In praise of dog not barking: Russian passengers break into applause after every perfectly ordinary landing.
From here (July 13).
In praise of dog not barking: Russian passengers break into applause after every perfectly ordinary landing.
WAR FOREVER
Wisconsin Becomes Orgy of Chaos As Recall Elections Begin
by Kirsten Boyd Johnson
1:41 pm July 12, 2011
The forces of good and evil resume their bilious clouded swirl over the state of Wisconsin today as primary voters go to cast votes in the state’s recall elections against six of Scott Walker’s senate puppets, and it is already just an orgy of dead fetuses and robots.
[The wife] called Brighton police last Oct. 15. That day, she alleged, arriving officers "high-fived" Cleveland, and after she told the officers that the abuse that day was verbal, not physical, they decided to have her stay in a hotel for a couple of nights. No charges were filed.
Brighton police initially took the case to the Adams County district attorney's office, but no charges were filed then either. According to District Attorney Don Quick, the investigating Brighton officer portrayed the allegations as a situation of "he said, she said."
"At the time, there were not injuries apparent or made note of by the officers," Quick said.
Later, however, the woman told another of his prosecutors about the abuse during a conversation at church, and Quick asked Garnett's office to investigate.
A Boulder investigator took over the case May 11, and eight days later a magistrate judge signed an arrest warrant for Cleveland.
It seems that Wells and JP Morgan are happy to do principal reductions only on the mortgages they bought at a discount from Wells Fargo and WaMu respectively; Bank of America, meanwhile, which inherited a bunch of these loans when it acquired Countrywide, is not doing principal reductions, and I don’t think it’s a coincidence that the Countrywide loans were bought at very close to par.
The behavioral psychology here is very easy to understand. No bank wants to admit that it wrote idiotic loans, and write down its own assets from par. Meanwhile, it’s much easier to write up an acquired asset, if the amount you reduce the loan is less than the discount you bought the loan for in the first place.
Economically speaking, however, what the banks are doing here does not make sense. Either writing down option-ARM loans makes sense, from a P&L perspective, or it doesn’t. If it does, then the banks should do so on all their toxic loans, not just the ones they bought at a discount. And if it doesn’t, then they shouldn’t be doing so at all.
The truth is, of course, that banks should be doing principal reductions, and they should be doing them on lots of their loans, rather than just the ones they bought cheap. And the fact that they’re already doing this, entirely voluntarily, on some of their loans is the best possible indication that it makes perfect economic sense to do so on all of their loans. Even if doing so might involve admitting that the subprime crisis still isn’t fully over.
Of the 34 states with the death penalty, Alabama is the only jurisdiction where judges routinely override jury verdicts of life to impose capital punishment. Since 1976, Alabama judges have overridden jury verdicts 107 times. Although judges have authority to override life or death verdicts, in 92% of overrides elected judges have overruled jury verdicts of life to impose the death penalty.
Twenty-one percent of the 199 people currently on Alabama’s death row were sentenced to death through judicial override. Judge override is the primary reason why Alabama has the highest per capita death sentencing rate and execution rate in the country. Last year, with a state population of 4.5 million people, Alabama imposed more new death sentences than Texas, with a population of 24 million.
Override is legal in only three states: Alabama, Delaware, and Florida. Florida and Delaware have strict standards for override. No one in Delaware is on death row as a result of an override and no death sentences have been imposed by override in Florida since 1999. In Delaware and Florida, override often is used to overrule jury death verdicts and impose life -- which rarely happens in Alabama.
The results indicate that even taking out the pro se cases, the odds of a court granting a 12(b)(6) motion, at least in part, as compared to denying the motion, were expected to be 1.79 times greater under Iqbal than under Conley (p = 0.002), all other variables held constant.
Second, I used only the cases in my database from 2006 (Jan to Dec) and from 2010 (Jan to May 18), and otherwise limited as described above (no pro se, no magistrate judges). Here, the results indicate that even leaving out the pro se cases, the odds of a court granting a 12(b)(6) motion, at least in part, as compared to denying the motion, were expected to be 1.92 times greater in 2010 than in 2006 (p = 0.013), all other variables held constant.
Among two-parent families, median earnings did rise by an inflation-adjusted 23% from 1975 to 2009. But the parents’ combined hours worked increased by 26% during the same period–accounting for most of the income gains.
The unemployment rate increased from 9.1% to 9.2%, and the participation rate declined to 64.1%. Note: This is the percentage of the working age population in the labor force.
The employment population ratio fell to 58.2%, matching the lowest level during the current employment recession. . . . [a] measure of labor underutilization that includes part time workers and marginally attached workers, increased to 16.2%, the highest level this year.
The BLS revised down April and May payrolls showing 44,000 fewer jobs were created than previously reported.
The average workweek declined slightly to 34.3 hours, . . . "average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls decreased by 1 cent to $22.99. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have increased by 1.9 percent." . . .
Through the first six months of 2011, the economy has added 757,000 total non-farm jobs or just 126 thousand per month. There have been 945,000 private sector jobs added, or about 158 thousand per month. This is a better pace of payroll job creation than last year, but the economy still has 6.98 million fewer payroll jobs than at the beginning of the 2007 recession.
There are a total of 14.1 million Americans unemployed and 6.3 million have been unemployed for more than 6 months.
[S]hadow-of-trial models [of plea bargaining] commonly pay little attention to defendants’ culpability per se. To wit, innocents – who may well face a higher average probability of acquittal at trial – are expected to demand a more lenient sentence in return for their guilty plea. However, if the plea offer is accurately adjusted to defendants’ probability of conviction, innocence in itself plays no role in the defendant's decision. This assumption, which is jointly held by both parties to the plea bargaining debate, is false. . . .
[I]nnocent defendants are significantly less likely to accept plea offers than their guilty counterparts, even when these offers appear objectively attractive in light of the evidence against them and the expected sanction at trial. . . .
[T]he implications of the innocence effect and its underlying causes for the plea bargaining debate . . . requires both camps to reevaluate their policy prescriptions and offering some new proposals of our own to minimize false convictions, better to protect the innocent, and improve the plea bargaining process. . . .
As a result of the innocence effect, plea bargains probably do not increase the rate of wrongful convictions, as argued by some of the plea bargaining opponents, but also do not promote the interests of innocent defendants as argued by the plea bargaining supporters. . . .
One way to reduce the negative effect of plea bargaining on the sentences of wrongfully convicted defendants is to limit size of the plea discount. The law can instruct judges not to approve a plea bargain if the post plea sentence is significantly lower than the sentence expected after a jury trial conviction. If the prosecution’s ability to offer significant sentence discount in plea bargaining would be limited, defendants requiring considerable discount in exchange for their guilty plea would not bargain. Since the innocent demand, on average, significantly lighter sentences than guilty defendants, the proportion of innocent defendants among those who plead guilty will be smaller. . . . Restriction of the guilty plea discount will minimize the gap between the sentence imposed on those who opt for a trial, including relatively many innocent, and that of those who plead guilty, most of whom are guilty. The innocent defendants who will be convicted in jury trial will still be sentenced for longer terms than the guilty pleaders, yet, the difference will be smaller. . . .
When it comes to sentence bargains, it is not a particularly difficult task. Courts can be instructed to reject plea bargains if the proposed sentence is substantially lower than that imposed in similar circumstances after a trial. Limiting charge bargaining is much harder, but it might still be a possible task. . .
Another alternative to plea bargaining can be bargaining for a simplified criminal process. The law can encourage parties to replace plea bargains with agreement on shorter and simplified process in return for a sentence discount. Parties can agree on a bench trial instead of a jury trial, agree that the defendants will be the first to testify, before the case for the prosecution is presented, or make other stipulations which allow a cheaper trial for the prosecution.
True, in such a simplified process, the risk of mistake might be larger. Yet, innocence defendants in such process can gain a discount for the agreement without pleading guilty – something which they are reluctant to do. Moreover, defendants in such simplified proceedings will maintain the right to contest the case, and, if successful, gain an acquitted, a right they waive in regular plea bargaining. Innocent defendants who may be reluctant to plead guilty, would often prefer a simplifies process in which they are not required to plead guilty, are able to avoid the damaging consequences of prolonged litigation and benefit a lenient sentence in exchange for saving judicial time.
True, the defendant in such a simplified trial might have a smaller chance of acquittal. As a result, it is possible that defendants who would have been acquitted in a full trial may be convicted in a simplified trial. Nevertheless, it can be said in confidence that the advantages of the simplified procedure outweigh its disadvantages.
First, the proposed procedure will promote the interest of the innocent defendants by allowing them to benefit from a real legal process which is aimed at finding the truth while benefiting from a sentence discount. Indeed, the cost of this procedure is higher than that of a guilty plea, but the gap between the two is not so big when it comes to substantially simplified process. Additionally, most of the guilty defendants who plead guilty today will continue to do so even when offered a simplified process is an option because in order to be acquitted in such a procedure, they would have to lie to the judge. In most cases that involve conclusive evidence, defendants will find it psychologically difficult to lie to a judge; mostly due to the fact that it probably will not help their case. As shown above, guilty defendants tend to plead guilty simply because they are guilty.
Therefore most of those who plead guilty will continue to do so even when they can get a similar discount in a simplified process. Furthermore, some of the defendants, who in the absence of an alternative procedure would choose a full trial, would now choose the simplified procedure. As a result, judicial resources will be spared and could be channeled towards the implementation of the simplified process. In light of this, the simplified procedure could advance the interests of the innocent without the need for additional resources.
Second, the procedure may also reduce wrongful convictions. Despite the reluctance of innocent defendants to plead guilty, some of them succumb to the desire to quickly end the proceedings or to the fear of a wrongful jury trial conviction, and thus plead guilty. The simplified procedure could provide these defendants an opportunity to challenge the charges against them. In light of all of this, we believe that the benefits of the proposed procedure, in view of innocent’s reluctance to plead guilty, outweigh its disadvantages. Moreover, even in cases where a person might be mistakenly convicted in a simplified process, the moral gravity of such conviction will be smaller because it will be reached after an honest judicial attempt to find the truth. Studies on procedural fairness even indicate that defendants who are not satisfied with the outcome of the trial tend to accept it if they were given an opportunity to argue their case before an impartial arbiter before the verdict. Simplified procedure might be better in allowing the defendant a saveopportunity to present his story, than the adversarial jury trial.