13 July 2009

The State of the Afghan National Army (Corrected)

As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently.

Twenty-nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support.

Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces.

Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions.

Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting.

From here (citing "the latest DoD report to Congress on Afghanistan.")

The commentator, Herschel Smith, who is the indirect source of the quote above, also states in reliance upon the British reporting firm, The Guardian, that "there is significant drug abuse and incompetency in the Afghan National Army. It has been estimated that if the ANA were to implement drug testing, it would lose as much as 85% of its forces."


Herschel Smith said...

No, Herschel Smith does not say on his own authority that there is significant drug abuse in the ANA. Follow the links provided in the original post, or if you are disinclined:


Andrew Oh-Willeke said...

My apologies. Thank you for the correction. I did not notice the connection between that language in the story and that link.