16 February 2024

Why Buy 3000 Armored Multipurpose Vehicles? (And Related Ideas)

The Army started taking deliveries of its new 27.6 ton Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) on March 13, 2023:

AMPV is the replacement for the M113 family of vehicles within the Armored Brigade Combat Team, comprising approximately 30 percent of its tracked vehicle fleet. The Army’s worldwide fleet of AMPVs will include nearly 3,000 vehicles delivered within the next 20 years. . . .
Brig. Gen. Geoffrey Norman, director of the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team [said that the] "AMPV is a more rugged, reliable and capable platform than the M113s that it replaces, bringing more capability to our ABCTs and allowing our formations to transform how they are able to fight."

There are five variants of the AMPV that provide soldiers with improvements in survivability, protection, weight, size, power, cooling and compatibility with future technologies.

The AMPV shares a common powertrain and suspension with the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzer, which reduces logistical and mechanical burdens among ABCTs.

"The Army is transforming our ABCT through integration of improved technology with warfighting concepts across the force. These modernization efforts increase our capacity to deter adversaries and if necessary, fight and win in combat," said Col Peter Moon, commander, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. "We look forward to the capabilities that AMPV will bring to the battlefield to ensure we remain lethal and ready to win the fight."
According to Wikipedia, the "five variants of the 2,907 AMPV that are planned are:
* M1283 General Purpose (522 planned)
* M1284 Medical Evacuation Vehicle (790 planned)
* M1285 Medical Treatment Vehicle (216 planned) (a small armored field hospital)
* M1286 Mission Command (993 planned)
* M1287 Mortar Carrier Vehicle (386 planned) 

There are aspects of this purchase that don't make much sense. A general purpose AMPV is just an under gunned Bradley IFV with very little weight or performance improvement. There is already a Bradley command variant as well, so neither of models, which make up half of the planned purchase, make much sense.

The 120mm mortar carrier version, which makes up about 13% of the planned purchase, has a quite narrow niche. A 120mm has a minimum range of 200 yards and a maximum range of 4.5 miles, with much less accuracy than a direct fire tank round within its roughly 2 mile range (and so is only desirable in those circumstances against an opponent not in the direct line of sight), or compared to a Bradley 25mm cannon or TOW missile, each with a roughly 2.3 mile range, or compared to the M270 Bradley with a range of 9.3-20 miles for its shortest range missile. A 120mm mortar round weighs 29 pounds, of which only 4 pounds is the warhead, so it that packs a much less powerful punch than an MLRS missile (which has a 200 pound warhead) and also significantly less than a 105mm or 120mm tank round, a 105mm or 155mm howitzer shell, a 5" naval gun, a Viper Strike bomb from a fighter aircraft, and all but the smallest anti-tank missiles. It has about the same punch as a 3" naval gun or a recoilless rifle a.k.a. bazooka shell or a Bofors RB56 anti-tank missile or  a MANPAD (like a Stinger missile), but moving slower than any of those. It's only optimally effective against targets that are pretty much limited to dismounted infantry and unarmored or lightly armored vehicles at fairly close range. At the short end of its range where it is most accurate, is vulnerable to direct fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank missiles, while at the long end of its range it is less accurate. A Humvee can tow a 120mm mortar system on a trailer (with the same number of rounds which weighs about 2800 pounds including all components and 69 mortar shells) and can reach the same terrain, but lacks the armor of the AMPV mortar carrier. It is much cheaper to buy a 120mm unguided mortar round than to buy an anti-tank missile. But, why have a 27 ton armored vehicle with such modest firepower? 

Why not get more self-propelled howitzers, like the M109A7 Paladin (which is itself partially Bradley derived) with heavier rounds than a 120mm mortar, a longer maximum range (13-25 miles depending upon the kind of shell used), and a similar minimum range (a 155mm shell has a blast radius of about 100 yards), instead? 

Or, alternately, why not develop an armored anti-tank missile launcher (sometimes called a "tank destroyer"), which would be much more accurate and at least comparably weight efficient, in at similar ranges, instead?

Medical evacuation and medical treatment, which makes up about a third of the planned purchase, is a function that is not served by existing armored systems other than the M113, and heavy armor does make sense for medical evacuation and treatment near the front lines of a battle. This is the only part of the purchase that makes much sense.

Wikipedia continues its analysis of why the AMPV was needed by stating: 

The M113 has been in service since the early 1960s and while able to take on various roles, has proven too vulnerable for combat. In the 1980s, the M2 Bradley replaced the M113 in the front-line transport role, moving it to rear-area roles. In the Iraq Warurban warfare tactics still defeated the M113, leading it to be almost entirely replaced in active service by Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehiclesMRAPs were useful on the roads of Iraq, but have less payload capacity and worse off-road performance. The AMPV aims to find a vehicle more versatile and mobile against a wide range of adversaries while having off-road mobility comparable to Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks. 
. . .

In order to keep development costs down, the Army is requiring the vehicle be a commercial off-the-shelf design that can be incrementally improved. The vehicle would have new technologies including electronics, networking, and communications gear added onto the platform as they become available later. If the AMPV can incorporate newer satellite communications as they are developed, they could be linked to other ground vehicles that would normally require a complete subsystems overhaul for new gear after a certain number of years. The operational maintenance cost requirement of the AMPV is up to $90 per mile, compared to $58 per mile for the M113. . . .
Army leaders have rejected General Dynamics' idea of using a wheeled vehicle for medical evacuation in armored brigades, saying a tracked vehicle's superior mobility better enables it to retrieve wounded soldiers. The requirements were for a vehicle that could go wherever the tracked vehicles of an armored brigade went, which would include rough terrain and soft ground that a wheeled vehicle could get bogged down in, preventing an armored ambulance from reaching wounded soldiers in time. 
Using BAE's Bradley-based chassis allows for commonality between 75 percent of an armored brigade's combat vehicles, easing maintenance and logistics and ensuring the vehicles have comparable mobility.

As a practical matter, however, there has been surprisingly little use of the U.S. military's tracked armored vehicles in an off-road capacity in the post-Korean War period.

In part, because this takes more fuel (an M1 Abrams has a range of 265 miles on the road with 504.4 gallons of diesel fuel, but only 93-124 miles off-road), and is slower (an M1A Abrams can go 42-45 miles per hour on road and only 25 miles per hour off-road). Other tracked vehicles has similar reductions in speed and fuel efficiency off-road.

The Gulf War demonstrated the strengths of tracked tanks off roads in open flat deserts and plains. The Ukraine war demonstrated, however, that heavy tracked tanks and armored vehicles still get bogged down in mud even on flat terrain, and also don't perform off road well in heavy forests. Vietnam demonstrated that heavy tracked tanks performed poorly in tropical, wet, jungles and swamps. Kosovo and Afghanistan demonstrated their limitations in narrow mountain passes. The Iraq War demonstrated their limitations in urban environments with narrow roads.

The wheeled Stryker Armored Personnel Carrier has a range of 310 miles and can go 60 miles per hour on roads, is 18.2 tons in its standard version and 20.7 tons with its mobile gun system (a 105 mm tank gun).  It also has V-shaped hull versions.

Also, the wheeled Humvee (which is superior pretty much any wheeled civilian vehicle off-road, including the jeep which it replaced). As noted in a previous post at this blog:

Its low center of gravity, wide frame, four wheel drive and other features allow it to climb steep hills (60% grade), drive with a right side much higher than its left (40% grade), or visa versa, and its undercarriage is designed to give it exceptionally high clearance (16 inches) of rocks and tree stumps and debris that may be in its way, and ford shallow streams (30 inches in a standard configuration). In short, it is designed to be able to carry modest loads of cargo and troops anywhere tracked military vehicles, like tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, could while getting fuel economy at about 12 mpg, which isn't great, but is far better than a tank, 0.5 mpg, or a Bradley, at about 1.5 mpg. (A Stryker gets about 6 mpg.)

The wheeled JLTV also performs well off-road (and is armed with .50 caliber M2 machine guns, 40mm Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers, and TOW anti-tank missiles, much like the original Bradley IFV, and will have a modified version that will carry intermediate range anti-ship missiles).

The standard version of the JTLV via Wikipedia


A Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher [based on the JLTV] deploys into position aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. The NMESIS and its Naval Strike Missiles participated in a live-fire exercise, here, part of Large Scale Exercise 2021. (Maj. Nick Mannweiler/Marine Corps). From here (in an article noting the development of a semi-submersible drone designed to stealthily deliver two missiles at a time for this system).

The eight wheeled the Stryker is modestly inferior to an M1 Abrams tank off road. As one source notes:

“The main difference between a Stryker and a Bradley is that a Bradley is far more maneuverable than a Stryker.” On roads, Strykers and Abrams tanks could move at about the same speed, but maneuvering off-road in rolling desert terrain, the wheeled Strykers were far slower than the tracked tanks.

Still, this is a pretty modest performance reduction that comes up only quite rarely, compared to a great performance enhancement on road, in circumstances that are the predominant norm in actual use.

Also, unless the entire logistics train is tracked, a entire unit can't deploy travel across extreme terrain that tracked vehicles can manage but wheeled vehicles cannot, for more than temporary excursions by the tracked vehicles into the extreme terrain.

Stryker Infantry Carrier Version (ICV)

While the AMPV is indeed more modern than the 13.6 ton M113 armored personnel carrier which entered service 64 years ago in 1960, that they replace, "the M113 series have long been replaced as front-line combat vehicles by the M2 and M3 Bradleys, but large numbers are still used in support roles such as armored ambulance, mortar carrier, engineer vehicle, and command vehicle. The U.S. Army's heavy brigade combat teams are equipped with approximately 6,000 M113s and 4,000 Bradleys." 


An M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

The replacement turretless Bradley, however, is based on a design that entered service in 1981, which is still 43 years old, and is on the verge of being replaced. This is woefully outdated for a new major military system that the U.S. plans on buying 3000 of over the next twenty years, at which point the design will be as old as the M113 is today. The Army is on the verge of replacing the M2/M3 Bradley right now with an XM30 family of vehicles:
In July 2021, the Army awarded contracts to five teams: Point Blank Enterprises, Oshkosh Defense, BAE Systems, GDLS and American Rheinmetall Vehicles. The total value of the contract was $299.4 million. Teams will develop concept designs during the 15-month long phase. All entries had to meet three general criteria: a tracked vehicle with a hybrid-electric drive; an unmanned turret housing a 50 mm autocannon, or a 30 mm turret with the ability to upgrade to the larger caliber; and a reduced crew of two with space to carry six infantrymen. The Army planned to pick three teams, reduced to two teams upon contract award, to move on to building prototypes by mid-2023.

In June 2023, the Army downselected American Rheinmetall and GDLS to go forward in the competition. These two teams will now move on to the next phase of the program and split a $1.6 billion development fund to develop a total of eleven prototypes each, seven being for a contract award with an option for four more. They will also develop two ballistic hulls, turrets, armor coupons, and digital model twins during this phase of the program. The Army also announced due to the initial design stage of the OMFV being complete that they would be redesignating the program as the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.
The AMPV, however, does have some innovations relative to the original Bradley M2 from 1981:
For the U.S. Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program to replace the M113, BAE offered a variant of the Bradley. The AMPV submission is a turretless Bradley chassis, providing greater cargo spaceincreased armor, and upgraded engine and electrical systems. For increased protection, V-shaped bottom replaces the flat base. The AMPV has several modular roof sections to adapt to each role. For fuel efficiency, BAE is considered using a hybrid-electric drive. . . . Underbody blast tests demonstrated that AMPV survivability requirements could be met with a Bradley platform. BAE projected their AMPV submission to have similar operating costs to the M113 and lower costs than an M2 Bradley, as the platform's most expensive components are related to the omitted turret. To better accommodate modern electronics, the turretless Bradley has 78% more internal space than the M113, and two 400-amp generators.

It doesn't appear, however, that the hybrid-electric drive made it into the initial version of the AMPV. 

The AMPV's greater weight compared to the M113 also means that while the M113 could be transported with a C-130, that an AMPV cannot, and that a C-17 can carry only three AMPV's while it can carry six M113s, which in turn carry twice as many soldiers each. One C-17 load of AMPVs or Bradleys can transport 6 crew and 18 passengers for a combined 24 soldiers. One C-17 load of M113s can transport 12 crew and 66-90 passengers for a combined 78-102 soldiers. Again, this argues for limiting the AMPV to the specialty medical evacuation and treatment role, to reduce the number of them that need to be deployed.

The M113 is 15' 11.5" long, 8' 9.7" wide, and 8' 2" tall, and carries 2 crew together with 11-15 soldiers. 

The AMPV and the Bradley are 13' 2" to 13' 6" long,  10' 6" to 10' 9" wide, and 9' 9" tall. The AMPV carries 2 crew together with 6 soldiers in its general purpose version, like a Bradley but with less firepower. Thus, the AMPV is less suited than the M113 for use in narrow streets and mountain passes.

By comparison the most advanced version of the Abrams main battle tank, the M1A2 SEP v.3 Abrams is 26.02 feet long (32.04 feet with its gun forward), 12 feet wide, 8 feet tall, has four crew, and weighs 73.6 tons.

Official dimensions of the M10 Booker with a crew of 4 (and a range and speed similar to other U.S. military tracked vehicles) are hard to come by, but one source estimates that it is about 23' long (31' 2" with gun forward), 11' 6" wide, 10' 10" tall, and weighs 42 tons. If correct, it has only modestly smaller dimensions than the M1A Abrams and is the tallest armored vehicle, wheeled or tracked, in U.S. military service. I suspect that these estimates are on the high side in all dimensions. For example, in a side by side photo, it appears to be quite a bit less tall than a JLTV which is 8' 6" tall. It is also supposed to be significantly smaller than the Abrams, as discussed in this larger analysis:
The Booker would prove a valuable platform in a Taiwan ground fight, the armor expert explained to us. About two-thirds of the island is mostly rugged mountains. It features flat to rolling plains in the densely populated west, which faces mainland China. The M10’s smaller size compared to an Abrams would allow it to better maneuver through the tight, restricted urban areas where much of the fighting would take place. It would be able to pass over bridges an Abrams might not be able to cross due to weight concerns and operate, as previously mentioned, with a much lighter logistical footprint.

Its 105mm main gun, he added, “is powerful enough to handle most Chinese equipment.”

The vehicle would also theoretically be helpful to Ukraine, particularly in urban areas like those in and around Avdiivka and Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast. A lot of fighting there takes place in rubbled settings like the remains of the Avdiivka coke plant.

“I can see the Booker being used in conjunction with Ukrainian infantry as they're moving in restricted terrain,” said the expert.

The more open terrain found in Ukraine, like in the Robotyne-Verbove salient of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, or even in farmland outside of Avdiivka’s urban areas, would be even more difficult for the Booker, he said.

“The infantry would have to move up first and assess the situation and call in the Booker or place it in an area where they have an increased level of survivability when engaging targets that the infantry wants destroyed.”

Those situations are proving a difficult challenge to both Ukrainian and Russian tanks and other armor, which are unable to mass without drones either spotting them and correcting artillery fire or directly attacking. For Ukraine, there is the added challenge of having to breach the massive layers of dense minefields built up by Russia.

Still, in both the Taiwan and Ukraine scenarios, as well as Israel’s tough urban fight in Gaza, the lighter-protected Booker will be more vulnerable than Abrams or the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) Merkava tanks. The various types of rocket-propelled grenades Hamas is using against Israeli vehicles have highlighted that threat, and the expert we’ve talked to said having the Bookers equipped with ERA and MAPS is essential in any urban fight.

The M10 would be able to stay on the battlefield longer “because it doesn’t consume as much fuel,” said the expert. However, “if it starts acting like an M1 Abrams and the force that has the M10 Booker considers it more of a tank in the traditional sense, then we might see issues with it because of its level of protection. It is there to provide fire support and mobility for the infantry.”

So while the Booker may fill an Army need, thinking of it as just a smaller M1 is not the right mindset.

“The M10 Booker Combat Vehicle provides infantry forces organic, highly mobile, well protected, and large-caliber precise direct-fire capabilities,” Norman said. “M10’s will enable our light infantry forces to attack and maintain momentum in the face of enemy heavy machine guns, prepared positions and field fortifications, and light armored vehicles. In the defense, the M10 provides light infantry forces protected, direct-fire large caliber capabilities to defeat attacking enemy forces.”

“In all cases,” he added, “M10-equipped quick reaction forces can respond to situations requiring highly protected, fast-moving tracked mobility, employing large-caliber cannons to support U.S. and partnered forces.”
The wheeled Stryker Armored Personnel Carrier is 22' 10" long, 8' 11" wide (just 1.3 inches wider than the M113), and 8' 8" tall, and carries a crew of 2 and up to 9 passengers.

The 11.32 ton wheeled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle replacement for the Humvee and many MRAPs,  has a length of 20' 4", a width of 8' 4" (5.7" narrower than an M113), a height of 8' 6", and has a crew of 1, plus 3 passengers and an optional gunner. It has a range of 300 miles at a speed of 70 miles per hour.


  • M1283 General Purpose (GP): Replaces the M113A3 APC. Requirements are for 2 crew and 6 troops, be configured to carry one litter, and mount a crew served weapon. Tasks include conducting logistics package escort, emergency resupply, casualty evacuation, and security for medical evacuation. 522 planned.
  • M1284 Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV): Replaces the M113 AMEV. Requirements are for 3 crew and able to have either 6 ambulatory patients, 4 litter patients, or 3 ambulatory patients and 2 litter patients. It must also have medical equipment sets and environmental cooling. Tasks include conducting medical evacuation from the point of injury to an aid station and medical resupply replenishment. 790 planned.
  • M1285 Medical Treatment Vehicle (MTV): Replaces the M577A3 Medical Vehicle. Requirements are for 4 crew and one litter patient, as well as medical equipment sets and environmental cooling. Tasks include serving as the forward aid station, main aid station, and battalion aid station. 216 planned.
  • M1287 Mortar Carrier Vehicle (MCV): Replaces the M1064A3 Mortar Carrier. Requirements are for 2 crew and 2 mortar crew, with a 120 mm mortar and 69 mortar rounds. The task is to provide indirect mortar fire. 386 planned.
  • M1286 Mission Command (MCmd): Replaces the M1068A3 Command Post Carrier. Requirements are for 2 crew, 2 operators, and a mount for a crew served weapon. The task is to serve as a command post. 993 planned.

The Bradley chassis is also "the basis for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, the M4 C2V battlefield command post, and the M6 Bradley Linebacker air defense vehicle. Armed with a quad Stinger surface-to-air missile launcher in place of the TOW anti-tank missiles, but maintaining the 25 mm autocannon, the M6 Bradley Linebacker Air Defense Vehicle (no longer in service) possessed a unique role in the U.S. Army, providing highly mobile air defense at the front line."

The light wheeled M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARs) multiple rocket launcher system, which is C-130 transportable and uses the same missiles as the Bradley based M270 (6 MLRS missiles with a range of 20-28 miles (minimum range 9.3 miles), 1 ATACMS with a range of 186 miles, or 2 Precision Strike missiles with a range of 310 miles) except that the M270 can carry twice as many missiles at a time and comes with a reloading unit. HIMARs, introduced in 2010, has proved more attractive in modern warfare than its more heavily armored but slower counterpart, in part, because given the range of its missiles, its easier deployability and 53 mile per hour speed v. 40 miles per hour for the M270, are a better fit to a shoot and scoot strategy far from the front lines and it doesn't need to be in extreme off road locations. The 18 ton HIMARs with a crew of 3 is 23' long, 7' 10" wide, and 10' 6" tall. The 26.5 ton M270, which has been in service since 1983 (the last one was produced in 2003), and requires a crew of 3 is 22' 10.5" long, 9' 9" wide, and 8' 6" tall with its launcher stowed.


The M142 HIMARs via the Wikipedia article on it.


The M270 via the Wikipedia article on it.

Exiting from the back of an armored vehicle while under fire, securing dismounted command and control and responding in real time to fast-emerging new threat dynamics, are merely a few of the tactics now being explored and refined by Army soldiers preparing to deploy in a new, next-generation service infantry carrier.

The Army’s now-in-development XM30 Combat Vehicle Program has been the focus of intense evaluations referred to by the service as “Soldier Touchpoints,” experiments and analyses wherein infantry squads practice combat operation in the new platform to further inform and improve its ongoing development. Referred to broadly as a “Bradley” replacement, the XM30 is being engineered with a new generation of advanced technologies intended to expand the tactical envelope and introduce new concepts of operation for nine-man infantry squads closing with an enemy in combat. . . .

the soldiers will be testing the ease, fluidity and pace of how soldiers dismount from different vehicle design configurations, placement of key sensor technologies and panels and hands-on-practical maintenance questions such as how the engine will be accessible for field-level sustainment.

The Soldier touchpoint included a number of practical drills, such as timing how long it took a team of Soldiers to dismount from various possible vehicle design configurations. It also included more nuanced discussions about access and placement of panels that provide exterior situation awareness for the Soldiers, and how the engine will be accessible for field-level maintenance.

Previously referred to as an “Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle,” the Army’s Bradley replacement is referred to by weapons developers as being engineered with a “soldier-centric” design intended to change and improve soldier lethality in a new threat environment. Many of the specific technologies are proprietary to competing vendors or unavailable for security reasons, yet there are several key areas of technological focus as the service further refines its requirements. The vehicle is being engineered with an ability to operate autonomously and unmanned, meaning it can navigate and transit complex terrain, transport infantry and perform sensing missions without needing human intervention. The vehicle can also function in a “semi-autonomous” fashion, meaning it can receive command and control input from human decision-makers, operate air and ground unmanned systems and conduct high-risk reconnaissance missions under enemy fire. Not surprisingly, much of the innovations being built into the vehicle relate to establishing the fire-control technologies, sensors and optics, protections and maneuverability necessary to support future formations.

Several years ago during an earlier phase of development for the OMFV, senior Army weapons developers told Warrior that initial concepts for the vehicle included engineering a new infantry carrier that was powerful, lethal and precise enough to "out-range" an enemy with fires and also be light and maneuverable enough to cross 80-percent or more of bridges, narrowly configured urban areas and other challenged, high-threat transit areas.

As for weapons applications, the two variants and US Army lead weapons developers are likely exploring a range of cutting edge requirements, to include a Short-Range-Air-Defense like counter drone capability such as a Stinger missile and an ability to launch and recover advanced drones. One possibility for American Rheinmetall could involve the integration of a counter-drone-counter air vehicle-launched drone made by one of their XM30 teammates, Raytheon's Coyote. Raytheon has been developing an advanced Block2 Coyote which includes what developers describe as a larger, optimized warhead with advanced tracking. Specific solutions being integrated are likely still being determined, yet both General Dynamics and ARV are likely to be integrating and testing a wide range of cutting-edge weapons systems such as drones, cannons, sensors and counter-air weapons. General Dynamics Land Systems, for example, has engineered several armored vehicles with an ability to launch and recover surveillance and attack drones.

A November 2023 Concept Image of an XM30

Another report about the XM30 from June of 2023 notes that:

The Army’s next armored personnel carrier . . . which the Army is now calling the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, will replace the decades-old M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle as the service’s primary armored troop carrier. . . . Defense officials said Monday that, despite the “optionally manned” title of the program, the vehicle is unlikely to operate without a crew or be remotely drivable.

Soldiers who eventually ride in or operate the XM30 will find it similar to the Bradley, officials say, but with some key differences. The heavily armored vehicle will carry six soldiers, the same as the Bradley. But while the Bradley has three crew members, automation will cut that number to two.

The vehicle’s main weapon will be the XM913 50mm chain gun developed by Northrop Grumman, which the Army says has twice the range of the Bradley’s 25mm gun [i.e. about 4.6 miles]. The gun will be wired to a system that should allow soldiers to fire it remotely, reducing the exposure of a dedicated gunner to incoming fire.

However, while an Air Force C-17 can fly three Bradleys at once, the cargo plane will be able to fly just two XM30s, officials say [i.e. it will be more than 27 tons but not more than 42 tons].
Raytheon/Rheinmetall, one of the two finalists, has the following concept XM30 vehicle (which will feature "the new Multi-Mission Launcher which can fire the company’s TOW™, Javelin, [and] Coyote® Block 3 loitering munition"):

The other finalist, from General Dynamics Land Systems, based upon its Griffin III, would be about 42 tons like the Griffin II which became the M10 Booker, but "while similar in weight to Griffin II, scaled down the main gun from 105mm caliber to the 50 mm XM913 gun system. It is equipped with the IMI SystemsIron Fist Active Protection System (APS) and AeroVironment’s Switchblade loitering munition system") looks like this:


Developing an "optionally manned" ground warfare system makes lots of sense. Unmanned aircraft, ground vehicles, ships, boats, and submarines are clearly a key part of any future military force.

But, why would one pick an infantry carrier, of all things, to be optionally manned? 

An optionally manned tank, or tank destroyer, or mobile artillery system, or multiple rocket launcher, or air defense systems, or transport vehicle, or reconnaissance vehicle, whose core mission does not involve having people in the vehicle, could make plenty of sense. 

But a vehicle that is "optionally manned" doesn't make sense for an infantry carrier, whose whole reason to exist is to have real live soldiers in it, like the 18 ton Stryker, or the 27 ton Bradley and AMPV, or the Marine Corps' 35 ton Amphibious Combat Vehicle (whose introduction has been delayed by some late stage deadly mishaps until sometime later this year).

It isn't necessary for a vehicle with soldiers in it anyway. And, one of the benefits of a drone is that an unmanned vehicle can be smaller than a manned one with the same capabilities, because it doesn't need to meet the needs and protect the safety of the crew. But this benefit is eliminated in an optionally manned infantry carrier.


A U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle

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