decades), and large warships, and can be scaled down to arbitrarily small sizes (e.g. a pacemaker or watch or single automobile). Nuclear waste from nuclear batteries using lighter isotopes is also reputedly easier to dispose of than uranium. This has tremendous (I hesitate to use this overused phrase but it's appropriate here) game changing potential to reduce the logistics burden of military units. 

In fiction, this is basically the innovation that makes Iron Man's suit possible. 

Nuclear batteries facilitate quieter, lower maintenance, all electric military systems that don't need to be refueled for years, and that can also use that spare power to recharge electric devices in the unit and military lasers and directed energy weapons, and they allow fuel supplies to be decentralized to individual vehicles, systems, and equipment items. It generates no smoke or emissions smells. Combined with night vision, IR sensors, and LIDAR these vehicles could operate without lights at night. If a ship with a nuclear battery were sunk, it wouldn't create an oil slick that would endanger sailors who abandoned ship. 

The logistics burden involved in providing water to troops could be reduced as well. In coastal areas and at sea, it could power a desalinator, at least for showers and cleaning use, even if it wasn't good enough to make tasty water for drinking. In deserts, it could power a device to extract clean water from the air. In jungles and forests, it could power a water purifier that would allow local water supplies to be used. It could also power heat pumps in places that were too hot or too cold.

No more tanker ships. Propeller and rotor driven aircraft could dispense with aerial refueling tankers. No more vulnerable, unarmored convoys carrying diesel fuel. No more vulnerable fuel depots. No more reliance of distant fuel supplies whose prices are influenced by foreign powers who may become adverse to you.

And, because nuclear batteries can be much more compact than conventional fossil fuel tanks or chemical batteries, without sacrificing range, there is one less thing in the military system which can be easily struck causing the vehicle or military system to explode from its own fuel, because nuclear batteries are a much smaller target and, if properly designed with this risk in mind, aren't necessarily explosive if hit with a high explosive round.

Things That Are Hard To Predict

The mix of drones (armed and unarmed), guided bomb and missiles, active defenses including but not limited to directed energy weapons and jammers, new materials that could make armor lighter and stronger, hypersonic missiles, prototype "invisibility" cloaks, claimed (but not demonstrated) sensors that can penetrate radar stealth, and the use of artificial intelligence to organize information in the fog of war, identify incoming targets and respond before a human could react, and guide drones and guided munitions without active direction from a human controller and guide sniper weapons more accurate, all combine to make the future of warfare hard to predict.

Active defenses, particularly as used by Ukraine and Israel in recent conflicts, and by U.S. naval ships, have made securing air superiority much more challenging, intercept something like 85-90% of incoming missiles and drones reversing the one shot, one kill trend established by the first guided weapons, and could be the only thing that rescues tanks and fixed forward operating bases from obsolescence (while allowing the use of less armor since threats only countered by heavier armor can be actively intercepted). 

And, these are only in the early days. There is plenty of room to make interceptor munitions less expensive (particularly with directed energy weapons), to make them and their associated sensors smaller, lighter, and more secure, to increase the percentage of incoming munitions that are intercepted, and to increase their range.

On the other hand, countermeasures to active defenses, like AI guided and wire guided suicide drones that make jamming ineffective, are being developed rapidly too, out of necessity. So far, suicide drones have been mostly crude modification of commercial, off the shelf quadcopters, but there is also plenty of room to make them quieter, harder to see, and to make them harder to discern with radar and electronic signals.

Part of what makes the future course of these technologies so hard to predict is the constant, rapid Red Queen hypothesis evolution of measures and countermeasures. 

For example, recent efforts to develop rail guns with unguided rounds that rely purely on kinetic energy without resort to explosives or guidance systems, which were set aside because they were too difficult technologically, may receive renewed attention for their immunity to active defenses based upon jamming, lasers, or other directed energy weapons (like microwaves), and may be possible to scale down in size as heavier armor is abandoned in favor of active defenses.

Armed drones are much smaller and cheaper than comparable manned warplanes, warships, submarines, and military ground vehicles, and can be used to take much greater risks since the smaller ones are expendable. They have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine War and in military encounters directly between Israel and Iran, and have been one of the primary weapons used in the war on terrorism carried out by the U.S. in the wake of 9/11. They can strike targets well beyond the range of slug throwing artillery, and can be effective in precisely striking the most vulnerable parts of moving targets whose exact location isn't known when they are launched, while reducing the risk of friendly fire.

So far, simple, remote controlled, flying drones have been predominant in military applications. But, we have seen glimpses of other possibilities. Large sophisticated drone fighter aircraft are smaller, cheaper, and capable of higher-G maneuvers and faster reaction times than manned fighter aircraft. Flying drones have been used to resupply troops in war zones in environments where there is too much enemy fire or the terrain is too difficult for conventional logistics convoys. Drone jet skis and speed boats filled with explosives have destroyed large warships in the Black Sea. Small, comparatively inexpensive, drone ships carrying anti-ship missiles in shipping containers have been successfully tested against target test ships. Small anti-personnel aerial drones carrying small arms or grenade sized munitions have been prototyped but not yet widely used, but could facilitate sniper-like tactics in conditions where these tactics were previously not viable.

Reconnaissance drones can identify enemy forces in ways that previously took much larger and more expensive helicopters, fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft, and satellites, at a cost and size that make them cost effective for even platoon or squad sized army units to use organically for themselves in real time. Coast guard cutters can use them to patrol far more of the sea at once, and more quickly and in more places at once, than any ship or boat could. Smaller battery powered reconnaissance drones can be similar in size, speed, and noise level to birds, making them harder to detect. The smallest insect-sized reconnaissance drones can enter buildings or clear anti-drone netting, undetected, aren't that expensive, are harder to shoot down if detected, and can be deployed in swarms. There have also been successful efforts to put cameras on actual roaches and other insects for tasks like locating survivors in the rubble of collapsed buildings. Small remotely monitored sensors can constantly monitor roads, bridges, fields, buildings, and ports with a much reduced risk of detection. And, unlike a human scout or forward observer, who is also easier to detect, they can't reveal many secrets, or create a POW hostage situation or casualty if they are captured.

Submarine drones can be on constant patrol for days or weeks for enemy armed submarines, sea mines, and enemy ships, or could follow enemy submarines to their hidden bases, while appearing to sensors like sea life. Submarine drones or mostly submerged drone ships can be used to smuggle supplies in interdicted waters, in the way that drug dealers have used them. Submarine suicide drones (or armed submarine drones) can be used to destroy enemy ships without being detected until it is too late, at distances far exceeding what is possible with a conventional torpedo.

Nuclear batteries could be used to create drones or remote sensors that can operate autonomously for years without human contact or maintenance.

It is hard to know what kind of balance and mix of technologies will emerge as experience and economics guide the choices that make sense as these technologies become more mature. 

For example, lots of drone and missile guidance systems (and military aircraft) are expensive to a significant extent, not because they are expensive to manufacture, but because a large premium is being paid for the intellectual property rights arising from the development process. So, a significant part of the cost barrier to their use is economic and could be addressed without any technological advancement (perhaps the military would be better off paying for R&D itself on a work for hire basis and retaining all of the intellectual property).

Things We Can Predict

This said, there are some predictions and conclusions that can be reached with some comfort:

* Tanks and conventional warships without active defenses are as obsolete against a near peer opponent as horse cavalry, warships with sails and cannons, swords, and bayonets. Howitzers and mortars throwing unguided slugs will follow soon.

* Large, mostly unarmored and undefended forward operating bases near "front lines" (such as they are), massed formations of ground troops and armored vehicles, and small pillbox type fortifications are obsolete tactics against near peer opponents.

* No armor, unaccompanied by active defenses, is effective against anti-armor weapons, which are increasingly inexpensive, light, and effective, making large, heavy military systems that rely on armor ineffective against near peer opponents. Armor pretty much only makes sense against enemy forces or insurgents or civilians with only small arms.

* The cost and availability of the weapons necessary to be effective, in a cost-effective way, against a big budget sovereign nation military force has greatly declined.

* National borders, national waters, and military tactics organized around front lines have limited relevance when long range strikes are widely available.

* Large nuclear weapons will continue to not be used because they don't serve useful military objectives.

* Biological weapons are unlikely to be widely used until they can be better controlled, because the risk of blow back to the user is great.

* Despite being lumped in with nuclear and biological weapons, chemical weapons, at least historically, have not been significantly more effective than conventional weapons, and have been amenable to effective countermeasures when they have been used like air sealed vehicles with positive air pressure, filters, protective clothing, and gas masks.

* Advances in modern military weapons have made great strides in destroying distant and armored targets, but drones, missiles, and guided bombs can't hold or control populated territory, which is one of the most common military objectives, without boots on the ground.

05 August 2024

Ongoing Armed Conflicts

Wikipedia has a list of ongoing armed conflicts, ranked by number of deaths per year (with the 2023 combined military and civilian deaths on all sides shown). The two largest (Ukraine and Israel) have international components, while the rest are basically civil wars and insurgencies.

A few observations: 

* most are insurgencies or civil wars, only a few are international wars between organized national military forces;

* lots of conflicts have an ethnic/religious dimension (especially Islamist movements), with the collection of conflicts in multiple countries that I call the Sahel War most notable among them, the several Kurdish insurgencies are also notable, and several related to the fall of the Soviet Union;

* lots of conflicts have a drug war dimension (especially in Latin America and the Caribbean);

* many of the smaller conflicts are the tail end of formerly more intense conflicts.


It lists five major wars:

#1 Ukraine War. 71,235–95,088+

#2 Arab-Israel conflict in Gaza and Lebanon. 23,424–32,519

#3 Sahel War. 14,728

#4 Sudanese Civil War (two rival factions of the military government of Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the Janjaweed leader Hemedti). 7,757–13,225

#5 Myanmar Conflict. 3,065–15,773

Followed by 16 "wars":

#6 Mexican Drug War. 7,168–13,877

#7 Boko Haram insurgency (which I would tend to lump in as part of the Sahel War). 5,182

#8 Kivu conflict, a highly fractured insurgency at its root mostly a Tutsi-Hutu conflict in the wake of the Second Congo War (now involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda). 4,617

#9 Civil war in Somalia. 4,420–9,343

#10 Muslim/non-Muslim-herder/farmer violence in Nigeria (which I would also lump in as part of the Sahel War). 3,300–3,900

#11 Insurgencies/civil war in Ethiopia. 2,225–3,830

#12 Sudanese nomadic conflict (ethnic violence in South Sudan). 1,249.

#13 Insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. 1,164–1,300

#14 Yemeni civil war. 926–3,381

#15 Conflict with ISIS in Iraq. 480–1,338

#16 Pemon conflict centered around mining disputes between the Maduro government, the Pemon nation (indigenous people that live in the Gran Sabana region in southeastern Venezuela) and armed irregular groups in Venezuela. 472–2,558

#17 Gang war in Haiti. 435–4,451

#18 Afghan conflict. 342–1,041

#19 Cameroon Civil War. 338-1,042

#20 Syrian Civil War. 56–6,211

#21 Conflict for control of favelas in Rio, Brazil. 41–2,288.

Minor conflicts

    #22 Kashmir insurgency in India and Pakistan. 706

    #23 Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency in Pakistan and Iran. 600

    #24 Central African Republic Civil War also related to the Sahel War. 546.

    #25 Insurgency in NE India. 540

    #26 Jamaican political conflict. 397

    #27 Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India. 360

    #28 Philippine drug war. 269

    #29 Kurdish insurgency in Iran. 198

    #30 Papua conflict (independence from Indonesia movement). 179

    #31 Delta conflict in SE Nigeria (Biafra nationalist). 150

    #32 Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. 136

    #33 Honduran gang crackdown. 112-647

    #34 Islamic state insurgency in North Caucasus. 10

    #35 Armenia-Azerbaijan border crisis. 462-594

    #36 Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) 275-321

    #37 New People's Army Rebellion in the Philippines (Maoist). 259-580

    #38 Internal conflicts in Bangladesh. 12-328

    #39 Ethnic violence in Papua New Guinea. 1-337

Skirmishes and clashes

    #40 Libyan crisis. 89

    #41Peruvian conflict. 75

    #42 Cabinda War in Angola. 66

    #43 Ecuadorian drug war. 60

    #44 South Thailand insurgency. 57

    #45 Salvadoran gang crackdown. 56

    #46 Casamanse conflict in Senegal. 48

    #47 Western DR Congo clashes. 43+

    #48 Western Saharan clashes. 38

    #49 Insurgency in Northern Chad (arguably part of Sahel War). 37

    #50 Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. 21-25+ 

    #51 Insurgency in Egypt. 21

    #52 Korean War. 12

    #53 Insurgency in Paraguay. 10

    #54 Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (Africa). 3

    #55 Katanga insurgency in DR Congo. 2

    #56 Georgian-Ossetian conflict. 2

Broken out by region

Europe:
#1 Ukraine War 
#34 Islamic state insurgency in North Caucasus. 
#35 Armenia-Azerbaijan border crisis. 
#56 Georgian-Ossetian conflict. 
 
Middle East, North Africa, and West Asia:
#2 Arab-Israel conflict in Gaza and Lebanon.
#14 Yemeni civil war.
#15 Conflict with ISIS in Iraq.
#20 Syrian Civil War. 
#29 Kurdish insurgency in Iran.  
#32 Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.  
#40 Libyan crisis. 
#48 Western Saharan clashes. 
#50 Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. 
#51 Insurgency in Egypt.

Sub-Saharan Africa:
#3 Sahel War.
#4 Sudanese Civil War.
#7 Boko Haram insurgency (really part of the Sahel War).
#8 Kivu conflict, a highly fractured insurgency at its root mostly a Tutsi-Hutu conflict in the wake of the Second Congo War (now involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda).
#9 Civil war in Somalia.
#10 Muslim/non-Muslim-herder/farmer violence in Nigeria (which I would also lump in as part of the Sahel War).
#11 Insurgencies/civil war in Ethiopia.
#12 Sudanese nomadic conflict (ethnic violence in South Sudan).
#19 Cameroon Civil War (English v. French colonial legacies). 
#24 Central African Republic Civil War (also related to the Sahel War).  
#31 Delta conflict in SE Nigeria (Biafra nationalists)  
#36 Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) 
#42 Cabinda War in Angola (former Portugese enclave of related tribes).  
#46 Casamanse conflict in Senegal (non-Wolof, non-Muslim minority seeking autonomy). 
#47 Western DR Congo clashes. 
#49 Insurgency in Northern Chad (arguably part of Sahel War). 
#54 Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (Africa).  
#55 Katanga insurgency in DR Congo. 
 
Central and South Asia:
#5 Myanmar Conflict (anti-coup and Muslim minorities).
#13 Islamist insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.
#18 Afghan conflict. 
#22 Kashmir insurgency in India and Pakistan. 
#23 Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency in Pakistan and Iran.  
#25 Insurgency in NE India. 
#27 Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India. 
#38 Internal conflicts in Bangladesh. 

Southeast Asia:
#28 Philippine drug war.
#30 Papua conflict (independence from Indonesia movement).
#37 New People's Army Rebellion in the Philippines (Maoist).
#39 Ethnic violence in Papua New Guinea.
#44 South Thailand insurgency.
  
Latin America and the Caribbean:
#6 Mexican Drug War.
#16 Pemon conflict centered around mining disputes between the Maduro government, the Pemon nation (indigenous people that live in the Gran Sabana region in southeastern Venezuela) and armed irregular groups in Venezuela.
#17 Gang war in Haiti.
#21 Conflict for control of favelas in Rio, Brazil. 
#26 Jamaican political conflict. 
#33 Honduran gang crackdown. 
#41 Peruvian conflict (Maoist insurgency). 
#43 Ecuadorian drug war.  
#45 Salvadoran gang crackdown. 
#53 Insurgency in Paraguay (Marxist/drug war). 

East Asia:

#52 Korean War.

24 June 2024

The Ambivalence To Extremism Pipeline In Politically Polarized Contexts

Very counterintuitively, extreme political actions seem to be associated with people who start out ambivalent about issues in the context of high levels of polarization.
Political extremism varies across people and contexts, but which beliefs will a person support through extreme actions? 
We propose that ambivalent attitudes, despite reducing normative political actions like voting, increase support for extreme political actions. 
We demonstrate this hypothesized reversal using dozens of measures across six studies (N = 13,055). The effect was robust to relevant covariates and numerous methodological variations and was magnified when people’s attitudinal or ideological positions were more polarized. 
It appears to occur because being conflicted about political issues can feel psychologically uncomfortable, making extreme actions more appealing. Notably, this emerged when people thought ambivalence was justified, whereas leading them to consider ambivalence unjustified suppressed the effect, suggesting that ambivalent people are coping with but not necessarily trying to reduce their ambivalence. These results highlight the interplay of affective and cognitive influences in extreme behavior, showing that beliefs people feel justifiably conflicted about can promote extremism.
Joseph J. Siev and Richard E. Petty, "Ambivalent attitudes promote support for extreme political actions" 10(24) Science Advances (June 12, 2024) (open access). Hat tip to Guy in the comments.

02 April 2024

Hamas, The Houthis, Hezbollah, Iran, And ISIS-K

Hamas and the Houthis have provoked the responses that they predictably received with wide popular support for their actions.

The decision of Hamas to conduct the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel still had strong majority support among Gazans months after the attack when the devastating consequences of that decision were clear. 

Likewise, the Houthi attacks on shipping and U.S. warships in the Red Sea are a boost to Houthi political support and legitimacy in the parts of Southern Yemen which it controls that is home to 70% of the population of Yemen, despite the fact that the insurgency it has waged there has led to a catastrophic humanitarian disaster there.

Every bit of Israeli and Western military response in Gaza and against the Houthis was deliberately provoked and had broad popular support. In both places, large majorities actively wanted to inflict harm on the U.S. and to obliterate Israel entirely. And, Gaza also continues to keep 100 or so Israeli hostages and has done nothing to surrender.

So, in both cases, while there is clearly significant suffering and plenty of people in each place, like children did nothing to deserve it, neither population is very sympathetic. Each of them brought what they are experiencing upon themselves through deliberate provocation and evil conduct. 

Iran's Role

Of course, Iran is to blame too, for giving them firepower and intelligence that they otherwise would have lacked, and for egging them on behind the scenes. Iran has played a similar role in providing capabilities for and egging on Hezbollah which has waged war on Israel for Lebanon for decades, and Shiite Islamic militias in Iraq and Syria.

Iran's role in world affairs is complicated. 

The war in Yemen is a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia to a great extent, yet the two countries recently reached a Chinese brokered peace accord. China is also looking to strengthen its ties to the Houthis as a way to exempt its own merchants from Houthi piracy. China has previously joined naval coalitions against Somalian pirates in the same region. On the other hand, China is lukewarm toward Russia since it can't alienate its Western trading partners too badly, and has pulled back a majority of of expatriates and economic investments in Africa in the last five years or so, after having spent years trying to build economic and political influence in Africa and across the second and third worlds.

Iran is a key military supplier and source of military technology for both Russia and North Korea as a result of the military industrial capabilities it was forced to develop for itself after decades of Western sanctions. It probably has a few nuclear weapons, has proven it has long range missile capabilities, and its naval might in the Persian Gulf is rivaled upon plausible U.S. naval adversaries only by Russia, China, and North Korea. Iran has also not refrained from using its military capabilities on occasion and has designs on making Shiite majority Iraq into one of its client states.

Yet, Iran reached a treaty, from which Trump promptly withdrew, with the U.S. during President Obama's administration. Its democracy, while flawed and subject to a theoretic veto, is more of a real democracy than most of the Middle East and West Asia. While Iran presented itself to the world as a Shiite theocracy, it actually have considerable religious diversity and is almost as far along the path towards secularism as places like the U.S. and Ireland in terms of grass roots belief, even though the waning religious conservatives have the upper hand in terms of political power. Iran would be a natural place for an Islamic analog to the modernizing Protestant Reformation in Europe to emerge under the right circumstances. Iran has oil wealth, but unlike many other reasonably developed Islamic countries, also has a substantial commercial and manufacturing sector, leaving it in circumstances that have more in common with Turkey and Egypt, than with Saudi Arabia and UAE and Brunei which are dominated by oil wealth, or Yemen and Afghanistan which have little more than subsistence farming interrupted by long periods of civil war.

Israel's Overkill

Israel's response in Gaza has probably been overkill although it is also completely understandable. Hamas and kindred Islamist movements in Gaza, the West Bank, and across the Middle East have been trying to exterminate Israel and to wipe Jews from the face of the Earth almost since its inception in 1948. When Israel gave Gaza more autonomy and withdrew from direct supervision of the region, the Palestinians put Hamas in charge and Israel got terrorist bombings, endless rocket attacks, and the October 7 massacre in return.

President Biden treads the difficult path of not adding aid and comfort to those who would destroy Israel, while simultaneously trying to mitigate humanitarian suffering in Gaza. And, contrary to the views of many on the left, Israel is not just an American puppet that is compelled to do the bidding of an American President in response to an existential threat to it and its people.

About ISIS-K

As an aside, the terrorist attacked recently carried out at a concert in Moscow that killed about 144 people and seriously injured at least 100 more was the work of four Tajik terrorists affiliated with ISIS-K. ISIS-K is one of the main opponents of the Taliban in Afghanistan, although they obviously have no problem with the idea of an Islamist theocracy. 

ISIS-K stands for Islamic State - Khorasan, a reference to the 7th and 8th century CE kingdom in what is now Islamic Central Asia that included "western Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, the eastern halves of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, western Tajikistan, and portions of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan." The region was first united under the pre-Islamic Sasanian Persian empire, and then became part of the first two Sunni Islamic Caliphates:

First established in the 6th century as one of four administrative (military) divisions by the Sasanian Empire, the scope of the region has varied considerably during its nearly 1,500-year history. Initially, the Khorasan division of the Sasanian Empire covered the northeastern military gains of the empire. . . .With the rise of the Umayyad Caliphate, the designation was inherited and likewise stretched as far as their military gains in the east, starting off with the military installations at Nishapur and Merv, slowly expanding eastwards into Tokharistan and Sogdia. Under the Caliphs, Khorasan was the name of one of the three political zones under their dominion (the other two being Eraq-e Arab "Arabic Iraq" and Eraq-e Ajam "Non-Arabic Iraq or Persian Iraq"). Under the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, Khorasan was divided into four major sections or quarters (rub′), each section based on a single major city: Nishapur, Merv, Herat and Balkh.

The Abbasid Caliphate gots its start in Khorasan around 750 CE, was a high water mark of the Islamic empire in a golden age which lasted more than five centuries until 1258 CE, and persisted in some form for more than two and a half centuries after that, until the 1517 CE when the Ottoman Empire replaced them. The Ottomans, in turn, were the most powerful Islamic country in the world and expanded well into the Balkans, for centuries, but then faded in a long, slow decline, until it fell, roughly the end of World War I, when the current politics of the Middle East began when the colonial powers that won in World War I drew the boundaries of the modern Middle Eastern states and picked the rulers for those countries.

The Abbasid Caliphate or Abbasid Empire (/əˈbæsɪd/ or /ˈæbəsɪd/; Arabic: الْخِلَافَة الْعَبَّاسِيَّة, romanized: al-Khilāfa al-ʿAbbāsiyya) was the third caliphate to succeed the Islamic prophet Muhammad. It was founded by a dynasty descended from Muhammad's uncle, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–653 CE), from whom the dynasty takes its name. They ruled as caliphs for most of the caliphate from their capital in Baghdad in modern-day Iraq, after having overthrown the Umayyad Caliphate in the Abbasid Revolution of 750 CE (132 AH). The Abbasid Revolution had its origins and first successes in the easterly region of Khorasan, far from the bases of Umayyad power in Syria and Iraq. The Abbasid Caliphate first centered its government in Kufa, modern-day Iraq, but in 762 the caliph Al-Mansur founded the city of Baghdad, near the ancient Babylonian capital city of Babylon and Persian city of Ctesiphon. Baghdad became the center of science, culture, and invention in what became known as the Golden Age of Islam. This, in addition to housing several key academic institutions, including the House of Wisdom, as well as a multiethnic and multi-religious environment, garnered it an international reputation as the "Centre of Learning".

The Abbasid period was marked by dependence on Persian bureaucrats (such as the Barmakid family) for governing the territories as well as an increasing inclusion of non-Arab Muslims in the ummah (Muslim community). Persian customs were broadly adopted by the ruling elite, and they began patronage of artists and scholars. Since much support for the Abbasids came from Persian converts, it was natural for the Abbasids to take over much of the Persian tradition of government. Despite this initial cooperation, the Abbasids of the late 8th century had alienated both non-Arab mawali (clients) and Persian bureaucrats.

The political power of the caliphs was limited with the rise of the Iranian Buyids and the Seljuq Turks, who captured Baghdad in 945 and 1055, respectively. Although Abbasid leadership over the vast Islamic empire was gradually reduced to a ceremonial religious function in much of the caliphate, the dynasty retained control of its Mesopotamian domain during the rule of Caliph al-Muqtafi and extended into Iran during the reign of Caliph al-Nasir. The Abbasids' age of cultural revival and fruition ended in 1258 with the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols under Hulagu Khan and the execution of al-Musta'sim. The Abbasid line of rulers, and Muslim culture in general, re-centred themselves in the Mamluk capital of Cairo in 1261. Though lacking in political power (with the brief exception of Caliph al-Musta'in of Cairo), the dynasty continued to claim religious authority until a few years after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, with the last Abbasid caliph being Al-Mutawakkil III.

And, as an aside, who were the Sasanians? 

The Sasanian Empire or Sassanid Empire, also known as the Second Persian Empire or Neo-Persian Empire, was the last Iranian empire before the early Muslim conquests of the 7th to 8th centuries. Named after the House of Sasan, it endured for over four centuries, from 224 to 651, making it the second longest-lived Persian imperial dynasty after the Arsacids of the Parthian Empire.

31 July 2023

Stray Thoughts

Domestic affairs: 

* Back to the issue of the definition of "manhood". This is an intense crisis on the right and not so much on the left. This is because there is a definition of manhood out there, albeit a vague one, and most men on the left can come close to it or aspire to get there. Men on the right are distressed and want a new definition of manhood because they can't even realistically hope to live up to the prevailing definitions of it. They are educational and economic failures. They resort to violence or threats of violence. They are sympathetic to rapists because they can't cause women to have sex with them voluntarily without heavy pressure. They aren't emotionally stable. They can't sustain positive relationships with women. They are either not fathers at all, or are divorce absentee fathers who don't even pay the child support that they owe.

* Maybe someday, we will adapt to warm American summer climes with a world where professionals wear shorts and short sleeves without a necktie in the summer, and maybe even stop their days for siestas, while keeping their offices a bit warmer.

* The GOP base doesn't seem to care that Trump is facing two felony prosecutions and is likely to be indicted on felonies in two other cases with pending grand jury investigations in Atlanta and the District of Columbia respectively. Realistically, Biden's announcement that he will run again will keep viable Democrats out of the race for the 2024 Presidential election. So, we seem likely to have another Trump v. Biden race in 2024, unless Republicans change their mind following one or more felony convictions of Trump (which seem likely). If that does happen, the race is likely to be less close as liberal Gen Z replaces older more conservative voters in the electorate and turns out to vote more than younger voters in the past, and as Trump's legal problems sway swing voters to avoid him and discourage more moderate Republican voters from voting at all.

* The U.S. has seen far more population growth in Southern latitudes, both in the Southwest and the Southeast, than other places. Some of this is chasing jobs, but a lot of it seems to be driving by older people retiring somewhere that they no longer have to deal with snow and cold. As summer temperatures in the Southern U.S. relentlessly rise, water shortages strike some places, and warm temperature bugs and beasts move north, will this trend eventually reverse itself? Insurance companies withdrawing from or limiting their exposure to Florida and California seems to presage these trends.

* The trend towards Florida, Texas, and other Southern states doubling down on their backwardness ought to be had for them in the long run. Will that happen? Will it discourage smarter and more sane people from moving there? Will it at least lead to more political polarization? Is this a strategy to keep liberal migrants out in order to prevent old school conservatives from being diluted away to political irrelevance?

* The coal industry is collapsing. This has to bode ill for the economic futures of Wyoming and West Virginia, the two states most dependent upon coal economically. Oil is used predominantly for transportation, which is transitioning steadily towards electric vehicles. Will that make a dent in the economies of states like Alaska and Texas that are stereotypically dependent upon the oil industry?

* Rural America is depopulating. There have been few decades when Americans haven't been migrating from rural areas to cities to make our nation more urban since the founding. Rural school districts have undergone multiple rounds of consolidation. Rural areas have half the per capita income of urban areas, despite subsidies of rural America. Robots and drones threaten to push the trend further by allowing for the greater automation of farming. When automation facilitates farms with more acres per farmer and more acres per farm, that inevitably depopulates farming communities, but also makes the farmers who remain more affluent.

* Eugenics is an almost taboo word in modern political discourse. But on the soft side of eugenics, it would seem better for our society if college educated couples had more kids and if economic struggling people and felons had fewer kids. It seems like the demographic trends at the bottom are trending that way. But educated people are marrying later and are less likely to have kids at all.

* Another paradigm challenging data point is that homelessness is higher, predictably, in places with higher home prices, but unforeseen, in places with low poverty rates:

A study from the real estate website Home Bay suggests what metro Denver and other regions with high home prices really face is an affordable housing crisis, of which homelessness is the most visible sign.

“Since 1985, housing prices have risen four times faster than incomes, even after adjusting for inflation,” said Matt Brannon, a data analyst with Home Bay’s parent company, Clever Real Estate. “The relationship between homelessness and housing affordability needs to be talked about more.”

The U.S. may be the wealthiest nation on the planet, but last year about 582,000 of its residents were homeless. . . . One of the most vexing problems is that economic prosperity does not improve housing outcomes, but more often than not, worsens them.

An analysis of the 50 largest U.S. metro areas that Brannon conducted found that those with home values above the national average have homeless rates 2.5 times higher than metro areas with below average home values.

Take San Jose, in the heart of California’s Silicon Valley, which epitomizes the nation’s high-tech prowess and ability to create high-paying jobs. It boasts the lowest poverty rate among the 50 metros studied at 6.9%. Yet it also has the country’s highest typical home values at $1.39 million, and the nation’s highest homeless rate of 637 per 100,000 residents — 3.6 times the U.S. rate. . . .

Right behind San Jose are San Francisco and Los Angeles, where the high rank on home values lines right up with the rank on the homeless rate — second and third. Seattle, Sacramento, Las Vegas, New York, Portland, Ore., and Denver all made the top 10.

Metro Denver had the seventh highest typical home value in the nation at $559,309, and the fourth-lowest poverty rate at 8.4%. It also had the 10th highest rate of homelessness at 231.6 per 100,000, based on 2022 counts from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

. . .

Dallas ranks 38th for its homeless rate and Houston 47th. Even Austin, which like metro Denver has faced rapid home price gains due to strong in-migration, ranked 17th.

Although high home prices typically align with higher rents, renters are more likely to become homeless than homeowners. The Home Bay study also looked at that relationship.

Cities with higher rates of homeless have an average rent of $2,274 a month, while those with below-average homelessness have average rents of $1,596, based on the Zillow Observed Rent Index, which covers a broad range of rental properties. . . . Western states hosted 10 of the 12 metros with above-average homeless rates. New York and Hartford, Conn., were the exceptions.

Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Houston, and Cincinnati had the lowest homeless rates among U.S. major metros, all below 50 per 100,000 or under a third of the U.S. average of 175.5 per 100,000.

And Brannon points out five metro areas that have done better at bucking the correlation between higher housing costs and more homelessness — Atlanta, Miami, Boston, Charlotte, N.C., and Dallas. 
Of those, Boston is the most comparable to Denver when it comes to home values — $577,160 vs. $559,309. Despite Denver having a slightly lower home value than Boston, its homeless rate is 2.5 times higher. In 2015, Boston’s mayor at the time issued a comprehensive plan to reduce chronic homelessness called “Boston’s Way Home.” The program counts more than 15,000 people without shelter who have been housed. Only one in 50 homeless people in Boston sleep outside on any given night, the lowest rate of any major city and a fraction of the nearly four in 10 estimated nationally, according to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. . . . 

Despite criticisms that outgoing Mayor Michael Hancock didn’t do enough, Denver boosted spending on homelessness from $8 million when he took office to $190 million authorized last year and another $254 million this year, including $77.7 million in federal dollars from the American Rescue Plan Act. . . . 
The Home Bay study is based on 2022 numbers from the U.S. Census Bureau. A point-in-time count conducted on Jan. 30 across metro Denver and released on July 24 found a 31.7% increase in the number of people living in temporary shelters or on the streets across the metro area. That number went up from 6,884 to 9,065 people.

My go to solutions for homeless are to reduce the shortage of affordable housing with market based housing facilitated by zoning deregulation and to focus on "housing first" solutions. Fully funding (or even more heavily funding) Section 8 HUD spending would do a lot as well.

* Air taxi service, an economic development I incorporated into fictional scribblings in the early aughts, is just about ready for prime time and is getting FAA regulations to go with it. I think it would be a great industry to organize primarily with mutual companies (i.e. consumer co-operatives).

International affairs:

* I still haven't seen a good clear narrative explanation of the riots that swept France a few weeks ago. I'd like to understand it better.

* Islamic terrorism is alive and well in Pakistan, with ISIS allied extremists targeting comparative "moderate" Islamist political and religious movements. The Sahel war is also ongoing. Islamic terrorism seems to have greatly diminished in North America and Europe, however.

* Israel is presenting itself as an example of what happens in a parliamentary political system with proportional representation producing quite pure majority rule, with few institutional checks and balances, and also with a fragmented political culture that can't rely on widely held political and legal norms to prevent abuses. In addition to disturbing reforms to its legal system, it is also continuing mistreatment of people in Palestinian territories unabated. I'm ambivalent. There is a lot of good about Israel which has provided a haven for the Jewish people worldwide, and the U.S. with the other largest group of Jewish people in the world has a unique obligation to protect Israel from genocide at the hands of hostile neighbors. But, Israel, feeling the existential threats it faces keenly, isn't exactly behaving well either.

* Ecuador had record murder rates, among the highest in the world, and rampant gang violence and extortion. It imposed draconian violations of civil rights and massive deployments of law enforcement. This worked. Murders have plummeted, and organized crime seems to have collapsed as well. One would think that it could eventually return to a more normal state. But massive organized crime and murders are a problem that is very rarely broken and they seem to have managed it. It is certainly an instance that calls for "reevaluating of priors." It doesn't disturb, however, the intuition that perceived likelihood of being caught is far more important that perceived punishment severity.

* The Ukraine War continues. The Ukrainian counteroffensive is making only slow gains, but has intruded into Russian territory a few times. Russia is still acting with disregard for basic standards of humanity, calling off its fragile grain shipment deal and attacking civilian centers with no military importance out of spite. The quality of Russia's military force continues to decline, however. Russia narrowly survived an abortive coup by its mercenaries who had been hung out to dry by the ordinary military. Russia has lost so many experienced and often high ranking soldiers and so much equipment that its conventional military capabilities in Europe have been vastly diminished and its neighbors are ramping up their own military might and expanding NATO. This engagement has greatly downgraded Russia's international standing as a military power. Without the economic base of the full Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe, it can't maintain a Soviet scale military force as it has tried to.

* The U.S. is inherently in its origin story, a nation of immigrants. Most countries are nation-states. Does that change the legitimacy of anti-immigrant xenophobia in those countries in ways that it does not in the U.S.?