18 March 2022

The War In Ukraine After Three Weeks

The Russian invasions of Ukraine is three weeks old. Enough time has passed to make some preliminary assessments.

The Russian military is "hollow". 

Russia has far fewer guided missiles and "smart bombs" than the U.S. or other developed nations, and apparently used up much of its supply in the first day or two of this conflict.

Russia's pilots are only minimally trained, Russian forces weren't patient enough to wait until they had air superiority, and the widespread availability of MANPADS among Ukrainian forces (infantry carried anti-aircraft missiles) have all worked together prevent Russia from gaining air superiority and control in Ukraine. This deprived Russia of an edge in the conflict could have had a decisive advantage for their forces if it had been secured.

Russia's logistics planning is horrible. Its forces were literally running out of gas, running out of food, and getting lost in the first few days. Ukrainian forces have targeted the "tow trucks" used for heavy military vehicles that are disabled and fuel and supply trucks, that are more vulnerable, for strikes to prevent their advance, and have been quite effective at doing so.

Despite their treads, tanks overwhelmingly stay on main roads, leaving their column exposed to attack.

An expectedly large share of Russian tanks and artillery are very dated models.

The best available data suggests that something on the order of half of Russian tanks deployed in this mission have been destroyed, as well as many armored personnel carriers and some mobile artillery vehicles. The large number of small, anti-tank missiles available to Ukrainian forces have been an important factor on this front.

Russian forces have lost significant numbers of fixed wing warplanes and military helicopters, maybe two dozen, all told.

About one in seven Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously injured in this conflict so far. About one in twenty-five of its generals have been killed.

It does not appear that either side has been able to use their tanks to secure decisive victories.

About a quarter of Russian soldiers are minimally trained and marginally competent conscripts. They are not properly trained to defend themselves against reasonably competent attacks or otherwise.

Inaccurate and indiscriminate unguided howitzer shell attacks that hurt civilian and military targets alike instilling terror in the general population, and indiscriminate bombing by fighter aircraft with "dumb bombs" are shaping up to be some of the characteristic tactics of the Russian invasions. But this has not been cost free. It has painted Russian troops from Putin to the rank and file Russian soldiers in Ukraine as war criminals. These tactics have unified the Ukrainian people against the Russia. These tactics have helped cement global public opinion against Russia.

Russia's substantial Black Sea naval forces have done very little after the first day or two when they were part of a campaign to launch missiles all over Ukraine. They have not been used for fire support for ground troops and do not appear to have been important in making amphibious assaults. There has been essentially no naval warfare so far.

Russia already controlled Crimea and the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine, immediately prior to its invasion. As shown on the map below, Russia has crept a few miles past the Russian-Belorussian border in the north, has gained control of a narrow strip of Ukraine's Aral Sea coast,  and has gained control of some territory immediately adjacent to Crimea. But they have been stalled in the suburbs of the capital city Kyiv for three weeks. 

Overall Russia's territorial gains over the last three weeks have been very modest and have been largely confined to areas with substantial Russian minorities, despite the very heavy toll that Russian forces have suffered in both casualties to their troops and destroyed major military systems. 

Even if Russia manages to eventually take Kyiv, that would be a pyrrhic victory, as it seems highly unlikely that this would result in regime change in Ukraine or in giving Russia control over the vast majority of Russian territory. It is hard to imagine a scenario at this point in which Russia could secure regime change in Ukraine or could control anything close to the majority of the territory or population of Ukraine.

This is a map of the territory Russia controlled on March 17, 2022 (yellow dots indicate recent battles):


This is a map of territory that Russia controlled on March 7, 2022, ten days earlier, with the shaded and striped areas being territory that Russia controlled immediately prior to the invasion.


It is quite clear that Russia has gains only a little ground in the last ten days, and only a modest share of Russian territory at all since the invasion began.

The credibility of Russia's conventional military forces as a tool in diplomatic negotiations has been dramatically undermined. Unless Russia can make quick and remarkable gains relative to what it has achieved in the last three weeks, the credibility will only be diminished further as time passes.

The losses of equipment and personnel that Russia has suffered in its invasion has significantly degraded the capabilities of Russia's military as a whole, at least in the short term. The longer Russia continues to try to fight in Ukraine, the weaker it military capacity to fight other conventional wars in the near future will be.

Unprecedented international sanctions and boycotts are seriously harming Russia's economy and daily life for ordinary Russians. 

International trade in anything other the natural gas exports, air travel in and out of Russia, foreign investment, and international financial transactions have basically ground to a halt. The ruble has plunged in value. Interest rates have surged to 20%. Russian's can't trade stocks domestically and have only limited access to their bank accounts. Russia narrowly avoided a default on its sovereign debt this week. Foreign Russian assets of Russia, its political leaders, and its oligarchs have been frozen. China is preparing to cooperate with international sanctions against Russia because it needs trade with the rest of the world more than it needs Russia. Russia has been closed out of international sporting and cultural exchanges. Access to foreign media and entertainment has been shut down.

Even if sanctions and boycotts are formally lifted, the developed world and global big business has collectively concluded that the political risk associated with doing business in and with Russia is prohibitively high. As a result, it may take a decade or more for Russia to recover economically from the side effects of its invasion of Ukraine, even if the war ends swiftly, unless Russia experiences regime change.

Russia's "liberal intelligentsia" is fleeing Russia in droves, resulting in a massive brain drain from Russia. They are leaving mostly by car and train to neighboring countries,  some of which were formerly Soviet Republics, before the borders are sealed or these individuals who rarely supported the invasion in the first place and didn't think that Putin would go as far as he did, are persecuted themselves. This may help Putin continue to consolidate power as dissenters self-deport themselves, but it will do grievous harm to the Russia's medium to long term future as a country.

Europe has been given a powerful nudge to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and Russian natural gas in the long run. This will do serious long term, irreversible harm to Russia's predominantly export industry.

Europe and the rest of the world have mostly united around strong opposition to Russia's invasion.

How Russia will use its nuclear arsenal, as it has threatened to do, is the elephant in the room. This is the main reason (together with the dependency of countries like Germany and Italy on Russian natural gas) that other countries haven't directly intervened militarily.

Ukraine is more united as a single country than it ever has been in the past, and pro-Russian political forces in the country pre-invasion, have been completely undermined.

Ukraine is suffering immense property damage, significant although not nation changing loss of life, significant loss of military equipment (although foreign aid is making up for some of that), and an indefinite major refugee crisis that is sending more than 10% of the country's population fleeing abroad.

Global food prices will soar from now until a year or two after the war is over, because Ukraine is a major exporter of food that can't pay attention to farming right now.

Other countries bordering Russia are fortifying collective European defense measures and are studying the tactics hat have been effective against Russia in this war so that they can better repel those tactics in future conflicts.

6 comments:

Tom Bridgeland said...

One thought: I checked the Ukraine weather report shortly after the invasion started. It was already above 0 C throughout the country. Huge blunder by the Russians to wait until the mud season to start. I doubt they could have driven anything but specialized vehicles cross country, and it has only gotten worse.

A second thought: Where is the most advanced Russian equipment? According to reports very little of their modern equipment is being used. My guess is it is on other borders, mainly with China. The Russians have no reason to trust China. Chances of China invading are very low, but not zero.

Putin or his generals may have thought that Ukraine would be a good opportunity to get some last use out of their more antiquated gear in what they thought would be a fairly easy operation, and they don't care how much of it is lost as long as they get what they want.

Dave Barnes said...

I would not call the T-90 old.
While the T-14 is better/newer, the Russians only have about a dozen of them.
I think we may be looking at the end of "the tank". It can only shoot about 6km and anti-tank missiles are getting better all the time.

Tom Bridgeland said...

Good point Dave. 1990s era, so not old if upgraded.

andrew said...

Some of the destroyed tanks were T-70s (built late WWII to 1948), and many were T-80s (a ca. 1976 design).
I agree that we are looking at the end of "the tank".

Similar old tanks were promptly trounced by Bradleys, A-10s, AH-64s, F-16s and infantry, en masse, both the Gulf War and the Iraq War. But new tanks are only marginally more resistant to anti-tank weapons.

The M1 Abrams didn't fair well in Kosovo, and struggled in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is too heavy to deploy abroad in large numbers by anything but ships that take weeks. They are too heavy for rail bridges and lots of other European and African and Asian road bridges. They are too wide for narrow mountain roads and narrow urban streets designed before French and American urban planners stepped in. Despite their tracks, they are overwhelmingly deployed on roads -- procurement planners greatly overestimated the extent that military operations require hard core off road capabilities that a commercial 4x4 pickup couldn't handle. Their 0.5 mpg fuel economy means a long logistical supply train of less well protected vehicles which doesn't work in wars without front lines - Ukraine's defenders have targeted fuel supplies.

Their machine gunners were vulnerable until upgraded in Iraq. Their visibility isn't tops making the vulnerable to close in attacks by infantry. Anti-tank missiles and smart bombs kill them. IEDs usually don't kill the crews as they would in lighter vehicles, but do take them out of action for a while and are very hard from them with their big flat bottomed footprint to avoid.

The U.S. Marine Corps has ditched them entirely, the U.S. Army has dramatically reduced the number they are fielding, and the Russians sent thousands to the bone yard although some may have been recalled for this fight.

Multi-wheel drive off road wheels are good enough relative to tracks. Missiles are better than unguided direct fire 105mm-120mm main guns and much more weight efficient. Heavy armor still isn't good enough to stop major weapons or tanks or artillery shells so active defenses are more worth it and more weight efficient. And, no so many shots are fired in anger that the keeping the cost of ammunition low matters much. Tanks aren't the best way to kill enemy armor or fortifications when you have air superiority. Infantry support is necessary for tanks whether in the same vehicle or another one.

Dave Barnes said...

WTF!
"The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) provided further details on conscription measures in the DNR and LNR on March 21. They reported that Russian authorities are increasing the conscription age from 55 to 65 and aggressively recruiting 18-year-old students. The GUR reported conscripts in DNR/LNR forces are supplied with military equipment from the 1970s.[6] Local social media imagery depicted new conscripts equipped with the Mosin-Nagant bolt action rifle—which has not been produced since 1973 and was first produced in 1891."

andrew said...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/22/russia-invasion-ukraine-debate-future-war-tank-armor-drone/

"what we have seen to date is already offering fresh evidence for the continuing debate in military circles over the future of warfare — and in particular over whether the tank can continue its eight-decade reign as the king of land warfare.

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On one level, what we are seeing vindicates the judgment reached by national security adviser H.R. McMaster’s 2017 National Security Strategy and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Both proclaimed, in the words of the Defense Department, that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” And both documents correctly focused on the looming threat from Russia. As the National Security Strategy stated, “Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders.”

That change in national strategy encouraged the Army to double down on conventional, large-unit armored operations. The Marine Corps went the other way by ditching its tanks to focus on a strategy of employing portable missiles to challenge Chinese ships and aircraft in the western Pacific. Both decisions can claim some degree of vindication from events in Ukraine.. . . Open-source reporting indicates that the Russians have lost more than 1,600 vehicles and equipment, including nearly 300 tanks and more than 500 armored vehicles of other kinds. . . . The combination of TB2 drones and Israeli-made loitering munitions proved highly potent for Azerbaijan in its victorious war against Armenia in 2020. As I previously reported, 47 percent of Armenia’s combat vehicles were damaged or destroyed. . . . former British army officer Nicholas Drummond wrote: “Russia’s disastrous tactics have been a terrible advertisement for tanks. But we should be careful to avoid drawing the wrong conclusions. No artillery support. No infantry support. No air support. This is not how combined arms tactics work in an era of multi-domain operations.” If the Russian tanks were better supported by infantry, artillery and airpower, the argument goes, they would not be so vulnerable to the hit-and-run tactics of Ukrainian infantry armed with antitank weapons. . . . The question, then, is not whether armies should have tanks in the future but what they should look like. The U.S. Army is spending $4.62 billion upgrading its M1A2 Abrams tanks with the Israeli-developed Trophy active-protection system to defend against drones, electronic warfare devices to counter roadside bombs, and ballistic armor upgrades. But is there a point at which these 40-year-old, 80-ton behemoths become too costly and unwieldy? The Army is spreading its bets around by developing a light tank, along with unmanned ground vehicles.

Some visionaries suggest that the eventual M1 replacement shouldn’t be a new tank at all, Breaking Defense writes, but a wolf pack of manned and unmanned vehicles working together: “Instead of having gun, sensors, and crew all on one vehicle, you could put, say, your long-range sensors on a drone, your decoys on another (expendable) drone, your main gun on a ground robot, and your human controller in a small, well-armored command vehicle hidden some distance away.”