How We Got Here, And Where We Might Go Next

Proximately, the U.S. is in a bad way because Trump and MAGA secured a federal trifecta and also control the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the governmental apparatus of many states, because our laws do too little to discourage the concentration of economic power.

Political theory seeks to explain what factors in the complex political economy we live in led to this situation.

This post surveys some of the possible answers.

An institutionalist approach

An institutionalist approach is a social engineering outlook on why political systems work or do not work. It takes as an axiom the belief that the right rules and systems and organizations more or less directly produce good political economy outcomes, so reforming existing institutions is the path to a better political economy. 

This is closely aligned with a notion that the rule of law is the key to a good society, something that is an article of faith in "Western culture" (with its roots in Western Europe) and is widely rejected in "Eastern culture" (with its roots in China).

Fundamentally Broken Institutions

The U.S. Constitution, other key laws, and important institutions of political and civic society (like political parties and the media) are broken. There are deep design flaws with the status quo that can't right itself without decisive, and indeed, perhaps revolutionary change in our institutions.

Common reform proposals in this approach are campaign finance reform, gun control, abolition of the electoral college, expansion of the franchise, proportional representation electoral systems or ranked choice voting, better procedural rules within legislative institutions, improved methods of selecting judges and other key public officials, tweaked checks and balances (like a unicameral legislature, a conversion from a Presidential to a parliamentary system, laws prohibiting corrupt practices enforced by effective enforcement agencies, and so on.

Imperfect, But Fundamentally Sound Institutions

The U.S. Constitution, related key laws, and important institutions of political and civic society (like political parties and the media) are flawed but are not fundamentally broken. These institutions are robust enough to eventually right the ship of our political economy, even though they aren't as fool proof and rapid as we'd like.

Really bad Presidents produce electoral backlash and encourage more competent people who otherwise would pursue careers other than politics to resist bad political leaders, which puts us back on track. But this feedback mechanism can't react much sooner than every couple of years, can't prevent serious abuses and failings, and often takes decades. Lessons learned in the last crisis are forgotten until we pay the price for forgetting those lessons again. In worst case scenarios, it can take long insurgencies or wars or full on Great Depressions to trigger support for the necessary reforms.

Bad high court judges need to be threatened with court packing to overcome their biases. Legal scholars seeing legal doctrines producing bad results propose new legal theories. New political parties need to replace old ones much like the GOP replaced the Whigs. People come to realize that voting for openly corrupt liars and criminals is maybe not such a good idea.

Culture

The main counterpart to an institutionalist approach to the success of a political economy (which has strong parallels in the economic development literature), observation that laws and institutions that are identical in all material respects can produce wildly different results, when people who are culturally different utilize these institutions.

This approach concludes that the character, morals, norms, and values of the people who use the institutions profoundly influence the quality of the political economy outcomes that a society produces, while the particulars of the institutional arrangements put in place to facilitate management of the political economy aren't particularly important within a fairly finite set of combinations of big choices in institutions.

Differences between the success of parliamentary systems and Presidential systems, in this view, have more to do with the political culture of the people utilizing those systems than with the inherent, universal virtues of different reasonable sets of institutions and rules. 

There may be some sets of institutions and rules that usually led to bad outcomes, but people with a good political culture can make any remotely reasonable set of institutions produce good outcomes, while people with a political culture ill-suited to their demands of their current circumstances will find a way to break any set of institutions and rules, no matter how expertly crafted.

The optimal political culture is also not universal. In times of economic hardship and scarce resources which give rise to weak states, cultures of honor, clan based societies, cousin marriage, and systems that reward might over right may be more functional. In times of economic abundance that facilitate the rise of strong states, more atomized social structure, meritocracy, forgiveness, out marriage, and systems that reward truth over power may be more functional.

For example, one way to explain the rise of Christianity in the Greco-Roman classical era is that Christianity was a tool of cultural change that helped a society that was becoming more abundant, more urban, and more mercantile transition managed by a strong state, and away from a Greco-Roman pagan culture more suited to rural living, herding, and tradition based allocations of resources, in small and weak states. The expansion of the Islamic empire likewise involved a massive cultural change from a decadent and disorganized society without strong state management in the post-Roman era to a society with more firm and decisive, yet decentralized leadership that functioned well in the absence of Western Roman Empire type institutions.

This cultural-first approach to political theory is closely aligned with a notion that rule by good and moral leaders is the key to a good society, something that is an article of faith in "Eastern culture" (with its roots in Chinese Confucianism) and is widely rejected in "Western culture" (with its roots in Western Europe), where the "rule of man" is synonymous with authoritarianism, corruption, and arbitrary treatment of people.

Malleable culture

One version of a cultural approach to political economy sees a society's political culture as harder to change in many respects than institutional rules, but feasible with measures like widespread public education, religious conversion or deconversion, and grass roots activism through "movement politics" over decades. And, while this takes longer to accomplish than institutional rule changes, it is almost more robust and enduring.

A malleable culture theory concludes that while the relative political leanings of groups and geographic regions with different cultures are persistent over time periods measured in centuries, that societal progress is attainable over time. Yesterday's segregationists become today's advocates of a color blind society without affirmative action. Yesterday's corporal punishment advocates become today's advocates of large fines and long sentences of incarceration. 

In absolute terms, society gradually abandons specific practices and norms that are conservative or backward at the time, while the descendants of people who held those specific practices and norms come to adopt views that were liberal in the times of their ancestors and are conservative now. But the descendants of the liberal leaning ancestors in turn, become even more progressive.

Even proponents of malleable culture approaches to political economy acknowledge that the process can be two steps forward and one step back. But ultimately, technology and the accumulation of knowledge and fundamental, universal human impulses that are masked by different immediate material conditions point humanity in the same general direction in the long terms (although there are shorter and longer routes to progress), so we progress more often than we regress.

Static culture

In contrast, a view that culture at an ethnic group or geographic area scale is predominantly static, even if isolated and exceptional individuals can change their cultures, see mass movements and programs to change a society's culture intentionally as largely futile.

It isn't that this view believes that the culture of a particular geographic area can't change. But, it sees the main mechanism for a change in the culture of a particular geographic area to be replacement of people of one ethnicity or mix of ethnicities with people of another ethnicity or group of ethnicities.

In this view, some of the main mechanisms of cultural change are colonization by people of a different ethnicity, genocide (through forcible abandonment of culture, actually murder, restrictions on fertility, or economic marginalization), immigration, and differential rates of births and deaths between ethnicities, with these mechanisms being particularly strong among men, while women more easily assimilate into new cultures in which they find themselves. This is also a more zero sum worldview. Flavored with ideas about ethnic or religious or cultural superiority, this can morph into righteous missionary zeal, ethnic nationalism and/or religious nationalism.

Along the same lines, languages associated with dominant cultures tend to increase their market share of language speakers in a society, while languages associated with economically marginal ethnicities tend to decrease their market share of language speakers in a society, in both cases at a pace measured primarily in generations, rather than within the lives of individual speakers of a language.

This outlook was heavily disfavored in the 1960s and 1970s in the Western world (under the motto that pots are not people), but has enjoyed a resurgence as research into ancient DNA, historical linguistics, and physical archaeology have been synthesized in a manner that has reviewed that over time frames of centuries and millennia, that these mechanism of demic change have been far more common than culture change through intercultural contact and elite dominance. Admittedly, there have been notable exceptions to this general trend (e.g. the linguistic transition of the country now known as Hungary, or the Brahui people, or the expansion of the Islamic empire, or the rise of Christianity). But cultural transition without demic change has been the exception rather than the norm.

This outlook on political economy, for example, perceives Zionism and the formation of new West Bank settlements in Israel, or ethnically and religiously motivated raids by Sahel Muslims from traditionally herding societies in Africa on Christian/animist communities to their immediate South, from a very different worldview framework than a worldview in which institutional approaches or malleable cultural views are the norm.

More generally, a political theory bent rooted in the worldview that culture is predominantly static, particularly when fused with the concepts of economic and environmentally driven cultural change discussed below, tends to see political tactics that "civilized society" condemns most intensely, as largely inevitable and natural, even if it is not morally desirable at an individual level.

Political worldviews and theories that emphasis the static nature of culture at the group and regional level are more sanguine about the inevitability of progress than those which see culture as malleable. These worldviews tend to see cultural progress as exceptions to the general rule that require specific and rarely recurring conditions, rather than as a universal law or inevitability.

Environmentally determined culture

A premise which is widely accepted in anthropology, but less widely accepted in political theory, is that people's material conditions determine which cultures are optimal for those conditions.

While no culture is inherently better than any other in a vacuum, in any given set of circumstances, some cultures are more functional than others.

Plough based agriculture tends to favor patriarchy and patrilocal clan systems. Hoe based agriculture and hunter-gatherer societies can tend to favor matriarchal social structures, with households often led by brother-sister couples rather than households led by monogamous co-parent households. 

Affluent, urban societies, without low rates of childhood morality that rely on skilled labor that takes many years of investment in human capital tend to favor small family households; poor, rural societies, with high rates of childhood mortality that rely on unskilled labor tend to favor large family households. 

Weak states tend to favor cultures of honor, and clan based social organization. Strong states tend to favor a focus on individual autonomy, meritocracy, rule based justice, and weaker extended family ties. 

Perceptions of economic scarcity and uncertainty favor conservatism and societies where religion and/or superstition are important. Perceptions of economic abundance and security favor secular, liberal societies that rely on science rather than superstition.

Perceptions of economic decline or stagnation of an ethnicity or geographic group or social class, and societies where the economy is heavily reliant upon economic rents like land ownership or fossil fuel resources, can further fascism, far-right movements, ethnic and religious nationalist movements, and support for authoritarianism. Shared prosperity in a society where the economy depends heavily on a diffuse class of merchants, professionals, and skilled labor rather than natural resources, in contrast, tend to further democracy, an absence of corruption, respect for individual rights, and tolerance for diversity.

Cultures ill-suited to their conditions decline, due to both conversion to better suited cultures and economic and demographic decline. Cultures well-suited to their conditions thrive. Conversely, religious institutions that support threatened cultures tend to thrive, while religious institutions associated with establishment, secure, dominant cultures tend to wither despite the fact that the communities that they serve tend to have more economic resources.

The notion that culture is economically or environmentally determined is relatively agnostic about whether culture is malleable or static, with their very different mechanisms and tactics that give rise to cultural change.

Synthesis

Of course, none of these political theories is 100% true. 

Even a strong culture oriented political theorists who takes a hard look at all the data will acknowledge that institutions and rules can matter, and can shape culture. You can see this particularly clearly when looking at the divergent paths taken by North Korea and South Korea, by Taiwan and mainland China, by East Germany and West Germany prior to unification and persisting in regional culture differences in the thirty-seven years that have elapsed since unification, even though the highly distinct institutions in these places that once shared a common culture including a political culture arose only about eighty years ago or less, in these cases.

On the other hand, scholarly works like Albion's Seed, and studies of persistent regional cultural differences in Germany (that predate the formation of a unified Germany state about 150 years ago), also establish that once regional or ethnic cultures are established, they are remarkably resilient in the face of institutional change and political unification, and can persist for centuries.

If you were to guess how politicians in the late 1700s and early 1800s in newly formed U.S. states leaned politically relative to each other on major groups of political issues like being pro-war or anti-war, or on economic or social issues, based upon the current political leanings of those states, you would overwhelming be correct 250 years plus or minus a few decades later.

The Catholic-Protestant divisions of Europe have been mostly static for the entire early modern period that started with the Protestant Reformation in the 1500s that were decided based upon the decisions of late stage feudal lords to choose one side or the other of this divide in European Christianity. And, those religious divisions, as famously noted by Max Weber in the 19th century, are associated with a whole suite of larger cultural divides epitomized by what he called the "Protestant work ethic."

Persistent culture divisions whose effects predominate in places where different cultures function within the same formal political institutions, like divisions in economic prosperity and political economy between regions dominated by different ethnic groups in Nigeria, whose characteristic cultures and cultural identities pre-date the relatively recent conversion of southern Nigeria to Christianity across a wide variety of diverse ethnicities starting in the 19th century or so, are still very real (even though many formal statistics on African immigrants to the U.S. aren't so fine grained and don't make these distinctions in their record keeping mask these differences).

In India, genetic testing has confirmed the anthropologically well-documented phenomena of caste endogamy and inequalities, pin pointing the time frame, centuries ago, when endogamous caste divisions at the jati level started to harden upon which historical accounts from those time periods were inconclusive and scarce, and eighty years of Indian independence with egalitarian institutions and ideals have only modestly dented the resilient cultural juggernaut of caste divides. Genetic studies also establish the time frame of the much older origins of varna level caste/ethnic divisions within India and help establish more clearly the magnitude, timing, and nature of introgression of people from one varna into another one.

Particularly in my own personal world and my own country, I am well aware that I instinctually lean towards institutional explanations and solutions, and that I also tend to favor malleable culture worldviews over static culture worldviews, to a greater degree than that evidence available to me supports.

How We Got Here

Each of these political theories naturally lends itself to a different narrative about how we go here, and the deeper driving factors behind the proximate causes of our woes.

Environmental determinism points to technological changes and human driven climate changes as the source of structural economic changes and changes to the U.S. social structure and social class system that has shunted the benefits of economic growth to an educated upper middle class serving a thin veneer of old money and new money billionaires and big businesses, and while reducing the less educated whom the modern economy has little use for, from a broad unifying middle class that has a stake in our society to a working class and underclass. The upper middle class has small stable prosperous families, while the working class is seeing their families fall apart despite having as many or more children, and their prospects for social mobility or comfort without generational wealth and social capital fading. The upper middle class has become far more secular, while comparatively the working class has remained more religious despite its long term trend away from religion as well.

The neo-fascist MAGA movement is, in this analysis, a natural consequence of two generations of economic stagnation for the non-college educated working class.

Static cultural worldviews emphasize the fact that there is a straight line from antebellum Southern whites to the KKK and Jim Crow and segregation supporters and American Nazis prior to WWII to opponents of the civil rights movement to MAGA.

Malleable cultural worldviews emphasize the fact that far right political viewholders skew heavily towards older white men while younger generations are much more liberal on a wide variety of issues. They note that the divorce between the MAGA worldview and reality is the product of intentional propaganda by billionaire class funded conservative media outlets like Fox News, conservative think tanks, talk radio, and fundamentalist Christians and Christian clergy who are wary of reality based inquiry because it undermines their religious doctrines, and can be reversed with carefully crafted interventions to deprogram MAGA adherents.

Institutionalists who see the system as fundamentally broken see the proximate causes of our woes as more directly caused by particular flaws in our Microsoft of political systems which was state of the art in the late 1700s, but had rules that didn't benefit from the next couple of centuries of experience with democratic political institutions which addressed the inherent flaws in our own system which the Founders, not being omniscient, and with their own narrow franchise and biases could not have foreseen. The trouble is, that if indeed, our Institutions are fundamentally and deeply broken, there is no clear path to fixing them.

Institutionalists who see the system as flaws but fundamentally sound, in contrast, acknowledge that the flaws in our system have prevented our political system from preventing or more swiftly ending the MAGA scourge. But they are more optimistic and stoic. In an analog to the idea that suppressing all wildfires can make a forest more vulnerable to more devastating big wildfires, or to the hygienic hypothesis that an environment that is too sterile and devoid of threats can lead to autoimmune diseases and allergies because the immune system didn't have a chance to do its job non-pathologically, they argue that as unpleasant as it is at the time, healthy political economies need periodic threats to its values so that the people served by them remain vigilant in developing a combination of institutions and political cultures that can defeat even strong threats to their health.

People never exposed to fraud become too trusting and become easy marks (something that is a big problem in the overall high trust society of Mormon Utah). Politicians who grow too used to playing nice with their political opponents forget the tactics that their predecessors used to win when their political opponents didn't play fair. 

A near miss constitutional crisis of our political economy with fascism and authoritarianism, with an scary dose of corruption and lies, may be what it takes to build broad enough support to fix the most important institutional flaws in the status quo, much like the U.S. did in the New Deal, and again in the 1960s and 1970s.

Institutionalists who see the "bones" of U.S. political institutions as fundamentally sound will note that the U.S. system has been good enough to last 250 years including multiple comparably bad or worse political crises, like those leading up to, during, and following the U.S. Civil War. And, they see the gridlock and shifting political coalitions that have predominated in the time frame from the 1980s to the present, as a feature rather than a bug, by preventing thin majorities from making big and bold political changes in the absence of widespread, bipartisan, cross-ethnic, cross-regional support. Our federal system funnels paths to innovations to the states and refrains from making big changes until with the passage of time, some approaches are widely understood to be desirable, and other approaches are seen as failures. And, like the seventy year plus era of doctrinaire communism in Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia, on one side, and mixed capitalism in the "West" and some Western leaning East Asian nations, this deadlock can seem completely intractable and static, until sudden it collapses, with Eastern European communism collapsing in just a few years, and Asian communism more resiliently adopting market-style reforms to the point where it has become communism in name only with billionaire capitalists holding all positions of power in these one party states.

We saw something similar leading up to the abolition of slavery in the United States. This issue divided the new republic for eight-five years from its inception right up until 1861, only for slavery to be formally abolished four years later all at once, in turn followed after a brief reconstruction interlude, with another eight-five years of so of Jim Crow, only for that institution to in turn collapse over the course of about a decade when it had seemed in 1950 that Jim Crown might persist eternally. Sixty years after the Civil Rights movement had achieved most of its major objectives, MAGA is trying its best to undo the reforms of the civil rights era in a last dying eruption of a movement that know that democracy will mean its death as socially and economically regressive Baby Boomers, some of whom were born in the era of segregated water fountains, bathrooms, and schools, die and reduce their share of the electorate only to be replaced by liberal Generations Z and Alpha in the electorate for whom racial diversity is second nature and is their generation's reality.

Trump has been a racist all of his life, just like his Nazi father. Joe Biden came around later in his political career, but got started in Congress on a platform of opposition to school desegregation in Delaware. Many of the leaders in Congress, and especially in the U.S. Senate, are from that same generation and still wear ideological and worldview boots of clay developed in their politically formative years.

Eventually, however, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, dementia, COVID, geriatric falls, and the like will do the job of replacing them with the next generation of politicians, that Baby Boomers have prevented from happening in the ordinary course as it should have a couple of decades ago.

The midterms in 2026 could end the GOP's trifecta control of the federal government and reducing the bleeding that our national institutions and esteem on the global stage have been suffering. Ideally, its defeat could be crippling enough to lead to the GOP's replacement with some new center-right opposition party that starts over after MAGA has burned all of the GOP's bridges and poisoned the well with several younger generations. Democrats could take the Presidency in 2028 with majorities not seen in recent memory and a commitment to play hardball after the horrors of Trump 2.0, and make enough major reforms to put the U.S.A. on track again with wide consensus backing, even though it may take decades to undo the damage done by Trump already that is not irreparable. And, if that happens, the Institutionalists who believe that flawed as it is, that the U.S. political system is not broken beyond all repair, will be vindicated. The fact that the U.S. has weathered past crises makes this a far from unlikely scenario, and the optimist in my wants to hope that they are right. Polling leading up to the midterms that are barely more than five months away, suggest that they might be right. 

While MAGA stayed loyal during Trump 1.0, his more radical Trump 2.0 term has finally seen Trump's steadfast support start to erode and has seen some prominent GOP/MAGA leaders, like Marjorie Taylor Green, break ranks with him.

What Happens If We Don't Escape And End Up In A Deeper Circle of Hell?

I want to believe that they are right, because the alternatives are very dark indeed. If Democrats can't do this over the next three years or so, because its institutions are too badly broken to return the nation to a positive path, all of the paths before us are nightmares.

One need look no further than North Korea, Cuba, Albania until the fall of communism, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, East Germany, the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the slave states of the U.S. prior to the U.S. Civil War, to observe that the fact that a regime is authoritarian, undemocratic, and performs dismally economically in its non-natural resource sector, and faces significant sustained pressure from  the international community to reform, does not mean that these regimes are fragile or vulnerable to prompt collapse. Eventually, many of these regimes did collapse. But it took an entire lifetime or so to do fall, and more often than not it took an international military intervention (or at least a costly cold war interspersed with periodic hot proxy wars) to make it happen.

The U.S. is to big and militarily powerful for a turn for the worse to be cured with a foreign military invasion of the U.S. to liberate us any time soon. 

If one of the darker scenarios has developed in the U.S. by 2028 or 2030, it is entirely possible that the U.S. will degenerate into a full fledged malevolent dictatorship and remain in that state until sometime in the early twenty-second century. 

This dark era for the U.S. could possibly punctuated by an ugly and deadly military insurgency, and waves of assassinations, asymmetric warfare, sabotage, and non-violent resistance that persists as long as Afghanistan has been in a state of near continual war since the 1970s, that may only end or at least subside when it is put down with brutal ruthless efficiency that scars our nation with horrors we have yet to imagine like the annihilation of every soul in a whole liberal leaning rebellious metropolitan area like Minneapolis, rather than a mere attempted ICE and National Guard driven show of force. The Handmaid's Tale was meant to be a warning and not a prophecy, but there is no certainty that it won't turn out to be one.

There are happier paths that one could imagine, like a bloodless coup that is followed by a new covenant that replaces our existing political and economic institutions, if the existing ones don't solve the problem in the next three year or so, that reboot our nation in some manner or another, or a wave of blue state successions, that leaves unsubsidized red state America in a state of total economic collapse, and followed by reform or reunification.

One could also imagine something like the experience of the Romans, who first transformed from a genuine Republic, to a more flawed Republic, to a truly non-democratic empire, stuttering from crisis to crisis, with bandaid temporary political fixes that don't last, punctuated with emperors like Nero and Caligula, who are still remembered about two thousand years later for their perfidy and insanity. Trump could end up being a model for future corrupt, authoritarian, delusional demagogues who are equally bad, but even less restrained by the democratic actions of the electorate or the courts or federalism or military independence, than Trump 2.0 which is actually exploring every avenue to end these constraints upon it.

Some of these nightmares seem almost unthinkable now, after the imperfect and slow mechanisms and institutions for slowing down Trump and MAGA's destruction of the federal government and everything good in the United States of America finally started to kick in. But the United States doesn't get three strikes. If the midterms to provide a decisive and effective check on Trump 2.0 in what has so far been a Congress that has ceded its responsibilities, we'll be lucky to get a federal election at all in 2028, and if there is one then, it will probably be less free and less fair (despite the fact that Republicans are pulling out all stops to undermine the regularity of the 2026 elections and to persecute Trump's enemies with no regard to the law or any notion of anything greater than Trump's momentary whims).

If Americans, collectively, fail to decisively interrupt its current course in either 2026 or 2028, we're pretty much done. Democracy and democratic values and the rule of law and civil liberties will be no more, and there will be no way back within the confined of legal political action or even civil disobedience. The U.S. is too big, and too culturally divided to secure the final turnabout that ousted a far right authoritarian regime in Hungary earlier this year.

Those who can will become political refugees, much like the scientists who fled Germany when the Nazis came to power, and fled the Soviet Union as it grew ever more oppressive. Those who can't will suffer, or sell their souls for petty subordinate power at the whim of some unsteady dictator (probably not Trump for long, given his ill-health and age, but possibly some successor who is equally evil but more competent).

U.S. Marriage Trends

In the African-American community in the U.S., these kinds of factors have led to fewer marriages, lots of female headed households, and lots of half-siblings. Working class whites and Hispanics in the U.S. have started to follow the same patterns.

Over the past half-century, U.S. four-year colleges have shifted from enrolling mostly men to enrolling mostly women, while the economic position of non-college men has weakened markedly. We examine how these changes correspond with the evolving structure of marriage markets across cohorts and places. 

As college men have become increasingly scarce, college women have maintained stable marriage rates by marrying high-earning non-college men. This shift—combined with the broader economic decline of non-college men—has sharply reduced the pool of economically stable partners available to non-college women: the share of non-college men who earn above the national median and are not married to college women has fallen by more than 50%. Cross-area evidence shows that education gaps in marriage are smaller where non-college men face lower rates of joblessness and incarceration. Taken together, the evidence suggests that deteriorating outcomes for men have primarily undermined the marriage prospects of non-college women.

from a new NBER working paper by Clara Chambers, Benjamin Goldman & Joseph Winkelmann.

Who Gets Into Ivy League Colleges?

We use anonymized admissions data from several colleges linked to income tax records and SAT and ACT test scores to study the determinants and causal effects of attending Ivy-Plus colleges (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago). 

Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. 

In contrast, children from high-income families have no admissions advantage at flagship public colleges. The high-income admissions advantage at Ivy-Plus colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, and (3) athletic recruitment. 

Using a new research design that isolates idiosyncratic variation in admissions decisions for waitlisted applicants, we show that attending an Ivy-Plus college instead of the average flagship public college increases students’ chances of reaching the top 1% of the earnings distribution by 50%, nearly doubles their chances of attending an elite graduate school, and almost triples their chances of working at a prestigious firm. 

The three factors that give children from high-income families an admissions advantage are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with post-college outcomes, whereas academic credentials such as SAT/ACT scores are highly predictive of post-college success.

That is from a new paper by Raj Chetty, David J. Deming, and John N. Friedman. One immediate conclusion is that standardized test scores help lower-income groups get into the best schools, compared to the alternatives.

From Tyler Cohen at Marginal Revolution. 

It is well known and consistent with experience that graduating from an Ivy-Plus college is a huge advantage over graduating from a flagship public university.

The fact that Ivy-Plus colleges favor legacies is well known. The fact that admissions favoritism for athletes disproportionately favors students from affluent families (often in obscure sports that students from less affluent families don't even encounter) is much less widely known. It is unsurprising, however, that neither of these factors (controlling for academics and Ivy-Plus admission) influence post-graduation outcomes much (or even hurt). 

It is also no surprise that non-academic credential are important for Ivy-Plus admission or that affluence is a plus in this department. But it is somewhat surprising that those non-academic credentials don't influence post-graduation outcomes much (or even hurt).

A few points that the abstract buries, however, are that SAT/ACT scores are moderately strongly correlated with socio-economic class, that SAT/ACT scores are strongly correlated with IQ (and are not ethnically biased), and that test preparation influences SAT/ACT score outcomes much less than most people (even people very familiar with the college application process) usually believe. See also here. As an aside:

ACT English + ACT Math are actually more predictive of college success and retention than the ACT Composite or the other two parts of the ACT that are more content based. In relative terms, here is how predictive each subsection of the ACT is:

Math (significant at p=0.01 level) 26

English (significant at p=0.01 level) 16

Reading (significant at p=0.05 level) 3

Science (not statistically significant) -1.

Race and ethnicity also influence Ivy-Plus admissions, although in ways rather more complicated than commonly assumed, and in a manner that is rapidly in flux at the moment in light of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.

None of this is terribly surprising, but it is a nice, compact analysis with a good methodology. It largely corroborates a similar study about two years ago. As a summary of that study explained:

About 7 percent of the country’s very top students come from the top 1 percent of the income distribution. These students tend to have scored at least 1500 on the SAT (or 35 on the ACT), received top marks on Advanced Placement tests, earned almost all A’s in their high school classes, and often excelled in science fairs or other competitions. . . . 

Perhaps the most surprising pattern involves so-called legacy students, those who attend the same college that their parents did. At the elite colleges that the researchers studied, legacy students had stronger academic qualifications on average than nonlegacy students. Similarly, graduates of private high schools had stronger academic records on average than graduates of public high schools or Catholic schools. 

* . . . About half of legacy students at these colleges would not be there without the admissions boost they receive.  

* A similar advantage applies to the graduates of private schools (not including religious schools). Schools like Andover, Brentwood and Dalton do such a good job of selling their students — through teacher recommendations, essay editing and other help — that colleges admit them more often than academic merit would dictate. Many college admissions officers think they can see through this polish, but they don’t.  

* Recruited athletes are admitted with much lower academic standards — and are disproportionately affluent. It’s not just true of the obvious teams, like golf, squash, fencing and sailing. In today’s era of expensive youth sports, most teams skew wealthy. If colleges changed their approach to sports, they could admit more middle-class and poor athletes (or nonathletes) with stronger academic credentials.

Most of these colleges do not admit only the hyper-qualified affluent students; they also admit many other high-income students. As I mentioned above, 7 percent of the country’s very best high school students come from the top 1 percent of the income distribution. But what proportion of students at elite colleges comes from the top 1 percent of the income distribution? Much more: 16 percent.

I didn't emphasize it when I wrote about this two years ago, but it also is worth observing that 84% of Ivy-Plus college students are not from families in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, although very few of them are truly poor (and if they are poor, they tend to have a very high socio-economic class and social capital despite their personal lack of affluence). This is less than the 93% it would be in a purely meritocratic system, but it is still the lion's share of these students.

Indeed, the colleges with the most affluent student bodies are not the Ivy-Plus schools, but slightly less selective elite liberal arts colleges, like Colby College in Maine and Colorado College in Colorado, that have relatively weak grant based financial aid resources.

The Witches Road (Only Minimal Spoilers)

"The Witches Road" (2025) by Kate Elliott, can be summed up as The Apothecary Diaries x Shannara x Kabaneri of the Iron Fortress. 

In typical Kate Elliott style, there is extensive world building that experiment with novel norms and social structures unfamiliar to many readers, there are richly developed characters, and cliche tropes and genre conventions are frequently turned on their head. 

It is part of a two book series, with the second volume to be released in November, and while it is not her magnum opus, something reserved for her seven volume pair of series in the Jaran universe, or her seven volume Crown of Stars series, it is still a very solid and immersive slow burn high brow fantasy romance in a lovingly crafted and fully realized world.

In this post-apocalyptic world, deadly instantly mutagenic spores associated with the "Pall" have enveloped huge swaths of land in a rigidly hierarchal empire with vague East Asian vibes. The empire is organized at almost every level to permit civilization to survive in the face of the scourge that is the Pall. It isn't entirely clear what lies beyond the oceans and the ocean-like barrier that is the Pall.

The part of the empire that we see, far from the emperor's palace in the heartland, is predominantly agricultural and organized around other primary industries like farming, herding, fishing, forestry, stone quarrying, and mining. The empire is a rigidly hierarchical, but intrigue filled, feudal society where aristocrats jockey for power united under a single emperor who has united all territory up to its natural boundaries. Many key professions like surveying, engineering, and serving as soldiers and as archivists, which one must enter something like a holy order at age seventeen, are also limited to children of aristocrats, above the level of servants assigned to support the professionals who may be commoners, although some professions, like couriers and midwives, need not be aristocrats, and meritocracy is creeping into upset the privileges of aristocratic rank within those professions. Education is limited mostly to aristocrats and the very promising commoner students of liberal aristocrats, with literacy being perhaps about as common as a college education was in the 1960s in the U.S. Themes of found family, sexual identity, servitude, child exploitation, overcoming trauma, and the role of single, adult, childless women in society, are explored in detail.

The empire has pre-industrial, roughly 17th to 18th century level technology (without gun powder, but with fairly easily available contraception and midwives that can safely assist women in obtaining abortions). It has steel, bows, crossbows, spy-glasses, portable fire starting kits, finely crafted clothing, precious metal coins (but not paper currency), accurate surveying and extensive written record keeping, carriages, Roman era grade plumbing and civil engineering, ships that can travel along ocean coasts, libraries but not printing presses, traveling theatrical companies, and significant amounts of travel and trade with all roads leading to the capital in the heartland. 

There are isolated elements present in the empire, like ancient triple towers of stone and a set of roads magically immune to spores and the Pall that are also conduits for telegram-like messages, which pre-date the empire and are associated with a legendary era associated in lore with ancient sorcerer-kings. Silk road style hostel-cities (also similar to inns along ancient roman roads), provided for when the roads were built, dot the ancient "witch roads" in enclaves that are also engineered to be free of the Pall and its spores if properly managed, although rural villages have far inferior defensive measures, and it isn't safe to travel at night due to spores, various forms and races of marauding bandits, and deadly wild animals. 

The current empire has a class of fairly modestly potent magic users under the strict control of the empire via its dominant religion, the Heart Temples, which is more pagan than quasi-Christian. But the people of the empire, who are apparently all nominally adherents to this religion, are not meaningfully more superstitious or religiously minded than their more magical than ours world warrants. Other, mostly lost and forgotten, magic exists as well.

While humans are predominant, their are minorities of several other sentient races - a race of indestructible giants that can read and write and understand human language but not speak it who go dormant at night, a race of three horned dwarves who ride wild cats in small groups through forests and sell themselves a mercenaries, a race of elf-like folk who can be hard to distinguish from humans broken into two hostile groups called the Sea Wolves and the Blood Wolves, and a more peaceful group known as Forest Wolves, and a couple of other sentient races who are mentioned by name in passing, but are not described or introduced in the first volume. Some of these humanoid minority races are refugees, sometimes more recently but often generations ago, from areas devastated by the Pall (as are, we eventually learn, our main character and her deceased sister). Aristocratic messengers riding griffins provide limited air mail service. A few kinds of fantasy creatures, as well as magically powered animal golems, fill the place of heavy machinery, for example, pulling fast carriages. The more advanced, prosperous, and magical days of the sorcerer-kings of legendary history also apparently had dragons and various kinds of powerful chimeric warriors.

The visible presence of, and attitudes towards, LGBT folks (several of whom are important or secondary characters) is comparable to that of the 21st century in the U.S. (with attitudes mixed between more liberal and more conservative aristocrats), although acceptance of concubinage, indentured servitude, roles of women, and the like are more or less in line with those of 17th-19th century East Asia albeit with gender equality approaching late 19th century to early 20th century Western levels or what is seen in modern Islamic countries, and attitudes towards psychology and appropriate interpersonal interactions to deal with people's emotions that are very modern.

Refreshingly, the main character is neither the 17 year old young man about to declare his profession, nor the handsome but arrogant prince who is second in line, together with his sister who is trying to undermine him, to the throne, after the incompetent and ill tempered young crown prince. Instead, it is the young man's 31 year old never married aunt who has served for ten years as a deputy courier, delivering messages by foot over a route that takes weeks to walk while keeping her eye open for spore outbreaks in order to stop them immediately before they get out of hand, and reporting generally on local conditions to the local junior aristocrat who runs the local way station along the imperial road and provides county-level type governmental supervision to the local rural villages.

Most of the characters, including our main character's sister who died a couple of years earlier in an avalanche while on bad terms with her child, have deep dark traumatic pasts that are only revealed bit by bit.

The nominal core plot revolves around our main character guiding the handsome prince with a secret mission on a shortcut past an avalanche blocked canyon (a problem his rival sister hid from him in an effort to one up him, or to create an opportunity to assassinate him in royal succession politics), off the safe and ancient witch roads, together with her nephew, both of whom are urgently escaping their dark pasts trying to catch up with them. But this mission gets a new twist when a charming, wiser, more open minded, and ancient "haunt" temporarily possesses the prince so it can travel to the same destination as the one where the prince was bound on a mission of its own.

I have no quarrel with the fact the she introduce many important terms and concepts long before they are fully explained. But, a small nitpick is that she invents many proper names and creature type names that it is hard to know how to pronounce, such as Xilsi, for which the pronunciation is the "X" is unclear. Given the neo-East Asian setting, I pronounced it in my mind as if it was a transliteration of Chinese with an "sh" sound, rather than the "ch" sound used for X as an initial letter in words of Greek origin. But the proper pronunciation of this name, and several other names and terms used in the book, is less than clear.

The Theoretical Foundations Of Republican Politics

People who understand the theoretical foundation of Republican policy positions tend to see it as too obvious (and obviously flawed) to mention. But this post is devoted to setting forth the core points of that theoretical foundation in the hope that a better understanding of it can point us towards better political tactics.

1. The Zero Sum Theory Of Employment Economics

Stylized Consensus Facts

The left and the right agree that the economic well-being of U.S. born white men without college educations relative to other workers in the U.S. economy has declined greatly, in relative terms, since at least 1970. They have captured almost none of the benefit of U.S. economic growth in the last 55 years, while women, non-white men, and college educated men, have all seen significant economic gains, relative to white men without college educations, over the last 55 years.

It is also widely agreed that the percentage of the U.S. population that is foreign born was at an all time low in 1970 and is now at or near an all time high, 55 years later. It is widely agreed there are a signifiant share of people in America (about 10 million in round numbers) who are not U.S. citizens and do not have legal immigration status, and that the undocumented immigrants who are in the labor force are predominantly less educated, less skilled workers. A significant number of U.S. born citizens, moreover, are children of undocumented immigrants.

And, it is widely agreed that a large share of good consumed in the United States are produced outside the United States with non-U.S. labor and imported to the U.S. There is also a significant off shored employees who provide services to people in the U.S., most notably, people who answer customer service telephone numbers for big U.S. businesses. The share of goods and services consumed in the U.S. that is produced with non-U.S. labor is much lower now than it was in the time period from roughly 1945 to 1970.

Zero Sum Thinking

Where Republicans (and right wing political movements generally) and Democrats (and centrists and left wing political movements generally) differ, is that the right believes that the labor market is well approximated by a zero sum model, in which the number of jobs in the economy is largely fixed.

If the labor market is a zero sum game, then all growth in non-white employee employment and pay comes at the expense of white employee employment and pay. Likewise, this theory implies that every improvement in female employment and pay comes at the expense of male employment and pay, that every job filled by someone who is not a U.S. citizen comes at the expense of a job that would otherwise be filled by a U.S. citizen, and that every off shored job that provides goods or services to the U.S. economy comes at the expense of a U.S. person's job.

In this theory, the Civil Rights movement, disparaged as "DEI", caused women and minorities to get jobs that white men would have gotten without government intervention, which they see as discrimination against white men. Therefore, it is imperative to right the horrible wrong that the Civil Rights movement has done to white men, who they feel that the pre-Civil Rights law economy demonstrated were actually more qualified than women and minorities.

In this theory, immigration laws that allow more immigration and illegal immigration have taken many millions of jobs away from native born Americans, as have the children of illegal immigrants whom they do not see as legitimate U.S. citizens since their citizenship was made possible by the illegal conduct of illegal immigrants. And, since most of these jobs are less skilled, this has come at the expense of non-college educated native born Americans. So, mass deportation of immigrants (legal and illegal), discouraging new immigration, and ending birthright citizenship all increase the supply of jobs available to native born Americans, especially those without college educations.

In this theory, free trade has made it economically feasible to off shore work that contributed to the U.S. economy and all of the off shored jobs would have otherwise filled by people in the U.S., so large tariffs are desirable in order to force firms to replace off shore workers with U.S. workers. And, again, off shored jobs tend to be disproportionately jobs that don't require college educations.

2. Moral collapse theory, and the belief that homosexuality and transgender identities are perverse and immoral choices.

Stylized Consensus Facts

Relative to the 1945-1970 time period, divorce rates have soared, marriage rates have fallen, couples are getting married later, a larger share of children are born out of wedlock, more children are being raised in single parent families, and people are having fewer children. Divorces are disproportionately sought by women. These trends have been particular stark for non-college educated men who are also experiencing economic stagnation.  This economic stagnation has led to economic pressures which, together with inferior social skills due to being less smart and educated, makes it more likely that they will be accused of child neglect and/or child abuse.

Non-college educated men, who have seen lower relative incomes and growing unemployment rates, also tend to end up having weaker relationships with their children when they are born out of wedlock or following a divorce, to have greater difficulty and willingness to pay child support and/or alimony, and to increasingly see marital assets reliably split 50-50 even though those marital assets were purchased disproportionately from their incomes.

The time period since 1970 has also been marked by the widespread increased availability of birth control pills and IUDs, by the legalization of abortion, by the rise of gay rights, and by a stark decline in the percentage of people in the U.S. who identify as Christian (in favor of both "nones" and non-Christian religions) as well as the percentage of people who attend church and otherwise actually make Christianity a part of their lives. It has also been accompanied by the near universal availability of unilateral "no fault" divorce, and laws that have given women with lower earnings more reliably larger child support and alimony awards, larger property division awards, and a greater ability to enforce those court orders. And, furthermore, women's rights outside the workforce have improved, making it easier for women to borrow money independently and receive higher education in fields previously reserved almost entirely for men like law and being medical doctors.

This is also a time period in which "war on poverty" and "Great Society" social programs have provided economic support to poor families, and especially, poor single mothers, first mostly black mothers, but increasingly non-college educated white mothers.

And, in the later part of this time period, access over the Internet to free hard core pornography of all kinds has become ubiquitous, when the First Amendment establishment clause has been enforced to make public schools and government more secular (such as removing prayer and the Ten Commandments from schools), when public schools have been more comfortable teaching scientific and historical discoveries at odds with Christian doctrine, and when school and public libraries have been more willing to shelve books that are arguably obscene or contrary to more restrictive conservative Christian belief systems.

Moral collapse theory

The right attributes most of these changes to moral collapse, and to feminism motivated changes in the law that have helped facilitate this moral collapse by undermining traditional values.

In this view, the law is making it too easy for women to have children out of wedlock, and making it too easy for women to shirk their marital obligations to their husbands by divorcing them and getting unfair benefits for doing so in female biased divorce settlements, and by restricting the number of children they have without the consent of their husbands or lovers. They also see abortion as murder. They see laws against marital rape as undermining the basic concept of marriage where a wife is obligated to have sex with her husband who is the head of the family and should be the ultimately decision maker on all questions in the marriage, in which wives should obey their husbands.

They feel that a transgender identity is contrary to common sense, isn't real, is a voluntary choice, and actually reflects a combination of perversion motivated fraud, and liberal brain washing. They feel that homosexuality is a voluntary choice that is sinful and perverse, is contrary to nature and God, and is disgusting. They see trend of the law treating homosexuality and transgender identity as legitimate as a symptom of the overall moral collapse in society that feminism has likewise facilitated.

In this worldview, gay rights, transgender rights, legalized abortion, birth control without a husband's permission, no fault divorce, prohibitions on marital rape, interpretations of the law that criminalize sexual assertiveness in pre-marital relationships, and greater independent economic rights of women, the decline of Christianity in general and in public institutions, and state intervention in the father-child relationship for abuse and neglect or to recognize an adolescent's or wife's autonomy, are all deviations from traditional values that are symptoms of a larger moral collapse in society.

This moral collapse is in this view the cause of these changes and needs to be addressed by returning society to a previously more implicit, Christian foundation.

In this view, the remedy to the fact that non-college educated men are having increasing difficulty getting married, staying married, keeping their kids and maintaining a relationship with them, and not being accused of rape, is to insist on making society more overtly Christian and to reinstate laws based upon a pre-1960s "traditional values" across the board.

3. Government is harmful theory.

Stylized Consensus Facts

Total nominal government spending has increased steadily. The scope and scale of the federal government, in particular, increased dramatically, first after the U.S. Civil War, modestly again during the Progressive era in the late 19th century and early 20th century, dramatically again during the Great Depression and World War II, and then significantly but less dramatically in the post-World War II to 1970s era. The scope and scale of the federal government far exceeds what was initially contemplated by the Founders and what the practical reality was for the first 80 years or so of the United States.

Government is harmful theory.

A third major pillar of right wing political theory is that government spending generates no value and is inherently less efficient and economically valuable than private sector spending, and that each government employee on average, has a net negative economic impact. And, taxes automatically reduce economic output.

In this view, the correct size of government is always to have less government spending and fewer government employees, with less taxation. So, indiscriminate tax cuts, spending cuts, and layoffs of government employees, especially at the federal level, is a good thing.

4. Education is overrated.

Stylized Consensus Facts

Educational attainment has steadily increased since World War II, with more people graduating from high school, more people attending college, more people graduating from college, and more people earning graduate and professional degrees. At first this was due to the GI Bill (which benefited veterans which a very large share of adult men young enough to consider college were after WWII, Korea, and Vietnam), and due to the creation of cheap state public universities made possible by high levels of economic prosperity at the time. Starting in the 1970s, women and minorities began to receive higher education at greatly increased levels, with women achieving something close to parity sometime in the early 1990s and continuing to have greater educational attainment than men since then.

Many jobs that previously did not require a certain level of formal educational attainment now do, either formally, or as a matter of practical reality. Almost all of the benefits of economic growth since 1970 in the U.S. economy has been captured by college educated people. College educated people have faced less competition from immigrants and off shoring than non-college educated people. Government has devoted far more resources to supporting higher education than vocational education such as apprenticeships in skilled trades.

Education is overrated.

The right sees the educational establishment from kindergarten through higher education as equally as much an institution for spreading left wing ideologies and propaganda, and undermining religion and traditional values, as it is an institution for actually providing value added knowledge. They see most educational requirements for work as artificial cultural and class driven barriers to entry rather than as being genuinely necessary to do the job. They believe that teachers and academics immorally twist what they teach to their own political agendas and self-interest that have little to do with truth and more to do with an agenda to undermine traditional values and to facilitate moral collapse. They will grudgingly acknowledge that sometimes education can be necessary (especially in STEM and in basic literacy), but that even there instruction is improperly undermining traditional values and religious beliefs based upon alleged academic knowledge that they do not trust. They see most teachers and professors as less competent and valuable than people who more directly produce economic value in our economy.

They see this as being motivated, especially, by a collective class effort of the upper middle class of college educated people to appropriate economic gains from the working class and middle class of non-college educated people and people with some college but not four year or greater degrees.

Conclusion

While there are other, less central, foundations of Republican politics, such as economic beliefs about where prices come from, energy policy, homelessness, crime, controlled substances, prostitution, and the political process, these four core theoretical foundations (all of which could be facially plausible, but don't bear out to be true with closer examination) which also impact some of these issues, at least in part, go a long way towards explaining right wing political stances.

Enforcing Noblesse Oblige

La noblesse oblige literally "nobility obliges") is a French expression that means that nobility extends beyond mere entitlement, requiring people who hold such status to fulfill social responsibilities; the term retains the same meaning in English. For example, a primary obligation of a nobleman could include generosity towards those around him. As those who lived on the nobles' land had obligations to the nobility, the nobility had obligations to their people, including protection at the least.

- Wikipedia, Noblesse Oblige.

The American system of representative democracy is profoundly anti-elitist. In its ideal form, which it somewhat approximates, all adults can vote for candidates who are not meaningfully screened for qualifications to do the jobs for which they are elected.

Most other parts of our society don't work that way. 

Typically, when a business or government needs an employee, or an individual or firm or government wants to hire a contractor to do something, the business or person seeking a contractor tries to do so on a meritocratic basis consistent with what they can afford. For many kinds of tasks, a government license awarded on the basis of a meritocratic examination process that can be revoked for various kinds of professional or personal misconduct is required to even be considered for doing that task.

Most of the time, competence and qualifications are considered to some extent in the process of electing representatives to oversee the government on behalf of the voting public by the voters who are given the authority to elect them. But that isn't hard wired into the system (although some more specialized state and local elected offices like sheriffs and surveyors and judges and prosecutors sometimes do have some minimal professional qualifications that are required of candidates).

Unlike elected officials, civil service employees of governments are appointed on a formally meritocratic basis with only minimal political input by supervising officers for the prospective employees who are well-informed about the candidates' qualifications and are generally highly trained and qualified themselves.

Why do we have a system that allows ill-informed voters, no matter how uneducated they may be, choose people to run the system from among a group of minimally screened candidates with no obligation, even an unenforceable and theoretical one, to choose from among those candidates on a meritocratic basis?

The political theory behind a system with minimal screening of candidates and a very broad franchise is that the desire to win elections gives politicians an incentive to care about the best interests of the people who are entitled to vote, rather than caring only about their own personal interests and desires.

The ill-treatment that American society affords to people who can't vote at some or all levels of our political system, like children, non-citizens, prison inmates, institutionalized mentally ill people, people in places like the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and people who live outside the territory of the governmental body whose voters select those elected officials, supports the conclusion that including someone in the franchise tends to produce political outcomes that benefit people who can vote. 

Likewise, policies that meet the interests and desires of people who vote more consistently, like older people, educated people, and Evangelical Christians, are more frequently translated into government policy than the interests and desires of people who vote less often, like younger people and less educated people, even when they have a right to vote.

The American political system has made a calculated choice that having politicians who care about the needs and desires of as many people as can legitimately be permitted to vote is so important that it is worth the risk that in the cases where these voters will make bad choices, especially when they are ill-informed and are not very good decision makers about anything.

The political theory, in other words, is that a franchise that is as broad as possible with minimally screened candidates will enforce noblesse oblige upon the class of politicians who are elected in this system, and that having politicians who are incentivized to display noblesse oblige in their decision making is worth the price that society pays in choosing less qualified leaders because a greater share of the decision makers are ill-informed and bad at making decisions than they would be if the franchise was narrower. The political system of American representative democracy enshrines equality in order to create no incentives to make as few people as possible strangers of the law.

It is a political theory that leans heavily on formal political institutions to cause this to happen rather than alternative means.

Not every political system in history as relied upon this strategy.

Confucianism, in contrast, focuses on securing noblesse oblige by instilling a political culture infused in it.

In Confucianism, almost every important interact in life in characterized as being unequal and hierarchical. Subordinates have a duty to obey and defer to their superiors. Superiors have a duty to look out for the bests interests of their subordinates in a spirit of reciprocity and fiduciary-like duty. Confucianism calls for people to be promoted to higher positions of authority on the basis of merit, which is viewed as a balanced mix of competence and good character in the sense of upholding confucian values.

Modern cultures with strong Confucian values display pros and cons. They tend to be well ordered, to be law abiding, to have people who are good at self-organization and cooperation in times of need, and to have relatively few people who are just cast away and neglected. But these are prone to abuse of authority and bullying by people higher up in the hierarchy, tend to ignore positive or urgent input from people low in the hierarchy, tend to force subordinates to sacrifice their own well-being and desires for the demands of their superiors, and are reliant on the people at the top to be innovative because those at the bottom are not permitted to innovate. Confucianism, focused as it is on a system rooted in good men, rather than good laws, also tends to be vulnerable to corruption and not very focused on the consistent rule of law.

Of course, different modern Confucian influenced societies address the "natural" shortcomings of Confucianism in different ways. 

Japan has done a relatively good job at curbing the selfishness of people like senior executives in positions of power, and has begun to temper Confucian values with respect for personal self-actualization as it has become a more affluent society with the luxury of doing so. 

South Korea has been less successful at curbing excesses and abuses by superiors, and has likewise been somewhat less successful at fulfilling the obligation to look out for subordinates. But it has also been better, on balance, at allowing self-actualization in lieu of subordination of one's own desires to the will of those superior in the hierarchy.

China has done a poor job indeed of curbing kleptocracy by those in power, but has done a good job at having the older generation cede power to the younger generation, in a manner that has fostered a class of relatively young, powerful, innovative change makers that have kept its society from becoming too static and tradition bound. But China has done a particularly poor job of respecting individual self-actualization, or listening to the voices of subordinates with valuable input that could be offered in decision-making. China has also suffered mightily from corruption and is deeply immersed in a social and intellectual climate of dishonesty and censorship of the truth.

Feudalism, the political culture that produced the concept of noblesse oblige in the West was similar, but unlike Confucianism, awarded positions of authority based primarily on the hereditary principal, rather than based upon meritocratic selection. Also, feudalism tied the sense that superiors should look out for the well-being of their subordinates to the pride, ego, and greed associated with ownership. In a feudal context, you basically owned your subordinates, and your sense of noblesse oblige was related to your desire to have your property be the best that it can be for your own person benefit since this would make you rich in the process.

Saudi Arabian style monarchies, while hardly meritocratic or democratic, have at least tamed the hereditary principle, by having large, polygamous royal families in which the current ruler can choose the most qualified person within this large royal family to be their successor. This mitigates the risk that a hereditary successor will be profoundly incompetent or immoral, and creates an incentive for its many princes to distinguish themselves in competence and loyalty in connection with the competition to be a successor to the reigning monarch or at least a member of the reigning monarch's inner circle.

Saudi Arabian monarchies do show outstanding noblesse oblige in terms of using their wealth to benefit the actual citizens of their kingdoms, but like most absolute monarchies, are also highly repressive and authoritarian, and treat people who are not their permanent subjects and property as disposable and care for their well-being only to the extent that it is transactionally necessary.

Returning to the question of the American political system, the question is really how we can secure noblesse oblige on a broad based basis, without sacrificing competence, rule of law, and freedom from corruption motivated by partisanship, to the extent that the MAGA movement does today. 

While there is a place to recognize political motives rooted in a desire to satisfy a broad grass roots of society rather than only its elites, not all choices which we have vested politicians with making are equally valid. There may not be one right choice, but there are many choices which are objectively worse across the value systems that are intersubjectively shared by broad swaths of our society. And, a system that makes objectively bad choices because swaths ignorant people in the grass roots don't understand that these are bad choices is broken.

Furthermore, the American political system has slipped away from securing noblesse oblige on a broad based basis from its political leaders, because its electoral and legislative processes and procedures have created incentives to further the well-being and desires of minimal winning coalitions while neglecting or actively harming those outside the winning coalition. 

Also, deep rooted flaws in the design of the American political system that arose because the Founders who designed it didn't have the benefit of the lessons of two and a half centuries of global democratic government's successes and failures, prevent the American political system from accurately translating the needs and desires of its people as a whole into appropriate action. It is a political system that is too gridlocked to promptly change to reflect new knowledge and needs, and is too biased towards rural white Christian interests and the interests of the ultra-rich, and against urban, non-Christian and non-white people's interests, and people who are not ultra-rich.

The inability of our gridlocked political system to address urgent needs and desires, especially those of the working class has been toxic for the American political culture. It has undermined faith in the belief that politicians can be in good faith about wanting change. It has washed away concern about the good character or competence of its political leaders. It has fueled the search for scapegoats to lash out against like immigration and free trade and non-Christians and LGBT people and women's rights and racial minorities. It has encouraged thoughtless and radical anti-government attitudes, conspiracy theories, anti-science ideologies, and distrust of intellectual elites.

Working class needs and desires have been neglected, in part, because they don't vote as consistently as more educated and affluent people do, and, in part, because the economy is changing but political gridlock has preventing timely and competent responses to these changes. This is led to the conventional wisdom that political changes have not occurred because bipartisan political elites are conspiring against them, even though this is more untrue than not and the primary reason that the current political system has not addressed their needs is that  the current system makes it too hard for well-intentioned political elites to secure effective change.

Returning to the question of the American economic system, there, the question is mostly, how we can cause the people at the top of economic hierarchies to display more noblesse oblige to their subordinates and to the larger society at a time when they have gone too far in milking the system for their own personal benefit at the expense of the rest of society. American economic elites generally are very competent, and are certainly much less corrupt the American political elites. But they also have far too weak incentives to refrain from causing externalities or exploiting subordinates and third-parties for their own personal benefit. The American political system's job is, in substantial part, to reign in the excesses of American economic elites, and the American political system has done a fairly shoddy job of doing so, in part, because the system in designed in such a way that this kind of regulation of American economic elites is too difficult to secure in a system that takes an unreasonably wide consensus to act.