The Trump 2.0 Defense Budget

One of Trump's signature military programs that he has pushed is the "Golden Dome", a missile system for U.S. territory. The Congressional Budget Office says that this system, which would also be space based, would cost $542 billion. North Korea, Russia, and China are all potentially hostile nations that might launch nuclear weapons at the United States, making this kind of defense necessary.

This is not cheap, but it is also less than the roughly $950 billion it is expected to cost over the next ten year to update the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, a weapons system in the same arena that is much less likely to be used. This is because even on smallish nuclear weapon does more indiscriminate harm than there is any legitimate reason to use to achieve a military objective.

Indeed, the Golden Dome is one of the very few parts of the Trump Agenda that is within the realm of "normal" politics and which, with proper Congressional appropriations and approval, could be a worthwhile addition to the capabilities of the U.S. military, which might actually reduce the need for U.S. nuclear missile deterrents to ever be used. 

It is also the highest level of the emerging concept of active defense, as passive defenses like armor and bunkers have increasingly become less effective in the face of more potent offensive weapons. 

Other aspects of Trump 2.0's first defense budget are discussed here. Some highlights (my comments follow in italics):

The ending DEI component is doing serious harm to the U.S. military's effectiveness, rolls back the military's many civil rights movement accomplishments, and threatens the rule of law.

The focus on shipbuilding is misguided. The U.S. has the largest blue sea navy in the world which far outnumbers its likely adversaries, but its surface fleet is far too vulnerable. We should be shifting away from large surface combatants and focusing on building a ghost fleet, and on shifting anti-ship warfare to submarines, drones, aircraft, and long range missiles.

Also, Trump 2.0 in the foreign policy arena is all about leaving the role of world policeman, at least outside the Western Hemisphere which has far less militarily capable military forces. Trump wants so little to do with Africa that he's even proposing to close U.S. embassies there. He wants to reduce or make more conditional U.S. support for Ukraine, is trying to reduce the size of our foreign military bases, and has viewed our NATO alliance with such disdain that he seems to be considering leaving it in favor of a far more pro-Russian foreign policy. He's at most ambivalent about defending U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region although his trade war is making a conflict there more likely since China has less to lose from invading Taiwan or harassing the Philippines, to the horror of U.S. military and defense contractor lobbyists who are using that threat as almost the exclusive justification for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

The F-47 might be significant, but it might not. Too little is known about it to be sure. It is very likely that its steal features may be undermined by Chinese technological developments before it leaves service.

Characterizing illegal immigration and drug smuggling as an "ongoing invasion of the U.S." is just factually wrong and profoundly misguided. Border control should be predominantly a civilian homeland defense department and Coast Guard function, supplemented by the Air National Guard, not a U.S. military function. U.S. military action in a drug war in Mexico or elsewhere in almost all of Latin America is not welcome and would constitute an illegal invasion of Mexico which is the international war crime of "aggression." If the U.S. wants to hurt cartels, it should legalize but regulate drugs to destroy the U.S. black market that funds the cartels and crack down on illegal exports of U.S. firearms.

Modernizing the nation's nuclear deterrent, as a technological matter, has its place when our nuclear missiles were recently run by 5.25" floppy disks and 1970s CRT screen computers running DOS. But it is being done thoughtlessly. A capability to destroy the entire world in a mutual assured destruction scenario with the Soviet Union, which is was designed for, isn't very valuable, and the strategy of packing large numbers of H-bomb submunitions into a single "dumb" non-stealth ICBM undermines that deterrent effect in an age when missile defense can, or soon will, be able to intercept a large percentage of incoming missiles, especially when there aren't all that many incoming missiles. Indeed, it isn't at all obvious that ground based ICBMs add much value when we have SLBMs and aircraft delivered nuclear weapons. This lazy, autopilot thinking in a trillion dollar nuclear force upgrade is the epitome of wastefulness. The current U.S. nuclear arsenal is overkill for a mission that doesn't make sense. 

A program to develop a tactical nuclear anti-ship cruise missile, which in practice would be predominantly used against countries with nuclear arsenals (like China and Russia and North Korea), risks escalating conventional military conflicts into nuclear wars for very marginal improvements in anti-ship missile capabilities which are already more than adequate with conventional armaments including submarine launched torpedos, and soon to enter service hypersonic missiles. In theory, a nuclear armed anti-ship cruise missile could be smaller than a comparable conventional explosive based anti-ship cruise missile, although not faster, and the case that it is necessary to overcome the armor or size of enemy warships has not been made. There is no surface warship in the Russian navy that can't be destroyed with existing anti-ship missiles and torpedos, and longer range and hypersonic missiles, and improved stealth fighters and bombers will only accentuate that reality. There might be a handful of Chinese aircraft carriers that make take more than a single anti-ship missile or torpedo to sink, but simply using more conventional missiles for that very narrow task makes more sense that risking escalation of a conflict with China into a nuclear war and the many, many billions of dollars needed to develop and deploy a tactical nuclear armed anti-ship cruise missile.

A cost of living pay raise for active duty service members is fine enough, but it can't make up for major cuts in veteran's benefits, for nickel and dime savings from cutting (and undermining with anti-DEI agendas) U.S. military academies, failing to retain seasoned combat veterans (especially in the Army and Marines), not having enough ground troops that can be deployed abroad at any one time for one or two major conflicts, and closing and shrinking foreign military bases that make deployment of U.S. forces in a conflict much more rapid especially with heavier equipment.

With respect to the U.S. Army (the indented language in ordinary type are quotations, with my comments interlineated in italics):

We will introduce long-range missiles and modernized UAS into formations, field the M1E3 tank, develop the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, and close the C-sUAS capability gap. 

The M1E3 tank is a bad decision as I have discussed previously. 

Long range missiles and modernized unmanned aerial systems make sense. 

Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft System capabilities (i.e. anti-drone weapons) are indeed critical as recent wars in Israel and Ukraine have illustrated. 

The Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (basically a next generation MV-22 Osprey for the Army) previously discussed here as a successor to existing transport helicopters also has its place because it would be faster and have longer range that a true helicopter (although the fact that the military has a second program in an earlier stage of development in the Air Force to do almost exactly the same thing is wasteful).

We are eliminating 1,000 staff positions at HQDA. To further optimize force structure, Army Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command will merge into a single command that aligns force generation, force design, and force development under a single headquarters. Forces Command will transform into Western Hemisphere Command through the consolidation of Army North and Army South. Multi-Domain Task Forces will align with theater headquarters to operate under relevant authorities. 

A little bureaucratic reorganization isn't necessarily bad, and may need trimming, but this isn't being done very thoughtfully. 

The U.S. military is really bad at procuring major new military systems, however, and a little reshuffling of top level headquarters organization with a few layoffs won't fundamentally address the problem of programs that are chronically far behind schedule, far over budget, technologically infeasible, or ill-suited for what the U.S. military really needs, resulting in many programs that are canceled, cut short, or deeply flawed.

We will trim general officer positions to streamline command structures and revise civilian talent management policies to prioritize performance.

Again, a little bureaucratic reorganization isn't necessarily bad, and may need trimming, but this isn't being done very thoughtfully. The increasing focus in this process on personal loyalty to Donald Trump, and on replacing qualified officers who happen to be women or minorities with unqualified ideological arch-conservatives (in an already overwhelmingly conservative officer corps) is deeply concerning. Arch-conservatives are not the people with the IQ or emotional intelligence necessary to be effective on a complex foreign battlefield or war zone, or to consider out of the box possibilities.

…reducing one Aerial Cavalry Squadron per Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in the Active Component... We will convert all Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to Mobile Brigade Combat Teams to improve mobility and lethality in a leaner formation. We are trading weight for speed, and mass for decisive force. 

Lighter weight and greater speed are generally good concepts. But this is a lot of labels without much detail for the uninitiated.

The MBCT's heavy reliance on the M1301 Infantry Squad Vehicle (image below) introduced in 2020, which doesn't even have an enclosed space for troops or significant equipment storage space and built in weapons, let alone providing any cover in a hostile environment, after the lessons we learned about the need to replace unarmored Humvees (which were at least enclosed) with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs) in multiple conflicts leading to the development of the JLTV is very problematic and suggests bad force design. Ill-suited to cold weather, rain, hail, dust storms, smoke, ambush friendly terrain, land mines, proximity to shrapnel that could be created by artillery and missile near misses or active defenses, and more. It doesn't even protect the crew from adversaries with civilian handguns and rifles, let alone military grade weapons. It is light, it can seat nine soldiers, it beats walking, and it can de-active its running lights and brake lights, but that's a pretty weak set of capabilities to recommend it. These reduced capabilities are particularly troubling when viewed together with the elimination of close air support resources from the force. And, if it really is being used in a reconnaissance role, nine soldiers in a dune buggy without reconnaissance drones or anti-tank missiles or anti-air missiles seems very non-optimal.

The fact that this is being advocated by the very same people who think that we need tracked vehicles to have off road capabilities and need heavy tanks to provide mobile protection to infantry forces and more drones also makes little sense.

The U.S. Army is doing a far inferior job of thoughtful force design than the U.S. Marine Corps. By all means, the Army needs to rethink its force design make it lighter so that it can deploy faster, and abandon the idea of troops whose primary means of travel is on foot (or slow, heavy, tracked vehicles like the cancelled M10 Booker or the M1 Abrams tank or the under gunned M2 Bradley based replacements for the M113).

But military vehicles for front line combat and reconnaissance units still ought to be afford some force protection in an environment like is even somewhat non-permissive like an urban riot with armed civilians (especially if it can't blend in to the existing civilian vehicles in the area), and ought to be suited to environments less friendly than Southern California beaches or country roads in Florida in good weather when there are no wildfires burning. The ISV also doesn't appear to have the off road capabilities of the Humvee or JTLV, as it is just a glorified civilian Chevy Colorado pickup truck with less occupant protection from attacks or weather than the civilian version.

We will cancel procurement of outdated crewed attack aircraft such as the AH-64D, excess ground vehicles like the HMMWV and JLTV, and obsolete UAVs like the Gray Eagle. We will also continue to cancel programs that deliver dated, late-to-need, overpriced, or difficult-to-maintain capabilities. 

The JLTV is not an excess ground vehicle and much better suited to modern warfare than either a next generation M1 Abrams tank or the ISV dune buggy (which is worse than a Humvee). 

If you cut the AH-64, the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) successor to the AH-64, and allow the Air Force to finally dispose of the A-10 with only the F-35A to replace it and the light OA-1K in permissive environments, what will the military use to provide close air support to troops during the daytime in less permissive environments when the AC-130 can't be used. Incidentally, naval fire support for ground troops located near coasts has also been largely eliminated. But mortars and canon artillery aren't accurate enough to fill that role.

Close air support is also a role where keeping a human being in the kill loop is particularly essential, and where reliance on remote controls for drones in an environment where electronic warfare and jamming may disrupt that, is particularly problematic.

Another account of the new budget notes that:

Republicans on the House and Senate armed services committees unveiled a $150 billion boost to the defence budget, most going to existing and near-future programs: $3.15 billion for more Boeing F-15EX fighters, $4.5 billion to accelerate the Northrop Grumman B-21 bomber, and even $1.5 billion for the ailing ICBM replacement, Sentinel. There was also money to slow retirements of F-15s and F-22s. The new Boeing F-47 and the Navy’s F/A-XX got $400m and $500m respectively. The Lockheed Martin F-35 was not mentioned at all, nor were aircraft carriers.

The navy gets an extra Virginia-class submarine and money for shipbuilding infrastructure—everything from wire and steel to drydocks and workforce development. The consistent ‘more ships’ message has been heard, after a decade of repetition. But there was no cash for the messed-up Constellation-class frigate, which could yet be thrown to the DOGEs. . . .

Like industry, Congress strongly favors protecting established programs. In its plus-up proposal, among new and radical things, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program (for fighter-like drones) and missile defense did best. . . .

Not mentioning the carriers is not significant. The idea of not having carriers is off the table; the last major design change in the carrier program was traumatic; and its unique facilities and skills make it almost impossible to adjust its building rate.

The omission of the F-35 may mean rather more. The new fighter designs and the F-15EX have greater range; even the F-47 will arrive before the USAF’s planned production of the F-35 will be completed, not before 2051. The F-35’s supporters seem anxious, and Lockheed Martin wasted no time in promoting a Super F-35 after the F-47 announcement.

The navy converted most of its future F-35Bs, capable of short take-off and vertical landing, into F-35Cs early this year, under a new Marine aviation plan. Navy Secretary John Phelan was asked in his confirmation process whether the service planned to upgrade the B models to the new Block 4 standard; he answered noncommittally. That’s significant because it has long been held that U.S. forces would keep all their F-35s in a common configuration. . . .

New cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles present an opening for new ideas and new competitors. There is little daylight between the views of the people running Anduril’s Barracuda cruise-missile project and those who did Lockheed Martin’s Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT, or Comet). Both teams believe new technology—one-shot injected structures, additive manufacturing in engines, and cheap and powerful data processing—can drop the cost of a cruise missile by an order of magnitude.

They also think new electronic payloads can allow the same vehicle to perform multiple kinetic and non-kinetic missions. The difference is that Anduril is pushing the idea hard but Lockheed Martin—maker of the million-dollar AGM-158 cruise missile—is not.

And, while not directly on point, a recent argument that missiles and drones can't replace cannon artillery isn't very convincing. It argues that:

A careful and historically informed examination of the conflict in Ukraine, coupled with an understanding of the fundamental principles of warfare, reveals a fundamental truth: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can enhance fire support, improve situational awareness, and provide tactical advantages, but they are not, and won’t be in the foreseeable future, a replacement for the range, volume, destructive power, and all-weather operability of traditional artillery. The focus should be on integrating drones into a comprehensive fires network, not on attempting to substitute them for a proven and essential capability.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, rapidly fielding large numbers of drones, both short and long-range, commercial and military-grade, to address resource constraints, a largely static front, and the evolving demands of the conflict. However, this isn’t a strategic shift based on superior capability or a harbinger of a new era of warfare, but rather a pragmatic response to circumstance. As many reports open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, and other respected military analysts indicate, the proliferation of FPV drones largely compensates for critical shortages of artillery shells, particularly on the Ukrainian side, filling a gap rather than offering a fundamentally better solution. While FPV drones have proven effective against armored vehicles and in close-quarters combat, at best, they deliver tactical-level precision comparable to battalion mortars, a far cry from the comprehensive impact of artillery fire. They are a tactical tool, not a strategic game-changer. Furthermore, the reliance on drones has created new vulnerabilities, as both sides have developed increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities to counter them.

The Limits of Drones in Modern Warfare: A Multifaceted Analysis

Drones excel in specific roles, and their utility is undeniable. They provide invaluable real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, significantly enhancing situational awareness for commanders and troops on the ground. They can strike isolated targets with precision, reducing collateral damage and minimizing the risk to friendly forces. They are effective at harassing enemy units, disrupting logistics, and conducting psychological warfare. Yet, as the Institute for Security and Development Policy and other think tanks have pointed out, UAVs are inherently limited by a number of factors. UAVs are significantly hampered by adverse weather conditions; rain degrades sensor performance and can cause electrical malfunctions, while strong winds can destabilize the aircraft, impacting its ability to maintain flight or accurately deliver payloads. These limitations mean UAV effectiveness is often dramatically reduced, or even negated, during inclement weather, making them unreliable.

UAVs’ payloads also restrict their destructive potential, limiting their ability to inflict significant damage on hardened targets or to suppress enemy fire effectively. Their reliance on radio frequency links makes them vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks, and other forms of electronic warfare—a weakness artillery, particularly when combined with robust communications security measures, doesn’t share.

Moreover, the logistical demands of drone operations—battery charging, spare parts, specialized operator training, and the constant need for counter-electronic warfare measures—create new sustainment challenges that would become overwhelmingly complex and costly in a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Add in the manning requirements for drone units, observers, and support teams, and that heavy draw off of an already stretched force creates a self-inflicted dilemma on force structure.

Artillery, in contrast, delivers massed fires in all weather conditions, over extended ranges, and with significantly greater explosive effect. Even the most advanced FPV drones, as Euromaidan Press and other sources have highlighted, cannot replicate the broad-area suppression, neutralization, and destruction that a battery of 155mm howitzers can achieve in a matter of minutes. Nor can drones match the psychological impact of sustained artillery bombardment, a long-recognized element of attritional warfare. The notion that swarms of small drones could simply replace guns and rocket systems also ignores the economic realities of scaling up drone warfare, especially when considering enemy countermeasures and layered defenses, as David Hambling of Forbes and other defense analysts have argued. The cost of replacing drones lost in combat, coupled with the expense of maintaining a robust logistical tail, and manning requirements quickly erodes any perceived cost advantage. Furthermore, the vulnerability of drones to electronic warfare and physical destruction creates a significant risk of losing critical ISR assets and disrupting fire support operations. 

Ukraine and Russia: A Unique Case Study — Circumstance, Not Revolution

The reliance on drones by Ukraine and Russia doesn’t necessarily predict the future of warfare for well-equipped, industrialized militaries. It’s a reflection of their specific circumstances; adaptation born of necessity, resource constraints, and the unique characteristics of the conflict. Drone strikes address tactical needs, achieving limited effects when traditional artillery is unavailable or when precise targeting is required. They enhance reconnaissance and target acquisition, allowing for more efficient use of dwindling artillery resources. However, neither side has abandoned conventional indirect fire. In fact, both are actively working to rebuild their artillery capabilities even as they deploy drones extensively. The Ukrainian plea for more artillery shells from Western allies underscores the continued importance of conventional fires. Drones are a temporary fix, a stopgap measure, not a replacement. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for American military planners. The conflict has also highlighted the importance of counter-drone technology, with both sides investing heavily in electronic warfare systems and physical defenses to mitigate the threat posed by UAVs.

The trouble with this analysis is that many existing drones and missiles have longer ranges than artillery (their limited range is one of their biggest drawbacks), canon artillery is profoundly less accurate than drones and guided missiles, and that it is easy to scale up the payload of a drone or guided missile to equal or exceed the explosive power of the largest artillery shells currently in use (the 155mm howitzer round).

One of the latest guided missiles, the "Red Wolf" long range precision fire missile carried by a light AH-1Z Marine Corps helicopter, for example, has a range of 170 miles or more, and "the munition was a six-foot-long design powered by an unspecified German-made turbojet and capable of being launched by an MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone."

TWZ added that the Corps previously has expressed a need to be able to reach ranges of 170 miles (278 kilometers), and the Red Wolf appears to be capable of reaching that distance. Extended range variants of the Hellfire, like the AGM-114R-4, or the JAGM’s ‘MR’ version have maximum ranges of 21 miles and 10 miles respectively, which are drastically shorter than what the Corps desires.

Heavy howitzers, in contrast, has a range on the order of 24 miles, with extended range versions relying on guidance systems that have the same issues as drones and guided missiles and bombs. 

The notion that mortars or howitzers are more precise than drones is absurd, and arguing that drones are not a strategic game changer is putting your head in the sand contrary to all available evidence from recent real world conflicts, like those in Ukraine and Middle East.

Canon artillery shells, like most drones and slower missiles, are also vulnerable to active defenses.

While some of the more feeble FPV drones suffer in bad weather, most ground, air and sea launched guided missiles don't (relative to artillery shells).

And, when you are making the beyond the line of sight long range strikes that canon artillery are designed for, you need to have forward reconnaissance to provide eyes on the target that will often be a drone with the same issues. Firing artillery blindly is not a good practice. It may inflict terror with the vast collateral damage it inflicts, but it's not particularly effective. And, any barrier to communicating with drones also applies to communications with forward observers. It is true that dumb weapons can't be jammed. But remote control is not the only way to operate a drone. And great progress has been made in fire and forget technologies for drone and missile guidance that don't rely on GPS signals or radio controls. This is also an area where advanced AI technologies can be deployed for the purposes of final approach target identification. If you have human forward observers, they can use laser designators (in colors not visible to the human eye) to substitute for GPS, radar sensors, heat sensors, or more elaborate AI systems in guiding a munition in its final approach to the target.

The biggest problem with guided missiles and drones is their cost relative to artillery shells. But as another article quoted above notes, we are on the brink of being able to reduce that by an order of magnitude. And, much of that cost comes from intellectual property royalties, not unit assembly costs. Maybe the U.S. military just needs to buy some patents from defense contractors who hold them (it can seize them for fair compensation using the power of eminent domain if they don't do so willingly).

Why use drones or missiles instead of canon artillery?

1. Their greater cost is offset by their greater accuracy so that fewer of them are necessary to destroy a single target than the number of artillery shells that would be required. This was one of the biggest lesson that the U.S. Air Force learned in the 1990s which has held true in every conflict since then. The greater accuracy also reduces collateral damage and allows forces to strike closer to friendly forces. Aside from a few extremely heavy bunker buster bombs, almost all U.S. Air Force bombs and missiles are guided for this reason. The A-10 and AC-130 retain canons and in the case of the AC-130 what amounts to a howitzer for direct fire purposes, but not for indirect fire. Other fighter jets also have direct fire canons (which are very rarely used), but none of them use slug throwers for long range or beyond line of sight engagements.

2. The delivery systems for artillery are vastly heavier and are often tracked, making these systems harder to deploy swiftly and less agile. A 100 pound missile and missile launcher can deliver the same results as a multi-tons howitzer or mortar carrier vehicle. This is why military helicopters, fighter jets, and the Bradley M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle have been using missiles rather than guns of more than 40mm diameter for decades.

3. The delivery systems for canon artillery are much more expensive than missile launchers. The missile launcher for an artillery substitute missile can be so cheap relative to the cost of the missile that it is basically disposable. A self-propelled howitzer costs tens of millions of dollars.

The main reason that canon artillery was used in the Ukraine War at all, was because the combatants didn't have enough drones at first. Now, 70%-80% of casualties are inflicted with drones that often cost $500, but with heavier drones and missiles for more robust or distant targets. And, don't forget that the reasons that the Ukraine War is being fought predominantly with drones, missiles, and artillery, is because in the Ukraine War, the tank proved so obsolete that the lion's share of them have been destroyed and tanks have provided only a very small share of the offensive kills of either side in the conflict.

Basically, this pro-artillery argument is taking down a straw man, limiting its comparison to very cheap, short range, small, and feeble FPV drones, rather than to the full range of guided missile and drone alternatives that the U.S. military is capable of procuring to fill the role of canon artillery in a way that outperforms it in almost all respects.