The Ukraine War After Almost Three Years

An Overview Three Years Later

In three years of war, Ukraine and Russia have both had immense casualties (as have the North Korean soldiers deployed with Russian forces), and have lost immense amounts of military equipment.

Ukraine is able to obtain replacements for its military equipment losses from the U.S. and Europe. Russia has a very limited capacity to replace its military equipment and is able to buy additional military equipment primarily only from North Korea (whose equipment is of poor quality) and Iran (which has primarily supplied it with military drones).

Estimates of what military equipment resources Russia and Ukraine, respectively, have to use right now are hard to come by (previous posts at this blog have tried to estimate this for Russia). Russia has so far been able to largely replace its casualties with new recruits and conscripts, but the expertise of the huge swath of its officer corps and experienced career soldier veterans which it has lost are much harder to replace than warm bodies with minimal military training.

But it is fair to say that Russia's resources to fight conventional ground warfare have been greatly reduced by the Ukraine War, while NATO countries have simultaneously increased their capacity to wage war with Russia in response to the Ukraine War (and NATO has also expanded to add new members as a result). And, this ignores the extent to which Russian military secrets about its tactics and readiness have made it easier for its opponents to figure out how best to counter its military and has allowed them to more realistically assess how its forces on paper translate into actual military capabilities.

Russia has lost more troops and military equipment than many countries in the world have at all. Russia inherited the Soviet Navy, but at a fraction of the USSR's population, struggles to maintain and operate it.

Russia's economy more generally is also starting to struggle, as 57% of its sovereign wealth fund has been used up, its fiscal deficit has increased thirteen-fold, its cutting pay for soldiers, its inflation rate has leapt to 24% (with key food items like butter and potatoes surging 30% and 56%, year to year, respectively), consumer loans are almost impossible to get (95% of applications are rejected) and business loans are much harder to get because interest rates are being artificially capped at 21%, 700,000 to 900,000 economically mobile Russians have moved abroad since the war started, this and diversion of people from the work force to the military, and mass deportations of foreigners in response to terrorist attacks, have created shortages of workers, and sanctions have slowly but effectively taken a toll on it. Russia's fossil fuel sales have taken a hit as well.

For the most part, the Trump Administration has been intent upon pulling the rug out from under Ukraine and doing what Russia wants, but in one surprising deviation from that policy, it has floated the idea of providing Ukraine with nuclear weapons.

Russia continues to make some territorial gains, but is going so slowly and at an immense cost in soldiers, equipment, and money.

So far, Russia has used the excuse of the war to crack down on internal dissent and shut off foreign influences. It has been largely successful in doing so, apart from one mutiny by Russia's mercenaries which was quickly abandoned.

Military Casualties in the Ukraine War

"In a rare public estimate, President Volodymyr Zelensky told US news outlet NBC over the weekend that more than 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and some 380,000 wounded. But independent Ukrainian war correspondent Yuri Butusov said in December 2024 that his army sources estimated some 70,000 dead and 35,000 missing. Several Western media, citing European and US sources, have reported numbers that hugely vary -- with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 Ukrainians killed in combat."

From France24. 

"The Russian army has lost almost 250,000 soldiers in the war against Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Feb. 15 during his speech at the Munich Security Conference. . . . In addition, a total of over 610,000 Russian troops have been wounded since Feb. 24, 2022, according to the president. . . . 

Up to 12,000 North Korean troops were deployed to Kursk Oblast last fall to support Russian forces in countering a Ukrainian incursion launched in early August 2024. Zelensky previously said that North Korean troops fighting for Russia against Ukraine have suffered 4,000 casualties, two-thirds of whom have been killed. The heavy losses of the North Korean army may be related to its lack of combat experience and the tactic of human waves attacks with a limited amount of equipment[.]"

From the Kyiv Independent.  

Russian Military Equipment Losses

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported in early February 2025 that Russia has lost (presumably damaged or destroyed) almost 10,000 tanks since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems in 2024 alone. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 1,400 Russian main battle tanks and over 3,700 Russian IFVs and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in 2024. (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from the Ukrainian General Staff as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Dutch open-source project Oryx, which uses photo or video evidence to verify Russian equipment losses, confirmed that Russia has lost at least 3,740 tanks, 5,459 IFVs, 615 APCs, 446 towed artillery systems, and 880 self-propelled artillery systems since February 2022 as of the time of this writing.

From an Institute for the Study of War report, dated February 19, 2025.  

Replacing Russian casualties and resupplying Russian military equipment

Russia is replacing its military casualties at a roughly one to one rate with new green recruits, and North Korean forces have barely made a dent in that issue. 

Russia's efforts to replenish its military equipment are in even worse shape, and are forcing it to dig deep into Soviet boneyards for inferior older models that are hard to refurbish and will be exhausted in a year or two. Russia is burning through artillery and tank shells as fast as it can make them. 

North Korea is supplying Russia with military equipment, but its products are inferior. Iran is mostly limiting itself to selling Russia drones. China is refusing to sell Russia military equipment.

Russia's current reported monthly recruitment rate is either just equal to or just below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one. Former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reported in October 2024 that Russian forces were suffering roughly 1,200 casualties per day. UK Defense Secretary John Healey stated in November 2024 that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,345 troops per day in October 2024. Russia's casualty rate increased in late 2024 as Russian forces made gradual, creeping advances in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that December 2024 saw a record-high Russian loss rate with 48,670 casualties, even though Russian advances slowed in December 2024 compared to September through November 2024. Syrskyi reported in January 2025 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024. Similarly high casualty rates have continued into 2025, with Russia reportedly suffering 48,240 casualties in January 2025. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD in 2024 — about 36,600 new recruits per month. . . . The roughly 12,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast would offset nine to 12 days of theater-wide Russian losses at current rates.

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Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term. Russia is reportedly able to produce about 200 IFVs per year — far below even the more conservative figures for Russia's IFV losses in 2024. Russia is reportedly able to produce about 50 artillery gun barrels per year but is unable to quickly scale up this production as Russia currently only has two factories that are equipped with the specialized machines used to produce gun barrels. Russia has one factory producing new tanks — Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil. Estimates vary widely for the factory's production rates, ranging from about 20 tanks per month to just 60 to 90 per year. Uralvagonzavod can also reportedly refurbish about eight tanks per month, while three other repair plants can reportedly refurbish about 17 tanks per month each. Еven Uralvagonzavod's higher new production estimates plus Russia's reported refurbishment rates leave the Russian DIB unable to replace Russia's continued high tank losses.

Russia has maintained its offensives by tapping its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles and artillery systems to compensate for these high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability. IISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of IISS's estimated tank losses and three quarters of IISS's assessed Russian armored vehicle losses in 2024. Other open-source assessments of Russian military depots using satellite imagery find that Russia retains 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves in storage as of December 2, 2024. Some analysts forecast that Russia will run out of its Soviet-era equipment stockpiles by the end of 2025 or in 2026. IISS also notably assessed that Russia may be suffering from a shortage of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. Significant portions of Russia’s Soviet-era tanks and armored vehicles remaining in long-term stores are likely the remains of cannibalized or unsalvageable hulls in deteriorated condition that cannot be used to offset the high equipment losses Russian could face in 2025 and beyond.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent months, likely in part due to heavy losses and the need to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances. Ukrainian military officials have reported in recent months that Russian forces are fielding fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — the two operational directions with the highest intensity of fighting and where Russia has the densest concentrations of its forces — in favor of highly attritional, infantry-led assaults. IISS noted in February 2025 that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.

Russia's DIB may not be able to produce or procure enough artillery ammunition to support the current rate of Russian offensive operations in the medium- to long-term. Russia cannot produce sufficient shells to meet its current operational needs despite the fact that Russia has increased its artillery production since the start of its full-scale invasion. CNN reported in March 2024 that NATO intelligence estimated that the Russian DIB was producing about 250,000 artillery shells per month. The Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) and Open Source Center reported in October 2024 that Russian forces' rate of fire since June 2022 has been "fairly consistent" between 7,000 and 16,000 rounds per day, with an average of about 10,000 per day or about 300,000 per month — just over Russia's average production rate. Russia’s previous 5:1 artillery advantage ratio over Ukraine has been reduced to 1.5:1 as of December 2024 and will likely continue to decrease provided current trends continue.

Russia has had to lean on allies and partners to satisfy Russia’s materiel requirements. Up to 60 percent of the artillery and mortar shells that Russian forces have been firing as of December 2024 have reportedly come from North Korea, which reportedly sent Russia as many as nine million shells — indicating that the Russian DIB was unable to sustain the required level of supplies on its own. It remains unclear if North Korean and other foreign provisions will be able to compensate for the Russian DIB's inadequacies indefinitely. North Korea reportedly increased its domestic production of 152mm shells in 2024, but the North Korean shells that Russian forces are currently firing are reportedly of a low quality, with about half of them proving to be duds.

Iran has supplied Russia with weapons, particularly Shahed drones, as Russian-Iranian relations have intensified since Russia's full-scale invasion. However, it is unclear if Iran would be willing or able to significantly increase its materiel supplies to Russia. The January 2025 Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement lacked a mutual defense clause, and Iranian officials noted at the time that the agreement is "not a military alliance" and differs from Russia's agreements with North Korea and Belarus — suggesting that Iran is unwilling to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine at a higher level on par with North Korea or Belarus. Iran also lacks the stockpiles or defense industrial capacity to provide Russia with much needed tanks, IFVs, APCs, artillery systems, or ammunition.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has larger materiel stocks and could provide Russia with vehicles, artillery systems, and ammunition, but has so far refused to engage in such direct support. The PRC will likely continue to refuse to do so out of fear of triggering economic sanctions or decoupling from the West.

From an Institute for the Study of War report, dated February 19, 2025.