Enforcing Noblesse Oblige

La noblesse oblige literally "nobility obliges") is a French expression that means that nobility extends beyond mere entitlement, requiring people who hold such status to fulfill social responsibilities; the term retains the same meaning in English. For example, a primary obligation of a nobleman could include generosity towards those around him. As those who lived on the nobles' land had obligations to the nobility, the nobility had obligations to their people, including protection at the least.

- Wikipedia, Noblesse Oblige.

The American system of representative democracy is profoundly anti-elitist. In its ideal form, which it somewhat approximates, all adults can vote for candidates who are not meaningfully screened for qualifications to do the jobs for which they are elected.

Most other parts of our society don't work that way. 

Typically, when a business or government needs an employee, or an individual or firm or government wants to hire a contractor to do something, the business or person seeking a contractor tries to do so on a meritocratic basis consistent with what they can afford. For many kinds of tasks, a government license awarded on the basis of a meritocratic examination process that can be revoked for various kinds of professional or personal misconduct is required to even be considered for doing that task.

Most of the time, competence and qualifications are considered to some extent in the process of electing representatives to oversee the government on behalf of the voting public by the voters who are given the authority to elect them. But that isn't hard wired into the system (although some more specialized state and local elected offices like sheriffs and surveyors and judges and prosecutors sometimes do have some minimal professional qualifications that are required of candidates).

Unlike elected officials, civil service employees of governments are appointed on a formally meritocratic basis with only minimal political input by supervising officers for the prospective employees who are well-informed about the candidates' qualifications and are generally highly trained and qualified themselves.

Why do we have a system that allows ill-informed voters, no matter how uneducated they may be, choose people to run the system from among a group of minimally screened candidates with no obligation, even an unenforceable and theoretical one, to choose from among those candidates on a meritocratic basis?

The political theory behind a system with minimal screening of candidates and a very broad franchise is that the desire to win elections gives politicians an incentive to care about the best interests of the people who are entitled to vote, rather than caring only about their own personal interests and desires.

The ill-treatment that American society affords to people who can't vote at some or all levels of our political system, like children, non-citizens, prison inmates, institutionalized mentally ill people, people in places like the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and people who live outside the territory of the governmental body whose voters select those elected officials, supports the conclusion that including someone in the franchise tends to produce political outcomes that benefit people who can vote. 

Likewise, policies that meet the interests and desires of people who vote more consistently, like older people, educated people, and Evangelical Christians, are more frequently translated into government policy than the interests and desires of people who vote less often, like younger people and less educated people, even when they have a right to vote.

The American political system has made a calculated choice that having politicians who care about the needs and desires of as many people as can legitimately be permitted to vote is so important that it is worth the risk that in the cases where these voters will make bad choices, especially when they are ill-informed and are not very good decision makers about anything.

The political theory, in other words, is that a franchise that is as broad as possible with minimally screened candidates will enforce noblesse oblige upon the class of politicians who are elected in this system, and that having politicians who are incentivized to display noblesse oblige in their decision making is worth the price that society pays in choosing less qualified leaders because a greater share of the decision makers are ill-informed and bad at making decisions than they would be if the franchise was narrower. The political system of American representative democracy enshrines equality in order to create no incentives to make as few people as possible strangers of the law.

It is a political theory that leans heavily on formal political institutions to cause this to happen rather than alternative means.

Not every political system in history as relied upon this strategy.

Confucianism, in contrast, focuses on securing noblesse oblige by instilling a political culture infused in it.

In Confucianism, almost every important interact in life in characterized as being unequal and hierarchical. Subordinates have a duty to obey and defer to their superiors. Superiors have a duty to look out for the bests interests of their subordinates in a spirit of reciprocity and fiduciary-like duty. Confucianism calls for people to be promoted to higher positions of authority on the basis of merit, which is viewed as a balanced mix of competence and good character in the sense of upholding confucian values.

Modern cultures with strong Confucian values display pros and cons. They tend to be well ordered, to be law abiding, to have people who are good at self-organization and cooperation in times of need, and to have relatively few people who are just cast away and neglected. But these are prone to abuse of authority and bullying by people higher up in the hierarchy, tend to ignore positive or urgent input from people low in the hierarchy, tend to force subordinates to sacrifice their own well-being and desires for the demands of their superiors, and are reliant on the people at the top to be innovative because those at the bottom are not permitted to innovate. Confucianism, focused as it is on a system rooted in good men, rather than good laws, also tends to be vulnerable to corruption and not very focused on the consistent rule of law.

Of course, different modern Confucian influenced societies address the "natural" shortcomings of Confucianism in different ways. 

Japan has done a relatively good job at curbing the selfishness of people like senior executives in positions of power, and has begun to temper Confucian values with respect for personal self-actualization as it has become a more affluent society with the luxury of doing so. 

South Korea has been less successful at curbing excesses and abuses by superiors, and has likewise been somewhat less successful at fulfilling the obligation to look out for subordinates. But it has also been better, on balance, at allowing self-actualization in lieu of subordination of one's own desires to the will of those superior in the hierarchy.

China has done a poor job indeed of curbing kleptocracy by those in power, but has done a good job at having the older generation cede power to the younger generation, in a manner that has fostered a class of relatively young, powerful, innovative change makers that have kept its society from becoming too static and tradition bound. But China has done a particularly poor job of respecting individual self-actualization, or listening to the voices of subordinates with valuable input that could be offered in decision-making. China has also suffered mightily from corruption and is deeply immersed in a social and intellectual climate of dishonesty and censorship of the truth.

Feudalism, the political culture that produced the concept of noblesse oblige in the West was similar, but unlike Confucianism, awarded positions of authority based primarily on the hereditary principal, rather than based upon meritocratic selection. Also, feudalism tied the sense that superiors should look out for the well-being of their subordinates to the pride, ego, and greed associated with ownership. In a feudal context, you basically owned your subordinates, and your sense of noblesse oblige was related to your desire to have your property be the best that it can be for your own person benefit since this would make you rich in the process.

Saudi Arabian style monarchies, while hardly meritocratic or democratic, have at least tamed the hereditary principle, by having large, polygamous royal families in which the current ruler can choose the most qualified person within this large royal family to be their successor. This mitigates the risk that a hereditary successor will be profoundly incompetent or immoral, and creates an incentive for its many princes to distinguish themselves in competence and loyalty in connection with the competition to be a successor to the reigning monarch or at least a member of the reigning monarch's inner circle.

Saudi Arabian monarchies do show outstanding noblesse oblige in terms of using their wealth to benefit the actual citizens of their kingdoms, but like most absolute monarchies, are also highly repressive and authoritarian, and treat people who are not their permanent subjects and property as disposable and care for their well-being only to the extent that it is transactionally necessary.

Returning to the question of the American political system, the question is really how we can secure noblesse oblige on a broad based basis, without sacrificing competence, rule of law, and freedom from corruption motivated by partisanship, to the extent that the MAGA movement does today. 

While there is a place to recognize political motives rooted in a desire to satisfy a broad grass roots of society rather than only its elites, not all choices which we have vested politicians with making are equally valid. There may not be one right choice, but there are many choices which are objectively worse across the value systems that are intersubjectively shared by broad swaths of our society. And, a system that makes objectively bad choices because swaths ignorant people in the grass roots don't understand that these are bad choices is broken.

Furthermore, the American political system has slipped away from securing noblesse oblige on a broad based basis from its political leaders, because its electoral and legislative processes and procedures have created incentives to further the well-being and desires of minimal winning coalitions while neglecting or actively harming those outside the winning coalition. 

Also, deep rooted flaws in the design of the American political system that arose because the Founders who designed it didn't have the benefit of the lessons of two and a half centuries of global democratic government's successes and failures, prevent the American political system from accurately translating the needs and desires of its people as a whole into appropriate action. It is a political system that is too gridlocked to promptly change to reflect new knowledge and needs, and is too biased towards rural white Christian interests and the interests of the ultra-rich, and against urban, non-Christian and non-white people's interests, and people who are not ultra-rich.

The inability of our gridlocked political system to address urgent needs and desires, especially those of the working class has been toxic for the American political culture. It has undermined faith in the belief that politicians can be in good faith about wanting change. It has washed away concern about the good character or competence of its political leaders. It has fueled the search for scapegoats to lash out against like immigration and free trade and non-Christians and LGBT people and women's rights and racial minorities. It has encouraged thoughtless and radical anti-government attitudes, conspiracy theories, anti-science ideologies, and distrust of intellectual elites.

Working class needs and desires have been neglected, in part, because they don't vote as consistently as more educated and affluent people do, and, in part, because the economy is changing but political gridlock has preventing timely and competent responses to these changes. This is led to the conventional wisdom that political changes have not occurred because bipartisan political elites are conspiring against them, even though this is more untrue than not and the primary reason that the current political system has not addressed their needs is that  the current system makes it too hard for well-intentioned political elites to secure effective change.

Returning to the question of the American economic system, there, the question is mostly, how we can cause the people at the top of economic hierarchies to display more noblesse oblige to their subordinates and to the larger society at a time when they have gone too far in milking the system for their own personal benefit at the expense of the rest of society. American economic elites generally are very competent, and are certainly much less corrupt the American political elites. But they also have far too weak incentives to refrain from causing externalities or exploiting subordinates and third-parties for their own personal benefit. The American political system's job is, in substantial part, to reign in the excesses of American economic elites, and the American political system has done a fairly shoddy job of doing so, in part, because the system in designed in such a way that this kind of regulation of American economic elites is too difficult to secure in a system that takes an unreasonably wide consensus to act.

The Perils Of Valuing Loyalty Over Competence

One of the problems of absolute power is that you get it by valuing loyalty over competence, which means you don't have anyone in a position to dissuade you from making a disastrously bad decision. Often this means that sooner or later, you will make a disastrously bad decision.

It also would suggest that more secure autocrats, like hereditary monarchs, may be less at risk than insecure ones who need to maximize loyalty to stay in power.

Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the regime such as Mao’s Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot’s collectivization drive, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which better-informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. 

We offer a dynamic model of non-democratic politics, in which repression and bad decision-making are self-reinforcing. Repressions reduce the threat, yet raise the stakes for the incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the mechanism of disastrous individual decisions in highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.

Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin, "Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy" Becker Friedman Institute Working Paper No. 2023-52 (April 5, 2023).

Did Islamic Law Substitute For Institutional Constraints On Political Power?

A new paper asks why the Islamic political theory tradition, in contrast to Greco-Roman classical  period political theory, doesn't discuss institutions constraining political power until the 19th century. Its authors conclude that this was due to a political consensus created by Islamic law, which made fear of a popular revolt if leaders strayed to far from Islamic law's mandates more viable. 

Despite its roots in an in depth analysis of Islamic political thought and game theory style "social science" analysis, this model is basically wrong. It misses the forest for the trees. It fails to recognize that institutional constraints on abuses of politician power were also missing in the Western and Confucian traditions in the same time period. And, it also fails to recognize that grass roots revolts were not a serious threat to political leaders in that era almost anywhere in the world and didn't last long when the gained brief victories. 

A model that sees the rise of democracy as driven by economic development that requires the willing consent and cooperation with the nation's leader from a broad merchant class when its role in the economy eclipses that of economic rents from land and other natural resources which the ruled owned directly or indirectly, better describes the circumstances in which institutional constraints on abuses of political power arise. And this economically driven model explains these developments without regard to religious and moral systems like Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Confucianism.

The Paper

Institutional constraints to counter potential abuses in the use of political power have been viewed as essential to well functioning political institutions and good public policy outcomes in the Western World since the time of ancient Greece. A sophisticated intellectual tradition emerged to justify the need for such constraints. 

In this paper we identify a new puzzle: such an intellectual tradition did not exist in the Islamic world, even if the potential for abuse was recognized. We develop a model to explain why such ideas might not have emerged. We argue that this is due to the nature of Islamic law (the Sharia) being far more encompassing than Western law, making it easier for citizens to identify abuses of power and use collective action to discipline them. We study how the relative homogeneity and solidarity of Islamic society fortified this logic.

A. Arda Gitmez, James A. Robinson & Mehdi Shadmehr, "Missing Discussions: Institutional Constraints in the Islamic Political Tradition" NBER Working Paper 30916 (February 2023). DOI 10.3386/w30916

The Rest Of The World Was The Same In This Era

One big flaw is the paper's analysis is that in the time period in question during which Islamic political thought didn't seriously consider institutional constraints on political power, i.e. from the 7th to the 18th centuries, institutional constraints on political power were extremely rare in the Western tradition as well. 

While there were periods of democratic governance in the classical Greco-Roman civilization, by the 7th century, those democratic institutions were well and truly dead outside a few free cities and "barbarian" tribes outside the Western political theory tradition. Prior to classical Greco-Roman civilization, monarchy and other forms of dictatorships were predominant in the region that would later be influenced by the classical civilization's influence. Even in the classical Greco-Roman era itself, democratic governance was frequently flawed, geographically spotty, and only intermittent. But, ultimately, the political and legal institutions of Greco-Roman civilization at its peak turned out to be premature and collapsed. 

Greco-Roman legal concepts and classical intellectual achievements of other kinds were only starting to be received back into Western civilization in the renaissance starting in the late 15th century, a millennium after the fall of the Western Roman empire. The Reformation, while adopting somewhat democratic religious institutions in some places (e.g. Geneva) in the 16th century, still left the church subordinate to secular rulers. The intellectual seeds that eventually gave rise to the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the diminution of the power of the monarchy vis-a-vis parliament in England were only starting to emerge in the 18th century Enlightenment movement in the West.

Hereditary monarchies were the predominant rule in Western Civilization from the 7th to the 18th centuries, as well as in the Bronze Age and in the early Iron Age civilizations of the Mediterranean represented, for example, by the Hellenic dark ages following the Bronze Age collapse of ca. 1200 BCE.  

The only countries that were more than city-states of any consequence in this time period with legally recognized institutional constrains of consequence were the tiny, remote, and weak Icelandic Commonwealth (between the establishment of the Althing in 930 and the pledge of fealty to the Norwegian king with the Old Covenant in 1262), the Venetian Republic (from 697 until 1797), a few small "free" city-states, and England (and its colonies) often dated back to the Magna Carta (in 1215 with a rocky start to its acceptance at first). But, even in England from the 13th to the 18th century, the monarchy's political power was far from symbolic only as it is today, and was routinely abused, except during the eleven year interruption of the semi-democratic Republic of the Commonwealth of England (from 1649 to 1660 when England and Wales, later along with Ireland and Scotland, were governed as a republic after the end of the Second English Civil War and the trial and execution of Charles I).

For the most part, in this era, even nominally republican city states were ruled by quasi-hereditary councils of leading quasi-aristocratic families for the most part. For example, per the link above, the Venetian Republic "was ruled by the doge, who was elected by members of the Great Council of Venice, the city-state's parliament, and ruled for life. The ruling class was an oligarchy of merchants and aristocrats."

In the period from the 7th to 18th centuries (apart from the last few decades of that time period), in Western civilization, like the parallel periods in Islamic civilization, the primary constraints on abuses of political power were moral condemnations from religious leaders. 

Also, in that time period in Chinese civilization, in Korea, and in Japan, the primary constraints on abuses of political power were Confucian moral precepts. 

Grass Roots Results Were Not A Check On Abuses Of Political Power

The other big flaw is seeing the threat of a possible revolt or revolution as a significant constraint on abuses of political power. 

But, in reality, in both the Islamic world and in the Western tradition (and also in the areas that are part of the Confucian tradition), grass roots revolts were basically non-existent. Leaders who fell were instead taken down in succession fights launched by high aristocrats and conquests launched by other non-democratic regimes.

Monarchs and dictators, for all of their symbolic roles, are still mere human beings, not gods. They only have power to the extent that other powerful and strong people follow their leadership. This is an inherent institutional constraint of every political system, democratic and non-democratic alike. They are followed to a great extent because of the legitimacy arising from their uncontested succession or seizure of power to start a new dynasty or acquire new territory. But if they antagonize their powerful and strong subordinates too much, their power can erode, either incrementally if they are ignored, or dramatically, in some sort of coup. Democratic institutions to check political abuses and provide an alternative non-violent means of securing regime changes can discourage disregard for the authority of the regime's leaders and extra-legal successions. But young democracies in newly independent countries routinely experience both of these kinds of difficulties.

More From The Paper

While its thesis is basically wrong, and its game theoretic styled analysis section has dubious merit, the paper does, nonetheless make some interesting observations. The body text of the paper explains:

[A]n intellectual tradition reaching as far back as Plato and Aristotle. . . . provided mechanisms via which power, unconstrained by institutions, would lead to abuses and undesirable policy outcomes. . . . A similar intellectual tradition never arose in the Islamic world. This is despite the fact that Muslim thinkers were concerned about abuses of power and had access to much of the discussion of institutional political constraints by classical Greek philosophers (for example Plato’s Republic and Laws, and Aristotle’s Ethics, even if not his Politics). Of course, positive theories exist that aim to explain the absence of ruler-constraining institutions in the Islamic civilization. . . . 

What this research does not explain however is why notions of institutional constraints on rulers did not develop even in theory in the millennium from the rise of Islam in the 7th century to the 18th century, prior to the emergence of broader modernization and Westernization currents in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. . . . Muslim thinkers, jurists, philosophers failed to develop, even in theory, ideas about the necessity of institutional mechanisms that aimed to constrain rulers. This cannot be attributed to an absence of innovation or ignorance of related ideas. . . . 

In our model, government policies are divided into two categories: those that are prescribed by divine law, and those that are not. For example, divine law may prescribe a 10 percent tax on particular goods, but may not specify whether the revenue should be spent on improving roads or education. The scope of divine law varies across societies. Some do not have divine law (e.g., the Roman Republic and Ancient Greek city-states); some have divine law with a broad scope (e.g., most Islamic societies and some Jewish societies in antiquity); in others, divine law has a limited scope in public policy (e.g., most Christian societies). . . . Critically, when a government policy is prescribed by divine law, believers know the right policy for them. When divine law is silent, they remain uncertain about the right policy, i.e., the policy that is congruent with their preferences. When the scope of divine law is broader, it prescribes a larger fraction of government’s policies: At one extreme, divine law has no scope, and hence non-existent in public policy; at the other extreme, divine law specifies all public policies. . . . while Islamic law was not monolithic, differences among mainstream interpretations were small compared to the wide range of possible laws that could be. . . . 

Our main result is that when the scope of divine law is broader, the added benefits of institutional constraints on rulers are smaller. A broader scope of divine law reduces the uncertainty among majority citizens about the correct government policy, facilitating collective action and reducing the gains from institutional constraints. Moreover, we show that the marginal effect of (a broader scope of) divine law is larger when the society is more homogeneous or when there is more solidarity amongst society. A broader scope of divine law enables citizens to better know when their rulers deviate from the right policy; however, this knowledge helps them only if they can mobilize, and their mobilization capacity depends on their homogeneity and solidarity. This implies a complementarity between the scope of divine law on the one hand and homogeneity and solidarity on the other. Our interpretation of these results is that the characteristics of Islamic civilization (in particular, a law with a broad scope stemming from the Quran, Hadiths, and early traditions), combined with the nature of society, meant that it was less desirable to construct institutional constraints on rulers along the lines advocated in the West in one form or another from Plato and Aristotle onwards. 

Given the costs of such institutions, revolt was a more effective disciplining device. We argue that this is a potential explanation for the lack of an intellectual tradition proposing institutional constraints. Islamic intellectuals and scholars were perfectly aware of the problem of tyranny, but saw the desirable solution as being different. 

An interesting comparison, as we will discuss, is with Jewish civilization. Here, as in Islam, the scope of divine law was also broad, and the discussion of institutional constraints on rulers was absent throughout the first and second temple periods from the founding of the state up until its absorption into the Roman empire. In contrast, in the Greek and Roman civilization, in which there was no divine law, and in the subsequent Christian civilization, in which the scope of divine (canon) law was far narrower, arguments for institutional constraints on rulers were more common—even if in rudimentary forms in some periods.

. . .

Institutional Constraints on Rulers in the Islamic Tradition 

As the prophet, Mohammad (d. 632) was the leader (imam) of the Islamic community (umma). The Constitution of Medina also recognizes Mohammad as the ultimate judge and arbitrator in case of disagreements among the members of umma. The tribal nature of early Muslim society and Mohammad’s emphasis on building consensus through consultation (shur¯a), combined with his prophetic charisma, would alleviate concerns about the concentration of coercive power. 

Upon Mohammad’s death, Ab¯u Bakr (d. 634) took over as the imam and adopted the title of caliph (khal¯ıfa, meaning “successor” or “deputy”). The rebellion and killing of the third caliph, ‘Uthman (d. 656), led to a legitimacy crisis, which evolved into the First Civil War (656-661) during the fourth caliph, ‘Ali (d. 661). In turn, ‘Ali was assasinated and his challenger Mu‘awyah (d. 680), a kinsman of ‘Uthman and the governor of Syria, became the next caliph. Concerns about tyranny of rulers became widespread by the time of Mu‘awyah. Mu‘awyah established hereditary succession (and hence is known as the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty) and centralized power. 

By the late 7th century, the fourth Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik (d. 705) “wanted his subjects to believe that the power and the kingship. . . was a possession. . . granted by God and inalienable according to the divine will. The corollary of the assertion. . . was that disobedience to the caliph and his subordinate officers was a refusal to acknowledge God and so tantamount to unbelief”. The title caliph referring to the deputy of God (khal¯ıfat All¯ah), as opposed to the deputy of God’s messenger (khal¯ıfat ras¯ul All¯ah), appeared on coinage for the first time during ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign. 

Umayyad caliphs and their sumptuous lifestyle were sharp departures from the behavior of Mohammad and his immediate successors. Various revolts broke out over “the Umayyad manner of distributing revenues. . . maltreatment of the Prophet’s family, tyranny and the like." However, we have no record of discussions about institutional constraints on rulers in that period. This puzzling absence persists during the Abbasid dynasty, which followed the Umayyads in 750, and throughout various dynasties and kingdoms in the following millennium. 

First, we establish this puzzling absence. Then, we argue that the comprehensive nature of Islamic law facilitates disciplining rulers by revolt (at least it was so perceived), thereby reducing the marginal gains from imposing institutional constraints. To establish this puzzle, following Rosenthal’s classic categories, we divide political writings in Islamic civilization into three groups, depending on whether their primary foundation is Islamic law, philosophy, or advice-giving in the manner of Mirrors of Princes. We provide brief discussions of a few well-known examples in each category to touch on the political themes that Muslim thinkers engaged with and to demonstrate the absence of discussions about institutional constraints on rulers in those works. Such discussions are also absent in more comprehensive surveys of Islamic political thought. 

Obviously, the corpus of Islamic writings with direct political implications is vast. For example, the above categories do not include the writings and traditions of mystic orders that sometimes had direct political implications. However, mystic orders with their emphasis on the spiritual (and sometimes temporal) leaders with divine inspiration tended to be even less concerned with institutional constraints. While many scholars have studied the absence of institutional constraints on Islamic rulers in practice, the literature has not identified the puzzling absence of discussions about institutional constraints in theory. 

Some came close. For example, Crone keenly observes: “it was the scholars who formulated the law that the imam was meant to execute; by their own account, it was also they who elected and deposed him on behalf of the community. One would have thought that there was only a short step from all this to the view that the scholars should also monitor his performance, for example by forming independent councils authorized to signal when the rules had been breached, to strike out illegal decisions, and to block their execution. 

Small though the step may seem, however, there were few who took it.” Crone goes on to provide a few, short-lived, attempts on the eve of the Abbasid revolution, in North Africa and in Spain, to form councils that would rule along with the rulers. None of these attempts gained significant traction and they stand as exceptions proving the rule. Roy notes that the “poverty of Islamist thought on political institutions is striking, considering the emphasis Islamism places on politics”. 

Overall, institutional constraints on rulers or “republics. . . were ignored by the normative tradition.” These scholars do not offer an explanation for these “missing discussions” in the Islamic normative tradition. One may be tempted to attribute this absence to Muslim thinkers’ limited access to the Greco-Roman philosophical writings or history. 

For example, while Plato’s Republic and Laws and Aristotle’s Ethics were familiar to Muslim philosophers, it seems that they did not have access to a translation of Cicero’s De re publica, or Aristotle’s Politics where theories of mixed constitutions were more explicitly advocated. However, this view would imply that, without the help of the Greeks’ discoveries, many generations of Muslim thinkers somehow could not take what Crone calls “a short step” toward even a theoretical discussion of institutional constraints on rulers. Their “political horizon. . . did not reach to suggesting reforms or offering alternative institutions,” as Halbertal and Holmes describe some of their earlier Jewish counterparts in antiquity. 

We believe that this view is highly implausible. The vast territory of the Islamic Empire included people of various geographical and religious backgrounds, some of whom interacted routinely with Muslim scholars and many of whom played key roles in translating the vast corpus of Greek knowledge into Arabic. That generations of Muslim scholars over huge geographical and time periods simply did not have any knowledge of the political structure of Greek city-states, the Roman Republic, or even the Roman Empire with its Senate seems unlikely. As Gutas argues, “as late as. . . tenth century, the historian H. amza al-Is. fah¯an¯ı (d. after 350/961) relates that when ‘he needed information on Graeco-Roman history, he asked an old Greek, who had been captured and served as a valet, to translate for him a Greek historical work orally. This was accomplished with the help of the Greek’s son, Yumn, who knew Arabic well.’ This report establishes that oral translation by native speakers of whatever language within the Islamic domain did occur and that, as might have been expected, it must have been widely practiced”. 

To make sense of the puzzle, one must go beyond explanations that Muslim thinkers (and their Jewish counterparts, see below) did not discuss institutional constraints on rulers even in theory because they did not learn their potential usefulness from Aristotle and Cicero.

Select Online Comments About The Article

There is discussion of the article at Marginal Revolution where I saw the link to the article myself. Here are some quotes from that discussion from multiple commentators whom I do not specifically cite but are identified in the source (mostly by pseudonyms):

It's hard to envision a culture that comes up with an intellectual tradition to constraints to counter potential abuses in the use of political power like the West has when the central figurehead is a dictatorial warlord whose rules and ethics rules of conquest would shock even middle-age European rulers. . . . many of the rules enshrined in Sharia are precisely what we would call abuses of political power, repression of religious minorities, women, and the citizenry codified into religious law. It's tough to come up with an intellectual tradition of freedom when the intellectual tradition of your culture is codifying highly specific and exact rules for enacting barbarism and warlordism in your holiest texts.

It's arguably kind of hard when your central figure is the unquestionable semi-divine leader of an apocalyptic cult, but eh.

The concept of abuse of political power depends on the notion that there can be such thing as abusing political power. In the vast majority of pre-modern societies, there was a monarch, and the monarch was a god. In Ancient Egypt you had the Pharaohs, for instance, in China you had the emperor with a "mandate of heaven," in 17th century France, Louis XIV said he was the state. Absolutist monarchs did whatever he wanted and that was it. The ancient Greeks were the first who developed this concept because their society was very weird compared to other pre-modern societies. They lacked a centralized government and instead were divided into thousands of tiny city-states which often were democratic. Since power in these city-states was shared instead of concentrated into a single ruler, they had to develop notions of legitimate and illegitimate use of political power.

"A sophisticated intellectual tradition emerged to justify the need for such constraints. In this paper we identify a new puzzle: such an intellectual tradition did not exist in the Islamic world, even if the potential for abuse was recognized." It is not that it didn't exist. It was that it was rejected. The Islamic world is as much an heir to the Greek world as the West. More so as they got the central Greek lands like Alexandria. What is interesting is the Islamic world also rejected the Islamic model of government - rule by an Imam or at least an elected member of Muhammed's family - in favor of military dictatorship by Turks. So when it came to people in power the Islamic world got sophisticated thinkers like Ghazali who said that nothing was as bad as civil strife so the Authorities had to be supported no matter what.

People really shouldn't use the word "law" for Sharia or Jewish law. They are not law in the sense that Western law is law. They are, as they say, all encompassing guides to daily life. Sharia in particular has nothing much to say about government but a lot to say about diet and masturbation. It does not help to have a religious scholar who can tell you whether you can eat a goat that has been properly slaughtered after it has been gang raped when the issue is despotism. It is made worse because the Cadi Justice Max Weber criticized is a real thing in Sharia. Any hand book of Islamic law will have scholarly opinions but they will usually go something like "The Founder of the School and his second most famous student said you can't, while the most famous student said you can". So the judge gets to pick. Both options are valid.

"making it easier for citizens to identify abuses of power and use collective action to discipline them." Notice the smooth glide from identifying an abuse to correcting it. Not sure that the two have much to do with each other. The problem is that Islamic law is not much concerned about government and so it allows a lot of leeway for the people in power. Essentially if the ruler really wants to do something, it is Islamic. This is why the Ottomans can take the children of their dhimmis even though it is specifically forbidden by Sharia. Why they can have more than four wives too.

"We study how the relative homogeneity and solidarity of Islamic society fortified this logic." No one in their right mind would describe Islamic societies as anything like homogeneous. That is the point of Coons' mosaic model. And solidarity? Please. Someone needs to read Ibn Khaldoun.

I would temper some of this commentary, however, by noting that just as there is nothing inherently Christian about Western political theory, there is nothing about Islam that inherently prevents it from evolving republican governments with institutional constraints on abuses of political power. 

While they aren't perfect examples, in part, because they are fairly young democracies, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Indonesia, for example, all have reasonably democratic governments in Islamic countries, at least compared to the absolute monarchies of the past and those of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Brunei, and Oman, to give a few examples, today. Syria and Morocco are edge cases transitioning between democratic and autocratic systems and are not entirely one or the other.

Basically, different Islamic countries are at different places in their political development and mostly lag behind developed Western countries. The most politically advanced approach the level of development seen in the early 20th century in some countries in the West. Many are at a level of development comparable to the Victorian era. Some are culturally back where the West was in the 18th century. 

I have little doubt that in due time, many of these countries will evolve political driven by their economic development. In time, many will come to develop a culture similar to that of Muslims who have lived their entire lives fully participating in the cultural life of developed Western countries like the U.S., Canada, Sweden, England, France, Italy, and Germany.

Worker Safety In Qatar Is Poor

Basic Facts About Qatar

Qatar is shown in green. 

As the Huffington Post which is my source for the map and pronunciation of the country's name explains:

Qatar is a small Middle Eastern peninsula in the Persian Gulf bordered by Saudi Arabia. It has been ruled by the Al-Thani family since the mid-1800s, according to the CIA World Factbook, and has a population of about 840,000 people. It is slightly smaller than Connecticut. This tiny nation holds the world's third largest oil reserves, and oil and natural gas account for over 50 percent of the GDP.

Qatar is pronounced so that it sounds roughly like "cutter" and is one of the only words in which the letter Q appears without being followed by the letter "u" in its English spelling.

According to Wikipedia:

Qatar has been ruled as a hereditary monarchy by the House of Thani since Mohammed bin Thani signed a treaty with the British in 1868 that recognised its separate status. Following Ottoman rule, Qatar became a British protectorate in the early 20th century until gaining independence in 1971. The current emir is Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who holds nearly all executive and legislative authority under the Constitution of Qatar, as well as controlling the judiciary. He appoints the prime minister and cabinet. The partially-elected Consultative Assembly can block legislation and has a limited ability to dismiss ministers.

In early 2017, Qatar's total population was 2.6 million, with 313,000 of them Qatari citizens and 2.3 million expatriates. Its official religion is Islam. In terms of income, the country has the fourth-highest GDP (PPP) per capita in the world, and the eleventh-highest GNI per capita (Atlas method). Qatar ranks 42nd in the Human Development Index, the third-highest HDI in the Arab world. It is a high-income economy, backed by the world's third-largest natural gas reserves and oil reserves. Qatar is one of the world's largest exporters of liquefied natural gas, and the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide per capita.

Qatar In The Spotlight

Qatar is currently hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup (the global championship for professional soccer, the world's leading sport) which has turned the spotlight on the country, not necessarily in a positive way. 

Qatar has received attention for its restrictions on beer consumption in a country where alcohol consumption is mostly banned due to Islamic prohibitions on consuming it, the hostility of the venue to LGBT associated symbols since hostility towards gays attributed to Islam is the norm there, its treatment of women justified by Islam, and its weak protections for human rights (particularly for migrant workers who make up 90% of the workforce) and its lack of democracy. 

I say "attributed to" and "justified by" because many of the "Islamic practices" of countries like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are not universal in predominantly Islamic countries and are justified with Islamic religious authorities in ways that do not compel the conclusions that these communities reach about what Islamic law requires according to many Muslims and Muslim religious scholars. 

Worker Safety In Qatar 

The issue addressed in this post, however, worker safety, is an issue with regard to which Islamic and Western norms, secular and religious alike, are not meaningfully in disagreement. The Qataris, like almost everyone else in the world, would prefer that there are no workplace fatalities.

World Cup chief Hassan Al-Thawadi said that between 400 and 500 migrant workers have died as a result of work done on projects connected to the tournament [since Qatar was selected to host this year's World Cup in 2010].

In an interview with Piers Morgan which aired on TalkTV on Monday, Al-Thawadi was asked about the number of fatalities to migrant workers as a result of the work done in the tournament and said: “The estimate is around 400, between 400 and 500.

“I don’t have the exact number, that’s something that’s been discussed. One death is too many, it’s as simple as that.”

From CNN.

* Fatal Occupational Injuries in U.S. in 2019: 5,333

World Almanac 2022 citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

* U.S. Population in 2019: 328.3 million

Google

* Fatal Occupational Injuries per year in U.S. per million people: 16.2

* Per Capita GDP in U.S.: $63,554

World Almanac 2022

* Average Annual Migrant Worker Fatal Deaths in Qatar: 650

2010-2019 for South Asian migrant workers only per CNN citing the Guardian

* Percentage of workforce made up of migrant workers in Qatar: 90%

CNN citing Amnesty International

* Qatar Population in 2019: 2.832 million

Google

* Fatal Migrant Worker deaths per year in Qatar per million people: 229.5

* Adjusted Qatar rate since migrant workers are 90% of the workforce: 255

* Per capita GDP in Qatar: $89,949

World Almanac 2022

Migrant workers in Qatar, who make up 90% of the workforce there, are about 15 times as likely as U.S. workers to die on the job in any given year.

The workplace death rate in Qatar is roughly what it was in the United States in 1913, before there was any significant governmental regulation of workplace safety in the United States.

In 1913, the Bureau of Labor Statistics documented approximately 23,000 industrial deaths among a workforce of 38 million, equivalent to a rate of 61 deaths per 100,000 workers. Under a different reporting system, data from the National Safety Council from 1933 through 1997 indicate that deaths from unintentional work-related injuries declined 90%, from 37 per 100,000 workers to 4 per 100,000. The corresponding annual number of deaths decreased from 14,500 to 5100; during this same period, the workforce more than tripled, from 39 million to approximately 130 million.

From the U.S. Center For Disease Control citing National Safety Council. Accident facts, 1998 edition. Itasca, Illinois: National Safety Council, 1998 and Corn JK. Response to occupational health hazards: a historical perspective. New York, New York: Nostrand Reinhold, 1992.

Monarchy Benefits Overstated

Ed West at the Wrong Side Of History blog makes a case for monarchy based upon the alleged stability of monarchies relative to republics. For example, in 2015, monarchies had less political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa than non-monarchies.

The article make not even a passing reference to correlation vs. causation. It's a little worse than "apples and oranges" when you're comparing Arab republics and Arab monarchies without reference to the postcolonial or sectarian factors that led to those differences. 

The problem with this is selection bias. Almost all countries used to have monarchs. Only the stable ones still do. “Arab republics” are just toppled Arab monarchies.

Similarly, US News ranks of countries by quality of life: Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands, Finland, Germany, New Zealand: 7 of them are monarchies, and 3 of those are members of the British Commonwealth. Another desirable place to live, Japan, is also a monarchy. 

But, in all of these countries the monarchs are figure-heads. They could replace their monarchs with elected heads of state like Germany or France and not much would change. We're not in the 18th century arguing whether actual monarchs rule better than republics. Basically every functioning "monarchy" in a developed country is actually a republic in substance.

I won't entirely discount the possibility that both true monarchies and symbolic constitutional monarchies do have some benefits, but selection bias and the failure to distinguish between the two kinds of monarchies pushes an analysis that overstates their benefits.

The Queen Is Dead

Queen Elizabeth II died today at her summer home in Scotland at age 96. She served as Queen for 70 years, the second longest reign of any monarch in the entire world in all of history, after Louis XIV of France, the longest-reigning monarch, with a 72-year and 110-day reign from 1643 until 1715.

The man formerly known as Prince Charles, age 73, is now the King of the United Kingdom (and also of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and a few other places). It is customary for his to decide for himself what his name will be as King at his coronation (but see below). His second wife Camilla's title (whom he married in 2005, after his first wife and mother of all of his children, the late Princess Diana, divorced him prior to her death, and then died in 1996) is now Queen Consort.

Prince William, age 40, the adult eldest son of Prince Charles (and a much more popular figure than his father), is now the Crown Prince. The person next in line to the throne is Prince George, the nine year old eldest child of Prince William.

Since the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch plays a primarily symbolic role, such as formally declaring the United Kingdom's new Prime Minister to be head of government in Scotland earlier this month, there are basically no practical governmental policy implications for this development in the short term.

Charles Stross (a science fiction author and anti-monarchist in the U.K.) has some comments at his blog:

Operation Unicorn is in effect (contingency plans for the monarch dying in Scotland). Charles is now King: coronation will follow within the next year, his name as monarch isn't announced yet.

UPDATE:

A few hours after the death of Queen Elizabeth, the new King of England announced that his regnal name will be King Charles III.

Change, Some For The Better In Saudi Arabia

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made some reforms that restrict practices that are widely recognized as putting Saudi Arabia among the "uncivilized" countries of the world (he has also relaxed some restrictions on women's rights and expanded democracy at the local government level while retaining an absolute monarchy nationally). But, he's also taken actions that belong in a modern version of the television series "Game of Thrones."

Even with the reforms, Saudi Arabia will still have one of the highest rates of capital and corporal punishment in the world, still criminalizes conduct that is legal in most of the world, and remains one of the most totalitarian countries in the world. But, steps in the right direction are still welcome ones.

It remains to be seen if his policies, reforms and tactics, will be, on balance, positive or negative ones.

"Saudi Arabia's King Salman has ordered an end to the death penalty for crimes committed by minors, according to a statement Sunday by a top official. The decision comes on the heels of another ordering judges to end the practice of flogging, replacing it with jail time, fines or community service and bringing one of the kingdom’s most controversial forms of public punishment to a close. 

King Salman's son and heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is seen as the force behind the kingdom’s loosening of restrictions and its pivot away from ultraconservative interpretations of Islamic law known as Wahhabism, which many in the country still closely adhere to. 

The crown prince has sought to modernize the country, attract foreign investment and revamp Saudi Arabia’s reputation globally. He's also overseen a parallel crackdown on liberals, women's rights activists, writers, moderate clerics and reformers. The 2018 killing of Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey by agents who worked for the crown prince drew sharp criticism internationally. 

The latest royal decree by King Salman could spare the death penalty for at least six men from the country’s minority Shiite community who allegedly committed crimes while under the age of 18, including Ali al-Nimr, who had participated in anti-government protests. Such activity carries terrorism-related charges in the kingdom for disturbing order and disobeying the ruler. In a document seen by The Associated Press, the royal decree orders prosecutors to review cases and drop punishments for those who've already served the maximum 10 years. However, the decree states that terrorism-related cases of minors will be tried differently. . . . 

He said “more reforms will be coming,” and that the two decisions “reflect how Saudi Arabia is forging ahead in its realization of critical human rights reforms even amid the hardship imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic." The decree expands on a previous order by King Salman issued in late 2018, which set a maximum 10-year prison term for minors in certain cases, except for crimes punishable by death. Now the 10-year maximum applies to all crimes by minors, with the possible exception of terrorism-related crimes. . . . 

Saudi Arabia's Supreme Court recently issued a directive to end flogging as a form of punishment sometime in April, according to another document seen by The Associated Press. The public spectacle of whipping a handcuffed prisoner for often non-violent crimes had drawn some comparisons to the types of punishment carried out by extremist groups like the Islamic State. . . . The Supreme Court document said the decision was in line with the kingdom's reforms and developments in the realm of human rights as directed by King Salman and overseen by the crown prince. .. . 

While some crimes, such as murder, may carry fixed punishments under Saudi Arabia’s interpretation of Islamic law, or Shariah, many other offenses are considered “tazir," meaning neither the crime nor the punishment is defined in Islam. Discretionary judgments for “tazir” crimes, such as flogging, have led to arbitrary rulings with contentious outcomes. Muslim countries generally do not practice public flogging. “This is a good step but we are still waiting to see if existing lashing sentences will be reversed and expunged,” al-Ahmed said."

From ABC News. 

The Hope Diamond, The Sun King, And His Mistresses

The French Blue was one of the most prized possessions of Louis XIV. A humongous diamond that gave the illusion of a sun at its center when positioned against a gold background (fitting for the Sun King), it was stolen after the French Revolution. It reemerged in England as the Hope diamond, a 45.52-carat mineral that is arguably the most famous jewel in the world. Not until 2009 did experts confirm that, yes, the Hope Diamond and the French Blue were cut from the same stone.

From here (with minor unattributed editing). Confirmation at Wikipedia:

The Hope Diamond is one of the most famous jewels in the world, with ownership records dating back almost four centuries. Its much-admired rare blue color is due to trace amounts of boron atoms. Weighing 45.52 carats, its exceptional size has revealed new findings about the formation of gemstones. 

The jewel is believed to have originated in India, where the original (larger) stone was purchased in 1666 by French gem merchant Jean-Baptiste Tavernier as the Tavernier Blue. The Tavernier Blue was cut and yielded the French Blue (Le bleu de France), which Tavernier sold to King Louis XIV in 1668. Stolen in 1791, it was recut, with the largest section acquiring its "Hope" name when it appeared in the catalogue of a gem collection owned by a London banking family called Hope in 1839. After going through numerous owners, it was sold to Washington socialite Evalyn Walsh McLean, who was often seen wearing it. It was purchased in 1949 by New York gem merchant Harry Winston, who toured it for a number of years before giving it to the National Museum of Natural History in 1958, where it has since remained on permanent exhibition.

It is estimated to be worth about $250 million.

Fun fact: You can buy a plastic and cubic zirconia imitation of this gem as it is set today, that it is the same size, for about $20.

Also (with minor unattributed editing from the same source):

Louis XIV (1638-1715) was King of France was known as “the Sun King,” he inherited the French throne when he was only four years old. At 72 years and 110 days, his reign is the longest of any monarch of a sovereign state in European history. Anne of Austria, Louis’ mother, gave birth to her eldest son later in life—she was 37 when Louis was born and had suffered stillbirths before him. After dying of gangrene in 1715, Louis was buried in Saint-Dennis Basilica outside of Paris. His royal body remained undisturbed for about 80 years before being exhumed and destroyed by radicals in the French Revolution. 

Louis performed 80 roles in 40 major ballets, often (though not always) in leading or god-like roles (of course). Throughout the 1660s, he founded the Académie Royale de Danse and the Académie d’Opéra, two critical elements in the evolution of French ballet. 

Although he and his first wife, Maria Theresa, shared a mutual affection, the king was never faithful to her. Louis fathered 13 illegitimate children with three other women in addition to carrying on liaisons with countless other lovers. Later in life, Louis found himself taken by the piety and compassion of his children’s governess, Françoise d’Aubigné, otherwise known as “Madame de Maintenon.” He eventually married her. The union was never publicly declared, but it was an open secret at court. 

The most powerful mistress of Louis XIV was clearly Madame de Montespan. She rose to chief mistress (maistresse-en-titre) by cultivating a friendship with his current chief mistress, Louise de La Vallière, and then swooping in to “temporarily” fulfill her friend’s “duties” when both Louise and the queen found themselves pregnant. To make rejection a little less embarrassing for La Vallière, he did (at first) keep the women in the same apartments, so he could visit Montespan without drawing suspicion. Montespan was no upstart. She was born on October 5, 1640, to one of the most ancient noble families in France, the House of Rochechouart. As the king’s mistress, her legitimized children with him would go on themselves to found royal houses in Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, and Portugal. Montespan possessed a legendary beauty by the standards of her day. With her peculiar and large blue eyes, thick “corn-colored” blonde hair, and her fashionably voluptuous figure, she was held as “astonishingly beautiful,” even for a king’s mistress. Montespan’s big break in the king’s bed came as both his queen and his main royal mistress became pregnant at the same time. Louise de La Vallière trusted Madame de Montespan to be a “temp” of sorts while she was closed away for childbirth. Madame lived the contract laborer’s dream by staying on the job long after La Vallière had given birth. According to lore, Montespan dropped towel to get on top. It’s said she first seduced the king by letting her bath wrap fall down as he happened to be spying on her shower. King Louis’s transition period from de La Vallière to Montespan was awkward for all involved. At first, he made his discarded lover (La Vallière) and current lover (Montespan) share an apartment. Both Louis and Montespan were married (to other people), so they were committing double-adultery. This arrangement was so Louis could visit his new squeeze without arousing the suspicion of Montespan’s husband. Altogether, Madame de Montespan had seven illegitimate children with Louis XIV. The first three children who survived were legitimized in 1673, after the lack of male heirs for Louis put the succession in crisis. Montespan was known for openly disrespecting Queen Maria Theresa in public—an act for which even the lovestruck Louis himself had to reprimand his mistress.  

In 1679, Montespan was accused of using witchcraft and aphrodisiacs to stay ahead of King Louis’s other lovers. A midwife named Catherine Monvoisin, or La Voison, had been arrested as part of the Affair of the Poisons—and she had named the king’s chief mistress as one of her prolific clients. La Voison even alleged that Montespan performed black masses, a sacrilegious accusation that effectively destroyed Montespan’s reputation, regardless of the truth. In the specifics of La Voisin’s accusations against Montespan, the midwife alleged Montespan and a witch would call on the Devil to ensure the king’s love in his mistress. To seal the deal, they also sacrificed a newborn baby and used the blood and bones in a love potion for the king. It’s said the king’s food was poisoned for 13 years to keep his heart—and other parts—in line for her. It’s said that police up dug 2,500 baby corpses in La Voisin’s garden, all of whom were used in Montespan’s black mass love rituals. Of course, this is almost definitely a myth or exaggeration, as no contemporary evidence of such a mass grave exists.

How bad was health care in the late 1600s? 

Only three of the seven children of the most powerful and wealthy kings in the world and in the entire history of France from one of his mistresses survived to adulthood.

Her Royal Highness Princess . . .

When the name on your birth certificate begins with the four words in the title of this post, you can be pretty sure that your life is going to be good.

Incidentally, she is also currently fourth in line for the throne, quite an accomplishment for someone who isn't potty trained yet.  In the United States, that spot in the Presidential succession belongs to Secretary of State and former Presidential candidate John Kerry.

Third in line to the British throne is His Royal Highness Prince George, who is not yet preschool aged.  The comparable post in the U.S. Presidential succession is held by Senator Orrin Hatch, a grumpy seventy-one year old man from Utah.

Then again, the U.S. has never had to dip further the the first place spot in the line of succession (Vice President) its entire history since 1776, and there are two adults: Prince Charles and Prince William, in line before Prince William's children.

Few Roman Emperors Collected Their Pensions

A detailed summary of the manner in which the emperors of the Roman Empire died makes clear a fundamental flaw in the Roman political system, at least insofar as the emperors were considered.  (Hat Tip to Enik Rising).

Is North Korea A Monarchy?

Kim Il Sung founded North Korea as a country and regime out of the ashes of World War II occupation of Korea by Japan and the process of new state formation that ultimately led to the Korean war, one of the first "hot" conflicts of the Cold War. There is a cease fire in that conflict but not a true peace treaty.

Kim Il Sung, who ruled that hard line one party Communist state as a dictator in a cult of personality, was succeeded by Kim Jong Il who ruled for seventeen years until his death, also as a dictator in a cult of personality.

Now, the heir apparent to rule North Korea is Kim Jong Un, the third son of Kim Il Sung, although the transfer of power has not been confirmed.

Assuming that Kim Jong Un does take power as an absolute dictator, like his two predecessors, at what point do we start to acknowledge the status of North Korea as a monarchy rather than a communist regime?

There are residual communist one party state frameworks for the regime, but these seem to have been increasingly withered in favor of a cult of personality that deifies the ruler.

Of course, there is also the question of how Kim Jong Un, a Swiss educated basketball fan who is by most accounts a serious, intelligent young man might choose to take his country out of the dark ages, where it lingers in autarky, backwardness, fear, and privation. The only comparable European example was the communist regime of Albania, which is now struggling to remark itself in a Western parliamentary capitalist mold, despite mishaps along the way.

Might Kim Jong Un see the path of constitutional monarchy, followed by Japan and Thailand, as attractive? Would he be willing to cede power to democractic elections by a polity so stripped of civil society and democratic instincts that it is hard to know if it would be even possible to recreate a democracy in that mold? Might he work towards reunification with South Korea?

His people might not know that the regime he is inheriting is profoundly backward, but he does, and surely have given considerable thought to what he would do if he was in charge. It is also entirely possible that there could be a coup of some kind by the real powerbrokers in the regime, for example, in the military.

This may seem like a mere academic exercise, but when a regime has nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, as well as submarines it has shown a willingness to use against its neighbors in recent history, the outcome matters, no matter how out of whack its parameters may be.

People Trust The Military More Than Politicians

The conventional wisdom (for good reason) in political science circles is that military regimes are bad and regimes run by elected civilian politicians are good. Yet, in the United States, widely viewed as one of the most mature, stable democracies in the world, the percentage of people who trust the military is 46 percentage points greater than the percentage who distrust the military, while the percentage who distrust Congress is 49 percentage points greater than the percentage who trust Congress.

Congress is trusted by 8% and distrusted by 57%, the military is trusted by 54% and distrusted by 8%. The percentage who trust and distrust the courts is about equal with state courts distrusted by a net two percentage points, while the Supreme Court is trusted by a net three percentage points. Net distrust of local government (14 percentage points) is less than net distrust of state government (20 percentage points) which in turn is less than net distrust of the federal government (37 points). Americans have equal net distrust of religious institutions and public schools (16 points). People say they distrust banks just as much as they distrust the federal government.

There are few social institutions other than the military and the Supreme Court that Americans have net trust for, they are (from most to least trusted, all between the Supreme Court and the military): Small and local companies, the scientific community, and charitable institutions.

The big changes since last year’s poll were a 16% increase in the spread for the military, a 12% increase in the spread (meaning greater confidence) for big business and the Supreme Court, a 9% increase in the spread for banks and charities, and a 7% decrease in the spread (meaning lesser confidence) for Congress.

At what point do people decide that they simply trust the military more than politicians and cede democracy? Or, is it actually the job that the various institutions do rather than who they are, that matters?

In the age of posse comitatus and no draft, the military is pretty harmless to the average person and doesn't make discretionary decisions that matter to us (it doesn't even decide whether or not to fight which wars for how long), even though it reports to the unpopular Congress and unpopular President that have the unpopular jobs of imposing and collecting taxes (respectively) to support it, and despite the fact that it is by far the largest part of the unpopular federal government (the Department of Defense and Veteran's Administration employ more civilians than the rest of the federal government put together in addition to the soldiers it employs). Congress, in contrast, has vast discretionary power, and hence is to be feared.

Maybe it is nuts, but shouldn't popularly elected political institutions be at least a little more popular in a democracy which is seemingly an institution that selected politicians on popularity more than any other?

Monarchies and Theocracies

There are only ten self-styled monarchies in the world that are national, hereditary, and have genuine political power. There are seventeen more monarchs who are national hereditary monarchs, who have an overwhelmingly symbolic role with real power vested in a democratic government. The Pope, the Supreme Leader of Iran, and one of the co-princes of Andorra arguably fit the model of theocracy. The only women in this group are Queen Elizabeth II, Queen Margrethe II of Denmark, and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.

Many of the places with monarchies, with or without genuine power, and two of the three arguable theocracies, are mere city-states or postage stamp countries with little more territory that a decent sized U.S. county, small populations, and dependent relationships on nearby sovereign states.

All but one of the monarchies where the monarch has genuine political power, and Iran, the only significant sized theocracy, are Islamic. Most of these monarchies rely on oil wealth to maintain their supremacy. Swaziland is the only non-Islamic monarchy with genuine political power.

The shrinkage is notable, given the fact that less than two hundred years ago monarchs with genuine political power were the modal for of government in the world, and less than five hundred years ago you could count the number of democracies in the world on your fingers.

Yet, there is a case to be made that nations with constitutional monarchies have fared better than purely republican governments, by providing a unifying symbol and smoothing over moments of constitutional crisis. It is notable that none of the absolutist regimes to fall in North Africa and the Middle East in the last few months have been monarchies, which suggests that the legitimacy conferred by a monarchy may have practical value to a regime. Some of these monarchies, such as Jordan's King, have, however, taken steps to liberalize democratic components of their regimes. The West has pushed for decades, mostly to deaf ears, for the few remaining monarchies in which a monarch has genuine political power to cede more power to democratic forces via constitutional monarchy. There are other non-democratic governments in the world, of course, but most of pure dictators.

Hereditary Constitutional Monarchs

There are seventeen purely symbolic constitutional monarchs who a monarchs of thirty-two countries and their dependent territories, excluding the three countries discussed under theocracy in this post, and excluding some subnational constitutional monarchs of Africa and Asia (these exist or have existed in relatively recent times, in parts of Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa). There were also, in recent history, territorial leaders who amounted to monarchs in parts of Northwestern Pakistan who are not considered.

Queen Elizabeth II, whose second in line to the throne grandson William is scheduled to marry Kate Middleton this Friday is the constitutional monarch of sixteen different countries, some outside Europe, an almost entirely symbolic role. The nine other almost purely symbolic constitutional monarchs of Europe are King Albert II of Belgium, Queen Margrethe II of Denmark, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (population 34,761; 62 square miles), Grand Duke Henri of Luxembourg (population 491,775; 998 square miles), Prince Albert II of Monaco (population 32,965; 1 square mile), Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands (population 16,715,999; 16,033 square miles), King Harald of Norway, King Juan Carlos I of Spain (population 40,525,002; 194,897 square miles), and King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden.

These monarchs have a presence in the Americas in Canada, Greenland, Belize, and a number of Caribbean island dependencies of European countries.

There are six Asian symbolic constitutional monarchs: King Jigme Khesar Namgyel of Bhutan, King Norodom Sihamoni of Cambodia, Emperor Akihito of Japan, King Mizan Zainal Abidin of Malyasia (elected for a limited term as premier king out of pool of regional hereditary monarchies of Malaysia), King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand (population 65,905,410; 198,457 square miles) and King Siaosi Tupou V of Tonga (population 120,898; 289 square miles).

There is one African symbolic constitutional monarch, King Letsie III of Lesotho (population 2,130,819; 1,720 square miles), a small landlocked state surrounded entirely by South Africa.

In practice, all of the symbolic constitutional monarchies are republics with elected officials who hold real political power. In each of these, the elected government, if supported by a popular referendum, could in practice, become monarchies in a bloodless or near bloodless change of form of government.

Genuine Monarchs

There are ten monarchs in the world (excluding six subnational monarchs in these monarchies) with genuine political power, many of which rule only tiny states.

There are two African monarchs with genuine political power: King Mswati III of Swaziland (population 1,123,913; 6,704 square miles) carved out of South Africa on its border with Mozambique, and King Mohammed VI of Morocco (population 34,859,364; 172,414 square miles).

There is one East Asian monarch with genuine political power: Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, a tiny nation that is basically a city-state (population 388,190; 2,228 square miles) on the island of Borneo that is entirely surround by Malaysia and also shares the island with Indonesia.

The remaining seven monarchs with genuine political power are found on the Arabian Pennisula: King Hamad ibn Isa of Bahrain (population 727,785; 257 square miles), King Abdullah II of Jordan (population 6,342,948; 35,637 square miles), Emir Sabah al-Ahmad of Kuwait (population 2,691,158; 6,880 square miles), Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman (population 3,418,085; 82,031 square miles), Emir Hamad bin Khalifa of Qatar (population 833,285; 4416 square miels), King Abdullah bin Abdul‘aziz of Saudi Arabia (population 28,686,633; area 830,000 square miles), and President Khalifa bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates (population 4,798,491; 32,278 square miles). The United Arab Emirates also has six other subnational Emirs, but the post of leading Emir does not rotate as it does the premier kingship in Malaysia.

The territory ruled by these seven Arabian monarchs in contiguous. Saudi Arabia, is by far the largest geographically, has by far the largest population of this group, has the most powerful military of the group, has shown that at least one of the others (Bahrain) is dependent upon it by militarily propping it up earlier this year, has the most aggregate wealth, and is home to the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Collectively, they control all of the Arabian Pennisula except Yemen. Sucession in Saudi Arabia is not strictly hereditary - a monarch is chosen by the royal family collectively from a group of men closely related to the King, rather than by automatic succession to a particular individual. This may be the case in some of the other monarchies of the region.

All of the monarchs with genuine political power are men.

In addition, North Korea, by virtue of an imminent second successive father to son transfer of power as an absolute dictatorship, comes close to being a monarchy where the monarch has genuine political power in practice, despite the fact that this has not been how the regime has chosen to characterize itself so far.

Theocracies

Vatican City (population 826, 0.17 square miles) under the rule of Pope Benedict XVI, and Iran under Shi'ite cleric and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are the only theocracies in the world, defined as states in which significant sovereign temporal power resides in a non-hereditary religious leadership. Both of them are men.

The Pope has absolute power when living although he is expected to stay within the boundaries of a nearly two thousand year old religious tradition and under a collective church leadership between the death of one Pope and the election of another by a college of Cardinals. The Pope's authority over Vatican City is a minor part of his overall responsibilities as leader of the Roman Catholic Church, and Vatican City, in practice, exists only with the consent and cooperation of the government of the Italian Republic that surrounds it.

Iran has an elected unicameral legislature and an elected President and parliament, selected in elections that are not free and fair, and are subject to significant religious and political interference through limitations on those who are eligible to be candidates, restrictions on speech and debate, and tampering with election results. But, Iran's elections are also not those of an absolutely dictatorial state in which there is only a single choice that is a foregone conclusion for every political office. The Supreme Leader controls the military, the police, the judiciary, the state owned media, war and peace level foreign affairs, and half of a Council of Guardians that controls ballot access and acts of a constitutional court with a constitution that incorporates Islamic law. The Supreme Leader also appoints an Assembly of Experts made up of clerics who theoretically are a check on the Supreme Leaders authority with the power to remove him from office and direct his decisions, and in fact are little more than a Shi'ite College of Cardinals or a corporate board of directors. Arguably, Iran's Supreme Leader who has held power since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that deposed the Shah is simply a dictator or elective monarch in the mold of a President for Life who has devolved some political power. The Supreme Leader does not clearly seem to have a hereditary successor in mind.

There are other states with established religions that have significant power, but in all of the others there is a secular leadership with far more predominant power than in Vatican City and Iran.

Arguably Andorra (population 83,888; 181 square miles) which is ruled in name by Archbishop Joan Enric Vives Sicília and French President Nicolas Sarkozy as Co-Princes, neither hereditary and symbolically only, fits the bill of a theocracy as well, but it is really a unique arrangement, that is closest to a constitutional monarchy in practice.

Other Non-Democratically Ruled Areas

There are many dictators in the world, some of whom are relatives of the prior dictators, who do not claim monarch status and are not as close to a de facto monarchy as North Korea.

There are also many countries which formally have some form of Republic that are neither entirely democratic with free and fair elections and a secure rule of law, nor entirely dicatorial and authoritarian. These flawed democracies rule much of the world's territory and population. Some like China, are one party states where power is not totally concentrated in a supreme leader and there is non-hereditary succession, but there are strong restrictions on political activity. Others are democracies acting in the shadow of military authority that poses a genuine check and influence on the elected officials who formally rule, countries in the process of transitioning to new democratic regimes (e.g. South Sudan and Egypt), and countries organized on a republican basis with elections but not free and fair ones.

There are also many colonies and dependencies and territories of otherwise democratic regimes that lack democratic self-government or full democratic self-government.

Finally, there are a few pockets of the world, such as parts of Somolia today, and parts of Afghanistan prior to 2002, that are effectively stateless, because no governmental arrangement, other than illegitimate petty warlords, has authority in a particular area.