Showing posts with label Intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intelligence. Show all posts

20 December 2024

What To Abolish?

Republicans want to abolish the Department of Education and the IRS. Both are horrible ideas. 

What should be abolished?

1. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

2. The Office of National Drug Control Policy.

3. The Alcohol And Tobacco Tax And Trade Bureau.

4. The Alcohol and Tobacco parts of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

5. The Article I Immigration Court system (transfer this duty to Article III courts).

6. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (as opposed to the separate border control agency).

7. The Employment and Training Administration in the Labor Department.

8. The Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

9. The National Indian Gaming Commission.

10. Criminal and civil forfeiture enforcement of copyright and trademark violations (a similar statutory stand alone crimes).

11. Federal pornography possession enforcement.

12. Diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts.

13. Federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts in most cases involving private parties. 

14. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (merge into the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit)

15. The Federal Arbitration Act.

16. Federal grand juries (would require a constitutional amendment).

17. Criminal punishment of illegal entry into the United States.

18. Federal enforcement of bank robbery laws.

19. Federal enforcement of intrastate controlled substance violations.

20.  Most federal agency law enforcement agencies.

21.  Merge the Commodity Futures Trading Commission into the SEC.

22. Slow speed, long haul passenger rail lines at AMTRAK.

23. Door to door rural mail delivery (replace it with P.O. boxes).

24. The Jones Act.

25. Grants to for profit colleges and universities.

26. Federal civil forfeitures.

27. For profit federal prisons and detention centers.

28. The Medicaid Estate Recovery program.

29.  FEMA grants to people suffering disaster losses after rebuilding in stupid zones.

30. The Office of the Director Of National Intelligence.

31. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (enforce the laws in regular Article III courts).

32. The Selective Service System.

33. Most tanks in the U.S. Army (transfer them to allies who want them like Ukraine and Taiwan).

34. New destroyers (of existing designs) for the U.S. Navy.

35. The U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay.

36. Bomber aircraft in the Air National Guard.

37. Canon artillery in the Army National Guard.

38. The Space Force (which should be merged into the Air Force).

39. The Air Force (which should be merged into the Army).

40. Stealth fighters in the Air National Guard.

41. The Next-Generation Intratheater Airlift (NGIA) program in the Air Force (it duplicates a more advanced Army Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program).

42. Foreign aid to Saudi Arabia.

43. The amphibious assault mission of the U.S. Marine Corps.

44. The U.S. Navy's nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program.

45. Most U.S. military VIP transport aircraft.

46. The Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) procurement of 522 M1283 General Purpose Vehicles, 993 M1286 Mission Command Vehicles, and 386 M1287 Mortar Carrier Vehicles. This would leave the AMPV program with 790 M1284 Medical Evacuation Vehicles and 216 M1285 Medical Treatment Vehicles.

47. The M10 Booker Mobile Protected Firepower program.

48. Retire the B1-B bomber (or transfer it to the U.S. Navy as a patrol aircraft).

49. The ban on travel by Americans to Cuba.

50. The U.S. Army Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC), which is a high school pre-ROTC program.

09 June 2023

The Entire GOP Is Rotten

The utterly lawless and unprincipled character of the Republican Party is no longer surprising but is still extremely disheartening. 

In the hours after Trump himself announced his own indictment, his GOP defenders rushed to tear down the criminal justice system by sheer invective. The GOP speaker of the House, GOP senators and representatives, the leading GOP candidates for president, and the whole right-wing Wurlitzer launched a furious attack on the rule of law.
From TPM.

03 April 2023

Quote Of The Day

The jack of all trades is the master of none, but the master of one is the connector of none.
- Eric Weinstein

I understand the sentiment, which resonates with me as a jack of all trades who makes connections across disciplines personally. There is definitely something to it in modern academia. But, I'm not convinced it is empirically true because I can think of notable counterexamples of geniuses in one field who have very broad knowledge.

29 December 2021

Accountability Works

According to the nonprofit organization Airwars, the U.S. has conducted more than 91,000 airstrikes in seven major conflict zones since 2001, with at least 22,000 civilians killed and potentially as many as 48,000.

How does America react when it kills civilians? Just last week, we learned that the U.S. military decided that nobody will be held responsible for the August 29 drone attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed 10 members of an Afghan family, including seven children. After an internal review, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin chose to take no action, not even a wrist slap for a single intelligence analyst, drone operator, mission commander, or general. Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby bizarrely said, “We acknowledge that there were procedural breakdowns” but that “it doesn’t necessarily indicate that an individual or individuals have to be held to account.” . . .

U.S. bombings since 2014 have consistently killed civilians but that the Pentagon has done almost nothing to discern how many were harmed or what went wrong and might be corrected. As Khan noted, “It was a system that seemed to function almost by design to not only mask the true toll of American airstrikes but also legitimize their expanded use.” . . .

Impunity tends to begin at the top. No American general has been disciplined for overseeing the catastrophic wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, nor for lying to Congress about these disasters. The opposite has occurred: Stars have usually been added to their shoulders, and when they retire from the military, they tend to march into well-paid positions as board members in the weapons industry or elsewhere (even though they are not strapped for resources, thanks to pensions that can reach $250,000 a year). The reputation-protection racket is so galling that an Army officer who served two tours in Iraq wrote a now-famous article in 2007 that noted: “A private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” . . .

We should not be surprised. We are a society that excels in elite unaccountability. Just look at the number of bank CEOs who faced criminal charges after the 2008 financial collapse (zero), or the number of Sackler family members who were criminally charged after their company, Purdue Pharma, started the opioid epidemic with OxyContin (also zero), or the number of billionaires who avoid paying income taxes (lots of them). And let’s not forget the politicians and pundits who goaded America into an illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 and suffered no consequences. . . . .

Military impunity is somewhat unique because it stretches downward, too. If an intelligence analyst or drone operator or fighter pilot follows orders and procedures for an airstrike that kills dozens of civilians in a wedding party — which has happened — they need to be excused of wrongdoing. After all, who gave the orders, and who set the procedures? These questions would require looking up the chain of command, and for that reason, they are not asked with any intention of finding the answers. That’s why it was with no sense of alarm that secret military documents published by The Intercept in 2015 noted that in a two-year campaign called Operation Haymaker, 9 of 10 Afghans killed in U.S. drone strikes were not the intended targets. For the U.S., this was the acceptable cost of doing business.

The Pentagon’s culture of impunity for killing civilians stands in contrast to its zealous pursuit of soldiers for other offenses.

The Pentagon’s culture of impunity for killing civilians stands in contrast to its zealous pursuit of soldiers for other offenses. Unlike the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates the financial industry, or the IRS, which oversees taxpayers, or the Senate and House ethics committees, which keep an eye on members of Congress, the U.S. military has wide authority and deep resources to impose an array of penalties, from pay reductions to loss of rank and death sentences. The military avidly uses these powers, too. In 2020 alone, there were more than 37,000 cases of discipline in the armed forces, and since 2001, there have been more than 1.3 million cases.

Yet these powers have been used sparingly or not at all when it comes to airstrikes that kill civilians. One of the worst massacres in two decades of warfare occurred not long ago, on March 18, 2019, when U.S. warplanes dropped bombs that killed scores of civilians, mostly women and children, in an Islamic State enclave in Syria. The carnage was immediately apparent. As the Times reported last month, an analyst who watched the attack on a drone video typed into a secure chat system, “Who dropped that?” Another analyst wrote, “We just dropped on 50 women and children.” A quick battle assessment settled on 70 people killed.

A legal officer flagged it as a possible war crime that warranted an investigation. . . . “but at nearly every step, the military made moves that concealed the catastrophic strike.” The Pentagon’s inspector general looked into what happened, but even its report was “stalled and stripped of any mention of the strike.” An evaluator who worked on the inspector general’s report, Gene Tate, was forced out of his job after complaining about the lack of progress and honesty. Tate told the Times: “Leadership just seemed so set on burying this.”

I could go on for thousands of words describing other airstrikes that killed civilians and resulted in no discipline or slight reprimands that were issued only after embarrassing reports from news organizations and human rights groups. For instance, there was a 2015 airstrike on a hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, that killed 42 patients and staffers; the military’s reluctant discipline included counseling and retraining for some of the personnel involved. The point is this: A military establishment that has enthusiastically enforced requirements for things as petty as wearing a reflector belt while jogging has consistently failed to discipline soldiers for wrongful bombings that its own battle assessments acknowledge have killed civilians.

The machinery of impunity actually has two missions: The most obvious is to excuse people who should not be excused. The other is to punish those who try to expose the machine, because it does not function well in daylight. That’s why Daniel Hale, an Air Force veteran whom the government accused of leaking those classified drone documents to The Intercept, was sentenced under the Espionage Act to nearly four years in prison. It is not the act of killing civilians that will result in definite and heavy punishment, but exposing the act of killing.

In 1992, I interviewed a Muslim girl in Bosnia who had been raped. “The Višegrad warlord took a fancy to her,” I later wrote, “and one night dragged her and her younger sister away from their mother, who of course was crying hysterically and holding onto the legs of the warlord, who kicked her away and shouted, ‘I am the law.’”

The warlord’s name was Milan Lukić, and he was one of the most evil men in a war that had a surplus of them. He killed women and children with particular ruthlessness, one time setting fire to a house in which 59 civilians were sheltering; they all perished. But Lukić was saying one honest thing when he kidnapped the sisters: He was the law. His paramilitary thugs had a monopoly on violence in Višegrad and the full support of Serb political and military authorities. At the time, I didn’t imagine that their crimes would catch up with any of them. . . .

Yet the impunity that seemed eternal in Bosnia turned out to be short-lived, at least for the elites of criminality. Lukić is now in prison with a life sentence, thanks to his conviction at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity. Key wartime leaders were extradited to the Hague too. Slobodan Milošević, the president of Serbia, died of a heart attack before his trial concluded, but Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, the political and military leaders of Bosnia’s Serbs, were convicted of genocide.

America in 2021 is not Serbia in 1995. Our machinery of impunity is not susceptible to pressure from larger nations. But the journalists, whistleblowers, and researchers who have done the hard work of exposing its lies — they are still at work. One thing I’ve learned over the years is that the more these people uncover, the harder they toil. I wouldn’t bet against them.

The good news is that an empirical analysis shows that ending abuses by the military-intelligence complex has a fairly straightforward solution: accountability. 

Decision-making in intelligence matters is often assumed to be an extra-legal process. This article however shows that the determining factor in compliance is a legal one: the likelihood of the state being held effectively accountable for a breach of international law. Through a behavioural analysis of state conduct in intelligence matters and the modelling of intelligence decision-making, the article demonstrates that state behaviour in intelligence matters can be explained and predicted. Taking compliance as the standard for assessing the effectiveness of regulation, this finding has strategic implications for the actors of the international legal order attempting to enhance compliance. Specifically, increasing the likelihood of effective accountability increases the probability of compliance and decreases the weight given to extra-legal and domestic considerations in decision-making, regardless of the activity and state considered. Hence, rather than focussing on the regulatory framework itself (international law), regulatory approaches aiming to enhance compliance should focus on improving accountability.

25 June 2019

20 February 2019

Are U.S. Intelligence Agencies Useless?

G. Cochran, at West Hunter, makes the case that the capacity of U.S. intelligence agencies to evaluated technical issues, like the viability of the claim that Iraq had a nuclear program. is pretty dismal.

To be clear, he says lots of things I disagree with, and this post is no exception to that rule. But, the case he makes that the intelligence agencies that the U.S. spends vast amounts of money on have serious blind spots does sound plausible.

19 October 2016

Mosaicism And Brain Disorders

Genetic epilepsy and developmental disorders in non-affected parents are sometimes de novo disorders, but are also sometimes caused by mosaicism in a parent, which means that the parent has one kind of DNA in some cells and a different kind in other cells. As a result, the risk factor genes may evade detection by normal DNA tests that only look at one, easy to access site. These variants can make their way a child's DNA in vitro after initial fertilization of the egg giving rise to a zygote.

29 December 2015

Russia's Navy Not As Awesome As Naval Intelligence Suggests

An unclassified December 18, 2015 report summarizing the state of the Russian Navy prepared by the United States Office of Naval Intelligence presents a somewhat surprising and unrealistically positive assessment of the capabilities of the Russian Navy. (Thanks to a helpful reader for locating it, which is includes a nice easily accessible summary of the different kinds of submarines and ships in Russian naval service.)

The Russian Navy is probably the most formidable blue sea naval adversary that the U.S. has in the world.  But, the report doesn't even hint at the most important thing that more independent naval analysts have to say about it, which is that the Russian Navy is hollow.  To recap the relevant part of a post at this blog from August of this year discussing that issue:
The loss of access to suppliers in the Ukraine due to Russia's seizure of some of its territory, an inability to obtain replacement suppliers in the West for the same reasons, and a weak economy in Russia, as well as the fact that Russia is trying to support all of the Soviet Navy with a smaller population and economy than the Soviet Union had, has taken a huge toll on the Russian Navy. The bottom line:
On paper the Russian Navy currently has 270 combat ships (including amphibious and combat support vessels). But only about half of these are in any shape to go to sea. The rest are too old, and usually too poorly maintained for too many years, to leave port. Russian shipyards are terrible at building or repairing ships and efforts to remedy this have so far failed. Thus only about 15 percent of Russian naval vessels are major surface warships or submarines. In comparison the U.S. Navy has 290 warships and about 85 percent can go to sea (the others are being upgraded or repaired.)
As a result, the U.S. blue sea naval superiority is actually considerable greater than one would naively expect.Moreover, any realistic assessment of naval force has to consider not just each individual country's naval resources, but those of its likely allies in any particular conflict.
The United States has a lot of BFFs who also have modern, well maintained, powerful naval forces. None of them are even near peers to the U.S. Navy which is far and away the most impressive navy in the world.  But, the navies of countries like the U.K., France, Italy and Japan aren't milquetoast either.

Russia has a few BFFs with navies, and more countries who might be unreliable allies like Syria, Iran, China or North Korea.  But, just as its naval is less impressive than the U.S. Navy, its allies navies are less impressive than the navies of U.S. allies in almost every potential theater of naval warfare.

The fact that Russia has nuclear weapons may mean that it will never make sense for anyone to engage in full fledged conventional naval warfare with Russia.  But, when push comes to shove, the only respect in which Russia is truly a near peer of the U.S. in naval capabilities is in its President's rather reckless willingness to use the military resources at his disposal.

Why would the Office of Naval Intelligence unrealistically puff up Russian naval capabilities?

Well, to ask the question is very nearly to have your answer.  The unmatched U.S. Naval budget needs to be justified, and a report that reveals that our nearest peer force is much less impressive than it seems on the service won't help the naval fight the biggest real war that it has fought in the past two generations that have seen very few actual naval military conflicts - the budget wars that rage in Congress.

From an institutional perspective, Naval Intelligence can never go wrong by overestimating its enemy.  It is is right, it gets the funding it needs to combat the threat.  If it is wrong, it will win any conflict that comes up handily.  A win-win for the navy, even if this means a loss for American taxpayers.

15 December 2015

Heroism Is Meaningless Without Good Intelligence

Early in the conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. forces brutally and with a great deal of heroic action in combat shut down two suspected al-Qaeda bases there, killing dozens, and capturing dozens more who were tortured during their interrogations afterwards.

The problem: the bases actually belonged to two of the strongest leaders of our allies.

In hindsight, this raid seriously hurt the U.S. cause in Afghanistan.  But, due to bad intelligence and an imperative to act swiftly we didn't know any better.

The Special Forces troops involved did engage in some unprofessional overkill in their methods, but no one would have faulted them for that if the situation had been as they believed it to be (and indeed, several of the men involved in the raids won military honors as a result of their actions in those raids).  However, our poor intelligence on those raids undermined the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan for years to come and may be one reason that the Taliban is still a viable insurgent force even today.

We need to avoid those kinds of mistakes in future conflicts.

18 June 2015

Publicity, Not Secrecy, Is The Secret To Catching Culprits (Again)

A woman heading in to work at a florist shop in North Carolina Thursday morning led police to a man accused of gunning down nine people at a historic African-American church in South Carolina the night before.

Debbie Dills spotted the black car being driven by alleged gunman Dylann Roof at around 10:20 a.m. and called a friend, who notified police, NBC station WCNC in Charlotte reported.

"I paid close attention to the pictures on TV, but I thought, 'No. It can't be him,'" Dills, of Gastonia, N.C., told the station. "I noticed the car. And I noticed the boy's haircut," Dills said.

Dills, who was on her way to work at Frady's Florist, followed the black Hyundai along Highway 74 while the man she called, Fred Frady, called Kings Mountain Police, who notified Shelby Police and led to Roof's arrest, the station reported.

Roof, 21, is accused of opening fire at a Bible study meeting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston at around 9 p.m. Wednesday, killing nine people, including the church pastor, the Rev. Clementa C. Pinckney, who is also a state senator.
From NBC News.

To be clear, I don't presume, at this point, that Roof is definitely guilty or definitely innocent. Police identified him as a suspect, for reasons I don't know, and made the information public.  That question depends upon the evidence that was used to identify the suspect.  But, there is no doubt that sharing information about the person who they suspected widely and publicly was pivotal to apprehending their suspect who was hours of driving and a state line away from the scene of the crime.

Earlier reports had attributed the arrest to an apparently random traffic stop, but it turns out from this report that the stop wasn't nearly as random as it was first described as being.

09 December 2014

The CIA Tortured People and It Didn't Produce Useful Information

A slightly longer summary of the U.S. Senate report on the subject is found here and at the New York Times.  Lawfare also covers the report with links to the original documents.

08 August 2014

The Case For Atrocity Prevention On A Budget

Saving The Yazidis

Yesterday, President Obama authorized the U.S. military to make airdrops of food and water supplies, and airstrikes in the part of Iraq under the control of the Islamic State that has de facto political control of most of Northern and Western Iraq and Eastern Syria.  Before taking action, he obtained the permission of the elected civilian Iraqi government that the U.S. and its allies installed in the wake of the Iraq War that deposed the Baathist regime of dictator Saddam Hussein, to take action in Iraqi territory.

The mission was carried out with five aircraft.  A large C-17 military cargo plane and two smaller C-130 military cargo planes dropped 72 bundles of food and water containing a total of 5,300 gallons of drinking water and 8,000 pre-prepared military ration meals over about 15 minutes in a target drop area.  Two F/A-18 fighter jets (the main kind of jet fighters deployed on aircraft carriers) escorted the cargo planes and bombed selected Islamic State military targets in the vicinity.

President Obama did this to protect members of the Yazidi religious minority trapped in Sinjar Mountain without food and water facing imminent slaughter by fundamentalist Sunni Islamist fighters from the Islamic State.  Stopping an imminent atrocity that we had the power to prevent from happening was a central justification for the United States to take some steps, however modest, to help.  The Yazidi community had previously relied regional Kurdish government militias to protect them, but the Islamic State had outgunned the Kurds in this instance, which is in the heart of the territory that they claim as their own.

The Islamic State openly acknowledges that one of its objectives is the extermination or exile from its territory ("ethnic cleansing to use the term used by Serbs in the war in Bosnia) of the Yazidi people.  Their fundamentalist reading of Islamic law calls this objective a religiously required and righteously moral  jihad. The rest of the world and international law, however, consider any efforts to carry out these objectives by the Islamic State to be the war crimes of genocide and of the disproportionate slaughter of civilians, because killing these non-combatants civilians serves no legitimate military objective.

President Obama also did this protect the safety of U.S. humanitarian aide workers and U.S. diplomats at a U.S. consulate in the vicinity, but this justification was secondary.

The U.S. could have simply brought U.S. citizens in the region into the consulate, holed up there with protection from a beefed up Marine Guard Unit, and extracted the people in the consulate if it appeared that this modern fortress would not hold, while leaving the locals to fight their own battles without any U.S. intervention.

The United States has done many times in the past at locations around the world.  An evacuation of this kind from the U.S. embassy in Vietnam in the final days of the Vietnam War was famously captured by news photographers. A 2003 Hollywood movie on this theme called "Tears of the Sun" portraying an effort to make this kind of extraction in an African country that was falling apart that famously illustrated the moral problems with this kind of policy.  This week's episode of international intervention by President Obama, however, is one of the first times in recent memory in U.S. history that the U.S. has taken action to address the moral problems with its standard evacuate its own and don't intervene protocol in these situations.

Who Are The Yazidi and Why Does The Islamic State Want To Slaughter Them?

While it doesn't really matter much to the larger issue of U.S. policy towards preventing atrocities like the Islamic State's attempt to slaughter the Yazidi people, it is worth a moment to familiarize ourselves with who they are and why the Islamic State wants to kill them.

From the point of view of their fundamentalist Sunni Muslim religious doctrine, the Islamic State is justified in its genocide of these people.  Islamic law calls for Muslim communities to allow other "People of the Book" (i.e. Christians and Jews) to be tolerated on a subordinate basis, but demands the conversion or extermination of pagans and heretic Muslims.  But, the Yazidi are clearly not "People of the Book."  And, in the interests of expediency and terrorizing dissenters, the Islamic State, in  the honeymoon period at the dawn of its regime, has focused on the extermination strategy, rather than the conversion approach.

The Yazidi people's religion is an offshoot of Zorastrianism, with a strongly gnostic character and borrowing from other pagan religious traditions of Mesopotamia.  There are about 700,000 Yazidi people in the world, about 500,000 in Iraq (mostly in Ninevah province in an area near the Kurdish-Arab ethnic boundary in that Northwestern Iraqi province), about abut 35,000 in Armenia, about 18,000 in Tiblisi, Georgia (with another 2,000 elsewhere in Georgia), and about 105,000 in a diaspora mostly in Germany, Russia and Sweden.

Gnosticism is a mystical metaphysical belief system that was influential particularly among Neo-Platonistic philosophers and early Christian sects of the classical Greco-Roman era in the Eastern Mediterranean that lost the struggle to become the orthodox interpretation of Christianity among early Christian sectors that considered each other to be mutually heretical.

Zoroastrianism was the predominant religion of Iran (known as Persia at the time) from ca. 1000 BCE to about 650 CE, and communities that practiced this religion were common throughout the classical Greco-Roman era in Anatolia, Babylon and Central Asia.

Zoroastrianism is a likely religious source of ideas that would give rise to Christian metaphysical understandings of the world we live in as a battle ground between the forces of Good, led by God in Heaven, and the forces of evil, led by Satan in Hell, who send angels, prophets, Jesus and demons into the world to do their bidding.  These ideas probably made their way into Christianity, not directly, but through Jews returning to the Levant from a period of exile in Babylon where they would have been exposed to Zoroastrianism who incorporated these ideas into one of more Jewish sects from which Christianity emerged.  These Zoroastrian influences had little impact, however on the sects of Judaism that would go on to found modern Rabbinic Judaism after the fall of the Second Jewish Temple in 70 CE.

In addition to the Zoroastrian influenced Yazidi people mostly from Northern Iraq in the vicinity, two relatively "purely Zoroastrian" faiths remain.  The Parsi community, which migrated to India from the Persian capitol of Pars in the wake of the initial mass forced conversion to Islam in Persia ca. 700-900 CE, and the Irani community, who migrated to India from Iran ca. 1500-1700 CE, in the wake of a crackdown on relict Zoroastrian communities by a later Islamic ruler in Persia.

Today, fewer than 1 million of the 7046 million people on Earth are either Zoroastrian or Yazidi: the 700,000 people who share the Yazidi faith (which is sufficiently far from its Zoroastrian influences to be considered a separate religion from it) and the 125,000 to 300,000 members of Zoroastrian sects.  These Zoroastrians are found today in India (ca. half of the world total), Iran (ca. 1/6th), Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (ca. 1/8th in these three countries combined), various English speaking countries around the world (about 1/5th of the world total), and small communities in Singapore and the Gulf States (about 1/20th).

The Case For Atrocity Prevention On A Budget

We Are Regularly Aware of Atrocities That Are Imminent Or In Progress

The modern reality is that telecommunications and widespread global travel, communication and commerce brings news of imminent atrocities or atrocities in progress around the world to the attention of well informed Americans several times a year.

We knew about the Hutu genocide directed at Tutsi people in Burundi as it was about to happen and started to happen.  We were aware of the Boko Haram capture of hundreds of school girls in Northern Nigeria before many people in Lagos did and have also heard promptly about the many instances in which Boko Haram has slaughtered whole villages in Northern Nigeria.  We have witnessed Syria and Libya use aircraft to bomb their own civilian populations, and promptly witnessed Syria use chemical weapons on its own people in a way that did not discriminate between soldiers and civilians - we intervened in Libya under Hilary Clinton's leadership as Secretary of State, but did not in Syria, in order to avoid crossing Russia which deployed war ships to the Syrian coast to discourage Western intervention in the conflict.

Together With Our Allies, We Have The Ability To Stop Many Individual Atrocities

The United States has, by far, the most powerful military force in the world.  It has the largest and most advanced air force and is the only country with a significant fleet of operational stealth aircraft.  It has the largest blue sea navy in the world by war, and the greatest power to use that navy to establish bases for its troops and aircraft and missiles far from its own territory.  It is rivaled only by Russia in its nuclear arsenal.

Only China has more tanks (although, surprisingly, Syria is second to the United States in that respect).  Also, only China has more active duty soldiers, despite the fact that the U.S. has about a third fewer active duty soldiers than it did during the Cold War, and has a wealth of veteran officers and non-commissioned officers with wartime experience and training that rivals any other military in the world.

The budget of the United States military is the largest in the world and rivals or exceeds the military budgets of the rest of the world combined.  Our intelligence resources are second to none.

The U.S. also has a great many allies in the world, many of whom are willing to offer up their assistance and military resources as part of coalitions with the U.S. to advance uncontroversial missions, and the U.S. together with its developed world allies, collectively, wield immense economic power in the global economy.  The money that third world despots have available to fund their own military organizations comes mostly from their share of profits from the domestic operations of multinational companies based in the developed world, from sovereign wealth funds invested in developed world economies or in developing economies other than their own through international financial markets in developed world economies, and through direct military aid and loans to these countries.

Even if the U.S. cannot unilaterally sanction sovereign bad actors in the world economy effectively with economic sanctions, the community of first world nations, collectively, if they chose to do so, collective do have economic control over the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, the atrocities that we do learn about almost always take place in smallish (compared to the United States or the European Union or China or India, for example), third world or developing world countries with non-democratic governments with regimes that leave little to find worth respecting, other than their bare sovereignty.

We don't intervene in this atrocities, however, most of the time, out of a lack of direct national interest, a fear that we will end up footing an unaffordable bill in the lives of our soldiers and treasure, to become a "World Policeman" that we are not politically willing to pay, and a fear that intervention will impair the benefits we and our allies receive from the principle of absolute national sovereignty, transforming civil wars and insurgencies across the globe into a Pandora's box unleashed to international wars.

Devoting A Measured Amount of Resources To Atrocity Prevention As An Express, Secondary Mission Of Our National Defense And Intelligence Establishment Is In Our National Interest.

I believe that we can do better, and that it is in our interest to do so.

We can't do everything as a world policeman, but we could certainly set aside 1%-2% of the defense and intelligence budget ($7-$14 billion a year plus contributions from allies who would join us in this venture, with perhaps 15,000 to 30,000 active duty soldiers and appropriate weapons systems, vehicles and gear for their missions), together with no additional cost or low additional cost assistance from other national security resources (such as spy satellites), for a military, intelligence, law enforcement, and humanitarian aid force that had as its primary mission preventing atrocities due to military force or natural disaster, intervening to prevent atrocities in progress, and holding the war criminal perpetrators of atrocities accountable.

This force wouldn't be large enough to effect regime change, or serve as long term peacekeepers as the U.N. Blue Helmet forces do, but it would be enough to rapidly intervene in international crisis situations much like police, firemen, and EMTs do domestically.  Even a tiny force of a five planes and perhaps a couple of hundred active duty servicemen was enough to make all the temporary but critical difference that may have saved thousands of lives for the Yazidis in a moment of crisis this week, for example.

This narrow mission - limited to war crimes and national disasters - would also provide a limiting principle to this exception to the general principle of national sovereignty that would prevent the general rule from being too badly compromised.  This would be akin to the domestic violence and child abuse and neglect exceptions to the general rule of a family's right to privacy in its own home and autonomy and religious freedom in how the members of that family raise their children.  This narrow mission would also help to keep this agency popular politically, both at home with voters and abroad with allies.

This agency could be mobilized by the President in times of war for other national defense missions, much like the Coast Guard, the National Guard, and the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps reserve units.  So, this spending while being put to use and generating a corp of people with real life conflict experience, would be available if necessary.  And, honestly, a huge percentage of the U.S. military (certainly more than 1%-2%) is training (often for missions that are highly unlikely to every happen), rather than involved in carrying out any other military operations or objectives, at any given time.

The limited budget of the agency, contributions of third party economic resources, and limited mandate of the agency would allow the United States, through the agency, to be a world policeman, without falling down the slippery slope that would overextend American budgetary resources, expose American soldiers unreasonable to risks not justified in the narrowly construed national interest, or impair the general rule of sovereignty as a governing principle of international law.

In addition to assuaging our consciences and "saving the world", this agency would also enhance U.S. soft power by adding to U.S. goodwill, in the world through the horrors it prevented that it had no obligation to prevent, and by cementing a global perception of international leadership and of the U.S. as a first among equals in the world.

Furthermore, by establishing that there is someone in the world who will intervene to stop war crimes, save disaster victims, and punish war criminals, this agency would discourage war crimes as a political tactic and would mitigate the harm caused by natural disasters and in the process would make the world a safer place for American commerce and Americans around generally and would advance democracy.  World leaders who can't credibly threaten to commit war crimes with impunity are weaker and this strengthens the hands of the comparatively good guys around the world in their own domestic struggles for political power, making the world a better place for everyone and enhancing economic development in a way that ill supervised, tiny grant programs have failed to achieve.

Details: Some Guiding Principles

As a result of budget limitations, the agency might not have the ability to response to every incident in the world that its mandate would permit it to intervene in, and political realities like credible demands from nuclear armed countries that the agency not intervene in a particular conflict would prevent it from taking on other missions.

I would contemplate a threshold for taking on a mission that might result in three to six major war crime interventions in a particular year, perhaps another half a dozen or dozen potential war crime interventions that can be handled with much smaller teams (perhaps a platoon or smaller with a few civilian advisors), and perhaps half a dozen to a dozen full fledged natural disaster responses a year in cases where no other responders are adequate and deployments of a few specialists to assist otherwise adequate national natural disaster responses in a couple of dozen other cases.  A budget of $6-$13 billion a year, plus perhaps $1-6 billion of agency supporter and coalition support would probably be able to manage a level of operations on something like this order of magnitude.  If it couldn't, it would do less.  Someone in the organization would have an office devoted to finding other people to do work within the agency's mandate that it can't afford to do itself.

Typical missions would last anywhere from a few days to a few months.

I would imagine that the number of people at any given time being investigated, pursued, or prosecuted for war crimes might number in the dozens or low hundreds in an operation that might cost $100 million to $1,000 million a year, but might also generate revenues sporadically from asset forfeitures from convicted and suspected war criminals, and, like support for humanitarian natural disaster aid, it might generate national government financial support in cases from countries that might be uncomfortable supporting military action to support war crimes (e.g. from countries like German and Japan that have constitutions that disavow offensive military action, or from countries like Switzerland that prefer to remain a position of neutrality for the most part).

A number of missions would be outside the scope of this agency.

It would have a rapid reaction "emergency room" philosophy of stabilizing the patient, and would not be an agency in the business of providing "long term care" in the form of prolonged peace keeping missions or "nation building."

It would not respond to coups, even if they depose democratically elected regimes, that don't involve imminent risks of atrocities committed against large numbers of civilians.

It would not be an anti-terrorism force, even though there are parallels.  While one man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter, nobody wants to stand up for a war criminal or war crime, or to let people suffer and die as a result of a natural disaster.

It would operate with the kind of transparency found in well run civilian governmental agencies, rather than the shroud of secrecy associated with agencies that have a "national security" mission.  It would have a "white" budget, would not engage in covert operations, and would not be privy to state secrets other than brief tactical delays in disclosing operational information in order to facilitate current operations but not to protect methods and practices.  The only secrets would be those necessary to protect intelligence collection methods and practices from other national security oriented intelligence agencies.  Even then, this agency would operate on the basis of maximum transparency and would share any intelligence, used by it in a particular mission, that had to be redacted for the public with the intelligence agency counterparts of in all governments contributing to any particular mission.  It might even have a counterpart to the U.S. Secretary of State's website warning travelers and locals alike of disaster and conflict risks in various places.

The agency would have as its ultimate commander in chief at all times the President of the United States and would be an international organization permanently controlled and primarily funded by the United States government in which other governments could participate with voice and contractual promises but not a vote.  It would not be subject to United Nations or NATO control, or require their authorization to act.  Details of how missions would be authorized could be worked out.  It might be done by the President as a political decision, it might be done by vote of an agency board, it might be authorized or subject to conferral without a mandatory approval by the U.S. Senate or Congress, or some Congressional committee or foreign ally participants in the agency or the supporters of a particular mission, or it might call for a judge or multi-judge panel of a court to authorize missions at the request of a decision maker in a manner similar to an arrest warrant or search warrant or wiretap or grand jury indictment, but without the secrecy attendant with any of those tools - proceedings to request authorization to act would, as much as possible be public and certainly would not be classified.  Authorizations for missions would not themselves be specific enough to require tactical short term secrecy related to operational details.  The public discussion of a possible request to authorize a mission would be calculated (much like U.N. Security Council meetings) to deter war crimes and encourage remedial action and negotiation and disclosure of information that clarifies the situations on the part of countries suspected of committing war crimes.

In some ways it would have something of the character of the French foreign legion.  Individuals who are not citizens, nationals or permanent residents of the United States would be allowed to be employees, independent contractors and active duty or reserve military personnel in the agency.  But, military veterans of the agency receiving honorable discharges would have a right to U.S. citizenship and the same military benefits as U.S. veterans.  Foreign soldiers could swear allegiance to the agency's mission and to loyally obey the orders of its ex officio commander in chief, but not to the United States, or to its constitution or laws except insofar as they apply to the agency itself.

The agency's charter would permit up to 1/3rd of the agency's military personnel organized in national military units loaned from the military of another nation but subject to the agency's command and control, and would be allowed to receive up to 1/3rd of the agency's funding to come from supporting governments.  For example, perhaps Canada might provide a unit of 1,500 people trained in search and rescue operations and their gear at Canadian expense as part of a Canadian unit, for a couple of year commitment.  The unit would remain part of the Canadian military, but while serving with the agency, that Canadian unit's commanding officer would report to the general who was the commanding officer for the military personnel in the agency who in turn would report to the President of the United States.

The agency would also be permitted to borrow or rent military or civilian resources from non-U.S. governments on a long term or temporary basis.  "Significant" free borrowing or "significant" dramatically below reasonably equivalent value support, however, would count against the 1/3rd of agency funding from outside sources that was permitted under its charter.  Short term use of resources donated to it (e.g. use of an air field or port or vehicle for less than a month in connection with current missions), donated humanitarian supplies, volunteers not paid by their sponsoring governments, somewhat below fair market value economic arrangements, unrestricted donations from individual or corporate donors not affiliated with or controlled by a government, or donations under some threshold of dollar value per year, would not count as significant.  Bribes and kickbacks for individuals working at the agency would be strictly forbidden (no "tipping" allowed for rescuers except as authorized by express written policies of the organization).

U.S. posse comitatus limitations would apply to the agency just as they do to other U.S. military forces.

The United States and other supporting countries could (and would) delegate to the agency the authority to issue refugee visas and to transport refugees to the sponsoring countries in a safe and secure manner.  Each nation's delegations of immigration authority would be on its own terms and conditions and would be individually negotiated.  Thus, for example, Germany might offer to provide refugee status to 10,000 Yazaris assisted by the agency in the year 2014, subject to processing of applications by a German immigration official loaned by Germany to the agency for the mission to assist the Yazari people in the face of a threat from the Islamic State, while Indonesia might agree to provide refugee status to up to 2,000 Sunni Muslim sympathizers and deserters who renounce their military intentions in the same mission in the year 2013, subject to processing of applications by an Indonesian immigration official loans by Indonesia to the agency for the purposes of this mission.

Countries that regularly offered to assist with refugee visas like the United States, Canada and Sweden might have civilian immigration application processors on loan to the agency indefinitely who were authorized to handle delegated refugee authority for any incident that might come up and might have form refugee visa delegation contracts drawn up and agreed to by the agency and the supporting country so that no time was wasted haggling over boilerplate details and only mission specific authorizations would have to be communicated when emergencies come up.

Similarly, there could be standing agreements and arrangements in place with particular countries regarding support for the agency through donations of humanitarian aid supplies, use of air fields, or protocols for gaining permission to cross a nation's airspace in furtherance of a mission, or to provide natural disaster response in a country.  These standing agreements might even include standing agreements to provide certain kinds of assistance to the agency in certain situations without the prior authorization of elected officials or high level government officials.

The agency might organize a system of low cost or subsidized national disaster insurance for countries that don't have sufficient financial reserves, credit, political discipline, are too small, or do not have a sufficient lack of corruption, to allow them to finance their own national responses to natural disasters when they come up (e.g. the kinds of services that FEMA provides in the United States which the United States can afford without insurance because it is large enough to spread risk widely and is affluent and non-corrupt enough to pre-fund in a natural disaster reserve fund, tax and spend or to borrow funds to provide this kind of disaster assistance if necessary).

The agency would have a secondary mission of documenting atrocities and determining who was responsible in cases that it is unable to mobilize to prevent for whatever reason.  I suspect that the agency would prove to be able in practice to mount an effective economic sanction regime on countries that commit war crimes, but its credibility and first hand on the scene documentation of war crimes when it intervenes might be sufficient to help others mobilize economic sanctions.  On the other hand, I do think that it might be able to secure widespread cooperation from national governments to cooperate in prosecuting war criminals, much as the Israeli government has received considerable support from other national governments in its long running, dogged and tireless efforts to prosecute Nazi war criminals for the principle of the matter even when they are elderly and harmless now.

War criminals who were located would be prosecuted in the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, when available, a national court with jurisdiction (universal or specific) over the Defendant for the acts charged, or an agency military tribunal when neither the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal or a national court of the United States or a participating or cooperating country, is not available.  The relevant judicial body, as the case might be, would have authority to issue arrest warrants, to issue search warrants, to make extradition requests, to attach assets, etc. in countries with treaty relationships to the agency or a participating country taking action coordinated with the agency, and so on.  There would also be arrangements with the United States and/or other participating countries for the incarceration of war criminals convicted by these means.

Countries would have the option of signing on to a full fledged membership in the agency which would require it to consent in advance to any future authorized missions in their country, to cooperation with agency investigations and prosecutions of war criminals, and to other kinds of cooperation with and contributions to the agency.  Some of these might be particularized to particular relationships with individualized treaties in a manner a bit like individualized agreements in the Middle Ages of a notable lord to swear fealty to a more powerful sovereign lord.  They would have rights and privileges that would be respected by the lord and would be on the lord's "team" and not attacked by him without good cause, in exchange for recognizing the lord's authority to obtain certain kinds of support and cooperation from him.

24 October 2013

How Big Is The Drone War?

The United States has been fighting at least two CIA managed, covert wars that have been conducted with armed drones and possibly also with airstrikes from manned aircraft with guided munitions.  One has taken place principally in Northern Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan and has been targeted at both Taliban organizations and terrorist organizations there.  There other has taken place in Yemen and has been directed at terrorist organizations there.

There have been CIA led covert operations to capture and kill suspected terrorists elsewhere, but these operations are believed to have been comparatively small in scale.  Probably fewer than a thousand people have been captured and probably far fewer have been killed outside Northern Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.  With only a handful of exceptions, these other anti-terrorist covert operations do not seem to have involved armed drone strikes or airstrikes.

The Data

A recent post at the Lawfare blog summarizes what is known from open media sources about the militant and non-combatant civilian casualties that have been inflicted by U.S. armed drones and airstrikes in Pakistan and Yemen. The key conclusions reached are as follows:
In his widely discussed May 23 speech at the National Defense University, President Obama acknowledged that “much of the criticism about drone strikes—at home and abroad—understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There is a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties, and non-governmental reports.” This gap is wide indeed. The range of public estimates of civilian deaths from drone strikes, at the low end, includes the June 2011 statement by then-White House Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan that there had not been “a single collateral death” in a year as a result of American drones. At the other extreme, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a London-based non-profit organization, puts the number of civilian casualties between 84 and 193 in 2010, and between 52 and 146 in 2011—the years that together encapsulate the period in which Brennan said there had been none. . . .
Number of Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan in 2011
Militant
303 – 502
405
330 – 575
Civilian
57 – 65
30
52 – 146
72 – 155
Unknown
32 – 37
Total
392 – 604
435
447 – 660
456 – 661
Civilian Casualty Death Rate
9% – 17%
7%
8% – 33%
11% – 34%
. . . 
Number of Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan from 2004-Present 
Militant
1,585 – 2,733
Civilian
258 – 307
411 – 890
Unknown
196 – 330
Total
2,039 – 3,370
2,566 – 3,570
Civilian Casualty Death Rate
8% – 15%
12% – 35%
[In Yemen, from 2002 to the present the] NAF reports between 557 and 760 militant deaths and a total of 596 and 832 total casualties. LWJ puts AQAP deaths at 349 and civilian deaths at 82. And BIJ’s estimates are between 15 and 52 civilians killed and 239 and 349 total deaths as a result of “confirmed” drone strikes—and between 23 and 48 civilian casualties and 283 and 456 total casualties as a result of “possible” US drone strikes. 
Analysis

John Brennan's public statement that there was not a single collateral death from U.S. drones is nothing less than a bald faced intentional lie.  It isn't true.  And, given his position, he knew that it wasn't true at the time he said it and made a false statement regarding this fact with an intent to deceive the American and the global public.  It is so completely unbelievable and contrary to facts that are well established from multiple sources that it does not deserve to be taken seriously and undermines the credibility of the entire United States government on the issue.

The number of deaths from drone strikes is not insignificant.  The number of U.S. drone caused deaths in 2011 are similar in number, for example, to the number of justified homicides by law enforcement in the entire United States in any given year, and the percentage of "collateral damage" deaths from U.S. drone strikes far exceed those associated with justified homicides by law enforcement.  Far more "innocent" people are killed each year in drone strikes than in criminal justice based anti-terrorism activities, and the U.S. government provides no remedy to the families of these bystanders who are killed merely because they were in the vicinity of the drone strike target.

We have no good way to determine if there were any U.S. drone strikes or airstrikes in which no militants were killed due to bad intelligence, although this was consistent with the historical record in a small number of cases of overt military operations in Afghanistan by the United States involving similar kinds of strikes.  The CIA is not forthcoming on this issue and there is nothing that a member of the general public or journalist could do to determine who the CIA intended as a target in a particular strike - sometimes the target is obvious, but sometimes there may be a bona fide target who is not obvious, especially years into the campaign that has made it clear to people in the region that open affiliation with terrorist groups or the Taliban is likely to result in your death.  It is the answer to this question that Brennan may have used to deceive himself into thinking he was providing when he lied about collateral damage deaths.

On the other hand, the overall scale and pace of operations in the drone wars is not huge.  In Pakistan we are probably talking about no more than one or two drone strikes a day, or less.  In Yemen, the average pace of operations appears to be about one or two drone strikes a week, or less.  The volume of strikes is no so great that it is inconceivable that someone as senior as the President's National Security Advisor or a designated chief deputy in that office might review a dossier on every single proposed drone strike in advance and flag proposals at the highest level for approval or denial.  It isn't clear that this actually happens, although leaked White Papers from the Executive Office of the President suggest that something fairly similar does happen.  But, it could.  And, the number of people who are known by the U.S. government to be U.S. citizens who are at risk in these drone strikes is clearly so small that you could count them on your fingers, and these cases probably are reviewed by the President with his advisors in every single instance because of their rarity and political importance.

Footnote: Historical Background on the War on Terror

Afghanistan's monarchy unified the country in the 1700s and reigned until 1973 when a military coup established a Republic.  Pro-Soviet communists replaced the Republic in a 1978 coup and another Soviet backed coup with a leader more loyal to the Soviets was carried out in 1979.  A succession of civil wars ravaged Afghanistan almost continuously from then until 2001, leading to more than two million deaths and leading to the exile of more than six million refugees.  But, eventually the balance in this never ending, but ever mutating civil war had tipped decisively in favor of the strict Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime.  The Taliban controlled 90% of the territory of the country from 1998 to 2001, with an opposition group of remaining warlords called the "Northern Alliance" on the verge of total defeat in the country's remaining territory.

The drone wars in Pakistan and Yemen are basically a spin off from the overt war U.S. has fought an overt war against the Taliban and terrorist groups in Afghanistan since shortly after 9-11 in 2001.  When the Taliban was unable or unwilling to deliver up the 9-11 terrorists to the United States, Congress included the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had been just about to win a long civil war in Afghanistan as an enemy upon which it declared war in the Authorization For Use of Military Force (AUMF) that it adopted in the fall of 2001.

The term "war on terror" has sometimes been used to refer to all military activity and covert operations in support of the AUMF, although it is sometimes used instead to refer to AUMF operations other than the Afghan War itself (also called Operation Enduring Freedom), and to non-AUMF authorized anti-terrorism efforts domestic and foreign as well.  By any reasonable definition, however, the "drone wars" in Pakistan and Yemen clearly count as part of the war on terror.

The Northern Alliance, once they secured the post-9-11 assistance of the U.S. military and CIA, routed the Taliban in about two months, and the U.S. and an international coalition of military forces recruited by George W. Bush's administration to join them then assisted them in the process of reconstituting a civilian government for Afghanistan and providing military support for it from insurgent forces.

In the almost twelve years since then (the longest war in U.S. history other than the "Indian Wars" which is itself really a series of smaller domestic counterinsurgency campaigns over almost a century), the U.S., as part of an international coalition of military forces which has dwindled over time, has helped the new civilian regime's security forces fight a counterinsurgency operation against the remnants of the Taliban regime.

Many remnants of the Taliban regime and the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups that had operated in the territory it had once controlled sought greener pastures from a base of operations in Northern Pakistan.  For example, Osama bin Laden, the leader of the group that conducted the 9-11 attack, was killed in Pakistan by U.S. Special Forces during President Obama's first term of office.

President Obama has firmly declared that U.S. combat units and the bulk of other U.S. military forces will leave Afghan forces to fight the ongoing counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan by itself and will withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 (apart from an embassy guard and perhaps also some U.S. troops training Afghan security forces and/or operating a small U.S. military base or two in the country).  The administration has indicated that this withdrawal may happen sooner in 2014 than year end.

At first, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was quite modest in terms of number of troops, number of casualties, and funds expended despite its fairly great successes, and the CIA component of the action was significant.  In more recent years, CIA involvement in Afghanistan targeted operations has dwindled (although drone strike and airstrike operations in Pakistan have apparently been based in Afghanistan).  Meanwhile, Taliban activity and the number of coalition troops (increasingly predominantly American) have both surged, and developed into a more conventional counterinsurgency operation focused on the more restive Afghan provinces.  Some of this surge was made possible by a contemporaneous draw down of U.S. troop levels in Iraq (from which all U.S. troops except the Marine guard at the U.S. embassy there were withdraw early in President Obama's first term).  At the peak of U.S. involvement in this counterinsurgency action in Afghanistan there were more than 100,000 U.S. troops stationed in the country.

On balance the Afghan insurgents have been less effective militarily than those in Iraq.  U.S. casualties in Afghanistan (which is about the same size in population and geographically as Iraq and like Iraq has large swaths of territory that are virtually uninhabitable) have been lower, as have civilian casualties caused by all sides in the conflict.  Afghan suicide bombings and ambushes have been less effectual than in Iraq, and the civilian government has been more cohesive (which is not to say that it is not without serious internal conflicts).  Improvised explosive devices called IEDs (basically crude bombs often activated with cell phones or based upon weight) have been the characteristic means by which casualties have been inflicted on U.S. and coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Afghan IEDs have been less potent, but have also inflicted a larger share of insurgent caused casualties.  In the last couple of years, Afghan insurgents have also used deadly attacks by insurgents who have infiltrated the Afghan security forces and gains the trust of the coalition partners and loyal to the regime colleagues as an effective tactic.

The insurgents in Afghanistan are often young, ill equipped and ill trained.  Coalition forces have killed large numbers of them for each coalition soldier who has been killed in the campaign.  The insurgents have targeted their efforts on foreign military forces and Afghan security forces and key senior Afghan government regime targets.  The Coalition forces have tried to kill only Taliban militants and terrorist group members.  Both have killed civilians in the course of the campaign, sometimes by accident, sometimes due to lack of discipline on the part of coalition and/or insurgent fighters, and at least in the case of insurgents, sometimes by design to punish people who arguably have violated Islamic law or betrayed the Taliban by supporting the Coalition or the new Afghan government in some way or being associated with someone who has done so.
The share of conflict caused deaths which involve civilians is a much larger share of the people killed by the insurgents than of the people killed by Coalition and Afghan security forces.  But, Coalition forces have paid a much higher reputational cost for the civilian casualties that it has inflicted than the insurgents.

In Pakistan, the U.S. covert operation's relationship with Pakistani security and intelligence agencies has been tenuous.  There is an insurgency in Northern Pakistan that is completely separate from the one in Afghanistan.  In the Pakistani insurgency, the Taliban groups that fled Afghanistan have been enemies of the principal insurgent groups that the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies are trying to put down, so these Pakistani government agencies have been reluctant to give more than lip service to high level agreements between the U.S. and Pakistan to allow the U.S. to carry out its war on terror with CIA operatives and armed drones in Pakistan.  Rare instances in which Pakistani security forces have been killed by U.S. forces, often after being fired upon themselves, have exacerbated the tensions between Pakistani security forces and U.S. forces.

While the CIA led operation in Pakistan is officially "covert" and the operational details of the operation generally remain secret, its existence and the broad outlines of the campaign are an open secret and a major leak of secret communications related to the operation by a U.S. soldier have shed further light on what is going on there.  U.S. and foreign media sources have also been able to determine a great deal about the operation by turning to non-U.S. government sources for information on airstrikes or armed drone strikes and aggregating the information.  Several non-governmental organizations have made organized efforts to aggregate the available information to provide a coherent overall story of the drone war in Pakistan and the parallel conflict in Yemen.