More Discussion Of Tanks

The first new armored vehicle in the U.S. Army in 40 years, the M10 Booker Mobile Protected Firepower a.k.a. Light Tank is about to enter service. The Army wants to buy 504 of them. 

This is still basically a bad idea. The number of units of the M10 should be greatly reduced as it provides a brief interim respite until a better alternative that is better suited to the realities of modern warfare can be fielded.

* The Ukraine war has demonstrated that tanks with a large main direct fire gun firing a dumb shell, tracks, and only minor secondary weapons, no matter how advanced, are generically sitting ducks in modern conventional warfare that provides little offensive capabilities that other military systems can't provide equally well or better. Other recent conflicts involving tanks tend to reaffirm this conclusion.

* The M1 Abrams was ill-suited for the Iraq War, was ill-suited for Kosovo, was ill-suited for Afghanistan, is ill-suited for the Ukraine War, and is ill-suited for any kind of war in the Pacific with China or North Korea. It isn't fit to fight in cities with narrow streets, in mountains with narrow passes, in jungles or other muddy terrain, and in countries with rivers crossed by bridges that can't hold 73 tons, although it performs adequately on plains and in deserts outside major cities that aren't broken up by canyons or rivers. It is also generically ill-suited to any kind of rapid response expeditionary mission where they cannot be prepositioned, because so few of them can be delivered by air and delivering tanks by sea is far slower than the pace at which modern warfare proceeds. 

* But the M10 Booker solves too few of the M1 Abrams' flaws. It doesn't solve the limited ability of crews to see their surroundings, and limited angular range of fire issues that make the M1 vulnerable to mines, IEDs and infantry with short range anti-tank weapons when it lacks dismounted infantry support. It doesn't solve the M1s vulnerability to drone and missile attacks. It doesn't solve the weak top armor problem. It doesn't solve the problem that its direct fire main gun has a shorter range than artillery rounds and anti-tank missiles. It doesn't solve the M1s slow speed that denies it a capacity to flee attackers moving at even modest speeds and slows down units that could otherwise move faster. It doesn't reduce the number of soldiers in harm's way in the tank. It is basically just an M1 Abrams with a smaller tank shell and somewhat less strong armor, that is more fuel efficient and 32 tons lighter, which is a pretty unimpressive improvement after 45 years on a tank that has consistently proven how ill-suited it is for most of the missions where its use might potentially be considered.

* The speed and lower fuel consumption and maintenance costs of wheeled armored vehicles make them superior to slower and more expensive tracked vehicles, in exchange for only minor reductions (if any) in their off road capabilities. Attacks on supply conveys were major military issues in the Ukraine, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, as modern warfare no longer has clearly defined front lines, so any vehicle located anywhere in the theater of conflict, including lightly armored and unarmed diesel fuel tankers, can be attacked.

* Anti-tank missiles deliver the same punch, with greater accuracy and range, with vastly less weight than a main gun on a tank. Tank shells are less expensive,  but the less expensive delivery devices for anti-tank missiles make up for that, unless the number of shells fired in anger is far greater than post-WWII combat history suggests are usually needed. And, the prices of anti-tank missiles can plummet as their tech goes out of patent.

* The M10's fairly heavy armor which is second only to the M1 main battle tank is virtually irrelevant, because it doesn't appear to have a V-shaped hull to deal with mines and IEDs, it lacks active defenses against drones and anti-tank weapons, and it appears to share the flaw of having thin top armor relative to front and side armor of most tanks that have increased their vulnerability to drones and anti-tank missiles. It also doesn't have its own drones to provide situational awareness and/or sniper capabilities at greater ranges that it can without drones.

* Unlike the Russian "Terminator", it doesn't have a versatile and numerous enough set of weapons to take on large numbers of infantry effectively in all directions and at all angles in an urban setting, where many future wars with a need for protected firepower are likely to be fought.

"The Russian army’s three-person, 53-ton BMPT Terminator tank support vehicle combines the thickly-armored hull of a T-72 tank with an unmanned turret packing twin 30-millimeter autocannons and launchers for four anti-tank missiles.", via Forbes magazine.

* There is no reason that a light tank entering service in the year 2024 should have the same sized four person crew as the M1 Abrams tank that entered service in 1979, 45 years earlier. It should have been possible with modern automation technologies to reduce the M10s crew to two, if not to make it optionally unmanned. The M2 Bradley which entered service in 1981, and has proven the equal of the M1 Abrams in actual combat, has a crew of three (commander, driver, and gunner) and could function with two.

* The M10 is still too heavy for an expeditionary armored vehicle meant to deploy rapidly with infantry by air. It is similar in weight at 41 tons to many other countries' main battle tanks. If the weight could be brought down by 14 tons to 27 tons, three of them could be deployed per C-17 sortie, instead of two, which would be huge in terms of its ability to get more systems in the field quickly, even if it didn't get down to the 19 tons of the Stryker that can be deployed four to a C-17 and one per C-130 sortie. More than tripling deployment rates is much better than more than doubling deployment rates.

* Getting to 27 tons for a light, wheeled missile tank is very technically feasible. The M2 Bradley's initial version was 27 tons and it had to carry six infantry and three crew while a new armored vehicle should only need a driver and a gunner. The other suggested changes, like wheels and losing the main gun in favor of anti-tank missiles (with the same punch and more range and accuracy), would also help achieve that weight goal. It would also be feasible to trade some of its passive armor capabilities for active protection systems and a drone of its own that weigh less.

Key observations about the M10 Booker:

Mobility, Deployment, and Training

* The 41 ton M10 is too heavy to be transported on a C-130. But a C-17 can carry two of them on a roll on, roll off basis, while a C-17 can carry only one 73+ ton M1 Abrams main battle tank and some assembly is required with heavy equipment (such as an M-88 tank recovery vehicle) after a C-17 drops off an M1 resulting in considerable delay in it being battle ready. It is comparable in size to the most fully extra-armored and kitted out M2 Bradley, a design that started in its base model at 27 tons, and is heavier than many M2s.

* An M10 can travel far more miles per gallon of diesel fuel than an M1, so they are less of a logistics burden. Every diesel fueled vehicle implies a caravan of tanker trucks that must follow not too far in their wake. 

* The M10, M1 and M2 Bradley are all tracked vehicles that travel at similar speeds (about 40 miles per hour). They are all considerably slower than wheeled vehicles on roads (where most tanks end up operating most of the time) like the Stryker and JLTV, and the cost of maintaining the tracks is more expensive per mile and harder to maintain than the wheels of wheeled armored vehicles. The M1, in particular, has proven expensive to maintain.

* An M10 can operate on narrower roads and cross weaker bridges than an M1. The M1 has had problems dealing with narrow urban streets, narrow mountain roads, weak non-U.S. road and train bridges, and mud, due to its great weight and great width.

* Operating an M10 is very similar to operating an M1. Minimal retraining is necessary for crews trains on an M1. Both have a crew of four.

Weapons and Defenses

* The M10 has a 105mm main gun, while the M1 has a 120mm main gun.

* A 105mm tank shell, a 120mm tank shell, and a 105mm howitzer shell (with a 7 mile range), are all in the 33-48 pound range and an order of magnitude cheaper per round than guided weapons systems (ca. $800-$2,500 each) This is comparable in size to the Chinese HJ-12 anti-tank missile (37 pounds), the BGM-71 TOW missile (42 pounds), the FGM-148 Javelin missile (49 pounds), and the AGM-176 Griffin missile (45 pounds), and Viper Strike guided bombs. An M2 Bradley with weight and deployability comparable to the M10, typically has a 7.62mm machine gun, a 25mm canon, and TOW missiles, giving it comparable or superior firepower (but fewer rounds of anti-tank class ammunition) to a tank, in addition to carrying six infantry passengers.

The 105mm and 120mm tanks rounds are significantly larger than rocket propelled grenades, bazookas (a.k.a. recoilless rifles), mortar shells (up to 120mm), 2-3" naval gun shells hydra rockets, and Bofors RB56 anti-tank missiles. 

But these tank rounds are smaller than 5" naval gun shells (70 pounds), 155mm howitzer shells (90-103 pounds), and heavier anti-tank missiles such as Israeli Spike missile (75 pounds), Chinese HJ-10 missile (94-95 pounds), U.S. AGM-114 Hellfire missile (108 pounds), and British Brimstone anti-tank missile (110 pounds). 

Airplane launched bombs other than the Viper Strike bombs, Army MLRS missiles, and naval ship missiles and torpedos (250 pounds to 3,900 pounds for everything but bunker buster bombs and ICBMs) are all much larger than tank shells.

Stinger and French Mistral man carried surface to air weapons are in the same overall weight range as tank shells, but pack much less punch (6-6.5 pound warheads) because their weight is devoted to achieving guided supersonic speeds to take on jet fighters. 

* The M10 has a secondary 7.62mm machine gun and a secondary 0.50 caliber machine gun, which is similar to an M1.

* The M10 has lighter armor than the M1, although its armor is still heavier than an M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, a Joint Light Tactical Light Vehicle (JLTV) or a Stryker armored personnel carrier. The need to fill this gap has not been demonstrated:

During the two decades of largely counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was little need for a vehicle that could bridge the gap between the Abrams and armored vehicles like the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or the Stryker Armored Vehicle. A mobile gun system Stryker variant had a 105mm gun, but the Army divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. That platform was also far less protected than the Booker and its wheels meant it could not get to the same places as easily as the M10 can.

At present, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) just have light tactical vehicles – Humvees that are now in the process of being replaced by Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) – armed with .50 caliber M2 machine guns, 40mm Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers, and TOW anti-tank missiles, for organic mobile fire support.

* The M10 does not initially have an explosive reactive armor add on, although it is designed to be able to receive one, or a "skirt" designed to protect against fire from the side at its tracks.

* The M10 does not have active defenses against anti-tank missiles or drones or a current plan to add these active defenses, while the Army's goal is to upgrade M1s with this capability. As noted here:

Initially . . . Bookers will not have a Modular Active Protection System (MAPS). . . . That system, designed to be adaptable to future threats, helps guard against anti-tank guided missiles and infantry anti-tank rockets by combining radar with launchers that shoot out blasts of metal pellets, intercepting the incoming round.

“The initial M10 Booker design is complete and vehicles are in low-rate initial production now,” Norman told us. “The M10 does not include an integrated Active Protection System. The Army is consistently evaluating best-of-breed APS from domestic and foreign sources and may elect to equip M10’s with one of those systems in the future but that is not currently programmed.” . . . In addition to not having APS, the M10 will not have anti-tank guided missiles or drone capabilities, at least at first.

Anticipated Use

* The M10 will be deployed in Army infantry brigades, which deploy more quickly and are more expeditionary, while the M1 is deployed in Army armor brigades. The Army also has Stryker brigades that will have neither M10s nor M1s. 

* The M10 is being pitched as providing a way to allow infantry to take on medium strength fortifications and armored vehicles that don't have weapons effective against tanks at beyond its direct fire range. Cheaper ammunition seems like a weak reason to use tank shells rather than missiles for this purpose.

* This means that M10s and M2 Bradleys (if any) in infantry brigades, plodding along at 40 miles per hour on their tracks along the roads that they actually travel on the vast majority of the time, will slow down the advancement of the wheeled vehicles in the brigade that could otherwise advance at least 50% faster, thus degrading the mobility of the unit as a whole, which can move no faster than its slowest member. Nothing else in an infantry combat brigade is tracked and limited to 40  miles per hour. Yet time is of the essence in war, and  this undermines scoot and shoot tactics.

* The M10 still doesn't have the range to take out artillery positions or anti-tank missile units with its main gun before it is within range of these threats, and doesn't have the speed to outrun these threats even if they are mounted on slow tracked vehicles themselves. In the vicinity of enemies with anti-tank missiles or artillery that has a range of at least three miles and can move at 40 miles per hour or more, the members of an M10 crew are dead men walking if they don't abandon their tank.

* Tanks v. tank engagements have always been uncommon and remain rare (under 5% of destroyed tanks). Artillery shells, armed drones, helicopters, loitering munitions (i.e. one way drones), ground attack fighters, anti-tank land mines and IEDs, anti-tank missiles, rocket propelled grenades, and 20-40mm cannons all destroy more tanks than the main guns of other tanks. As explained here:

Hundreds of expensive tanks of both sides are being destroyed on the battlegrounds of Ukraine by cheap UPV drones. These include the Russian T-90MS Tank (worth about $4.2million) and the German Leopard 2A6 Tank (about $6.3 million). They are being destroyed by ubiquitous Chinese UPV drones, and their local variants, that sell for about $3000. The U.S. has also supplied Ukraine with 155mm howitzer rounds known as Remote Anti-Armour Munitions (RAAM). Each shell scatters nine 2.3kg magnetically activated mines. Tanks with limited vision, especially Russian tanks, often hit these mines, damaging their tracks, and making them sitting targets. They are all then finished off by precision artillery and antitank guided missiles.

It also notes the massive losses of tanks in the Russian-Ukraine war (very few of which come from other tanks). More than 60% of tanks fielded by Russia and the Ukraine have been destroyed in the first year and a half of the war, with tanks every kind from the most advanced to the most out dated destroyed.

The same article also has interesting discussion of future tanks:

In the short term:

Tanks that are lighter in order to ease the logistic, with V-shaped floors, crewless turret, with minor heat signature, APS systems against drones (like Trophy or light Droneguns), more equal armor thickness all around since now top hitting kamikaze drones and missiles are the main enemy, not other tanks anymore.

They would all be armed high-trajectory indirect-fire weapons like rockets, missiles, or mortars. Many tank models would also have additional secondary weapons like rotary multi-barrelled autocannons, machine guns, anti-infantry explosive strips on the sides, side-firing ports for internally carried soldiers or crew, etc. They would also have various types of advanced computer brains, communications, systems, and sensors.

Increasingly they sound like the relatively inexpensive M3 Bradley and the variants America are about to produce.

In the long term:

Tanks will be AI controlled and/or remotely controlled, crewless vehicles, with light armor and focus on mass production and low maintenance.