I do, more or less. The short answer is yes, but fertility fell more slowly than marriage.
In the U.S., fertility rates have fallen off less sharply than marriage rates. The U.S. had no significant racial disparity in marriage or fertility rates through roughly the 1930 cohort. African American out of wedlock birthrates were already very high (and marriage rates were low) by the 1940 cohort. Hispanic out of wedlock birthrates were starting to get high (and marriage rates were falling) by the 1960 cohort, and non-college educated white out of wedlock birthrates were starting to get high (with falling marriage rates) by the 1980 cohort. Marriage rates remain high and out of wedlock birthrates remain low in the U.S. for college educated women (to about 1940 cohort whites levels), and marriage rates are low with high out of wedlock birthrates for non-college educated women (to record lows in the modern era). The average non-college educated woman in the U.S. first has kids two years before marriage and has a much greater than 50% chance of divorcing eventually. The average college educated woman in the U.S. first has kids two years after marriage and has a much lower than 50% chance of divorcing eventually. Birth rates for non-college educated women and non-white women in the U.S. fell dramatically from the 1970s cohort and the 1990 cohort (lagging the decline in more educated women, but now at about parity with them among all but the very poorest women), at all aged below age 40. U.S. births for women age 40+ have surged, but don't come close to balancing out declining birth rates for younger women across the board.
The demographics in England and Wales are a bit different. Out of wedlock births grew sooner in post-WWII England and Wales (in part due to a stronger welfare state and a much earlier decline of Christianity) than in the U.S., although not as much as in Scandinavia. And, South Asian and Afro-Caribbean populations who migrated to England as free economic migrants are much less economically disadvantaged relative to the white population of England than African-American descendants of slaves in the U.S. (who make up most black Americans and who were under Jim Crow segregation laws until the 1950s, much later than comparable levels of discrimination in England, with South Asian migrants for most of British colonial rule having a large upper class bias). South Asian Muslims have higher marriage rates and high fertility rates than non-Muslims. On the other hand, IIRC, the baby boom in England was not quite as intense as it was in the U.S.
This said, both the U.S. and England were some of the earlier countries to experience demographic transition to lower children per woman per lifetime (although not as early as France which was already starting to experience it in the 18th and 19th century). And, declining fertility was more strongly mitigated in the U.S. by immigration (with immigrants having higher marriage rates and higher fertility in the U.S. than native born Americans, reducing the fall in total fertility rate) than in the U.K. which still had significant immigration, but steadier and starting in the late 1960s, not as much as the U.S. did in relative terms.
2 comments:
Do you know if this tracks well with fertility rate?
I do, more or less. The short answer is yes, but fertility fell more slowly than marriage.
In the U.S., fertility rates have fallen off less sharply than marriage rates. The U.S. had no significant racial disparity in marriage or fertility rates through roughly the 1930 cohort. African American out of wedlock birthrates were already very high (and marriage rates were low) by the 1940 cohort. Hispanic out of wedlock birthrates were starting to get high (and marriage rates were falling) by the 1960 cohort, and non-college educated white out of wedlock birthrates were starting to get high (with falling marriage rates) by the 1980 cohort. Marriage rates remain high and out of wedlock birthrates remain low in the U.S. for college educated women (to about 1940 cohort whites levels), and marriage rates are low with high out of wedlock birthrates for non-college educated women (to record lows in the modern era). The average non-college educated woman in the U.S. first has kids two years before marriage and has a much greater than 50% chance of divorcing eventually. The average college educated woman in the U.S. first has kids two years after marriage and has a much lower than 50% chance of divorcing eventually. Birth rates for non-college educated women and non-white women in the U.S. fell dramatically from the 1970s cohort and the 1990 cohort (lagging the decline in more educated women, but now at about parity with them among all but the very poorest women), at all aged below age 40. U.S. births for women age 40+ have surged, but don't come close to balancing out declining birth rates for younger women across the board.
The demographics in England and Wales are a bit different. Out of wedlock births grew sooner in post-WWII England and Wales (in part due to a stronger welfare state and a much earlier decline of Christianity) than in the U.S., although not as much as in Scandinavia. And, South Asian and Afro-Caribbean populations who migrated to England as free economic migrants are much less economically disadvantaged relative to the white population of England than African-American descendants of slaves in the U.S. (who make up most black Americans and who were under Jim Crow segregation laws until the 1950s, much later than comparable levels of discrimination in England, with South Asian migrants for most of British colonial rule having a large upper class bias). South Asian Muslims have higher marriage rates and high fertility rates than non-Muslims. On the other hand, IIRC, the baby boom in England was not quite as intense as it was in the U.S.
This said, both the U.S. and England were some of the earlier countries to experience demographic transition to lower children per woman per lifetime (although not as early as France which was already starting to experience it in the 18th and 19th century). And, declining fertility was more strongly mitigated in the U.S. by immigration (with immigrants having higher marriage rates and higher fertility in the U.S. than native born Americans, reducing the fall in total fertility rate) than in the U.K. which still had significant immigration, but steadier and starting in the late 1960s, not as much as the U.S. did in relative terms.
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