10 May 2023

Is The B-21 Bomber A Good Idea?

An article critical of the current planned purchase of B-21 stealth long range bombers discusses many big picture issues in U.S. military procurement that deserve more attention. Some key points made by the author include:

* The B-52H can deliver nuclear missiles by air.

* In Afghanistan, the F-15 was more helpful than the B-1B in delivering conventional bombs.

* It might be possible at some point to overcome the stealth features of the B-21.

* Other options could include using F-22 and F-35 aircraft and F-16s converted to drones.

* 100 B-21s will cost $113 billion.

* Replacing 18 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines with 12 Columbia-class boats is projected to cost approximately $110 billion.

* "America's current ICBM, the LGM-30 Minuteman, originally entered service in 1962, and the current LGM-30G Minuteman III incarnation was first deployed in 1970, receiving upgrades during the intervening decades. The Minuteman's intended replacement, the LGM-118 Peacekeeper, first deployed in 1985. The SALT II treaty's moratorium on Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), coupled with the Peacekeeper's high operating costs, led the United States to procure only half of the proposed Peacekeeper fleet, and to retire that fleet by 2005."

* The author suggests that replacing the A-10 close air support fighter, or the Marine Corps M113 armored personnel vehicles is more urgent.

I don't find the author's arguments convincing, but a more moderate position is that in an age of guided munitions, we don't need 100 B-21s to fill a fairly narrow niche role of carrying out long range strikes into places with radar guided anti-aircraft defenses and more generally into contested airspace. A far smaller fleet of stealth bombers hasn't been particularly over utilized,  there is no indication that such a large fleet would be needed for the Ukraine War, and there isn't a very credible case that a fleet this large would be needed in a fight to defend Taiwan. The P-8, a B-52 replacement for uncontested airspaces, the F-35, and perhaps 20 B-21s to replace the B-2 and other stealth bombing requirements ought to be more than adequate to meet the nation's military requirements for bombers.

Suppose that each B-21 can hit ten targets per sortie. This is 1,000 targets per sortie for the entire B-21 fleet, and if you could make three sorties per day per plane, that is 3,000 targets per day. The case that this is necessary in the phase of a conflict when the U.S. is trying to secure air superiority is weak. How many air defense and other early phase critical targets would our most potent plausible enemy have in the relevant theater of battle? The constraint even at a fleet far smaller than 100 B-21 bombers is identifying targets, not striking them once they are identified.

It does make sense to substitute anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare capabilities from destroyers and frigates to aircraft like the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to a significant extent. But this isn't a role where the immense expense of stealth aircraft is a necessity.

No comments: