Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

22 April 2026

Oil And Water

Scarcity of oil and rising petroleum prices, and climate change driven drought, are a big deal. But there are fairly clear paths by which our society can adapt to both. Neither would be apocalyptic, even though it would drive significant, visible changes in our day to day material culture.

These matters are particularly worth thinking about on Earth Day, which is today.

Oil

A very large share of all petroleum consumption is for transportation, mostly cars, trucks, construction vehicles, boats, ships, and trains. Advances in battery technology, and EV manufacturing and infrastructure are making electric vehicle alternatives to all of those technologically viable. And, advances in renewable energy and nuclear power can replace almost all of the fossil fuels in the electrical power grid. Coal is well on its way to be phased out in the United States and much of the developed world. Alaska and Hawaii are the only U.S. states where a significant share of electricity is generated from petroleum. Heat pumps are paving the way as an alternative to heating buildings that were historically heated with heating oil in the U.S. (mostly in the Northeast). 

Heat pumps and evaporative coolers (together with better insulation) also dramatically more energy efficient than conventional air conditioning, and renewables like solar and wind combined with modern batteries are particularly well suited to meet the demand for electricity to provide cooling.

Lots of fertilizers that are petroleum based could also become unaffordable, as they have as global petroleum supplies have been interrupted by U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, and its counterattacks. But organic farming techniques are now well established enough that these methods pose an obvious alternative path for agriculture is petroleum based fertilizers cease to become economically viable. Dutch models of intensive hydroponic agriculture suggests another off ramp from what is now considered conventional agriculture.

There are some applications where there aren't good alternatives to petroleum, like plastics and jet fuel. But these are such a small share of total petroleum consumption that these uses could be sustained, even if they become more expensive, even if petroleum prices soar and the supplies contract greatly. 

Of course, plastics and petroleum based fabrics like nylon, have only been in wide use for about sixty years. If plastic becomes too expensive, we can revert to using metal, glass, wood, and plant and animal fiber alternatives for applications like kitchen ware and trash bins that aren't uniquely suited to plastic, as traditional alternatives becomes more affordable relative to plastic with rising petroleum prices.

The changes wouldn't be geographically neutral. A collapse in demand for petroleum driving by electric vehicles and organic farming would crush the economies of petrostates in the Middle East, in Brunei, in Nigeria, in Venezuela, and in select states within the United States. West Virginia has already seen its coal based economy collapse, as have many historically coal mining economy based regions in Europe. Wyoming will follow suit. 

On the other hand, rare earth rich areas who supply key components of modern batteries and electronics, may see mineral economy booms.

Water

In most of the arid west, marginal agricultural activity consumes 80%-90% of all fresh water, while landscaping and golf courses consume about half of the rest of the fresh water. If water becomes scarce, entire regions can eliminate their water hungry landscaping, golf courses can close or become much more expensive or use artificial grass, and marginal agricultural operations can close.

In places like the Arabian Peninsula, Greece, Utah, and California, desalination technology might become more prominent as a water source, at least for high value municipal waters uses like drinking, cooking, and bathing, and gray water systems would use non-potable water (such as salt water from the ocean or salt water lakes) in applications where drinkability wasn't important, like flushing toilets.

Climate change that produces global warming ultimately both gives and takes away arable land. It renders much of the arid West unsuitable for farming and ranching, but makes places that were too cold for farming in the past, more suitable for it. Even when climate change doesn't actually change the total amount of arable land somewhere, it may change the kind of agriculture that is appropriate in that place.

Places that used to support subtropical orange groves may freeze more often and get dryer and become more suitable for cotton and the soft wheat varieties currently grown in places north of Florida in the American South. Crops now grown in the South might start to be grown in the Midwest. The abundant corn and wheat fields of the Great Plains and Midwest might move north to Canada. The Great Plains might transition from grain farming to cattle grazing.

I'm not a climate scientist. I don't have exact models of exactly when and where climate zones that are suitable for particular crops and livestock will relocate. But that's the basic concept.

The ongoing wars across the Sahel of Africa illustrate how ugly the process of having herders ecologically forced into historically horticultural land can be without strong geographically large states to force the transition to be made with money instead of violence can look. But with strong states that remove violence as a viable option, the transition, while still massively disruptive, could be less tragic in places like North America and Western Europe.

Similarly, the skiing industry might relocate from places like Colorado and Vermont to places like the Yukon and Alaska, in North American, and from places like the Alps in Europe to the northern Urals and the Himalayas in Eurasia.

Many Sunbelt communities in places like Arizona and Texas and Florida may see the waves of migration to avoid the cold winters of the north replaced by migration north to avoid the months of hundred degree plus water in the Sunbelt which are already commonplace in cities like Phoenix and Las Vegas, while the rust belt, with its winters made milder due to global warming and abundant fresh water, may start to look more attractive, and may attract mass return migrations.

One of these days, people in the Sunbelt may return to the traditional solution of having midday siestas, inside cooler, shaded adobe insulated homes, and becoming more active once the sun goes down and the air cools late into the evening.

Coastal communities will have to build dikes or lose land area as sea levels rise, and many will have to remake their architectural landscape in the face of increasingly severe storms, something that will hit the U.S. states of Florida and Louisiana and some islands in Oceania particularly hard.

Species limited to narrow microenvironment ranges will go extinct en masse, as human encroachment upon their habitats, ecological disruption, and human predation have already done to many species already.

How fast will it happen?

We are, in 2026, at about the place on this path that we thought we'd be in the year 2006, back in 1986. Events like the transitions to EVs and heat pumps and renewables and industrial scale organic farming happened, but it took about twice as long as futurists at the time thought that it would.

Climate change, on the other hand, is happening faster than expected by a decade or three. The changes that were initially looking like they would take a century to run their course are now looking like they will occur in half of that time.

Certainly, these transitions are medium to long run trends. They will probably takes decades more to run their course. These transitions probably won't be complete in my lifetime, although they probably will run their course in the lives of my children, or at least, in the lives of my future grandchildren. Less poetically, this time frame is about 30-90 years.

But these trends are both massive and inexorable, like plate tectonics but much, much faster. Fast enough that it will be visible in future tree ring records.

Conclusion

These are huge, traumatic changes that will force mass migrations and fundamental changes in people's day to day culture. But they don't mean the end of modern life as we know it either. And falling birthrates will eventually lead to smaller global and regional populations that put less strain on scarce water and fossil fuel resources.

08 March 2026

Indirect And Non-Obvious Effects Of The Iran War

The U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran (the NYT recaps the first week here) will have some indirect and non-obvious impacts, some of which mirror those from the Ukraine War.

* Iran is the sole significant outside military supplier for Russia in the Ukraine War (supplying drones) apart from North Korea which has supplied artillery rounds and some old school military equipment (and even about 10,000 troops) all of which have been subpar in quality and not very useful. The attacks on Iran are likely to divert existing supplies of drones to domestic military use from exports to Russia for use in counterstrikes, and are likely to somewhat degrade Iran's military production capabilities.

* Iran's counterattacks and continued war-like footing have driven up global oil prices dramatically, have had direct supply effects on most of Asia, and have damaged the oil production infrastructure in many Middle Eastern oil producing nations (including Saudi Arabia) which will reduce the capacity of these countries to produce oil in the short to medium term.

* This oil price shock, like many more before it, makes electric vehicles and public transportation more attractive to policy-makers and consumers alike, all over the world, potentially resulting in long-term systemic reduction in demand for oil.

* This mirrors the indirect effect of the Ukraine War in causing Europe to rush to find long term alternatives to oil and natural gas, resulting in wider adoption of EV vehicles, renewable energy sources for their power grids, and energy conservation measures. Again, this results in long-term systemic reductions in demand for oil and natural gas in one of the largest economically developed regions in the world.

* The Ukraine War also strengthened NATO, strengthened European cooperation, and caused re-militarization of European countries, especially those most at risk of attacks from Russia.

* Trump's inexplicable decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil sales to India, helps Russia in the Ukraine War despite the fact that Russia has used its intelligence resources to help target the U.S. and its allies for Iranian counterstrikes.

* Generally, an international war strengthens the regime attacks vis-a-vis external dissent (something that partially explains Russia's persistence in the Ukraine because the ongoing war there makes Putin more able to crush dissent against him at home). The protests of the Iranian people against its regime may suffer because of this effect. While the U.S. assassinated the Ayatollah, Iran's supreme leader, and many of the likely successors, the successor chosen for this reason is probably more likely to be a hardliner than the person who might have been chosen if the Ayatollah (who was 86 years old and close to 87 when he was killed by a U.S. strike) had died of natural causes as was likely in the near future.

* It seems unlikely that Iran will experience regime change, either in favor of a more democratic regime (Iran's democracy was actually more robust than a lot of regimes in the Middle East), or a monarchist restoration of the Shah. Pre-attack, this had been conceivable because of huge protests against the too conservative Shiite religious regime's social policies, despite the fact that Iran is actually quite religiously and ethnically diverse. Air strikes and missiles are rarely sufficient to secure regime change.

* The war probably delays steps that could be positive for the residents of Gaza.

* The war probably depletes military equipment supplies of Iran, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. and Israel, weakening the affected countries' capacity to fight further wars.

* In much the same way, the Ukraine War has dramatically depleted Russia's military resources (despite half the national budget in Russia being spent on the military and interest on loans to support it).

* The strikes in Iran are very likely to weaken the Republican Party's MAGA coalition, since MAGA campaigned on ending foreign wars of choice and then has repeatedly sought out those wars in Trump's second term, striking Venezuela, embargoing Cuba, striking Iran, and renewing a "drug war" in Mexico, Ecuador, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, which doesn't seem very calculated to actually do anything about drug abuse and drug related crime in the U.S. (as well as threatening Canada and Greenland). This coalition has already been beaten up in special elections and survey results and has a very thin majority (especially in the U.S. House).

* The inflation caused by rising oil prices, weakens support for Trump and the Republicans and strengthens Democrats chances in the 2026 midterm elections, which are just seven months away.

* The Iran War hasn't been particularly effective at diverting attention from the Epstein files which graphically reveal a coalition of child trafficking, corrupt, and Russian influenced officials in senior levels of politics, business, and academia, with Trump at the center of all of it as a highly culpable serial child rapist.

* The Venezuela invasion, by the way, seems inconclusive and certainly doesn't seem to be having much of an oil supply impact.

04 March 2026

Trump's Many Wars

Trump has declared wars on small boats in international waters in the Caribbean and the Pacific, claiming that they are drug boats, without proof, claiming a right to kill the people on them, contrary to international law.

Trump invaded Venezuela and seized its leader.

Trump has involved U.S. military forces in striking a Mexican cartel chief, leading to a bloodbath there.

Trump has unilaterally made strikes on Iran.

Trump has now deployed the U.S. military in Ecuador.

Trump is trying to impose an oil embargo on Cuba.

Trump deployed the National Guard to peaceful American cities.

Trump has deployed ICE as his private secret police to lawlessly terrorize American cities with scant regard to what they are actually legally authorized to do.

Trump has deployed U.S. forces to interdict Russia's shadow fleet of oil tankers trying to evade sanctions arising out of the Ukraine War. The Ukraine war itself is ongoing and Trump and blown hot and cold on it, prolonging the war by giving Putin hope.

Trump has threatened, but not yet struck, Greenland, Canada, and Panama.

And, while only metaphorical, Trump has declared trade wars on the entire world.

In most of these cases, Trump hasn't had even a whisper of Congressional authorization or legal authorization to act. The uses of force (and the tariffs) have violated domestic and international law. 

02 September 2025

Moving Space Force HQ From Colorado To Alabama Is Stupid

Trump is about to renew his efforts to move the headquarters of the Space Force, a fifth military service that he created, from Colorado (where the headquarters of the part of the Air Force bureaucracy that was transferred to the separate Space Force service was located before he created the Space Force), to Alabama. He tried to do so during his first term, but the moved got bogged down in Department of Defense red tape, and the Department of Defense reversed that decision during the Biden Administration. 

UPDATE:

President Trump said one of the main considerations for moving Space Command out of Colorado Springs is because Colorado voters largely vote by mail. 
“I will say I want to thank Colorado,” Trump said. “The problem I have with Colorado… they do mail-in voting, they went to all mail-in voting, so they have automatically crooked elections." 
Trump has long criticized voting by mail, and has cited the practice as a major reason he lost the 2020 election to Biden though he has not provided evidence of fraud emanating from mail-in ballots." . . . 
The Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce estimates that Space Command supports nearly 1,400 jobs and has a $1 billion impact on the Colorado Springs economy. Colorado has a significant Space Force presence, hosting half the bases with its major operations, including Peterson as well as Schriever Space Force Base in the Colorado Springs area and Buckley Space Force Base in Aurora. Nationally, the branch has more than 14,000 military and civilian members, who are called Guardians. 

Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser on Tuesday said his office was prepared to challenge in court Trump’s decision to move the command, though he did not elaborate the legal rationale for a lawsuit. . . . 
Huntsville, nicknamed Rocket City, has long been home to Redstone and NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center. The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command is also located in Huntsville, which drew its nickname because of its role in building the first rockets for the U.S. space program.

This is almost certainly not a legitimate reason for executive branch action under the Administrative Procedure Act. It is also an outrageously false claim.

Colorado Pols has more details.

END UPDATE

This is very on brand for Trump. He is making a call that places partisan politics above what is best for national security and wastes federal dollars.

Alabama is less attractive than Colorado to the civilian employees and contractors (who have a choice unlike active duty service members), so it won't attract the same quality work force. And, if one was going to move it away from Colorado one could have justified an HQ in Florida or Texas, which are also GOP strongholds, but like Colorado and Washington State, actually have a space industry (but see the material in the update above about Huntsville). Charitably, the best that can be said for it is that it provides economic development assistance to an underdeveloped part of the U.S.A. that supports him politically. Less charitably, it can be seen as a political payoff to Senator Tommy Tuberville who was getting in the way of Trump's Defense Department agenda. Less charitably still, it is a way for Trump to try to take action solely attributable to him that will become part of a military service's legacy once the bad decisions that went into that choice are long forgotten.

Tearing down old infrastructure to move it somewhere else is also just wasteful, while providing no benefits to national security. It is will probably require a billion or so dollars of unnecessary defense spending.

Of course, creating the "Space Force" was a bone headed idea in the first place. It undermines interservice cooperation, and honestly, it would have been better to be truly conservative and roll the Air Force back into the Army, rather than further dividing the Air Force. There might be a time when a Space Force makes sense, but that time is far in future.

Space Force's military role remains ill-defined and it remains a work in progress that is currently creating more confusion rather than a stronger U.S. military. Do we really need a new Space Force academy? Do we really need Space Force reserves? How is it doing anything that the Air Force did better? How many people are even in the Space Force? According to Google AI it apparently has 9,400 active duty "guardians" and about 4,600 civilians, making it far smaller than even the Coast Guard.

Trump's other wasteful symbolic military acts

Trump's other symbolic military initiatives are similarly dubious. His military birthday parade in the District of Columbia on June 14, that the Army aptly converted to a boring historical display from the third-world dictatorship show of force that he wanted in an act of malicious compliance, it was a wasteful and expensive flop.

The idea he has floated to change the name of the Department of Defense to the Department of War (as it was called during and before World War II), were also wastes of money, but at least are basically harmless. Indeed, the calling it the Department of War is also more honest.

Trump's intent to reassign Confederate names to U.S. military bases is fundamentally endorsing treason and insurrection and is patently un-American.

Trump's inappropriate domestic uses of the military

Trump's deployment of military force, mostly but not entirely, national guard troops, on the other hand, in addition to being a waste of money, are grossly improper, manufactured crises that threaten democracy, undermine federalism, are inappropriate for immigration enforcement, and are illegal.

The Courts rejected his efforts to criminalize illegal immigration by calling a large swath of the border a military base, and have rejected his characterization of illegal immigration as an "invasion" of the United States for constitutional purposes. Courts have also held that deportation flights he had the military make in violation of court orders were illegal.

Courts have shut down his military deployments to Los Angeles. As the New York Times explains:
A federal judge in California said President Trump broke the law by deploying roughly 5,000 Marines and National Guard troops to Los Angeles in June in response to immigration protests. The judge said on Tuesday that Mr. Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the Defense Department had violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prohibits using the military to enforce domestic law. The judge barred them from using the troops for any law-enforcement purpose, but put the order on hold for 10 days. The administration is expected to appeal. . . . 
The ruling was the latest in a series of judicial battles over claims of expansive unilateral powers by the administration. Mr. Trump and administration officials have deported people without due process, imposed widespread and unpopular tariffs and rolled back energy regulations, citing wartime and emergency powers that have been disputed in federal court. 
The president also declared crime in Washington, D.C., to be an emergency in order to send federal troops there in August, although crime rates in the nation’s capital have actually been falling and local officials said the deployment was not needed. Since then, Mr. Trump has publicly mused about sending the National Guard into other Democratic-led cities. Federal law gives the White House more latitude to conduct local law enforcement in the District of Columbia than in the states. . . .
The ruling places strict limits on the what the troops can do and applies only in California, although the judge noted that Mr. Trump and Mr. Hegseth “have stated their intention” to use Guard troops as a “national police force with the president as its chief.” Gov. Gavin Newsom of California praised the decision, saying Mr. Trump’s efforts were “illegal, authoritarian, and must be stopped in every courtroom across this country.”

Other bad defense department decisions.

These aren't the only bad defense department decisions he's made. He's banned books at the military academies (eventually rescinding all but a few of those bans). 

He wiped all mention of women and minorities who contributed to the U.S. military on government websites (another decision he has mostly backed down from in the face of court action and bad P.R.). 

He's systemically fired or removed from command women and minorities whom he has called "DEI hires" while putting in place less qualified individuals chosen for political loyalty. 

He's baselessly fired transgender troops contrary to their civil rights and denied them their legitimate benefits for being laid off and having served with distinction.

He's purged the ranks of generals and admirals and national intelligence officials to replace them with political loyalists. Trump's major appointments in the defense and national intelligence sectors have involved woefully unqualified people who have made major public blunders.

His openly revenge oriented revocations of security clearances and security details for various officials has been disgraceful.

The mixed bag of Trump's military deployments and threats abroad.

Trump's deployment of U.S. forces have been a mixed bag at best.

Trump wasn't wrong to continue Biden's policy of militarily engaging the Iranian backed Houthi rebels in Yemen who have been using advanced anti-ship missiles from Iran to interrupt maritime commerce in acts of piracy that they claim are in support of Gaza but really have nothing to do with it. But then, he just lost interest and ended U.S. involvement.

Trump wasn't wrong to provide some extra military support to Israel's raids on Iran to thwart its nuclear capabilities, although the B-2 bomber strikes he made were less effective than might have been hoped. And, of course, this is a problem of his own making created when he pulled the U.S. out of President Obama's deal with Iran to end its nuclear weapons program.

Trump, in his first term, set up Biden for failure, and the Afghan government installed by the U.S. and its allies for collapse, by negotiating with the Taliban for a U.S. withdrawal that left the Afghan government out of the loop and left Biden holding the bag when he took office, just a month or so before the scheduled pull out date. And, in his second term, Trump has broken faith with Afghan citizens who served U.S. forces in Afghanistan at great risk to their own lives by trying to revoke the immigration protections that the Biden Administration and his own administration in his first term provided to them.

Trump has been indecisive, has wrecked our alliances, has taken absurd and counterfactual positions, and has played into Russia's hand with respect to the Ukraine War, even though with immense bipartisan political pressure from Congress and from the Defense Department, he hasn't entirely abandoned it.

Trump's utter abandonment of Africa, ending U.S. Aid in a way that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and will kill millions, planning to close all U.S. embassies there, and imposing tariffs upon it, has basically ceded the entire continent to China.

Trump has been less firm than he might have been in the Philippines-China clashes in the South China Sea caused by Chinese Coast Guard harassment of Filipino military and civilian shipping in places that international law has declared to be international waters.

Trump's response to the situation in Israel with Gaza has ranged from rudderless to absurd with his call to vacate Gaza and turn it into a Trump owned beach resort. By floating the proposal without even consulting his advisors, he has undermined U.S. credibility on the issue.

Trump's deployment of naval forces towards Venezuela seems to be an attempt to manufacture a war. His early threats to invade Greenland and Panama and Mexico, contrary to the sovereignty of a NATO member, to treaty obligations, and to international law, and to annex Canada, have likewise been toddler level moves that have undermined U.S. credibility in foreign affairs and turned us into a global menace.

The mixed bag of Trump's procurement decisions

Trump's military procurement decisions have also been a mixed bag.

The cancelation of the M10 Booker light tank (that the Army refused to call a tank) was a good move. Cancelling the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle for the Army (one of the best procurement decisions that the Army and Marine Corps have made for ages), while keeping the Army's buy of the obviously bad Infantry Squad Vehicle that ignores all of the lessons the Army learned in Iraq and Afghanistan was a very bad move.

Cancelling the Army's successor to the M113 was mostly a good move, but leaves the Army without a next generation medical transport and field hospital vehicle, even though other parts of that buy were unwise. Progress on an Osprey-like tilt wing successor to the Blackhawk helicopter in the Army is positive. Upgrading Army small arms makes sense.

The decision to boost purchases of the B-21 Raider and the F-47 Air Force fighter (to replace the F-35A) aren't horrible decisions, nor is the decision to continue the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (a.k.a. Loyal Wingman drone) program. Looking at ways to use cargo aircraft as bombers or missile launching platforms also makes sense. This administration's continued failure to recognize the need to have a close air support aircraft (shared with past administrations), however, even if the A-10 is just too old, wasn't wise. Trump's absurd attempt to play aerospace engineer and claim that the F-47 really needs twin engines, however, is more toddler level governance.

A focus on improving U.S. air defenses in a program known as the Golden Dome (playing on Israel's Iron Dome), on ramping up U.S. drone production, and on rushing to get drone defense resources fielded aren't wrong. Developing hypersonic missiles also makes sense. 

Developing new anti-ship tactical nuclear missiles, however, is a bad call and doesn't meet a real military need since existing anti-ship missiles are more than adequate to sink any ship in existence.

The decision to fund development of Elon Musk's SpaceX Rocket Cargo program which is technologically challenging, doesn't have a proven track record of quality control, and doesn't meet an urgent need, is less wise. This contract is just political payback.

It is honestly still hard to tell, more than seven months into the administration, what it's naval policy is. The Navy is appropriately looking at a major increase in unmanned ships and submarines, and at containerized anti-ship missiles for ships that wouldn't ordinarily have any missiles. Is the successor to the F-35C on or off? Is the Constellation class frigate on or off? Where is the Littoral Combat Ship program? Do we really need more old model Arleigh Burke destroyers? Does spending big bucks on maintaining a large scale amphibious attack capability really make sense?

Trump has talked big about using the U.S. military against cartels in Latin America, but the Department of Defense has apparently done nothing to prepare for this historically law enforcement and Coast Guard mission.

22 August 2025

Time Is On Ukraine's Side

An article in the New Yorker entitled "What It Would Actually Take to End the War in Ukraine" gets it exactly backward with in subheading that says:
With Ukraine drained by more than three years of fighting, time is on the side of Vladimir Putin.
Ukraine has held out as long as it had because it has Western allies resupplying with good quality (although not state of the art) military equipment. So, Ukrainian military equipment losses can be replaced. And, in general, a defender can inflict many times as much damage on an invader as an invader can on a defender (as reflected in the two country's respective military losses to date). As long as Western Europe sees Ukraine's survival as something that is in their interest (and it is hard to imagine circumstances when they wouldn't), Ukraine will not run out of modern military weapons.

Ukraine also can't just voluntarily stop the war without losing their country, so their commitment to keep fighting is higher. 

Russia has much less capacity to resupply itself from its own factories, with only North Korea (whose arms and munitions are of substandard quality) and Iran (who has only supplied some narrow types of drones and is distracted by war with Israel) willing to sell it arms. Russia is in grave peril in a time frame of six to twelve months or so, of basically completely running out of almost all of its tanks (even museum relics from the 1950s and 1960s), artillery batteries, other armored ground vehicles, guided missiles, and advanced drones over the next year. And, Russia is already is using artillery shells and less advanced drones as quickly as it can make or import them, because it has no inventories of them left. Russia is also, slowly but surely, seeing its supply of warplanes eroded, and has suffered some modest losses to its navy as well with its Black Sea fleet basically emasculated and forced to retreat to safety.

For Russia, this war is a luxury that it can stop at any time with no consequences except sunk costs and shame (and with the benefits that would come from relaxed sanctions and an end to military strikes on its roads, bridges, railroads, and oil and gas infrastructure). Furthermore, since Russia's war is driven almost entirely by the personal ambitions of Vladimir Putin, if he dies or is incapacitated or loses power, Russia's impetus for the war would end promptly, while Ukraine would continue its fight without missing a beat, even if President Zelensky was killed.

In a war of attrition, Russia not only loses, but ceases to become a threat to any other country in the short to medium term.

04 August 2025

Military Technology Musings

Nuclear Weapons

Most of the nuclear weapons in the world are H-bombs (which create a nuclear fusion explosion from heavy hydrogen) and ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that carry H-bombs) with multiple warheads that spread out over a large area, and a much greater explosive power than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombs (that created a nuclear fission explosion from uranium) that were the first and only time that nuclear weapons were used in combat in 80 years ago.

The problem with one of these typical weapons in nuclear arsenals worldwide is that blowing up everyone and everything in a major metropolitan area, irradiating that area for many years, doing significant harm to the global environmental, and risking a counterattack in kind from other nuclear powers under the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, is almost never a militarily useful thing to do. We justify them primarily under the MAD doctrine as a way to discouraging anyone from ever using nuclear weapons.

Even for extreme military missions like "bomb Mecca", or destroying the headquarters of an enemy government in a capital where its top leaders are located, or destroying a large military base isolated from civilian populations, or penetrating deep bunkers (such as a North Korean or Iranian nuclear facility or an ICBM missile base or an underground submarine base in China), a single warhead much less potent than a typical U.S. ICBM or SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile) and closer in explosive power to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bombs, are more than adequate in terms of explosive power.

Really, the only mission for which such powerful weapons make any military sense is planetary defense, to break up a large incoming meteor or comet into small enough pieces to burn up in the atmosphere before doing serious damage, or to divert an incoming meteor or comet from a collision course with Earth, in the basically oxygen free environment of deep space.

Indeed, one of the main reasons that nuclear weapons haven't been used again for 80 years, despite the fact that quite a few countries now have them, is precisely because they aren't a good fit to any military objectives, and not because the countries that have them been particularly ethical.

Tactical nuclear weapons, such as the backpack sized "Davy Crocket" bomb from Cold War era, are another matter. These can be as potent as, or perhaps ten times as potent as the largest conventional missiles and bombs, but can be five hundred times less massive. This makes them the right size to bust deep bunkers, sink aircraft carriers and other large warships, or destroy a large dam, bridge, or military base, or a dictator's palace while the dictator and his top lieutenants are in residence, with a single blow. This could be delivered using a small hypersonic missile, or small fast supercavitating torpedo, or small stealthy drone, or a guided bomb delivered with a stealth warplane, or by special forces soldiers disguised in a civilian boat or car or ATV, that can more easily evade air defenses that could more easily intercept a conventional sized missile or conventional bomber aircraft. If one could make a tactical nuclear weapon with a much smaller yield than even the 10-20 kiloton Davy Crocket bomb, one would even use it to make much smaller anti-armor/anti-ship/anti-fortifications weapons - with a four to ten pound mini-missile doing the damage of the two thousand pound bombs that are the largest typically used by fighter aircraft and as conventional ship and submarine launched missiles.

But, the much smaller size of the bomb is less likely to provoke a civilization ending counterattack, and, particularly if it is an H-bomb that doesn't spread uranium or plutonium all over the place, leaves a much smaller area irradiated for a shorter time period and doesn't do nearly as much damage to the global environment.

What this means for policy is another matter. 

On one hand, it suggests that investing in large numbers of multiple kinds of large modernized nuclear missiles and bombs doesn't really make sense. Optimally, one wants no more of them than is necessary to present a credible MAD deterrent. Why, for example, should you have land based ICBMs at all, when they turn those bases into first priority targets in World War III and are easier to use missile defenses against than SLBMs and nuclear bombs delivered by stealth aircraft or shorter range hypersonic missiles launched from aircraft.

On the other hand, if you create a significant arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly if other nations and insurgent groups follow your example, it is much more likely that they will actually be used in war. And, honestly, existing conventional bombs are more than adequate to destroy or disable that most heavily armored vehicles and all but the deepest and most secure bunkers, without crossing the line of normalizing the use of nuclear weapons in war.

Nuclear Batteries

Nuclear power for military applications has only been used for military submarines and large ships like aircraft carriers and mega-cruisers, in part, because they have been hard to scale down in size, and in part, because the nuclear materials in them could be used by an enemy, if captured, to make nuclear weapons.

But nuclear batteries, using lighter radioactive isotopes than uranium and plutonium (like thorium), that are not nearly as suitable for use in nuclear weapons, share the immense energy density of existing nuclear power plants on submarines (which use only 10 kg of fuel for decades), and large warships, and can be scaled down to arbitrarily small sizes (e.g. a pacemaker or watch or single automobile). Nuclear waste from nuclear batteries using lighter isotopes is also reputedly easier to dispose of than uranium. This has tremendous (I hesitate to use this overused phrase but it's appropriate here) game changing potential to reduce the logistics burden of military units. 

In fiction, this is basically the innovation that makes Iron Man's suit possible. 

Nuclear batteries facilitate quieter, lower maintenance, all electric military systems that don't need to be refueled for years, and that can also use that spare power to recharge electric devices in the unit and military lasers and directed energy weapons, and they allow fuel supplies to be decentralized to individual vehicles, systems, and equipment items. It generates no smoke or emissions smells. Combined with night vision, IR sensors, and LIDAR these vehicles could operate without lights at night. If a ship with a nuclear battery were sunk, it wouldn't create an oil slick that would endanger sailors who abandoned ship. 

The logistics burden involved in providing water to troops could be reduced as well. In coastal areas and at sea, it could power a desalinator, at least for showers and cleaning use, even if it wasn't good enough to make tasty water for drinking. In deserts, it could power a device to extract clean water from the air. In jungles and forests, it could power a water purifier that would allow local water supplies to be used. It could also power heat pumps in places that were too hot or too cold.

No more tanker ships. Propeller and rotor driven aircraft could dispense with aerial refueling tankers. No more vulnerable, unarmored convoys carrying diesel fuel. No more vulnerable fuel depots. No more reliance of distant fuel supplies whose prices are influenced by foreign powers who may become adverse to you.

And, because nuclear batteries can be much more compact than conventional fossil fuel tanks or chemical batteries, without sacrificing range, there is one less thing in the military system which can be easily struck causing the vehicle or military system to explode from its own fuel, because nuclear batteries are a much smaller target and, if properly designed with this risk in mind, aren't necessarily explosive if hit with a high explosive round.

Things That Are Hard To Predict

The mix of drones (armed and unarmed), guided bomb and missiles, active defenses including but not limited to directed energy weapons and jammers, new materials that could make armor lighter and stronger, hypersonic missiles, prototype "invisibility" cloaks, claimed (but not demonstrated) sensors that can penetrate radar stealth, and the use of artificial intelligence to organize information in the fog of war, identify incoming targets and respond before a human could react, and guide drones and guided munitions without active direction from a human controller and guide sniper weapons more accurate, all combine to make the future of warfare hard to predict.

Active defenses, particularly as used by Ukraine and Israel in recent conflicts, and by U.S. naval ships, have made securing air superiority much more challenging, intercept something like 85-90% of incoming missiles and drones reversing the one shot, one kill trend established by the first guided weapons, and could be the only thing that rescues tanks and fixed forward operating bases from obsolescence (while allowing the use of less armor since threats only countered by heavier armor can be actively intercepted). 

And, these are only in the early days. There is plenty of room to make interceptor munitions less expensive (particularly with directed energy weapons), to make them and their associated sensors smaller, lighter, and more secure, to increase the percentage of incoming munitions that are intercepted, and to increase their range.

On the other hand, countermeasures to active defenses, like AI guided and wire guided suicide drones that make jamming ineffective, are being developed rapidly too, out of necessity. So far, suicide drones have been mostly crude modification of commercial, off the shelf quadcopters, but there is also plenty of room to make them quieter, harder to see, and to make them harder to discern with radar and electronic signals.

Part of what makes the future course of these technologies so hard to predict is the constant, rapid Red Queen hypothesis evolution of measures and countermeasures. 

For example, recent efforts to develop rail guns with unguided rounds that rely purely on kinetic energy without resort to explosives or guidance systems, which were set aside because they were too difficult technologically, may receive renewed attention for their immunity to active defenses based upon jamming, lasers, or other directed energy weapons (like microwaves), and may be possible to scale down in size as heavier armor is abandoned in favor of active defenses.

Armed drones are much smaller and cheaper than comparable manned warplanes, warships, submarines, and military ground vehicles, and can be used to take much greater risks since the smaller ones are expendable. They have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine War and in military encounters directly between Israel and Iran, and have been one of the primary weapons used in the war on terrorism carried out by the U.S. in the wake of 9/11. They can strike targets well beyond the range of slug throwing artillery, and can be effective in precisely striking the most vulnerable parts of moving targets whose exact location isn't known when they are launched, while reducing the risk of friendly fire.

So far, simple, remote controlled, flying drones have been predominant in military applications. But, we have seen glimpses of other possibilities. Large sophisticated drone fighter aircraft are smaller, cheaper, and capable of higher-G maneuvers and faster reaction times than manned fighter aircraft. Flying drones have been used to resupply troops in war zones in environments where there is too much enemy fire or the terrain is too difficult for conventional logistics convoys. Drone jet skis and speed boats filled with explosives have destroyed large warships in the Black Sea. Small, comparatively inexpensive, drone ships carrying anti-ship missiles in shipping containers have been successfully tested against target test ships. Small anti-personnel aerial drones carrying small arms or grenade sized munitions have been prototyped but not yet widely used, but could facilitate sniper-like tactics in conditions where these tactics were previously not viable.

Reconnaissance drones can identify enemy forces in ways that previously took much larger and more expensive helicopters, fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft, and satellites, at a cost and size that make them cost effective for even platoon or squad sized army units to use organically for themselves in real time. Coast guard cutters can use them to patrol far more of the sea at once, and more quickly and in more places at once, than any ship or boat could. Smaller battery powered reconnaissance drones can be similar in size, speed, and noise level to birds, making them harder to detect. The smallest insect-sized reconnaissance drones can enter buildings or clear anti-drone netting, undetected, aren't that expensive, are harder to shoot down if detected, and can be deployed in swarms. There have also been successful efforts to put cameras on actual roaches and other insects for tasks like locating survivors in the rubble of collapsed buildings. Small remotely monitored sensors can constantly monitor roads, bridges, fields, buildings, and ports with a much reduced risk of detection. And, unlike a human scout or forward observer, who is also easier to detect, they can't reveal many secrets, or create a POW hostage situation or casualty if they are captured.

Submarine drones can be on constant patrol for days or weeks for enemy armed submarines, sea mines, and enemy ships, or could follow enemy submarines to their hidden bases, while appearing to sensors like sea life. Submarine drones or mostly submerged drone ships can be used to smuggle supplies in interdicted waters, in the way that drug dealers have used them. Submarine suicide drones (or armed submarine drones) can be used to destroy enemy ships without being detected until it is too late, at distances far exceeding what is possible with a conventional torpedo.

Nuclear batteries could be used to create drones or remote sensors that can operate autonomously for years without human contact or maintenance.

It is hard to know what kind of balance and mix of technologies will emerge as experience and economics guide the choices that make sense as these technologies become more mature. 

For example, lots of drone and missile guidance systems (and military aircraft) are expensive to a significant extent, not because they are expensive to manufacture, but because a large premium is being paid for the intellectual property rights arising from the development process. So, a significant part of the cost barrier to their use is economic and could be addressed without any technological advancement (perhaps the military would be better off paying for R&D itself on a work for hire basis and retaining all of the intellectual property).

Things We Can Predict

This said, there are some predictions and conclusions that can be reached with some comfort:

* Tanks and conventional warships without active defenses are as obsolete against a near peer opponent as horse cavalry, warships with sails and cannons, swords, and bayonets. Howitzers and mortars throwing unguided slugs will follow soon.

* Large, mostly unarmored and undefended forward operating bases near "front lines" (such as they are), massed formations of ground troops and armored vehicles, and small pillbox type fortifications are obsolete tactics against near peer opponents.

* No armor, unaccompanied by active defenses, is effective against anti-armor weapons, which are increasingly inexpensive, light, and effective, making large, heavy military systems that rely on armor ineffective against near peer opponents. Armor pretty much only makes sense against enemy forces or insurgents or civilians with only small arms.

* The cost and availability of the weapons necessary to be effective, in a cost-effective way, against a big budget sovereign nation military force has greatly declined.

* National borders, national waters, and military tactics organized around front lines have limited relevance when long range strikes are widely available.

* Large nuclear weapons will continue to not be used because they don't serve useful military objectives.

* Biological weapons are unlikely to be widely used until they can be better controlled, because the risk of blow back to the user is great.

* Despite being lumped in with nuclear and biological weapons, chemical weapons, at least historically, have not been significantly more effective than conventional weapons, and have been amenable to effective countermeasures when they have been used like air sealed vehicles with positive air pressure, filters, protective clothing, and gas masks.

* Advances in modern military weapons have made great strides in destroying distant and armored targets, but drones, missiles, and guided bombs can't hold or control populated territory, which is one of the most common military objectives, without boots on the ground.

30 July 2025

Context For The Latest Episode Of The Cambodia-Thailand Conflict

Not so long ago, international wars were viewed as a thing of the past, after a long lull at the end of the 20th century (with the brief, but notable exception of the Gulf War in 1992, which was prompted by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), leaving only insurgencies and cross-border fights with military forces not sponsored by recognized sovereign countries. 

But, the 21st century has proved that this lull was only temporary. We've seen the Russia-Ukraine War (in 2014 and 2022 to the present), there have been military clashes as recently as this year between India and Pakistan, Israel and the U.S. have attacked Iran (which has also struck Israel), the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have recently engage the Houthi regime that is the de facto ruler of Southern Yemen after it attacked merchant ships off its coast, and there have been low intensity naval clashes between China and the Philippines in the past couple of years. A six day war between Cambodia and Thailand this month has added to that roster.

The latest round in a 118 year old border dispute related to a historic Hindu temple built by the Khmer Empire during what were the Middle Ages in Europe, near the current border between Cambodia and Thailand, led to a six day military conflict between the two countries that left at least 38 people dead and displaced at least 310,000 people, until a cease fire took hold yesterday. The two nations have had military clashes for hundreds of years, even before the ambiguous 1907 map that is at the root of this particular border dispute took hold. 
Shots were heard early on Thursday morning near Prasat Ta Muen Thom, an ancient temple on the disputed border between the two countries. Senior commanders from the Thai and Cambodian militaries agreed to de-escalate one of the bloodiest border conflicts between their nations in decades on Tuesday.The deal seemed to end, at least for now, [six] days of fighting that killed at least 38 people. More than 180,000 people in Thailand have evacuated from areas along the border, while in Cambodia, more than 130,000 people have fled their homes.

Each nation accused the other of firing first.

The Thai Army said on July 24 that Cambodia had fired rockets into civilian areas in four Thai provinces, prompting Thailand to send F-16 fighter jets to strike targets in Cambodia.

Cambodian officials said that Thai soldiers had opened fire on Cambodian troops first, at a temple claimed by both nations, called Prasat Ta Moan Thom by the Cambodians and Prasat Ta Muen Thom by the Thais. They said Cambodian forces returned fire some 15 minutes later.

The ownership of Prasat Ta Muen Thom / Prasat Ta Moan Thom is disputed by the two countries. Cambodia’s de facto leader, Hun Sen, claimed in a social media post that a Thai military commander had “started this war” by ordering the closure of the temple on Wednesday, and opening fire on Cambodian troops the next day. Thailand has accused Cambodia of starting the conflict.

The temple is in disputed territory, and people there speak Khmer, the official language of Cambodia, as well as Thai — highlighting the cultural overlap. The area is known for ruins from the Khmer Empire, which lasted from the ninth to the 15th century.

Arguments about where the border should be, and who owns the temples in the region, have led to decades of disputes. In 1962, the International Court of Justice awarded Cambodia sovereignty over the Preah Vihear Temple (known as Phra Viharn in Thailand), another temple about 95 miles away. In 2013, the court, the top judicial body of the United Nations, tried to clarify the 1962 decision. It said that Cambodia had sovereignty over the immediate area around that temple, but it left unresolved who controlled a larger disputed area. The border disputes can be traced to a 1907 map created during French colonial rule in Cambodia. The two countries interpret the map differently. Military fighting has broken out intermittently since 2008, but the last time that a major clash turned deadly was in 2011.

The two countries have had occasional military clashes and nationalist rivalries for hundreds of years.

The quoted material above (and below) is all from today's New York Times, but I have reordered the quoted material to be more readable, in this particularly poorly structured and edited article (which also includes duplicated sentences), and as a result, have not specifically noted where I omitted parts of the story. 

The cease fire was negotiated by Malaysian diplomats, with input from the U.S. and China.

The U.S. does not have particularly strong ties to either party in the conflict and wasn't directly involved in it, even though it claims to have participated in the peace negotiations, so news coverage of the conflict was relatively modest. But, the U.S. has historically favored Thailand, a constitutional monarchy which was one of the few countries never to fall to colonial powers, since it generally speaking sided with the West in the Cold War, over Cambodia, with its history of one of the most violent communist revolutions in history, which China has tended to favor.

An equally interesting aspect of the latest conflict is that Thailand's prime minister was suspended from office by a Thai court for controversial statements made not long before the shooting broke out, which is a political tactic that would be unavailable in most countries (but might be desirable if the grounds for it were suitably defined), in which the status of the prime minister would be primarily an issue for the parliament. Also, relatively few countries recognize the intermediate sanction of suspending a head of government without actually removing the head of government from office.
The border tensions have already contributed to a political crisis in Thailand: On July 1, a Thai court suspended the prime minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, because of comments she made about the dispute.

In June, Ms. Paetongtarn spoke by phone to Hun Sen, who is . . . Mr. Hun Manet’s father [Hun Manet has been the prime minister of Cambodia since 2023], to discuss the escalating border tensions. Mr. Hun Sen has had close ties to [Ms. Paetongtarn's] father, Thaksin Shinawatra, a former prime minister of Thailand and the leader of a powerful political dynasty, as well as one of the country’s richest men.

Mr. Hun Sen posted a recording of their call, in which Ms. Paetongtarn seemed to disparage Thailand’s powerful military and take a deferential tone. She called Mr. Hun Sen “uncle” and told him that she would “arrange” anything he wanted.

In response, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Bangkok to express their outrage. Although Ms. Paetongtarn apologized, she has faced pressure to resign.

25 July 2025

The Air Force Plans To Phase Out B-2 Bomber By 2030

In a continuing reshuffling of Department of Defense procurement under the Trump Administration, the Air Force now wants to retire the B-2 stealth bomber with the similar, but smaller and more modern B-21 stealth bomber, in just five years, rather than its previously planned 32 years from now. 

The current plan is to buy far more B-21s (at least 100) than the current fleet of B-2 bombers (which is under 20).

The B-21 is almost ready for prime time, having made its first flight in 2023,  and almost unprecedentedly for a project of this scale, is under budget. The lower cost is a result of accepting the limits of current technologies (which have still advanced significantly from the B-2) rather than trying to push beyond them, and of resisting the temptation to make the bomber supersonic or giving it air-to-air missile capabilities. It's smaller size also reduces the per bomber cost.

The B-21 will have a smaller bomb payload than the B-2, the B-1, or the B-52, despite having a similar global range. While the B-2 Bomber can carry two 30,000 pound GBU-57 MOP bunker buster bombs (the largest in U.S. service which it entered in 2011), a capability highlighted in a recent B-2 bomber strike on nuclear facilities in Iran, it will carry, at most, a single 22,000 pound "next generation penetrator" which can be delivered from a greater distance, from a platform that is more stealthy in the first place, and is more accurate, but has a smaller warhead. The 22,000 pound NGP is about the same size as the C-130 delivered MOAB GBU-43 bunker buster bomb.

Does this moderately degraded capability, that has been used only once and didn't exist until 2011 matter?

It would take about three B-21s to deliver the same amount of ordinance as one B-2. But the plan is to buy more than three times as many B-21s as the current fleet of B-2s. Even the 30,000 pound MOP bombs used in pairs in Iran did not, however, as briefly claimed after the strike, decisively destroy the deep nuclear facility bunkers there anyway.  

A tactical nuclear weapons, like the Cold War 51 pound Mk-54 Davey Crocket with a yield of 10-20 tons of TNT, could do the same, but would require crossing the threshold to using nuclear weapons. 

This would be a yield about 1,000 times smaller than the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in World War II. The Hiroshima A-Bomb weighed 9,700 pounds (including 64 kg of Uranium-235) producing a 13-18 kiloton yield, and the Nagasaki A-Bomb weighed 10,300 pounds (including 6.2 kg of Plutonium-239) producing a 19-23 kiloton yield.

Realistically, one of the main missions of the B-21 would be to launch anti-ship missiles against a feared large Chinese fleet trying to invade Taiwan, and for that mission, a 22,000 pound bomb load is more the sufficient and quantity matters more than quality.

The Air Force has just announced an earlier retirement of the B-2 bomber by 2030. This is the second time that this has happened. This budget driven decision means that “…new B-21 must replace—and not be additive to—much of the existing bomber fleet. The Air Force had previously planned to operate the B-1 and B-52 until 2040, and the B-2 to 2058.” In addition, the Air Force has almost zeroed B-2 modernization.  
This may eliminate the U.S. ability to deliver the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (GBU-57/B or MOP) which is by far the most effective U.S. conventional weapon against hard and very deeply buried targets. The B-2 bomber is the only U.S. bomber cleared to deliver the MOP. It is also the only current U.S. bomber that can penetrate advanced air defenses. 
At about the same time, the Air Force accelerated the development of the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP) which would be carried by the new B-21. The NGP will be significantly lighter (no more 22,000 pounds) compared to the MOP’s (30,000 pounds). It will be superior to the MOP in some important respects. It will have a standoff capability, which is very important against advanced air defenses and substantially greater accuracy. However, it is unclear that it will be equal much less superior to the MOP in attacking and destroying large, hard and very deeply buried facilities such as Fordow in Iran. Moreover, at this point the NGP is untested. 
. . . 
The NGP has 8,000 pounds less weight available for high explosives which is only about 20% of the weight of the MOP. This is usual for penetrators which have to be built very heavy and strong to survive rock and reinforced concrete penetration. In addition, a significant part of the NGP weight will be the rocket motor which will further reduce the weight available for high explosives. Thus, it is possible that the NGP will be less effective than the MOP against large, hard and very deeply buried targets such as Fordow.

The B-21 bomber, the world’s first sixth generation aircraft, is an enormous improvement over the B-2 in most respects. It clearly has much greater stealth. The Air Force has characterized its stealth level as “extremely low observable.” Reportedly, its radar cross section has been reduced from .1 square meter in the B-2 to either .0001 or .0004 in the B-21. This would greatly increase its ability to penetrate advanced air defenses. Its stealth is much more robust than the much older technology which was used in the B-2. This will substantially increase bomber combat availability. The aircraft carries advanced sensors and electronic warfare capabilities. The B-21 has an open systems architecture which will facilitate future upgrades. Northrop Gruman has done an incredibly good job in bringing the B-21 into existence actually under budget. When the contract award was announced in 2015, many doubted whether this was possible.

However, the B-21 was designed in a period of defense budget starvation under the Obama Administration. It was deliberately made less capable than it could have been. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz, wrote in his memoires that the Next Generation Bomber (NGB, sometimes called the 2018 bomber) “‘…had grown too big’ and was carrying too many missions and requirements. It was to have an air-to-air missile capability for self defense.” This original concept for the NGB was de facto terminated in 2008 although it was described as a delay. The need to minimize B-21 costs (no more than $550 million per aircraft in 2010 dollars) resulted in an adoption of a low technical risk strategy, a smaller bomber, no possibility of it ever having a supersonic capability and a production equipment limitation on the possible production rate. Some analysts believe that stealth must be combined with supersonic speed to deal with the long-term projected threat environment and that the number of penetrating bombers must be doubled.

The size and weight of a bomber has a significant impact on its costs. For most missions the B-21s bomb load is sufficient. However, good capabilities against hard and very deeply buried facilities require the maximum practical bomb load. 
. . . 
It is clear that the B-21 is significantly smaller and lighter than the B-2. (The B-2 itself is also substantially lighter and smaller than the other U.S. heavy bombers, the B-52s and B-1s). According to noted aviation journalist Bill Sweetman, “The B-21’s resemblance to the original B-2 bomber design is close, but it is a smaller aircraft, with a wingspan estimated at 132 ft. compared with the B-2’s 172 ft., and is approximately half the empty weight.” If so, this would make it an advanced medium bomber with intercontinental range. The payload of the B-21 is clearly limited compared to the bombers it is replacing. Sweetman and a number of other aerospace journalists have reported that the bomb load of the B-21 is about 20,000 pounds. Christian Orr, editor of the National Security Journal, writes, “If Mr. Sweetman’s estimates are accurate, that would cast serious doubt upon the newer warbird’s ability to carry the 30,000-lb. (14,000 kg) GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bomb immortalized by its usage in the Midnight Hammer strikes.”

There are many reports that the B-21 can carry a single MOP, but this appears to largely be speculation. There is no official confirmation of this and it appears unlikely. If the weapons load is limited to about 20,000 pounds, it cannot carry even a single MOP. There are reports of higher bomb load numbers for the B-21 but the limitation of the weight of the NGP to 22,000 pounds suggests that the lower estimates of the B-2 bomb load are more accurate.

Even if the B-21s were able to carry the MOP, they certainly would be unable to carry more than one compared to two on the B-2. The MOP was originally designed to be used two at a time to maximize the probability of target destruction.

From here. 

In other military procurement news, the U.S. Navy is extending the life of three cruisers from 2026 to 2030. The U.S. Army is adding four new Patriot Missile battalions. And, the U.S. Marine Corps has ordered 44 of its new air defense systems for about $32.52 million:

The MRIC (Medium-Range Intercept Capability) is a mobile and modular air defense system developed specifically for the U.S. Marine Corps to provide a medium-range intercept capability against a wide array of aerial threats. Designed to operate in expeditionary and contested environments, MRIC fills a critical capability gap between short-range systems like the Stinger missile and long-range assets such as Patriot. The system is capable of intercepting cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and indirect fire threats such as rockets, artillery shells, and mortars.

24 June 2025

Observations Related To The Latest Conflict With Iran

In a nutshell, the most recent military conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the U.S. can be summed up as follows:

* Iran is getting close to developing nuclear weapons.

* Iran wants to remove Israel from the face of the Earth and that is why it is developing nuclear weapons.

* Iran has not very long ago launched missile and drone attacks on Israel.

* The Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank in Israel, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are all Iranian proxy forces. Iran was deeply involved in facilitating the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel.

* Iran has had periodic military engagements with U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.

* Israel carried out a major airstrike on Iran, mostly using F-35I stealth fighters with conformal fuel tanks to boost their range allowing them strike and return without aerial refueling, targeting Iran's nuclear program and key individuals in that program. Many of these targets were successfully struck and/or killed. But, one of Iran's most important nuclear facilities is in a very deep bunker in Iran.

* The U.S. used seven B-2 stealth bombers and with two "bunker buster" bombs each, to strike this very deep bunker with Iranian nuclear facilities (although probably only setting it back a few months), and used one of these and other carrier based aircraft to attack two other Iranian bases.

* It isn't clear that the U.S. has non-nuclear strike capabilities sufficient to truly destroy Iran's most secure nuclear program resources in its deepest bunker sufficiently to set its nuclear program back all that far.

* Before attacking Iran, the U.S. threatened it and evacuated personnel and ships from a U.S. naval base in Bahrain, and moved more carrier groups into the region.

* Iran counterattacked Israel and a U.S. military base in Qatar. Interceptor missiles apparently stopped all of the strikes on Qatar, and 80%-90% of the strikes on Israel, although this was not entirely successful and there was Israeli casualties. These defenses may not be sustainable, since Israel is running very low on key missile defense interceptor missiles that are part of its "Iron Dome" anti-missile and anti-drone defenses. But Iran's supply of effect long range missiles and armed drones and strike aircraft that can reach Israel is also not unlimited, and it has no quick source from which it can resupply itself (and Russia does not appear to want to get involved in this fight).

* Iran has been a major supplier of armed drones to Russia for it use in the Ukraine War.

* Iran has regularly interfered with shipping in the Persian Gulf and has a fairly impressive naval made up mostly of submarines and small missile boats, although it is building a drone carrier and has shipping container ballistic missiles as well.

* Many decades of sanctions have caused Iran to develop its own military industrial complex.

* Iran's government is officially under the supervision of a Shi'ite Islamic theocratic supreme leader since the Islamic revolution in 1979. But it has a democratic secular elected government, screened to remove candidates contrary to the regime or contrary to Shi'ite Islam, that has gradually been growing more powerful and more moderate. In part, this is because its economy is at least as dependent upon a diversified mercantile class as it is upon oil and gas exploitation (which is about 20% of its GDP) and agriculture.

* Iran is religiously diverse despite being a theocracy. It is home to many minority religions, that are tolerated, and its people are less religious in their daily lives and more secular leaning, than most countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and many other places in the Islamic world (like Pakistan and Afghanistan). Devout Shi'ite Muslims make up only a plurality of the population (about a third of the population) at most.


* Iran, not having the luxury of abundant oil wealth shared by a small population of citizens with real work done by temporary foreign laborers, like the Arab oil monarchies, has a substantial grass roots movement that wants fewer restrictions on women, more modernity, an identity that embraces its historical Persian roots rather than an exclusively Shi'ite Islamic national identity, more political freedom, and more freedom of speech. This said, there is wide grass roots opposition to and hate of Israel and the United States in Iran. In general, Shi'ite Muslims have been less backwards than Sunni Muslims in the Middle East. Iranians, and in particular, Iranian women, are also better educated than many Middle Eastern countries.

* But for its attacks and proxy attacks on Israel, its direct and indirect attacks on Persian Gulf and Red Sea commerce, its nuclear program, its military support for Russia, the sensible thing to do would be to allow Iran to percolate with its own internal conflicts and political developments without foreign interference. This would probably have led to considerable moderation and maybe even disestablishmentarianism, either politically or through a counterrevolution, sometime in the next five to twenty years. But, its violent foreign policy has made intervention more urgent.

* Israel was basically already at war with Iran and was entirely reasonable in taking action to prevent Iran from obtaining military capabilities that would be used to obliterate it.

* On the merits, U.S. military support for Israel in its strikes on Iran's nuclear capabilities was not unreasonable.

* The U.S. has, without really intending to do so, defanged Iran's main potential military opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan, through invasions of those countries, freeing up Iran's military resources to take on Israel and to interfere with Persian Gulf trade and to become an arms supplier to Russia.

* Neither the Israeli strikes nor the U.S. strikes appear to have done all that much to degrade Iran's air defenses, its air forces, its drone forces, its long range missile capabilities, its Persian Gulf navy, its anti-ship missiles, or the military industrial complex it uses to supply itself, Russia, the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah. But, if the U.S. and Israel are going to be attacking Iran anyway, those seem like sensible additional targets.

* A sustained ground invasion of Iran makes no military sense. There is no likely scenario in which the U.S. sends hundreds of thousand of U.S. group troops to Iran, possibly as part of a multi-national coalition like those in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or needs to new military draft. This a a conflict involving strikes with aircraft, missiles, and drones, and defenses against counterattacks by similar means and at sea, and in terror attacks (most likely not primarily on U.S. soil, and more like the U.S.S. Cole attack by al Qaeda on October 12, 2000 in Yemen, and Shi'ite militia attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Jordan in the waning days of the Syrian civil war).

* It isn't at all obvious that regime change can be achieved in Iran without a ground invasion, or that killing key political and theocratic leaders in Iran would result in much of a change in Iranian policies. Indeed, attacks by Israel and the U.S. on Iran probably strengthen the regime against these common enemies in the short run. Iran has plenty of adequate potential successors to its current leaders who wouldn't seem much different in their policies towards Israel, the U.S., and maritime commerce.

* A claimed U.S. brokered cease fire hasn't really held at all, for even t twenty-four hours.

* The Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear program wouldn't have been necessary if Trump hadn't ended an Obama negotiated deal with Iran related to its nuclear program in 2018.

* Both Israel's leadership and the U.S. leadership have reasons to divert attention from domestic affairs to this conflict. It does have a genuine solid military motive, but the timing may very well be politically motivated.

* It isn't clear that President Trump had the legal authority to strike Iran in support of Israel without Congressional authorization which was not sought or obtained. This strike is not within the scope of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), or any of the authorizations made in connection with the Iraq War.

* The MAGA right is divided on the desirability of this strike and it isn't clear that Trump could have promptly secured backing from Congress to make the strike if he'd asked it to do so.

* While a military strike directly on Iran from the U.S. no doubt does increase the likelihood of retaliation on the U.S. from Iran, the notion that we should be suspicious of Iranian-Americans, many of whom are medical professionals working in rural America, is very doubtful. There are probably not lots of Iranian "sleeper cells" in the U.S. who want to commit terrorist acts in the U.S.

* Political protests against Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is long standing on the American left, and has legitimate justification, particularly given an Israeli military response in Gaza to the October 7 attacks that, while understandable, particularly because Hamas continues to hold Israeli hostages and refused to surrender, has been overkill. Notably, however, the October 7 attacks had widespread support in Gaza long after the blowback it suffered from them became clear. The U.S. opposition to Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is predominantly not anti-Semitic, and isn't even predominantly anti-Zionist. It is mostly a very general pro-human rights driven movement.

* The Israeli response to October 7 in Gaza has been so completely destroyed that the enclave that it can support only perhaps a third or a half as many people as it had before the attacks (see also here). While there have been tens of thousands of Gazan deaths so far there, the clock is ticking and there will soon be either many hundreds of thousands to millions of Gazan deaths from starvation, lack of water, and illness, or a mass exile of people who are currently in Gaza, which no Islamic countries are volunteering to sponsor.